OCTOBER TERM, 1992
Syllabus
NEGONSOTT
v. SAMUELS, WARDEN, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH
CIRCUIT
No. 91-5397. Argued January 11, 1993-Decided February
24,1993
Petitioner Negonsott, a member of the Kickapoo Tribe and a
resident of the Kickapoo Reservation in Kansas, was convicted by a
County District Court jury of aggravated battery for shooting
another Indian on the reservation. The court set aside the
conviction on the ground that the Federal Government had exclusive
jurisdiction to prosecute Negonsott for the shooting under the
Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1153, which encompasses 13
enumerated felonies committed by "[a]ny Indian ... against the
person or property of another Indian or other person ... within the
Indian country." However, the State Supreme Court reinstated the
conviction, holding that the Kansas Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3243,
conferred on Kansas jurisdiction to prosecute all crimes committed
by or against Indians on Indian reservations in the State.
Subsequently, the Federal District Court dismissed Negonsott's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held: The Kansas Act explicitly confers jurisdiction on
Kansas over all offenses involving Indians on Indian reservations.
Congress has plenary authority to alter the otherwise exclusive
nature of federal jurisdiction under § 1153. Standing alone, the
Kansas Act's first sentencewhich confers jurisdiction on Kansas
over "offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian
reservations ... to the same extent as its courts have jurisdiction
over offenses committed elsewhere within the State in accordance
with the laws of the State"-is an unambiguous grant of jurisdiction
over both major and minor offenses. And the most logical meaning of
the Act's second sentence-which provides that nothing in the Act
shall "deprive" federal courts of their "jurisdiction over offenses
defined by the laws of the United States"-is that federal courts
shall retain their jurisdiction to try all offenses subject to
federal jurisdiction, while Kansas courts shall have jurisdiction
to try persons for the same conduct when it violates state law.
This is the only reading of the Kansas Act that gives effect to
every clause and word of the statute, and it is supported by the
Act's legislative history. In contrast, if this Court were to
accept Negonsott's argument that the second sentence renders
federal jurisdiction exclusive whenever the underlying conduct is
punishable under federal law, Kansas would be left with
jurisdiction over only those minor offenses committed by one Indian
against
100
the person or property of another, a result that can hardly be
reconciled with the first sentence's unqualified grant of
jurisdiction. There is no need to resort to the canon of statutory
construction that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of
Indians, since the Kansas Act quite unambiguously confers
jurisdiction on the State. pp. 102-110.
933 F.2d
818, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ.,
joined, and in all but Part II-B of which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ.,
joined.
Pamela S.
Thompson argued the cause and filed a
brief for petitioner.
Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, argued the
cause for respondents. With him on the brief were
John W
Campbell, Deputy Attorney General, and
Timothy G.
Madden, Special Assistant Attorney General.
William K. Kelley argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General O'Meara,
Edwin S. Kneedler, and Edward J. Shawaker. *
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.t
The question presented in this case is whether the Kansas Act,
18 U. S. C. § 3243, confers jurisdiction on the State of Kansas to
prosecute petitioner, a Kickapoo Indian, for the state-law offense
of aggravated battery committed against another Indian on an Indian
reservation. We hold that it does.
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe of the Fort Totten Indian Reservation
et al. by
Bertram E. Hirsch; and for the Iowa Tribe of
Kansas and Nebraska et al. by
Melody
tJUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join all but Part II-B of
this opinion.
101
I
Petitioner, Emery L. Negonsott, is a member of the Kickapoo
Tribe and a resident of the Kickapoo Reservation in Brown County,
Kansas. In March 1985, he was arrested by the county sheriff in
connection with the shooting of another Indian on the Kickapoo
Reservation. After a jury trial in the Brown County District Court,
petitioner was found guilty of aggravated battery. Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 21-3414 (1988). The District Court set the conviction aside,
however, on the ground that the Federal Government had exclusive
jurisdiction to prosecute petitioner for the shooting under the
Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1153. The Kansas Supreme
Court reinstated petitioner's conviction, holding that the Kansas
Act conferred jurisdiction on Kansas to prosecute "all crimes
committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations located in
Kansas."
State v.
Nioce, 239 Kan. 127, 131, 716 P. 2d
585, 588 (1986). On remand, the Brown County District Court
sentenced petitioner to imprisonment for a term of 3 to 10
years.
Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U. S. C. § 2254, reasserting his claim that Kansas lacked
jurisdiction to prosecute him for aggravated battery. The District
Court dismissed his petition, 696 F. Supp. 561 (Kan. 1988), and the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed,
933 F.2d
818 (1991). The Court of Appeals found the language of the
Kansas Act ambiguous as to "whether Congress intended to grant
Kansas courts concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over the
crimes enumerated in the [Indian] Major Crimes Act, or whether by
the second sentence of the Kansas Act Congress intended to retain
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts over those specific
crimes."
Id., at 820-821. After examining the Act's
legislative history, however, the Court of Appeals resolved this
ambiguity in favor of the first construction, and held that Kansas
had jurisdiction to prosecute petitioner for aggra-
102
vated battery.
Id., at 821-823. We granted certiorari to
resolve a conflict between the Courts of Appeals, 505 U. S. 1218
(1992),1 and now affirm.
II
Criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed in "Indian
country," 18 U. S. C. § 1151, "is governed by a complex patchwork
of federal, state, and tribal law."
Duro v.
Reina,
495 U. S. 676,
680, n. 1 (1990). The Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U. S. C. §
1152, extends the general criminal laws of federal maritime and
enclave jurisdiction to Indian country, except for those "offenses
committed by one Indian against the person or property of another
Indian." See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 288 (1982
ed.). These latter offenses typically are subject to the
jurisdiction of the concerned Indian tribe, unless they are among
those enumerated in the Indian Major Crimes Act. Originally enacted
in 1885, the Indian Major Crimes Act establishes federal
jurisdiction over 13 enumerated felonies committed by "[a]ny Indian
... against the person or property of another Indian or other
person ... within the Indian country." § 1153(a).2 As
1 See
Youngbear v.
Brewer, 415 F. Supp. 807 (ND
Iowa 1976), aff'd,
549 F.2d
74 (CA8 1977). In
Youngbear, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit upheld a lower court ruling that the State
of Iowa lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the Indian defendant under
a similarly worded statute conferring jurisdiction on Iowa over
offenses committed by or against Indians on certain Indian
reservations within the State, see Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759,
62 Stat. 1161, for conduct punishable as an offense enumerated in
the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1153.
2 The Indian Major Crimes Act provides in full:
"(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of
another Indian or other person any of the following offenses,
namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, maiming, a felony under
chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault
with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily
injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of
this title within the Indian country, shall be subject
103
the text of § 1153, see n. 2,
supra, and our prior cases
make clear, federal jurisdiction over the offenses covered by the
Indian Major Crimes Act is "exclusive" of state jurisdiction. See
United States v.
John, 437 U. S. 634, 651
(1978);
Seymour v.
Superintendent of Washington State
Penitentiary, 368 U. S. 351, 359 (1962);
United States
v.
Kagama, 118
U. S. 375, 384 (1886).
Congress has plenary authority to alter these jurisdictional
guideposts, see
Washington v.
Confederated Bands and
Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 470-471
(1979), which it has exercised from time to time. This case
concerns the first major grant of jurisdiction to a State over
offenses involving Indians committed in Indian country, the Kansas
Act, which provides in full:
"Jurisdiction is conferred on the State of Kansas over offenses
committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations, including
trust or restricted allotments, within the State of Kansas, to the
same extent as its courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed
elsewhere within the State in accordance with the laws of the
State.
"This section shall not deprive the courts of the United States
of jurisdiction over offenses defined by the laws of the United
States committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations." Act
of June 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (codified at 18 U. S. C. §
3243).
Passed in 1940, the Kansas Act was followed in short order by
virtually identical statutes granting to North Dakota and Iowa,
respectively, jurisdiction to prosecute offenses com-
to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing
any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States.
"(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section
that is not defined and punished by Federal law in force within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and
punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such
offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense."
18 U. S. C. § 1153.
104
mitted by or against Indians on certain Indian reservations
within their borders. See Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat.
229; Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161.
Kansas asserted jurisdiction to prosecute petitioner for
aggravated battery under the Kansas Act. Petitioner challenges the
State's jurisdiction in this regard. He contends that Congress
added the second sentence of the Kansas Act to preserve the
"exclusive" character of federal jurisdiction over the offenses
enumerated in the Indian Major Crimes Act, and since the conduct
resulting in his conviction for aggravated battery is punishable as
at least two offenses listed in the Indian Major Crimes Act,3
Kansas lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him in connection with the
shooting incident. According to petitioner, the Kansas Act was
intended to confer jurisdiction on Kansas only over misdemeanor
offenses involving Indians on Indian reservations. To construe the
statute otherwise, petitioner asserts, would effect an "implied
repeal" of the Indian Major Crimes Act. Moreover, petitioner
continues, the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals below
is at odds with the legislative history of the Kansas Act as well
as the canon that statutes are to be liberally construed in favor
of Indians.
A
"Our task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where
its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."
Griffin
v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 570 (1982)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In analyzing petitioner's
contentions, then, we begin with the text of the Kansas
3 The Indian Major Crimes Act does not explicitly refer to the
offense of aggravated battery, but it lists "assault with a
dangerous weapon" and "assault resulting in serious bodily injury."
18 U. S. C. § 1153(a). These offenses are defined at 18 U. S. C. §§
113(c) and (f). We assume, for the sake of deciding this case, that
the state-law offense for which petitioner was convicted, Kan.
Stat. Ann. §21-3414 (1988), is comparable to one or both of these
federal offenses.
105
Act itself. The first sentence confers jurisdiction on "Kansas
over offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian
reservations ... to the same extent as its courts have jurisdiction
over offenses committed elsewhere within the State in accordance
with the laws of the State." § 3243. Standing alone, this sentence
unambiguously confers jurisdiction on Kansas to prosecute all
offenses-major and minor-committed by or against Indians on Indian
reservations in accordance with state law. Petitioner does not
assert otherwise. Instead, he rests his case on the second sentence
of the Kansas Act, which states that nothing in the Act shall
"deprive" federal courts of their "jurisdiction over offenses
defined by the laws of the United States."
Ibid. But the
most logical meaning of this proviso, we believe, is that federal
courts shall retain their jurisdiction to try all offenses subject
to federal jurisdiction under 18 U. S. C. §§ 1152 and 1153, while
Kansas courts shall have jurisdiction to try persons for the same
conduct when it violates state law.
This interpretation is quite consistent with the first
sentence's conferral of jurisdiction on Kansas over all offenses
committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations in
accordance with state law. The Court of Appeals referred to this
state of affairs in terms of Kansas courts having "concurrent
jurisdiction" with federal courts over the offenses enumerated in
the Indian Major Crimes Act. See 933 F. 2d, at 820-821. But the
Kansas Act does not confer jurisdiction on Kansas to prosecute
individuals for the federal offenses listed in the Indian Major
Crimes Act; it confers jurisdiction to prosecute individuals in
accordance with state law for conduct that is also punishable under
federal law pursuant to the Indian Major Crimes Act. Strictly
speaking, then, federal courts retain their exclusive jurisdiction
to try individuals for offenses covered by the Indian Major Crimes
Act, and in this sense, the Kansas Act in fact confers only
concurrent "legislative" jurisdiction on the State to define and
prosecute similar offenses.
106
Our reading of the Kansas Act is the only one that gives effect
"to every clause and word of [the] statute."
Moskal v.
United States, 498 U. S. 103, 109-110
(1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner's
construction of the Act's second sentence renders federal
jurisdiction exclusive whenever the underlying conduct is
punishable under federal law pursuant to either 18 U. S. C. §§ 1152
or 1153. Kansas is left, then, with jurisdiction over only those
minor offenses committed by one Indian against the person or
property of another. This result can hardly be reconciled with the
first sentence's unqualified grant of jurisdiction to Kansas to
prosecute all state-law offenses committed by or against Indians on
Indian reservations. Moreover, contrary to the assertion of
petitioner, our construction of the Kansas Act does not work an
"implied repeal" of the Indian Major Crimes Act. As we have noted,
federal courts retain their exclusive jurisdiction to try
individuals for major federal crimes committed by or against
Indians in Indian country. In any event, to the extent that the
Kansas Act altered the jurisdictional landscape, the alteration is
not merely by implication: The Act explicitly conferred
jurisdiction on Kansas over all offenses involving Indians on
Indian reservations.
B
Although we think resort to secondary materials is unnecessary
to decide this case, the legislative history of the Kansas Act
supports our construction. Both the House and Senate Reports
accompanying the Act consist almost entirely of a letter and
memorandum from Acting Secretary of the Interior, E. K. Burlew, to
the Chairmen of the House and Senate Indian Affairs Committees,
which provide a background account of the forces leading to the
enactment of the Kansas Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 1999, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1940) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.); S. Rep. No. 1523, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) (hereinafter S. Rep.). According to Acting
Secretary Burlew, in practice, Kansas had exercised jurisdiction
over all offenses committed on Indian reservations involving
107
Indians, "even where the criminal act charged constituted one of
the major offenses listed in [the Indian Major Crimes Act],"
because such offenses were otherwise left unenforced by the
concerned tribes (who were without tribal courts). H. R. Rep., at
4; S. Rep., at 3. The Indian tribes of Kansas did not object to
this scheme, but welcomed it. When the authority of the Kansas
courts to entertain such prosecutions was called into question, the
tribes "expressed a wish that the jurisdiction hitherto exercised
by the State courts be continued." H. R. Rep., at 4; S. Rep., at 4.
Thus, the Kansas Act was designed to "merely confirm a relationship
which the State has willingly assumed, which the Indians have
willingly accepted, and which has produced successful results, over
a considerable period of years." H. R. Rep., at 5; S. Rep., at
5.4
Since Kansas had exercised jurisdiction over offenses covered by
the Indian Major Crimes Act, and the Kansas Act was enacted to
ratify the existing scheme of
de facto state jurisdiction
over all offenses committed on Indian reservations, it follows that
Congress did not intend to retain exclusive federal jurisdiction
over the prosecution of major crimes. In view of the experimental
nature of the Kansas Act, Congress simply intended to retain
jurisdiction over
4
Amici Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska et al. allege
that at least one tribe, the Potawatomi Indian Tribe, opposed the
Kansas Act. Brief for Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska et al. as
Amici Curiae 17. According to
amici, the Tribe sent a
telegram to the Chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs,
Representative W. Rogers, voicing its opposition to the Act, which
was followed by an exchange of several letters. See id., at 17-18.
This correspondence is not contained in the reprinted legislative
history of the Act, but instead rests in the National Archives.
Although one of Chairman Rogers' letters to the Tribe states:
"'Your letters are being filed with the House Committee on Indian
Affairs,'" id., at 17 (quoting letter of May 10, 1939), we have no
way of knowing to what extent, if at all, the Tribe's opposition to
the Kansas Act was brought to the attention of other Members of
Congress. Therefore, we regard the background account set forth in
the House and Senate Reports as conclusive for purposes of
discerning Congress' understanding of the forces leading to the
introduction of the bill which became the Kansas Act.
108
offenses already subject to federal jurisdiction under 18 U. S.
C. §§ 1152 and 1153 in the event that the Kansas Act did not solve
the identified enforcement problem (i.
e., in case the State
declined to exercise its jurisdiction). This explanation squares
with Acting Secretary Burlew's conclusion that, although the Kansas
Act's "proposed relinquishment of jurisdiction to the State of
Kansas appropriately extends to those offenses which are provided
for in existing Federal statutes as well as those which are not,"
"[t]he prosecution in the Federal courts of those offenses which
are now open to such prosecution will not be precluded under the
bill in any particular instance where this course may be deemed
advisable." H. R. Rep., at 5; S. Rep., at 4.
Petitioner argues that Congress' amendments to the original
version of the bill which became the Kansas Act confirm that it did
not intend to confer jurisdiction on Kansas over conduct covered by
the Indian Major Crimes Act. As originally drafted, the bill
provided "[t]hat concurrent jurisdiction is hereby relinquished to
the State of Kansas to prosecute Indians and others for offenses by
or against Indians or others, committed on Indian reservations in
Kansas," and explicitly stated that the Indian Major Crimes Act as
well as other statutes granting federal jurisdiction over offenses
committed in Indian country "are modified accordingly." 86 Congo
Rec. 5596 (1940). Congress eventually deleted the original bill's
reference to
"concurrent jurisdiction" as well as its
reference to the effect of the bill on the Indian Major Crimes Act.
Rather than supporting petitioner's construction of the Kansas Act,
however, we think these amendments are in accord with our reading
of the statute.
The amendments to the original bill were proposed by Acting
Secretary Burlew in his letter and memorandum to the committee
chairmen in order to reflect more accurately the "legal situation
as it now exists or as intended to be created." H. R. Rep., at 3;
S. Rep., at 2. He explained:
109
"The bill proposes to relinquish concurrent jurisdiction to the
State of Kansas, intending thereby to give the State jurisdiction
of all types of crimes, whether major or minor, defined by State
law. However, the Federal Government has exercised jurisdiction
only over major crimes. Therefore, strictly speaking, this is not a
case of relinquishing to a State a jurisdiction concurrent with
that of the United States, but a case of conferring upon the State
complete criminal jurisdiction, retaining, however, jurisdiction in
the Federal courts to prosecute crimes by or against Indians
defined by Federal law." Ibid.
Thus, the original bill was amended to make clear that the
statute conferred jurisdiction on Kansas over more offenses than
were subject to federal jurisdiction under existing federal law,
and not, as petitioner suggests, to narrow the category of offenses
subject to prosecution in state court to minor offenses excluded
from federal jurisdiction under 18 U. S. C. § 1152.
There is no explanation in the legislative history why Congress
deleted the original bill's reference to the effect of the statute
on the Indian Major Crimes Act and adopted the general language of
the second sentence of § 3243 in its place. But we think it is
likely that Congress simply thought it preferable to refer
generally to the fact that the Act did not "deprive" federal courts
of their jurisdiction over offenses defined by federal law, rather
than to list the specific statutes pursuant to which the Federal
Government had exercised jurisdiction to prosecute offenses
committed by or against Indians in Indian country. In any event, to
the extent one may draw a negative inference from Congress'
decision to delete the specific reference to the effect of the
Kansas Act on the Indian Major Crimes Act, we think this is too
slender a reed upon which to rest departure from the clear import
of the text of the Kansas Act.
110
C
Finally, we find petitioner's resort to general principles of
Indian law unavailing. Petitioner cites our opinion in
Bryan
v.
Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373 (1976), for
the proposition that "laws must be liberally construed to favor
Indians." Brief for Petitioner 11. What we actually said in
Bryan, was that "'statutes passed for the benefit of
dependent Indian tribes ... are to be liberally construed, doubtful
expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.'" 426 U. S., at
392 (quoting
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v.
United
States, 248 U. S.
78, 89 (1918)). Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals'
construction of the Kansas Act harms Indians by eliminating the
historically exclusive stewardship of the Federal Government over
major crimes committed by Indians in Indian country, and subjecting
Indians to the possibility of dual prosecution by state and federal
authorities.
It is not entirely clear to us that the Kansas Act is a statute
"passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes." But if it does
fall into that category, it seems likely that Congress thought that
the Act's conferral of criminal jurisdiction on the State would be
a "benefit" to the tribes in question. We see no reason to equate
"benefit of dependent Indian tribes," as that language is used in
Bryan, with "benefit of accused Indian criminals," without
regard to the interests of the victims of these crimes or of the
tribe itself. But in any event, for the reasons previously
discussed, we think that the Kansas Act quite unambiguously confers
jurisdiction on the State over major offenses committed by or
against Indians on Indian reservations, and we therefore have no
occasion to resort to this canon of statutory construction. See
South Carolina v.
Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc.,
476 U. S. 498,
506 (1986).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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