OCTOBER TERM, 1994
Syllabus
NATIONSBANK OF NORTH CAROLINA, N. A., ET AL.
V. VARIABLE
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE CO. ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT
No. 93-1612. Argued December 7, 1994-Decided January 18,
1995*
Petitioner national bank and its brokerage subsidiary applied to
the Comptroller of the Currency, charged by Congress with
superintendence of national banks, to allow the subsidiary to act
as an agent in the sale of annuities. Under the proposed plan, bank
customers could purchase a "variable annuity" -which invests
payments in a designated way and yields income that varies with
investment performance-a "fixed" annuity-which yields income that
does not vary-or a hybrid account. Granting the application, the
Comptroller typed the annuity sales "incidental" to "the business
of banking" under the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh.
The Comptroller further concluded that annuities are not
"insurance" within the meaning of § 92; that provision, by
expressly authorizing banks in towns of no more than 5,000 people
to sell insurance, arguably implies that banks in larger towns may
not sell insurance. Respondent Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.
(VALIC), which sells annuities, filed a suit challenging the
Comptroller's decision. The District Court upheld the Comptroller's
conclusions as a permissible reading of the Act. Reversing the
District Court's judgment, the Court of Appeals held that § 92 bars
banks not located in small towns from selling insurance, and
rejected the Comptroller's conclusion that annuities are not
insurance under § 92.
Held: The Comptroller's determination that national banks
may serve as agents in the sale of annuities is a reasonable
construction of the Act and therefore warrants judicial deference.
Pp. 256-264.
(a) If a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
precise question at issue, the reviewing court must determine
whether the answer reached by the agency charged with the statute's
enforcement is based on a permissible construction. If an expert
administrator's reading fills a gap or defines a term in a way that
is reasonable in light of
*Together with No. 93-1613, Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency,
et al. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. et al., also on
certiorari to the same court.
252
Syllabus
Congress' revealed design, the administrator's judgment is given
controlling weight. Pp. 256-257.
(b) The Court respects as reasonable the Comptroller's
conclusion that brokerage of annuities is an "incidental powe[r]
... necessary to carryon the business of banking" under § 24
Seventh. In interpreting "the business of banking" to include
brokerage of financial investment instruments, the Comptroller
better comprehends the Act's terms than does VALIC, whose reading
confines national banks to the five activities listed in § 24
Seventh's first sentence and endeavors incidental thereto:
discounting and negotiating evidences of debt; receiving deposits;
buying and selling money; making loans; and obtaining, issuing, and
circulating notes. The section's second sentence, which limits
banks' "dealing in securities," recognizes that banks otherwise
have the authority the sentence addresses, even though that
authority is not specifically enumerated; Congress thus evidenced
its intent to accord banks authority "to carryon the business of
banking" through customer services not circumscribed by the five
listed activities. The Comptroller therefore has discretion, within
reasonable bounds, to permit banking activities beyond those the
statute sets forth as exemplary. Here, the Comptroller reasonably
concluded that the authority to sell annuities qualifies as part of
the authority to purchase and sell financial investment
instruments. Modern annuities, though more sophisticated than the
standard savings bank deposits of old, answer essentially the same
need. By providing customers with the opportunity to invest in one
or more annuity options, banks are essentially offering financial
investment instruments of the kind congressional authorization
permits them to broker. Pp. 257-260.
(c) The Court further defers to the Comptroller's determination
that annuities are properly classified as investments, not
"insurance" within § 92's meaning. The Comptroller's classification
of annuities, based on the tax deferral and investment features
that distinguish them from insurance, is at least a reasonable
interpretation of the controlling legislation. A key feature of
insurance is that it indemnifies loss. As the Comptroller observes,
annuities serve an important investment purpose and are
functionally similar to other investments that banks typically
sell. And though fixed annuities more closely resemble insurance
than do variable annuities, fixed annuities too have significant
investment features and are functionally similar to debt
instruments. Moreover, mindful that fixed annuities are often
packaged with variable annuities, the Comptroller reasonably chose
to classify the two together. In light of the foregoing, the Court
need not reach the question whether § 92, by negative implication,
precludes
253
national banks in places more populous than 5,000 from selling
insurance. Pp. 260-264.
998 F.2d
1295, reversed.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Edward C. DuMont argued the cause for petitioners in No.
93-1613. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days,
Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender,
Mark B. Stern, Jacob M. Lewis, Julie L. Williams, L. Robert
Griffin, and Yvonne D. McIntire. Steven S. Rosenthal argued the
cause for petitioners in No. 93-1612. With him on the briefs were
Robert M. Kurucza and Robert G. Ballen.
David Overlock Stewart argued the cause for respondent in
both cases. With him on the brief were
Alan G.
Priest,
Raymond C.
Ortman, Jr., and
William A.
Wilson.t
tBriefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the
American Bankers Association et al. by John
J. Gill III,
Michael F. Crotty, James T. McIntyre, Richard M. Whiting, and David
L. Glass; for the Conference of State Bank Supervisors et al. by
David W Roderer, Eric L. Hirschhorn, Donn C. Meindertsma,
J.
Thomas Cardwell, Leonard
J. Rubin, and M. Brooks Senn; and
for the New York Clearing House Association by John L. Warden,
Michael M. Wiseman, Theodore Edelman, and Norman R. Nelson.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
Tom Gallagher, Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner of Florida, et
al. by
David J. Busch, Richard Blumenthal,
Attorney General of Connecticut,
pro se, and
Mark F.
Kohler, Assistant Attorney General,
J. Joseph
Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland,
Gary L. Spaeth,
Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney General of North Dakota,
Jeffrey B.
Pine, Attorney General of Rhode Island, and
Maureen G.
Glynn, Special Assistant Attorney General; for the American
Academy of Actuaries by
Lauren M. Bloom; for the American
Council of Life Insurance by
Gary E. Hughes, Allen R.
Caskie, and
Phillip E. Stano; for the American Land
Title Association by
Sheldon E. Hochberg; for the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners by
Susan E. Martin
and
Ellen Dollase Wilcox; and for the National Association
of Life Underwriters et al. by
Ann M. Kappler and
Scott
A. Sinder.
254
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. These
consolidated cases present the question whether national banks may
serve as agents in the sale of annuities. The Comptroller of the
Currency, charged by Congress with superintendence of national
banks, determined that federal law permits such annuity sales as a
service to bank customers. Specifically, the Comptroller considered
the sales at issue "incidental" to "the business of banking" under
the N ational Bank Act, Rev. Stat. § 5136, as amended, 12 U. S. C.
§ 24 Seventh (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The Comptroller further
concluded that annuities are not "insurance" within the meaning of
§ 92; that provision, by expressly authorizing banks in towns of no
more than 5,000 people to sell insurance, arguably implies that
banks in larger towns may not sell insurance. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas upheld the
Comptroller's conclusions as a permissible reading of the National
Bank Act, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed. We are satisfied that the Comptroller's
construction of the Act is reasonable and therefore warrants
judicial deference. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
I
Petitioner NationsBank of North Carolina, N. A., a national bank
based in Charlotte, and its brokerage subsidiary sought permission
from the Comptroller of the Currency, pursuant to 12 CFR § 5.34
(1994), for the brokerage subsidiary to act as an agent in the sale
of annuities. Annuities are contracts under which the purchaser
makes one or more premium payments to the issuer in exchange for a
series of payments, which continue either for a fixed period or for
the life of the purchaser or a designated beneficiary. When a
purchaser invests in a "variable" annuity, the purchaser's money is
invested in a designated way and payments to the purchaser vary
with investment performance. In a classic "fixed" annuity, in
contrast, payments do not vary. Under
255
the contracts N ationsBank proposed to sell, purchasers could
direct their payments to a variable, fixed, or hybrid account, and
would be allowed periodically to modify their choice. The issuers
would be various insurance companies. See Letter from J. Michael
Shepherd, Senior Deputy Comptroller, to Robert M. Kurucza (Mar. 21,
1990), App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 93-1612, pp. 35a-36a
(Comptroller's Letter).
The Comptroller granted N ationsBank's application. He concluded
that national banks have authority to broker annuities within "the
business of banking" under 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh. He further
concluded that § 92, addressing insurance sales by banks in towns
with no more than 5,000 people, did not impede his approval; for
purposes of that provision, the Comptroller explained, annuities do
not rank as "insurance." See Comptroller's Letter 41a-47a.
Respondent Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. (VALIC), which
sells annuities, challenged the Comptroller's decision. VALIC filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A), and 28 U. S.
C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The District Court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Comptroller and NationsBank.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v.
Clarke, 786 F.
Supp. 639 (1991). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v.
Clarke, 998 F.2d
1295 (1993). Relying on its decision in
Saxon v.
Georgia Assn. of Independent Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d
1010 (1968), the Fifth Circuit first held that § 92 bars banks
not located in small towns from selling insurance, and then
rejected the Comptroller's view that annuities are not insurance
for purposes of § 92. See 998 F. 2d, at 1298-1302.
Four judges dissented from the failure of the court to grant
rehearing en bane. The dissenters maintained that the panel had not
accorded due deference to the Comptroller's reasonable statutory
interpretations.
Variable Annu-
256
ity Life Ins. Co. v.
Clark [e], 13 F.3d
833, 837-838 (CA5 1994).1 We granted certiorari. 511 U. S. 1141
(1994).
II A
Authorizing national banks to "carry on the business of
banking," the National Bank Act provides that such banks shall have
power-
"To exercise ... all such incidental powers as shall be
necessary to carry on the business of banking; by discounting and
negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other
evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling
exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal security;
and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes .... The business
of dealing in securities and stock by the [bank] shall be limited
to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without
recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers,
and in no case for its own account, and the [bank] shall not
underwrite any issue of securities or stock .... " 12 U. S. C. § 24
Seventh (1988 ed. and Supp. V).
As the administrator charged with supervision of the N ational
Bank Act, see §§ 1, 26-27, 481, the Comptroller bears primary
responsibility for surveillance of "the business of banking"
authorized by § 24 Seventh. We have reiterated:
"'It is settled that courts should give great weight to any
reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the
agency charged with the enforcement of that statute. The
Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of
banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of this
principle with
1 The dissenters also observed that 6 of the court's 13 active
judges were disqualified from participating in the case. 13 F. 3d,
at 834.
257
respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of
these laws.'" Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn.,
479 U. S. 388,
403-404 (1987) (quoting Investment Company Institute v.
Camp, 401 U.
S. 617, 626-627 (1971)).
Under the formulation now familiar, when we confront an expert
administrator's statutory exposition, we inquire first whether "the
intent of Congress is clear" as to "the precise question at issue."
Chevron U. S.
A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842
(1984). If so, "that is the end of the matter."
Ibid. But
"if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute."
Id., at
843. If the administrator's reading fills a gap or defines a term
in a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed
design, we give the administrator's judgment "controlling weight."
Id., at 844.
In authorizing N ationsBank to broker annuities, the Comptroller
invokes the power of banks to "broker a wide variety of financial
investment instruments," Comptroller's Letter 38a, which the
Comptroller considers "part of [banks'] traditional role as
financial intermediaries,"
ibid., and therefore an
"incidental powe[r] ... necessary to carry on the business of
banking." 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh; see also Interpretive Letter
No. 494 (Dec. 20, 1989) (discussing features of financial
investment instruments brokerage that bring this activity within
the "business of banking") (cited in Comptroller's Letter 38a). The
Comptroller construes the § 24 Seventh authorization of "incidental
powers ... necessary to carry on the business of banking" as an
independent grant of authority; he reads the specific powers set
forth thereafter as exemplary, not exclusive.
VALIC argues that the Comptroller's interpretation is contrary
to the clear intent of Congress because the banking power on which
the Comptroller relies-"broker[ing] financial investment
instruments"-is not specified in § 24 Sev-
258
enth. Brief for Respondent 35-45. According to VALIC, the five
specific activities listed in § 24 Seventh after the words
"business of banking" are exclusive-banks are confined to these
five activities and to endeavors incidental thereto.
Id., at
35-36. VALIC thus attributes no independent significance to the
words "business of banking." We think the Comptroller better
comprehends the Act's terms.
The second sentence of § 24 Seventh, in limiting banks' "dealing
in securities," presupposes that banks have authority not
circumscribed by the five specifically listed activities. Congress'
insertion of the limitation decades after the Act's initial
adoption makes sense only if banks already
had authority to
deal in securities, authority presumably encompassed within the
"business of banking" language which dates from 1863. VALIC argues,
however, that the limitation was imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act
of 1933, and that the power Glass-Steagall presupposed was
specifically granted in the McFadden Act of 1927. Brief for
Respondent 46. While the statute's current wording derives from the
Glass-Steagall Act, see Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 16, 48
Stat. 184, the earlier McFadden Act does not bolster VALIC's case,
for that Act, too,
limited an activity already part of the
business national banks did. See Act of Feb. 25, 1927, § 2(b), 44
Stat. 1226
("Provided, That the business of buying and
selling investment securities shall hereinafter be limited to
buying and selling without recourse .... "); see also
Clarke
v.
Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S., at 407408 (even
before the McFadden Act, banks conducted securities transactions on
a widespread basis); 2 F. Redlich, The Molding of American Banking:
Men and Ideas, pt. 2, pp. 389393 (1951) (describing securities
activities of prominent early national banks).2
2We expressly hold that the "business of banking" is not limited
to the enumerated powers in § 24 Seventh and that the Comptroller
therefore has discretion to authorize activities beyond those
specifically enume-
259
B
As we have just explained, the Comptroller determined, in accord
with the legislature's intent, that "the business of banking"
described in § 24 Seventh covers brokerage of financial investment
instruments, and is not confined to the examples specifically
enumerated. He then reasonably concluded that the authority to sell
annuities qualifies as part of, or incidental to, the business of
banking. National banks, the Comptroller observed, are authorized
to serve as agents for their customers in the purchase and sale of
various financial investment instruments, Comptroller's Letter
38a,3 and annuities are widely recognized as just such investment
products. See D. Shapiro & T. Streiff, Annuities 7 (1992) (in
contrast to life insurance, "[a]nnuities ... are primarily
investment products"); 1 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance
Law and Practice § 84, p. 295 (1981) ("Annuity contracts must ...
be recognized as investments rather than as insurance.").
By making an initial payment in exchange for a future income
stream, the customer is deferring consumption, setting aside money
for retirement, future expenses, or a rainy day. For her, an
annuity is like putting money in a bank account, a debt instrument,
or a mutual fund. Offering bank accounts and acting as agent in the
sale of debt instruments and mutual funds are familiar parts of the
business of banking. See,
e. g., Securities
Industry Assn. v.
Board of Governors, FRS, 468 U. S. 207, 215 (1984)
("Banks long have arranged the purchase and sale of securities as
an accommodation to their customers.");
First Nat. Bank of
Hartford v.
Hartford, 273 U. S. 548, 559-560
(1927) (banks have authority
rated. The exercise of the Comptroller's discretion, however,
must be kept within reasonable bounds. Ventures distant from
dealing in financial investment instruments-for example, operating
a general travel agency-may exceed those bounds.
3 The Comptroller referred to Interpretive Letter No. 494 (Dec.
20, 1989) (approving brokerage of agricultural, oil, and metals
futures).
260
to sell mortgages and other debt instruments they have
originated or acquired by discount).
In sum, modern annuities, though more sophisticated than the
standard savings bank deposits of old, answer essentially the same
need. By providing customers with the opportunity to invest in one
or more annuity options, banks are essentially offering financial
investment instruments of the kind congressional authorization
permits them to broker. Hence, the Comptroller reasonably typed the
permission NationsBank sought as an "incidental powe[r] ...
necessary to carryon the business of banking." 4
III A
In the alternative, VALIC argues that 12 U. S. C. § 92 (1988
ed., Supp. V) bars N ationsBank from selling annuities as agent.
That section provides:
"In addition to the powers now vested by law in [national banks]
any such [bank] located and doing business in any place the
population of which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants ...
may ... act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insurance
company authorized by the authorities of the State in which said
bank is located to do business in said State, by soliciting and
selling insurance and collecting premiums on policies issued by
such company .... "
The parties disagree about whether § 92, by negative
implication, precludes national banks located in places more
populous than 5,000 from selling insurance. We do not reach
4 Assuring that the brokerage in question would not deviate from
traditional bank practices, the Comptroller specified that N
ationsBank "will act only as agent, ... will not have a principal
stake in annuity contracts and therefore will incur no interest
rate or actuarial risks." Comptroller's Letter 48a.
261
this question because we accept the Comptroller's view that, for
the purpose at hand, annuities are properly classified as
investments, not "insurance."
Again, VALIC contends that the Comptroller's determination is
contrary to the plain intent of Congress, or else is unreasonable.
In support of its position that annuities are insurance, VALIC
notes first that annuities traditionally have been sold by
insurance companies. But the sale of a product by an insurance
company does not inevitably render the product insurance. For
example, insurance companies have long offered loans on the
security of life insurance, see 3 Appleman & Appleman,
Insurance Law and Practice § 1731, p. 562 (1967), but a loan does
not thereby become insurance.
VALIC further asserts that most States have regulated annuities
as insurance and that Congress intended to define insurance under §
92 by reference to state law. Treatment of annuities under state
law, however, is contextual. States generally classify annuities as
insurance when defining the powers of insurance companies and state
insurance regulators. See,
e. g., 998 F. 2d, at 1300,
n. 2 (citing statutes). But in diverse settings, States have
resisted lump classification of annuities as insurance. See,
e.
g., In re New York State Assn. of Life Underwriters, Inc. v.
New York State Banking Dept., 83 N. Y. 2d 353, 363, 632 N.
E. 2d 876, 881 (1994) (rejecting "assertion that annuities are
insurance which [statechartered] banks are not authorized to sell,"
even though state insurance law "includes 'annuities' in its
description of 'kinds of insurance authorized' ");
In re Estate
of Rhodes, 197 Misc. 232, 237, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 406, 411 (Surr.
Ct. 1949) (annuity contracts do not qualify for New York estate tax
exemption applicable to insurance);
Commonwealth v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 Pa. 510, 513-516, 98 A.
1072, 1073 (1916) (annuities are not insurance for purposes of tax
that insurance companies pay on insurance premiums received
within
262
the State); State ex rel. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of
United States v. Ham, 54 Wyo. 148, 159, 88 P. 2d 484, 488 (1939)
(same).
As our decisions underscore, a characterization fitting in
certain contexts may be unsuitable in others. See,
e.
g., At
lantic Cleaners &
Dyers, Inc. v.
United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932)
("meaning [of words] well may vary to meet the purposes of the
law"; courts properly give words "the meaning which the legislature
intended [they] should have in each instance"); cf. Cook,
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L. J.
333, 337 (1933) ("The tendency to assume that a word which appears
in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one
purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all of
them, runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity
of original sin and must constantly be guarded against.").
Moreover, the federal banking law does not plainly require
automatic reference to state law here. The Comptroller has
concluded that the federal regime is best served by classifying
annuities according to their functional characteristics. Congress
has not ruled out that course, see
Chevron, 467 U. S., at
842; courts, therefore, have no cause to dictate to the Comptroller
the state-law constraint VALIC espouses.
VALIC further argues that annuities functionally resemble life
insurance because some annuities place mortality risk on the
parties. Under a classic fixed annuity, the purchaser pays a sum
certain and, in exchange, the issuer makes periodic payments
throughout, but not beyond, the life of the purchaser. In pricing
such annuities, issuers rely on actuarial assumptions about how
long purchasers will live.
While cognizant of this similarity between annuities and
insurance, the Comptroller points out that mortality risk is a less
salient characteristic of contemporary products. Many annuities
currently available, both fixed and variable, do not feature a life
term. Instead they provide for payments over a term of years; if
the purchaser dies before the term ends,
263
the balance is paid to the purchaser's estate. Moreover, the
presence of mortality risk does not necessarily qualify an
investment as "insurance" under § 92. For example, VALlC recognizes
that a life interest in real property is not insurance, although it
imposes a mortality risk on the purchaser. Tr. of Oral Arg. 42.
Some conventional debt instruments similarly impose mortality risk.
See Note, Reverse Annuity Mortgages and the Due-on-Sale Clause, 32
Stan. L. Rev. 143, 145-151 (1979).
B
VALlC also charges the Comptroller with inconsistency.
As evidence, VALlC refers to a 1978 letter from a member of the
Comptroller's staff describing annuity investments as insurance
arrangements. Brief for Respondent 16-17; see Letter from Charles
F. Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory Services Division,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (June 16, 1978), App. to
Brief in Opposition 1a-2a (Byrd Letter). We note, initially, that
the proposal disfavored in the 1978 letter did not clearly involve
a bank selling annuities as an agent, rather than as a principal.
See Byrd Letter 1a ("[T]he bank would purchase a group annuity
policy from an insurer and then sell annuity contracts as
investments in trust accounts."). Furthermore, unlike the
Comptroller's letter to N ationsBank here, the 1978 letter does not
purport to represent the Comptroller's position. Compare Byrd
Letter 1a ("It is my opinion ... ") with Comptroller's Letter 35a
("The OCC's legal position on this issue was announced in a [prior
1990 letter]. Since I find neither policy nor supervisory reasons
to object to this proposal, the Subsidiary may proceed."). Finally,
any change in the Comptroller's position might reduce, but would
not eliminate, the deference we owe his reasoned determinations.
See
Good Samaritan Hospital v.
Shalala, 508 U. S. 402, 417 (1993)
(quoting
NLRB v.
Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335, 351
(1978)).
The Comptroller's classification of annuities, based on the tax
deferral and investment features that distinguish them
264
from insurance, in short, is at least reasonable. See
Comptroller's Letter 44a. A key feature of insurance is that it
indemnifies loss. See Black's Law Dictionary 802 (6th ed. 1990)
(first definition of insurance is "contract whereby, for a
stipulated consideration, one party undertakes to compensate the
other for loss on a specified subject by specified perils"). As the
Comptroller observes, annuities serve an important investment
purpose and are functionally similar to other investments that
banks typically sell. See
supra, at 259-260. And though
fixed annuities more closely resemble insurance than do variable
annuities, fixed annuities too have significant investment features
and are functionally similar to debt instruments. Moreover, mindful
that fixed annuities are often packaged with variable annuities,
the Comptroller reasonably chose to classify the two together.
***
We respect as reasonable the Comptroller's conclusion that
brokerage of annuities is an "incidental powe[r] ... necessary to
carryon the business of banking." We further defer to the
Comptroller's reasonable determination that 12 U. S. C. § 92 is not
implicated because annuities are not insurance within the meaning
of that section. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit is
Reversed.
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