CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 1994
Syllabus
NEBRASKA
v. WYOMING ET AL.
ON EXCEPTIONS TO REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER No. 108, Orig. Argued
March 21, 1995-Decided May 30,1995
A 1945 decree rationing the North Platte River among users in
Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado enjoins Colorado and Wyoming from
diverting or storing water above prescribed amounts on the river's
upper reaches; sets priorities among Wyoming canals that divert
water for the use of Nebraska irrigators and federal reservoirs;
apportions the natural irrigation-season flows of the river's
so-called "pivotal reach" between Nebraska and Wyoming; and
authorizes any party to apply to amend the decree for further
relief.
Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589. N ebraska
sought such relief in 1986, alleging that Wyoming was threatening
its equitable apportionment, primarily by planning water projects
on tributaries that have historically added significant flows to
the pivotal reach. After this Court overruled the parties'
objections to the Special Master's First and Second Interim
Reports,
Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 507 U. S. 584, Nebraska
and Wyoming sought leave to amend their pleadings. The Master's
Third Interim Report recommended that N ebraska be allowed to
substitute three counts of its Amended Petition and that Wyoming be
allowed to substitute three of its proposed counterclaims and four
of its proposed cross-claims. Wyoming has filed four exceptions to
the Master's recommendations and Nebraska and the United States a
single (and largely overlapping) exception each.
Held: The exceptions are overruled. pp. 8-23.
(a) The requirement of obtaining leave to file a complaint in an
original action serves an important gatekeeping function, and
proposed pleading amendments must be scrutinized closely to see
whether they 1
2
Syllabus
would take the litigation beyond what the Court reasonably
anticipated when granting leave to file the initial pleadings. As
the decree indicates, the litigation here is not restricted solely
to enforcement of rights determined in the prior proceedings.
However, while the parties may ask for a reweighing of equities and
an injunction declaring new rights and responsibilities, they must
make a showing of substantial injury to be entitled to relief. The
Master duly appreciated these conclusions when considering the
proposed amendments to the pleadings. Pp. 8-9.
(b) Wyoming takes exception to the Master's recommendation that
it be denied leave to file its First Amended Counterclaim and
Cross-Claim, which allege that Nebraska and the United States have
failed to recognize beneficial use limitations on diversions of
canals and that Nebraska has violated the equitable apportionment
by demanding natural flow and storage water from sources above
Tri-State Dam for use below the dam. However, by seeking to replace
a proportionate sharing of the pivotal reach's natural flows with a
scheme based on the beneficial use requirement of the pivotal reach
irrigators, presumably to Wyoming's advantage, Wyoming in reality
is calling for a fundamental modification of the scheme established
in 1945, without alleging any change in conditions that would
arguably justify so bold a step. Pp.9-11.
(c) The Master's intention to consider a broad array of
downstream interests and to hear evidence of injury not only to
downstream irrigators, but also to wildlife and wildlife habitat,
when passing on Nebraska's request that the decree be modified to
enjoin Wyoming's proposed developments on the North Platte's
tributaries does not, as Wyoming argues in its exception, run
counter to this Court's denial of two of Nebraska's earlier motions
to amend. Those earlier claims sought to assign an affirmative
obligation to protect wildlife, while, here, the effect on wildlife
is but one equity to be balanced in determining whether the decree
can be modified. Moreover, Nebraska is seeking not broad new
apportionments, but only to have discrete Wyoming developments
enjoined. If its environmental claims are speculative, Nebraska
will not be able to make the necessary showing of substantial
injury. Pp. 11-13.
(d) Nebraska's allegations that Wyoming's actions along the
Horse Creek tributary threaten serious depletion of return flows,
with injury to Nebraska's interests, describe a change in
conditions sufficient, if proven, to warrant the injunctive relief
sought. Thus, Wyoming's exception to the Master's recommendation
that Nebraska be allowed to proceed with its challenge cannot
succeed. Pp. 13-14.
(e) Nebraska's allegation that Wyoming's increased groundwater
pumping threatens substantial depletion of the river's natural flow
also describes a change in conditions posing a threat of
significant injury.
3
In excepting to the Master's recommendation that the claim go
forward, Wyoming asserts that Nebraska's failure to regulate
groundwater pumping within its own borders precludes Nebraska from
seeking pumping limitations in Wyoming. However, Wyoming alleges no
injury to its interests caused by the downstream pumping, and the
effect that any such injury would have on the relief Nebraska is
seeking is a question for trial. Pp. 14-15.
(f) Both the United States and Nebraska take exception to the
recommendation that Wyoming's Fourth Amended Cross-Claim-which
alleges that federal management of reservoirs has contravened state
and federal law as well as contracts governing water supply to
individual users-be allowed to proceed. Although the 1945 decree
did not apportion storage water, a predicate to that decree was
that the United States adhered to beneficial use limitations in
administering storage water contracts. Wyoming's assertion that the
United States no longer does so, and that this change has caused or
permitted significant injury to Wyoming interests, states a serious
claim that ought to go forward. This claim arises from the decree,
and thus cannot be vindicated in district court litigation between
individual contract holders and the United States. Nor is it likely
that this proceeding will be overwhelmed by the intervention of
individual storage contract holders. Since a State is presumed to
speak for its citizens, requests to intervene will be denied absent
a showing, unlikely to be made here, of some compelling interest
not properly represented by the State. Pp. 15-22.
Exceptions overruled.
SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG,
and BREYER, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, II, and III of which
THOMAS, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part,
post, p. 23.
Richard A. Simms, Special Assistant Attorney General of
Nebraska, argued the cause for plaintiff. With him on the briefs
were
Don Stenberg, Attorney General,
Marie C.
Pawol, Assistant Attorney General,
James C.
Brockmann, and
Jay F. Stein.
Dennis C.
Cook, Special Assistant Attorney
General, argued the cause for defendant State of Wyoming. With him
on the briefs were
Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General,
Larry Donovan, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Donald
4
M. Gerstein, Assistant Attorney General, and
Raphael J.
Moses and
James R. Montgomery,
Special Assistant Attorneys General.
Timothy M. Tymkovich,
Solicitor General, argued the cause for defendant State of
Colorado. With him on the brief were
Gale A. Norton,
Attorney General,
Stephen K. Erkenbrack, Chief Deputy
Attorney General, and
Wendy C.
Weiss, First Assistant
Attorney General.
Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United
States.
With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant
Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler,
Andrew F. Walch, and Patricia L. Weiss. *
JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court. Since 1945, a
decree of this Court has rationed the North Platte River among
users in Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado. By petition in 1986,
Nebraska again brought the matter before us, and we appointed a
Special Master to conduct the appropriate proceedings. In his Third
Interim Report on Motions to Amend Pleadings (Sept. 9, 1994)
(hereinafter Third Interim Report), the Master has made
recommendations for rulings on requests for leave to amend filed by
Nebraska and Wyoming. We now have before us the parties' exceptions
to the Master's report, each of which we overrule.
I
The North Platte River is a nonnavigable stream rising in
northern Colorado and flowing through Wyoming into N ebraska, where
it joins with the South Platte to form the Platte River. In 1934,
Nebraska invoked our original jurisdiction under the Constitution,
Art. III, § 2, cl. 2, by suing Wyoming for an equitable
apportionment of the North Platte. The United States had leave to
intervene, Colorado was impleaded as a defendant, and the ensuing
litigation cul-
*Briefs of
amici curiae were filed for the Basin Electric
Power Cooperative by
Edward Weinberg, Richmond F.
Allan,
Michael J.
Hinman, and
Claire Olson; and for the
Platte River Trust by
Abbe David Lowell.
5
minated in the decision and decree in
Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325
U. S. 589 (1945)
(Nebraska I).
We concluded that the doctrine of prior appropriation should
serve as the general "guiding principle" in our allocation of the
North Platte's flows, id., at 618, but resisted an inflexible
application of that doctrine in rendering four principal rulings.
Ibid. First, we enjoined Colorado and Wyoming from diverting
or storing water above prescribed amounts, meant to reflect
existing uses, on the river's upper reaches.
Id., at
621-625, 665-666. Second, we set priorities among Wyoming canals
that divert water for the use of Nebraska irrigators and federal
reservoirs, also in Wyoming, that store water for Wyoming and
Nebraska irrigation districts.
Id., at 625-637, 666-667.
Third, we apportioned the natural irrigation-season flows in a
stretch of river that proved to be the principal focus of the
litigation (the "pivotal reach" of 41 miles between the Guernsey
Dam in Wyoming and the Tri-State Dam in Nebraska), allocating 75
percent of those flows to Nebraska and 25 percent to Wyoming.
Id., at 637-654, 667-669. Finally, we held that any party
could apply for amendment of the decree or for further relief.
Id., at 671 (Decree Paragraph XIII). With the parties'
stipulation, the decree has since been modified once, to account
for the construction of the Glendo Dam and Reservoir.
Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 345 U. S. 981 (1953).
Nebraska returned to this Court in 1986 seeking additional
relief under the decree, alleging that Wyoming was threatening its
equitable apportionment, primarily by planning water projects on
tributaries that have historically added significant flows to the
pivotal reach. We granted Nebraska leave to file its petition, 479
U. S. 1051 (1987), and allowed Wyoming to file a counterclaim, 481
U. S. 1011 (1987).
Soon thereafter, Wyoming made a global motion for summary
judgment, which the Master in his First Interim Report recommended
be denied. See First Interim Report of Special Master, O. T. 1988,
No. 108 Orig. After engaging
6
in discovery, Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, and the United States
all filed further summary judgment motions. In his Second Interim
Report, the Master recommended that we grant the motions of the
United States and Nebraska in part, but that we otherwise deny
summary relief. See Second Interim Report of Special Master on
Motions for Summary Judgment and Renewed Motions for Intervention,
O. T. 1991, No. 108 Orig. We overruled the parties' exceptions.
Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 507 U. S. 584 (1993)
(Nebraska II).
Nebraska and Wyoming then sought leave to amend their pleadings,
and we referred those requests to the Master. The Amended Petition
that Nebraska seeks to file contains four counts. Count I alleges
that Wyoming is depleting the natural flows of the North Platte and
asks for an injunction against constructing storage capacity on the
river's tributaries and "permitting unlimited depletion of
groundwater that is hydrologically connected to the North Platte
River and its tributaries." App. to Third Interim Report D-2 to
D-7. Count II alleges that the United States is operating the
Glendo Reservoir in violation of the decree and seeks an order
holding the United States to the decree.
Id., at D-7 to D-8.
Count III alleges that Wyoming water projects and groundwater
development threaten to deplete the Laramie River's contributions
to the North Platte, and asks the Court to "specify that the
inflows of the Laramie River below Wheatland are a component of the
equitable apportionment of the natural flows in the [pivotal]
reach, 75% to Nebraska and 25% to Wyoming, and [to] enjoin the
State of Wyoming from depleting Nebraska's equitable share of the
Laramie River's contribution to the North Platte River .... "
Id., at D-8 to D-12. Count IV seeks an equitable
apportionment of the North Platte's nonirrigation season flows.
Id., at D-12 to D-16. The Master recommended that we allow
Nebraska to substitute the first three counts of its Amended
Petition for its current petition, but that we deny leave to file
Count 1\1. Neither Nebraska nor the United States has
7
excepted to the Master's recommendation, whereas Wyoming has
filed three exceptions, set out in detail below.
Wyoming proposes to amend its pleading with four counterclaims
and five cross-claims. The First Counterclaim and Cross-Claim
allege that Nebraska and the United States have failed to recognize
beneficial use limitations on diversions by Nebraska canals, and
that Nebraska (with the acquiescence of the United States) has
violated the equitable apportionment by demanding natural flow and
storage water from sources above Tri-State Dam and diverting them
for use below Tri-State Dam. App. to Third Interim Report E-3 to
E-6, E-8 to E-10. Wyoming's Second and Third Counterclaims and
Cross-Claims seek enforcement or modification of Paragraph XVII of
the decree, which deals with the operation of the Glendo Reservoir
and is also the subject of Count II of Nebraska's Amended Petition.
Id., at E-6 to E-7, E-10 to E-l1. By its Fourth Counterclaim
and Fifth Cross-Claim, Wyoming asks the Court to modify the decree
to leave the determination of carriage (or transportation) losses
to state officials under state law.
Id., at E-7 to E-8,
E-12. Finally, Wyoming's Fourth Cross-Claim alleges that the United
States has failed to operate its storage reservoirs in accordance
with federal and state law and its own storage water contracts,
thus upsetting the very basis of the decree's equitable
apportionment.
Id., at E-ll to E-12.
The Master recommended that we allow Wyoming to substitute its
Second through Fourth Counterclaims and its Second through Fifth
Cross-Claims for its current pleadings, but that we deny leave to
file Wyoming's First Counterclaim and Cross-Claim insofar as they
seek to impose a beneficial use limitation on Nebraska's diversions
of natural flow. The United States and Nebraska except to the
recommendation to allow Wyoming to file its Fourth Cross-Claim.
Wyoming excepts to the Master's recommended disposition of its
First Counterclaim and Cross-Claim. In all, then, Wyoming has filed
four exceptions to the Master's recommendations and
8
the United States and Nebraska a single (and largely
overlapping) exception each.
II
We have found that the solicitude for liberal amendment of
pleadings animating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
15(a);
Foman v.
Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 182
(1962), does not suit cases within this Court's original
jurisdiction.
Ohio v.
Kentucky, 410 U. S. 641, 644
(1973); cf. this Court's Rule 17.2. The need for a less complaisant
standard follows from our traditional reluctance to exercise
original jurisdiction in any but the most serious of circumstances,
even where, as in cases between two or more States, our
jurisdiction is exclusive.
Mississippi v.
Louisiana,
506 U. S. 73, 77
(1992) (" 'The model case for invocation of this Court's original
jurisdiction is a dispute between States of such seriousness that
it would amount to
casus belli if the States were fully
sovereign,'" quoting
Texas v.
New Mexico, 462 U. S. 554, 571, n. 18
(1983));
New York v.
New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, 309 (1921)
("Before this court can be moved to exercise its extraordinary
power under the Constitution to control the conduct of one State at
the suit of another, the threatened invasion of rights must be of
serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and
convincing evidence"). Our requirement that leave be obtained
before a complaint may be filed in an original action, see this
Court's Rule 17.3, serves an important gatekeeping function, and
proposed pleading amendments must be scrutinized closely in the
first instance to see whether they would take the litigation beyond
what we reasonably anticipated when we granted leave to file the
initial pleadings. See
Ohio v.
Kentucky, supra, at
644.
Accordingly, an understanding of the scope of this litigation as
envisioned under the initial pleadings is the critical first step
in our consideration of the motions to amend. We have, in fact,
already discussed the breadth of the current litigation at some
length in reviewing the Special Master's First and Second Interim
Reports,
Nebraska II, 507 U. S.,
9
at 590-593, where we concluded that this litigation is not
restricted "solely to enforcement of rights determined in the prior
proceedings," id., at 592. To the contrary, we observed that in
Paragraph XIII of the decree, we had retained jurisdiction "to
modify the decree to answer unresolved questions and to accommodate
'change[s] in conditions'-a phrase sufficiently broad to encompass
not only changes in water supply, ... but also new development that
threatens a party's interests."
Id., at 591, citing
Nebraska I, 325 U. S., at 620. The parties may therefore not
only seek to enforce rights established by the decree, but may also
ask for "a reweighing of equities and an injunction declaring new
rights and responsibilities .... " 507 U. S., at 593. We made it
clear, however, that while "Paragraph XIII perhaps eases a
[party's] burden of establishing, as an initial matter, that a
claim [for modification] is 'of that character and dignity which
makes the controversy a justiciable one under our original
jurisdiction,'"
ibid., quoting
Nebraska I, supra, at
610, the "[party] still must make a showing of substantial injury
to be entitled to relief," 507 U. S., at 593.
We think the Master appreciated these conclusions about the
scope of this litigation when he assessed the proposed amendments
to pleadings to see whether they sought enforcement of the decree
or plausibly alleged a change in conditions sufficient to justify
its modification. See Third Interim Report 33-36. The parties, of
course, do not wholly agree with us, as they indicate by their
exceptions, to which we turn.
III A
Wyoming's First Amended Counterclaim alleges that "Nebraska has
circumvented and violated the equitable apportionment by demanding
natural flow water for diversion by irrigation canals at and above
Tri-State Dam in excess of the beneficial use requirements of the
Nebraska lands entitled to
10
water from those canals under the Decree .... " App. to Third
Interim Report E-4. Wyoming's First Amended Cross-Claim alleges
that the United States "has circumvented and violated the equitable
apportionment, and continues to do so, by operating the federal
reservoirs to deliver natural flow water for diversion by Nebraska
irrigation canals at and above Tri-State Dam in excess of the
beneficial use requirements of the lands entitled to water from
those canals under the Decree .... "
Id., at E-8. The Master
recommended that we deny leave to inject these claims into the
litigation, concluding that Wyoming's object is to transform the
1945 apportionment from a proportionate sharing of the natural
flows in the pivotal reach to a scheme based on the beneficial use
requirements of the pivotal reach irrigators. Third Interim Report
55-64. Wyoming excepts to the recommendation, claiming that its
amendments do no more than elaborate on the suggestion made in the
counterclaim that we allowed it to file in 1987, that Nebraska
irrigators are wasting water diverted in the pivotal reach. But
there is more to the amendments than that, and we agree with the
Master that Wyoming in reality is calling for a fundamental
modification of the settled apportionment scheme established in
1945, without alleging a change in conditions that would arguably
justify so bold a step.
In
Nebraska II we rejected any notion that our 1945
decision and decree "impose absolute ceilings on diversions by
canals taking in the pivotal reach." 507 U. S., at 602. We found
that although the irrigation requirements of the lands served by
the canals were calculated in the prior proceedings, those
calculations were used to "determin[e] the appropriate
apportionment of the pivotal reach, not to impose a cap on the
canals' total diversions, either individually or cumulatively."
Ibid. This was clearly indicated, we observed, by the fact
that "Paragraph V of the decree, which sets forth the
apportionment, makes no mention of diversion ceilings and expressly
states that Nebraska is free to allocate
11
its share among its canals as it sees fit."
Id., at 603,
citing
Nebraska I, supra, at 667.
These conclusions about our 1945 decision and decree expose the
true nature of Wyoming's amended claims. Simply put, Wyoming seeks
to replace a simple apportionment scheme with one in which
Nebraska's share would be capped at the volume of probable
beneficial use, presumably to Wyoming's advantage. Wyoming thus
seeks nothing less than relitigation of the "main controversy" of
the 1945 litigation, the equitable apportionment of
irrigation-season flows in the North Platte's pivotal reach. See
325 U. S., at 637-638. Under any circumstance, we would be
profoundly reluctant to revisit such a central question supposedly
resolved 50 years ago, and there can be no temptation to do so
here, in the absence of any allegation of a change in conditions
that might warrant reexamining the decree's apportionment scheme.
Wyoming's first exception is overruled.1
B
Counts I and III of Nebraska's Amended Petition would have us
modify the decree to enjoin proposed developments by Wyoming on the
North Platte's tributaries, see App. to Third Interim Report D-4 to
D-6, D-9 to D-ll, on the the-
1 The Master explicitly noted that his recommendation should not
be understood as foreclosing Wyoming from litigating discrete
matters captured within its First Amended Counterclaim and the
First Amended Cross-Claim that do not involve relitigation of the
1945 decision but rather go to the enforcement of the decree. Third
Amended Report 63. Specifically, these matters include Wyoming's
claim that Nebraska has circumvented the decree by calling for
upstream flows for the use of irrigators diverting water below the
Tri-State Dam; Wyoming's claim of waste by pivotal reach irrigators
offered as a defense to Nebraska's objections to Wyoming uses
upstream; and Wyoming's claim that Nebraska canal calls and natural
flow diversions by the United States contravene priorities
established in Paragraph IV of the decree.
Id., at 63-64.
Neither the United States nor Nebraska has objected to the Master's
recommendation in this respect.
12
ory that these will deplete the tributaries' contributions to
the mainstem, and hence upset "the equitable balance of the North
Platte River established in the Decree," id., at D-5, D-10.
Wyoming's second exception takes issue with the Master's stated
intention to consider a broad array of downstream interests in
passing on Nebraska's claims, and to hear evidence of injury not
only to downstream irrigators, but also to wildlife and wildlife
habitat. Third Interim Report 14, 17, 19,26.
Consideration of this evidence, Wyoming argues, would run
counter to our denial of two earlier motions to amend filed by
Nebraska: its 1988 motion, 485 U. S. 931, by which it expressly
sought modification of the decree to make Wyoming and Colorado
share the burden of providing instream flows necessary to preserve
critical wildlife habitat, and its 1991 motion, see 507 U. S. 1049
(1993), in which it sought an apportionment of nonirrigation-season
flows. Wyoming also suggests that allegations of injury to wildlife
are as yet purely speculative and would be best left to other
forums.
Wyoming's arguments are not persuasive. To assign an affirmative
obligation to protect wildlife is one thing; to consider all
downstream effects of upstream development when assessing threats
to equitable apportionment is quite another. As we have discussed
above,
Nebraska II makes it clear that modification of the
decree (as by enjoining developments on tributaries) will follow
only upon a "balancing of equities," 507 U. S., at 592, and that
Nebraska will have to make a showing of "substantial injury" before
we will grant it such relief, id., at 593. There is no warrant for
placing entire categories of evidence beyond Nebraska's reach when
it attempts to satisfy this burden, which is far from
insignificant.
Nor does our resistance to Nebraska's efforts to bring about
broad new apportionments (as of nonirrigation-season flows) alter
this conclusion. Here, Nebraska seeks only to have us enjoin
discrete Wyoming developments. If Ne-
13
braska is to have a fair opportunity to present its case for our
doing so, we do not understand how we can preclude it from setting
forth that evidence of environmental injury, or consign it to
producing that evidence in some other forum, since this is the only
Court in which Nebraska can challenge the Wyoming projects. And as
for Wyoming's argument that any proof of environmental injury that
Nebraska will present will be highly speculative, the point is
urged prematurely. Purely speculative harms will not, of course,
carry Nebraska's burden of showing substantial injury, but at this
stage we certainly have no basis for judging Nebraska's proof, and
no justification for denying Nebraska the chance to prove what it
can.
C
Wyoming's third exception is to the Master's recommendation to
allow Nebraska to proceed with its challenge to Wyoming's actions
on Horse Creek, a tributary that flows into the North Platte below
the Tri-State Dam. In Count I of its Amended Petition, Nebraska
alleges that Wyoming is "presently violating and threatens to
violate" Nebraska's equitable apportionment "by depleting the
natural flows of the North Platte River by such projects as ...
reregulating reservoirs and canal linings in the ... Horse Creek
Conservancy District." App. to Third Interim Report D-5. Nebraska
asks for an injunction against Wyoming's depletions of the
creek.
Wyoming argues that the claim is simply not germane to this
case, since Horse Creek feeds into the North Platte below the
apportioned reach, the downstream boundary of which is the
Tri-State Dam. It is clear, however, that the territorial scope of
the case extends downstream of the pivotal reach. In the 1945
decision and decree, we held against apportioning that stretch of
river between the Tri-State Dam and Bridgeport, Nebraska, not
because it fell outside the geographic confines of the case, but
because its needed water was "adequately supplied from return flows
and other
14
local sources."
Nebraska I, 325 U. S., at 654-655. In so
concluding, we had evidence that return flows from Horse Creek
provided an average annual contribution of 21,900 acre-feet of
water to the North Platte during the irrigation season. Third
Interim Report 42.
Now Nebraska alleges that Wyoming's actions threaten serious
depletion of these return flows, with consequent injury to its
interests in the region below the Tri-State Dam. These allegations
describe a change in conditions sufficient, if proven, to warrant
the injunctive relief sought, and Nebraska is accordingly entitled
to proceed with its claim. Wyoming's third exception is
overruled.
D
In Counts I and III of its Amended Petition, Nebraska alleges
that increased groundwater pumping within Wyoming threatens
substantial depletion of the natural flow of the river. This
allegation is obviously one of a change in conditions posing a
threat of significant injury, and Wyoming concedes that
"groundwater pumping in Wyoming can and does in fact deplete
surface water flows in the North Platte River," Third Interim
Report 38. In excepting nevertheless to the Master's recommendation
that we allow the claim to go forward, Wyoming raises Nebraska's
failure to regulate groundwater pumping within its own borders,
which is said to preclude Nebraska as a matter of equity from
seeking limitations on pumping within Wyoming.
We fail to see how the mere fact of unregulated pumping within
Nebraska can serve to bar Nebraska's claim. Nebraska is the
downstream State and claims that Wyoming's pumping hurts it;
Wyoming is upstream and has yet to make a showing that Nebraska's
pumping hurts it or anyone else. If Wyoming ultimately makes such a
showing, it could well affect the relief to which Nebraska is
entitled, but that is a question for trial, and does not stop
Nebraska from amending its claims at this stage.
15
Wyoming's reliance on two of this Court's prior original cases
is, at best, premature. Both cases were decided after trial, see
Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 49, 105
(1907);
Missouri v.
Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 518
(1906), and while both recognize that relief on the merits may turn
on the equities, 206 U. S., at 104-105, 113-114; 200 U. S., at 522,
the application of that principle to Nebraska's claim is not, as we
have just stated, obvious at this point. We accordingly accept the
Master's recommendation, Third Interim Report 41, and overrule
Wyoming's fourth exception.
IV
Wyoming's Fourth Amended Cross-Claim seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief and is aimed against the United States alone,
alleging that federal management of reservoirs has contravened
state and federal law as well as contracts governing water supply
to individual users. Wyoming claims that "the United States has
allocated storage water in a manner which (a) upsets the equitable
balance on which the apportionment of natural flow was based, (b)
results in the allocation of natural flow contrary to the
provisions of the Decree ... , (c) promotes inefficiency and waste
of water contrary to federal and state law, (d) violates the
contract rights of the North Platte Project Irrigation Districts
and violates the provisions of the Warren Act, 43 U. S. C. § 523,
... and (e) exceeds the limitations in the contracts under the
Warren Act." App. to Third Interim Report E-11 to E-12. Wyoming
alleges that this mismanagement has made "water shortages ... more
frequen[t] and ... more severe, thereby causing injury to Wyoming
and its water users."
Id., at E-12.
The United States and Nebraska except to allowing Wyoming's
cross-claim to proceed, for two reasons. They argue, first, that
the decree expressly refrained from apportioning storage water, as
distinct from natural flow, with the consequence that the
violations alleged are not cognizable in an
16
action brought under the decree. Second, they maintain that any
claim turning on the United States's failure to comply with
individual contracts for the release of storage water ought to be
relegated to an action brought by individual contract holders in a
federal district court and that, indeed, just such an action is
currently pending in
Goshen Irrigation District v.
United
States, No. C89-0161-J (D. Wyo., filed June 23, 1989).
The Master addressed both objections. As to the first, he said
that "even though the decree did not apportion storage water, it
was framed based in part on assumptions about storage water rights
and deliveries," and that therefore "Wyoming should have the
opportunity to go forward with her claims that the United States
has violated the law and contracts rights and that such violations
have the effect of undermining Wyoming's apportionment." Third
Interim Report 70. The Master found the second point "unpersuasive"
because "neither Wyoming nor Nebraska [is a party] to the
[Goshen] case [brought by the individual contractors], and
the federal district court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction
to consider whether any violations that may be proven on the part
of the United States will have the effect of undermining the 1945
apportionment decree."
Id., at 71. We agree with the Master
on both counts.
The availability of storage water and its distribution under
storage contracts was a predicate to the original apportionment
decree. Our 1945 opinion expressly recognized the significance of
storage water to the lands irrigated by the pivotal reach, noting
that over the prior decade storage water was on average over half
of the total supply and that over 90 percent of the irrigated lands
had storage rights as well as rights to natural flow.
Nebraska
I, 325 U. S., at 605. We pointed out that Nebraska
appropriators in the pivotal reach had "greater storage water
rights" than Wyoming appropriators, id., at 645, a fact that helped
"tip the scales in
17
favor of the flat percentage system," as against a scheme even
more favorable to Nebraska,
ibid.
In rejecting Wyoming's original proposal, which was to combine
water from storage and natural flow and apportion both by volume
among the different users, id., at 621, we anticipated that the
storage supply would "be left for distribution in accordance with
the contracts which govern it," id., at 631. In doing so, we were
clearly aware of the beneficial use limitations that govern federal
contracts for storage water. Contracts between the United States
and individual water users on the North Platte, we pointed out, had
been made and were maintained in compliance with § 8 of the
Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 388, 43 U. S. C. §§ 372, 383,
which provided that" 'the right to the use of water acquired under
the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land
irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and
the limit of the right.'" 325 U. S., at 613. In addition, contracts
had been made under the Warren Act, 36 Stat. 925, 43 U. S. C. §§
523-525, which granted the Secretary of the Interior the further
power to contract for the storage and delivery of water available
in excess of the requirements of any given project managed under
the Reclamation Act. See
Nebraska I, supra, at
631, 639-640.
Under this system, access to water from storage facilities was
only possible by a contract for its use,
Nebraska I,
325 U. S., at 640, and apportionment of storage water would
have disrupted that system. "If storage water is not segregated,
storage water contractors in times of shortage of the total supply
will be deprived of the use of a part of the storage supply for
which they pay ... [and] those who have not contracted for the
storage supply will receive at the expense of those who have
contracted for it a substantial increment to the natural flow
supply which, as we have seen, has been insufficient to go around."
Ibid. Hence, we refrained from apportioning stored water and
went no further than capping
18
the total amount of storage in certain dams to protect senior,
downstream rights to natural flow.
Id., at 630. But although
our refusal in 1945 to apportion storage water was driven by a
respect for the statutory and contractual regime in place at the
time, we surely did not dismiss storage water as immaterial to the
proper allocation of the natural flow in the pivotal reach. And
while our decree expressly protected those with rights to storage
water, it did so on the condition that storage water would continue
to be distributed "in accordance with ... lawful contracts .... "
Id., at 669. This is the very condition that Wyoming now
seeks to vindicate.
Wyoming argues that the United States no longer abides by the
governing law in administering the storage water contracts. First,
it contends that the Government pays no heed to federal law's
beneficial use limitations on the disposition of storage water but
rather "releas[es] storage water on demand to the canals in the
pivotal reach without regard to how the water is used." Brief for
Wyoming in Response to Exceptions of Nebraska and United States to
Third Interim Report 6 (emphasis deleted) (hereinafter Response
Brief). This liberality allegedly harms Wyoming contractees whose
storage supply is wasted, as well as junior Wyoming appropriators
who are subject to the senior call of the United States to refill
the reservoirs and are consequently deprived of the natural flow
they would otherwise receive.
Second, Wyoming claims that federal policy in drought years
encourages contract users to exploit this failure of the Government
to police consumption. It points out that in years of insufficient
supply, the United States has calculated each water district's
average use of storage water in prior years, and then allocated to
each district a certain percentage of that average, according to
what the overall supply will bear. The United States has then
further reduced the allotment of each individual canal within a
district by the
19
amount of natural flow delivered to the canal, with the result
that in dry years water is distributed under "purely a mass [i.
e., fixed volume] allocation that sets a cap on the total
diversion of each individual canal."
Id., at 8. Wyoming thus
contends not only that under this system "in a dry year like 1989
the [United States's] allocation effectively replaces the Court
decreed 75/25 apportionment," id., at 9, but that the departure
from the norm is needlessly great because the system "encourages
individual canals to divert as much water as possible during
'non-allocation' years in order to maximize their average
diversions which will be the measure of their entitlement in a
subsequent dry year allocation," id., at 8, n. 6.
If Wyoming were arguing merely that any administration of
storage water that takes account of fluctuations in the natural
flow received by a contractee violates the decree, we would reject
its claim, for we recognized in 1945 that the outstanding Warren
Act contracts contained "agree[ments] to deliver water which will,
with all the water to which the land is entitled by appropriation
or otherwise, aggregate a stated amount." 325 U. S., at 631.
Indeed, we set forth an example of just such a contract in our
opinion.
Id., at 631, n. 17. In asserting, however, that a
predicate to the 1945 decree was that the United States adhered to
beneficial use limitations in administering storage water
contracts, that it no longer does so, and that this change has
caused or permitted significant injury to Wyoming interests,
Wyoming has said enough to state a serious claim that ought to be
allowed to go forward.2
2 The dissent would disallow Wyoming's cross-claim on the
grounds that Wyoming seeks neither to modify the decree (because it
asks only for an injunction requiring the United States to adhere
to its contracts and to the federal and state law governing storage
water) nor to enforce it (since the decree presently contains no
such mandate). This leaves Wyoming hanging. It cannot sue under the
decree because a mandate of compliance
20
Although the claim may well require consideration of individual
contracts and compliance with the Reclamation and Warren Acts, it
does not follow (as Nebraska and the United States argue) that
Wyoming is asserting the private contractors' rights proper, or (as
the United States contends) that Wyoming brings suit" 'in reality
for the benefit of particular individuals,'" Brief for United
States in Support of Exception 25, quoting
Oklahoma ex rel.
Johnson v.
Cook, 304 U. S. 387, 393-394
(1938). Wyoming argues only that the cumulative effect of the
United States's failure to adhere to the law governing the
contracts undermines the operation of the decree, see Response
Brief 14-21, and thereby states a claim arising under the decree
itself, one by which it seeks to vindicate its"
'quasi-sovereign' interests which are 'independent of and
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within
its domain,'"
Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v.
Cook,
supra, at 393, quoting
Georgia v.
Tennessee
Copper Co.,
206
U. S. 230, 237 (1907).
It is of no moment that some of the contracts could be made (or
are) the subject of litigation between individual contract holders
and the United States in federal district court. Wyoming is not a
party to any such litigation and, as
is not included in it, yet it cannot seek modification of the
decree to include such a mandate, apparently because such relief is
not sufficiently drastic.
Post, at 24-26.
It seems very clear to us, however, that Wyoming is seeking a
modification of the decree in order to enforce its predicate. As
the dissent concedes, our 1945 decision could conceivably afford a
"basis for ordering the United States to comply with applicable
riparian law and with its storage contracts .... "
Post, at
25-26. The dissent then rightly points out that such a position
would be weak because the decree did not expressly mandate the
compliance with lawful contracts and governing law that we
anticipated in 1945.
Ibid. Wyoming's Fourth Cross-Claim,
however, now seeks just such a mandate by modifying the decree to
require the United States to comply with its own contracts and with
the federal and state law governing storage water.
21
counsel for the United States acknowledged at oral argument, it
is uncertain whether the State would qualify for intervention in
the ongoing
Goshen litigation under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. While the uncertainty of
intervention is beside the point on the dissent's view, which
"see[s] no reason ... why Wyoming could not institute its own
action against the United States in [district court],"
post,
at 27, the dissent nowhere explains how Wyoming would have standing
to bring an action under storage water contracts to which it is not
a party. As we have just said, Wyoming's claim derives not from
rights under individual contracts but from the decree, and the
decree can be modified only by this Court. Putting aside, then,
whether another forum might offer relief that, as a practical
matter, would mitigate the alleged ill effects of the National
Government's contract administration, this is the proper forum for
the State's claim, and it makes sense to entertain the claim in the
course of adjudicating the broader controversy among Wyoming,
Nebraska, and the United States. Cf.
United States v.
Nevada, 412 U.
S. 534, 537 (1973)
(per curiam) (denying motion for
leave to file bill of complaint in part because "[t]here is now no
controversy between the two States with respect to the ... [r]iver
[in question]").
Nor do we fear the specter, raised by the United States, of
intervention by many individual storage contractors in this
proceeding. Ordinarily, in a suit by one State against another
subject to the original jurisdiction of this Court, each State
"must be deemed to represent all its citizens."
Kentucky v.
Indiana, 281
U. S. 163, 173 (1930). A State is presumed to speak in the best
interests of those citizens, and requests to intervene by
individual contractees may be treated under the general rule that
an individual's motion for leave to intervene in this Court will be
denied absent a "showing [of] some compelling interest in his own
right,
22
apart from his interest in a class with all other citizens and
creatures of the state, which interest is not properly represented
by the state."
New Jersey v.
New York, 345 U. S. 369, 373
(1953); cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2). We have said on many
occasions that water disputes among States may be resolved by
compact or decree without the participation of individual
claimants, who nonetheless are bound by the result reached through
representation by their respective States.
Nebraska
I, 325 U. S., at 627, citing
Hinderlider v.
La
Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92, 106-108
(1938); see also
Wyoming v.
Colorado, 286 U. S. 494, 508-509
(1932). As we view the litigation at the current time, it is
unlikely to present occasion for individual storage contract
holders to show that their proprietary interests are not adequately
represented by their State.
Two caveats are nonetheless in order, despite our allowance of
Wyoming's cross-claim. Nebraska argues that Wyoming is using its
cross-claim as a back door to achieving the mass allocation of
natural flows sought in its First Counterclaim and Cross-Claim.
This argument will be difficult to assess without further
development of the merits, and we can only emphasize at this point
that in allowing Wyoming's Fourth Cross-Claim to go forward, we are
not, of course, in any way sanctioning the very modification of the
decree that we have just ruled out in this proceeding. Second, the
parties should not take our allowance of the Fourth Cross-Claim as
an opportunity to enquire into every detail of the United States's
administration of storage water contracts. The United States's
contractual compliance is not, of itself, an appropriate subject of
the Special Master's attention, which is properly confined to the
effects of contract administration on the operation of the decree.
Contractual compliance, as such, is the subject of the
Goshen litigation, which we presume will move forward
independently of this original action.
23
v
For these reasons, the exceptions to the Special Master's Third
Interim Report are overruled.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the decision of the Court to overrule all of
Wyoming's exceptions to the Third Interim Report on Motions to
Amend Pleading (Report). Accordingly, I join Parts I, II, and III
of the Court's opinion. I do not agree, however, that we should
overrule the exceptions of the United States and Nebraska to the
Master's recommendation that Wyoming be allowed to proceed with its
proposed Fourth Cross-Claim against the United States. I would
sustain those exceptions and require Wyoming to pursue that claim
in another forum.
Wyoming's Fourth Cross-Claim begins with the following
allegation:
"The equitable apportionment which the Decree was intended to
carry into effect was premised in part on the assumption that the
United States would operate the federal reservoirs and deliver
storage water in accordance with applicable federal and state law
and in accordance with the contracts governing use of water from
the federal reservoirs." App. to Report E-l1.
Wyoming then alleges generally that "[t]he United States has
failed to operate the federal reservoirs in accordance with
applicable federal and state laws and has failed to abide by the
contracts governing use of water from the federal reservoirs."
Ibid. According to Wyoming, these failures have "caused
water shortages to occur more frequently and to be more severe,
thereby causing injury to Wyoming and its water users."
Id.,
at E-12. In short, Wyoming alleges
24
Opinion of THOMAS, J.
that "a predicate to the 1945 decree was that the United States
adhered to [riparian law's] beneficial use limitations in
administering storage water contracts, that it no longer does so,
and that this change has caused or permitted significant injury to
Wyoming interests."
Ante, at 19.
In the abstract, these allegations are sufficient to state a
claim for modification of the decree based on changed
circumstances. Such relief is authorized by the decree's Paragraph
XIII, which invited the parties to "apply at the foot of this
decree for its amendment or for further relief."
Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325
U. S. 589, 671 (1945)
(Nebraska 1). In particular,
subdivision (f) of Paragraph XIII anticipates that we might modify
the decree in light of "[a]ny change in conditions making
modifications of the decree or the granting of further relief
necessary or appropriate."
Id., at 672. Thus, in light of
the Federal Government's failure to satisfy our expectation that it
would comply with applicable riparian law and with its contracts,
we might engage in "a reweighing of equities" and accordingly
"reope[n]" the 1945 apportionment of the North Platte and modify
the decree in Wyoming's favor.
Nebraska v.
Wyoming,
507 U. S. 584,
593 (1993)
(Nebraska II).
If Wyoming's Fourth Cross-Claim against the United States had
actually sought such relief, I might agree with the Court's
decision to allow the claim to proceed. But the cross-claim's
prayer for relief seeks neither a reapportionment of the North
Platte nor any other modification of the decree. Instead, it asks
the Court "to enjoin the United States' continuing violations of
federal and state law and ... to direct the United States to comply
with the terms of its contracts." App. to Report E-12. This prayer
makes perfect sense: Why seek to modify the decree based on a
"change in conditions" if such change could be reversed or annulled
by means of injunctive relief grounded in existing law? Indeed,
were existing law sufficient to prevent the in-
25
juries alleged by Wyoming, the State could hardly point to the
"considerable justification" necessary for "reopening an
apportionment of interstate water rights."
Nebraska II,
supra, at 593.1
Yet precisely because the injunctive relief requested by Wyoming
arises out of and depends on a body of law that exists
independently of the decree, the Court errs in asserting that
Wyoming "states a claim arising under the decree itself."
Ante, at 20. This is so for two reasons. First, a claim that
the United States must comply with applicable law and with
contracts governed by such law-here, § 8 of the Reclamation Act of
1902, 32 Stat. 390, 43 U. S. C. §§ 372, 383, the Warren Act, ch.
141, 36 Stat. 925, 43 U. S. C. §§ 523525, and other federal and
state riparian law, see
ante, at 17-necessarily "arises
under" that body of law. See,
e. g.,
Franchise Tax Bd. of
Cal. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern
Cal., 463 U. S.
1, 8-9 (1983) (approving, as a principle of inclusion, "Justice
Holmes' statement, 'A suit arises under the law that creates the
cause of action' " (quoting
American Well Works Co. v.
Layne &
Bowler Co., 241 U. S. 257, 260
(1916))).
Second, although a decree entered by this Court could
conceivably afford an additional and separate basis for
ordering
1 To the Court, "[i]t seems very clear ... that Wyoming is
seeking a modification of the decree in order to enforce its
predicate."
Ante, at 20, n. 2. I would expect such clarity
to show in the language of the Fourth Cross-Claim itself, but the
prayer for relief notably fails to include the word "modify" or its
synonyms. In this regard, the Fourth Cross-Claim stands in marked
contrast to Wyoming's other cross-claims and its counterclaims
against Nebraska. Compare App. to Report E-12 (Fourth Cross-Claim's
prayer for relief) with id., at E-6, E-7, E-8, E-10, E-ll, E-12
(other prayers). Wyoming is not left "hanging" by its failure to
seek a modification of the decree as to the United States'
compliance with applicable riparian law and with its contracts.
Ante, at 19-20, n. 2. As I explain
infra, at 27-28,
the State may seek its requested relief in another forum.
26
Opinion of THOMAS, J.
the United States to comply with applicable riparian law and
with its storage contracts, our 1945 decree in fact does not. That
is, we
"anticipated that the storage [water] supply would
'be left for distribution in accordance with the contracts which
govern it,'"
ante, at 17 (emphasis added) (quoting
Nebraska I, 325 U. S., at 631), but we did not
mandate that result. To the contrary, Paragraph VI of the
decree states expressly that "[s]torage water shall not be affected
by this decree" and that storage water shall be distributed
"without interference because of this decree."
Id., at 669.
Accord, Brief for Wyoming in Response to Exceptions of Nebraska and
the United States 19 ("No one asserted [in 1945] a need for the
Court affirmatively to require the [Federal Government's]
compliance with federal law; such compliance was assumed").
Because Wyoming's Fourth Cross-Claim against the United States
therefore involves neither "an application for
enforcement
of rights already recognized in the decree" nor a request for "a
modification of the decree,"
Nebraska II, supra, at
590, I do not understand why the Court chooses to entertain that
claim as part of the present proceeding. It is well established
that "[w]e seek to exercise our original jurisdiction sparingly and
are particularly reluctant to take jurisdiction of a suit where the
plaintiff has another adequate forum in which to settle his claim."
United States v.
Nevada, 412 U. S. 534, 538 (1973)
(per curiam). This particular reluctance applies squarely to
"controversies between the United States and a State," of which we
have "original
but not exclusive jurisdiction." 28 U. S. C.
§ 1251(b)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, in
United States v.
Nevada, we declined to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute
between those parties about intrastate water rights, noting that
such dispute was "within the jurisdiction of the District Court" in
Nevada. 412 U. S., at 538. Accord, id., at 539-540 ("Any possible
dispute with California with respect to United States water
27
uses in that State can be settled in the lower federal courts in
California... "). 2
These principles should be applied here. Although I agree with
the Court that the mere existence of pending litigation brought by
individual storage contract holders against the United States in
the Federal District Court in Wyoming is not dispositive, see
ante, at 20-21, I see no reason (and the parties offer none)
why Wyoming could not institute its own action against the United
States in that forum.3 Moreover,
2 Our decision in
California v.
Nevada, 447 U. S. 125 (1980), is
also on point. There, as here, we exercised our exclusive original
jurisdiction over a dispute between two States, but we declined to
expand the reference to the Special Master to include borderland
ownership and title disputes that "typically will involve only one
or the other State and the United States, or perhaps various
citizens of those States."
Id., at 133. Instead, we
explained, "litigation in other forums seems an entirely
appropriate means of resolving whatever questions remain."
Ibid.
Subsequent to our decision in
United States v.
Nevada in 1973, we have, in the majority of actions by
States against the United States or its officers, summarily denied
the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint. See
Georgia v.
Nixon, President of the United States, 414
U. S. 810 (1973);
Idaho v.
Vance, Secretary of State,
434 U. S. 1031 (1978);
Indiana v.
United States, 471
U. S. 1123 (1985);
Michigan v.
Meese, Attorney General of
the United States, 479 U. S. 1078 (1987);
Mississippi v.
United States, 499 U. S. 916 (1991). Accord,
United
States v.
Florida, 430 U. S. 140 (1977)
(per curiam) (denying motion by Florida for leave to file
counterclaim).
3 The reason cannot be, as the Court seems to think, that
"Wyoming's claim derives not from rights under individual contracts
but from the decree, and the decree can be modified only by this
Court."
Ante, at 21. As I have explained, the first of these
propositions is not correct. The second is correct, of course, but
also irrelevant: Wyoming seeks not a modification of the decree but
an injunction directing the United States to comply with applicable
riparian law and with its contracts, thereby
obviating the
need for this Court to modify the decree. Thus, by "[p]utting aside
... whether another forum might offer relief that, as a practical
matter, would mitigate the alleged ill effects of the National
Government's contract administration,"
ibid., the Court
actually puts aside the only relief sought by the claim the Court
allows to proceed.
As for standing, see
ante, at 21, I simply repeat the
Court's own discussion of this subject. In brief, Wyoming's
standing is predicated
28
Opinion of THOMAS, J.
given the number and variety of the other new or amended claims
we have approved today, see
ante, at 11-15-not to mention
the issues left unresolved by our 1993 opinion, see
Nebraska
II, 507 U. S., at 596-603-the significant statutory and
contractual issues raised by Wyoming's cross-claim against the
United States would most likely be resolved in the District Court
with far greater dispatch. Indeed, the present round of litigation
has dragged on for almost
nine years, but we are not even
beyond the stage of considering amendments to the pleadings.
Finally, although I share the Court's distaste at the prospect
of intervention by individual storage contract holders in this
original action, see
ante, at 21-22, I find it just as
distasteful unnecessarily to deny private parties the opportunity
to participate in a case the disposition of which may impair their
interests. By remitting Wyoming's claim to the District Court, we
would allow the storage contract holders to participate voluntarily
by joinder or intervention, see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 20(a) and 24,
or to be joined involuntarily in the interest of just adjudication,
see Rule 19.
***
The Court's decision to entertain Wyoming's Fourth Cross-Claim
against the United States departs from our established principles
for exercising our original jurisdiction, ignores the relief
requested by Wyoming, and needlessly opens the possibility to a
reapportionment of the North Platte. In short, it constitutes "a
misguided exercise of [our] discretion."
Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502
U. S. 437, 475 (1992) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent from the Court's decision in this regard.
upon its allegation that the United States has failed to
"adher[e] to beneficial use limitations in administering storage
water contracts ... and that this [failure] has caused or permitted
significant injury to Wyoming interests."
Ante, at 19.
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