OCTOBER TERM, 1993
Syllabus
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC., ET AL.
v.
SCHEIDLER ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
No. 92-780. Argued December 8, 1993-Decided January 24,1994
In this action, petitioner health care clinics alleged, among
other things, that respondents, a coalition of antiabortion groups
called the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) and others, were members
of a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through a
pattern of racketeering activity-including extortion under the
Hobbs Act-in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970,18 U. S. C. §§ 1961-1968. They claimed that respondents
conspired to use threatened or actual force, violence, or fear to
induce clinic employees, doctors, and patients to give up their
jobs, their right to practice medicine, and their right to obtain
clinic services; that the conspiracy injured the clinics' business
and property interests; and that PLAN is a racketeering enterprise.
The District Court dismissed the case pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It found that the clinics failed to state
a claim under § 1962(c)-which makes it unlawful "for any person
employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt" -because they did not allege a profit-generating
purpose in the activity or enterprise. It also dismissed their
conspiracy claim under § 1962(d) on the ground that the § 1962(c)
and other RICO claims they made could not stand. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, agreeing that there is an economic motive
requirement implicit in § 1962(c)'s enterprise element.
Held:
1. The clinics have standing to bring their claim. Since their
complaint was dismissed at the pleading stage, the complaint must
be sustained if relief could be granted under any set offacts that
could be proved consistent with the allegations.
Hishon v.
King &
Spalding, 467 U. S. 69,73. Nothing
more than the complaint's extortion and injury allegations are
needed to confer standing at this stage. Pp. 255-256.
2. RICO does not require proof that either the racketeering
enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering in § 1962(c) were
motivated by an economic purpose. Nowhere in either § 1962(c) or in
§ 1961's
250
Syllabus
definitions of "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering
activity" is there any indication that such a motive is required.
While arguably an enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce would have a profitseeking motive, § 1962(c)'s language
also includes enterprises whose activities "affect" such commerce.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "affect" as
"to have a detrimental influence on"; and an enterprise surely can
have such an influence on commerce without having its own
profit-seeking motives. The use of the term "enterprise" in
subsections (a) and (b), where it is arguably more tied in with
economic motivation, also does not lead to the inference of an
economic motive requirement in subsection (c). In subsections (a)
and (b), an "enterprise" is an entity acquired through illegal
activity or the money generated from illegal activity: the victim
of the activity. By contrast, the "enterprise" in subsection (c)
connotes generally the vehicle through which the unlawful pattern
of racketeering activity is committed. Since it is not being
acquired, it need not have a property interest that can be acquired
nor an economic motive for engaging in illegal activity; it need
only be an association in fact that engages in a pattern of
racketeering activity. Nor is an economic motive requirement
supported by the congressional statement of findings that prefaces
RICO and refers to activities that drain billions of dollars from
America's economy. Predicate acts, such as the alleged extortion
here, may not benefit the protesters financially, but they still
may drain money from the economy by harming businesses such as the
clinics. Moreover, a statement of congressional findings is a
rather thin reed upon which to base a requirement neither expressed
nor fairly implied from the Act's operative sections. Cf.
United
States v.
Turkette, 452 U. S. 576. The
Department of Justice's 1981 guidelines on RICO prosecutions are
also unpersuasive, since 1984 amendments broadened the focus of
RICO prosecutions from those association-in-fact enterprises that
exist "for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an
economic goal" to those that are "directed toward an economic or
other identifiable goal." In addition, the statutory language is
unambiguous, and there is no clearly expressed intent to the
contrary in the legislative history that would warrant a different
construction. Nor is there an ambiguity in RICO that would suffice
to invoke the rule of lenity. See
Sedima, S.
P. R. L.
v.
Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 499. pp.
256-262.
968 F.2d
612, reversed.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
SouTER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KENNEDY, J.,
joined,
post, p.263.
251
Fay Clayton argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the
briefs were Susan Valentine, Lowell E. Sachnoff, Jack L. Block,
Judi A. Lamble, Alan M. Pollack, and Mitchell G. Mandell.
Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy
Solicitor General Bryson, and Cynthia A. Young.
G.
Robert Blakey argued the cause for respondents.
Clark D. Forsythe and
Thomas Brejcha filed a brief
for respondent Scheidler et al.
Jay Alan Sekulow, Walter M.
Weber, Keith A. Fournier, and
Vincent P. McCarthy filed
a brief for respondent Terry et al.
Craig L. Parshall, John W
Whitehead, and
Alexis 1.
Crow filed a brief for
respondent Migliorino (Miller).
Paul Benjamin Linton filed a
brief for respondent Murphy. *
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of New York et al. by
Robert Abrams, Attorney
General of New York,
Jerry Boone, Solicitor General, and
Sanford M. Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, and by the
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:
Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut,
Roland W Burris
of Illinois,
Michael F.
Easley of North Carolina,
Stephen D. Rosenthal of Virginia,
Hubert H. Humphrey
III of Minnesota, and
Lee Fisher of Ohio; for the
American Medical Association et al. by
Jack R. Bierig,
Carter G.
Phillips, Kirk B. Johnson, and
Ann E.
Allen; for the National Abortion Federation et al. by
Elaine
Metlin, Eve W Paul, and
Roger K. Evans; for the National
Network of Abortion Funds by
Kathryn Kolbert; and for the
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by
David I.
Goldblatt, Charles S.
Sims, Deborah A. Ellis, and
Burt Neuborne.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., et al. by
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., David Goldberger, and
Victor G.
Rosenblum; for the Ohio Right to Life
Society, Inc., et al. by
David F.
Forte; and for the
Southern Center for Law & Ethics et al. by
Albert L. Jordan,
Steven T. McFarland, and
Bradley P. Jacob.
Briefs of
amici curiae were filed for the American Civil
Liberties Union by
Louis M. Bograd and
Steven R.
Shapiro; and for Focus on the Family by
Stephen W Reed
and
Ronald E. McKinstry.
252
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are required once again to interpret the provisions of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) chapter
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), Pub. L. 91-452,
Title IX, 84 Stat. 941, as amended, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988
ed. and Supp. IV). Section 1962(c) prohibits any person associated
with an enterprise from conducting its affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity. We granted certiorari to determine whether
RICO requires proof that either the racketeering enterprise or the
predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic
purpose. We hold that RICO requires no such economic motive.
I
Petitioner National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW), is a
national nonprofit organization that supports the legal
availability of abortion; petitioners Delaware Women's Health
Organization, Inc. (DWHO), and Summit Women's Health Organization,
Inc. (SWHO), are health care centers that perform abortions and
other medical procedures. Respondents are a coalition of
antiabortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN),
Joseph Scheidler and other individuals and organizations that
oppose legal abortion, and a medical laboratory that formerly
provided services to the two petitioner health care centers.1
Petitioners sued respondents in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging violations of the
Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1
et
seq., and RICO's §§ 1962(a), (c), and (d), as well as several
pendent state-law claims stemming from the activ-
1 The other respondents named in the complaint include the
following:
John Patrick Ryan, Randall A. Terry, Andrew Scholberg, Conrad
Wojnar, Timothy Murphy, Monica Migliorino, Vital-Med Laboratories,
Inc., ProLife Action League, Inc. (PLAL), Pro-Life Direct Action
League, Inc. (PDAL), Operation Rescue, and Project Life.
253
ities of antiabortion protesters at the clinics. According to
respondent Scheidler's congressional testimony, these protesters
aim to shut down the clinics and persuade women not to have
abortions. See,
e. g., Abortion Clinic Violence,
Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 55 (1987) (statement of Joseph M.
Scheidler, Executive Director, Pro-Life Action League). Petitioners
sought injunctive relief, along with treble damages, costs, and
attorney's fees. They later amended their complaint, and pursuant
to local rules, filed a "RICO Case Statement" that further detailed
the enterprise, the pattern of racketeering, the victims of the
racketeering activity, and the participants involved.
The amended complaint alleged that respondents were members of a
nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through a
pattern of racketeering activity including extortion in violation
of the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1951.2 Section 1951(b)(2) defines
extortion as "the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear, or under color of official right." Petitioners
alleged that respondents conspired to use threatened or actual
force, violence, or fear to induce clinic employees, doctors, and
patients to give up their jobs, give up their economic right to
practice medicine, and give up their right to obtain medical
services at the clinics. App. 66, Second Amended Complaint , 97.
Petitioners claimed that this conspiracy "has injured
2 The Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1951(a), provides: "Whoever in
any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or
threatens physical violence to any person or property in
furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of
this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both." Respondents contend that
petitioners are unable to show that their actions violated the
Hobbs Act. We do not reach that issue and express no opinion upon
it.
254
the business and/or property interests of the [petitioners]."
Id., at 72, , 104. According to the amended complaint, PLAN
constitutes the alleged racketeering "enterprise" for purposes of §
1962(c).
Id., at 72-73, "107-109.
The District Court dismissed the case pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Citing
Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127
(1961), it held that since the activities alleged "involve[d]
political opponents, not commercial competitors, and political
objectives, not marketplace goals," the Sherman Act did not apply.
765 F. Supp. 937, 941 (ND Ill. 1991). It dismissed petitioners'
RICO claims under § 1962(a) because the "income" alleged by
petitioners consisted of voluntary donations from persons opposed
to abortion which "in no way were derived from the pattern of
racketeering alleged in the complaint."
Ibid. The District
Court then concluded that petitioners failed to state a claim under
§ 1962(c) since "an economic motive requirement exists to the
extent that some profit-generating purpose must be alleged in order
to state a RICO claim."
Id., at 943. Finally, it dismissed
petitioners' RICO conspiracy claim under § 1962(d) since
petitioners' other RICO claims could not stand.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
968 F.2d
612 (CA7 1992).
As to the RICO counts, it agreed with the District Court that
the voluntary contributions received by respondents did not
constitute income derived from racketeering activities for purposes
of § 1962(a).
Id., at 625. It adopted the analysis of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
United States v.
Ivic, 700 F.2d
51 (1983), which found an "economic motive" requirement
implicit in the "enterprise" element of the offense. The Court of
Appeals determined that "noneconomic crimes committed in
furtherance of non-economic motives are not within the ambit of
RICO." 968 F. 2d, at 629. Consequently, petitioners failed to state
a claim under § 1962(c). The Court of Appeals also affirmed
dismissal of the RICO conspiracy claim under § 1962(d).
255
We granted certiorari, 508 U. S. 971 (1993), to resolve a
conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the putative economic
motive requirement of 18 U. S. C. §§ 1962(c) and (d). Compare
United States v.
Ivic, supra, and
United
States v.
Flynn, 852 F.2d
1045, 1052 (CA8), ("For purposes of RICO, an enterprise must be
directed toward an economic goal"), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 974
(1988), with
Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v.
McMonagle, 868 F.2d
1342 (CA3) (because the predicate offense does not require
economic motive, RICO requires no additional economic motive),
cert. denied,
493 U.
S. 901 (1989).
II
We first address the threshold question raised by respondents
whether petitioners have standing to bring their claim. Standing
represents a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to
review at all stages of the litigation.
Bender v.
Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 546-547
(1986). Respondents are correct that only DWHO and SWHO, and not
NOW; have sued under RICO.3 Despite the fact that the clinics
attempted to bring the RICO claim as class actions, DWHO and SWHO
must themselves have standing.
Simon v.
Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 40, n. 20
(1976), citing
Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 502
(1975). Respondents are wrong, however, in asserting that the
complaint alleges no "injury" to DWHO and SWHO "fairly traceable to
the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct."
Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.
S. 737, 751 (1984).
3 NOW sought class certification for itself, its women members
who use or may use the targeted health centers, and other women who
use or may use the services of such centers. The District Court did
not certify the class, apparently deferring its ruling until
resolution of the motions to dismiss. All pending motions were
dismissed as moot when the court granted respondents' motion to
dismiss. 765 F. Supp. 937, 945 (ND Ill. 1991).
256
We have held that "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual
allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may
suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to
support the claim."
Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U. S. 555,
561 (1992) (citations omitted). The District Court dismissed
petitioners' claim at the pleading stage pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), so their complaint must be sustained
if relief could be granted "under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations."
Hishon v.
King &
Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 73 (1984).
DWHO and SWHO alleged in their complaint that respondents conspired
to use force to induce clinic staff and patients to stop working
and obtain medical services elsewhere. App. 66, Second Amended
Complaint' 97. Petitioners claimed that this conspiracy "has
injured the business and/or property interests of the
[petitioners]."
Id., at 72, , 104. In addition, petitioners
claimed that respondent Scheidler threatened DWHO's clinic
administrator with reprisals if she refused to quit her job at the
clinic.
Id., at 68, , 98(g). Paragraphs 106 and 110 of
petitioners' complaint incorporate these allegations into the §
1962(c) claim.
Id., at 72, 73. Nothing more is needed to
confer standing on DWHO and SWHO at the pleading stage.
III
We turn to the question whether the racketeering enterprise or
the racketeering predicate acts must be accompanied by an
underlying economic motive. Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful "for
any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." Section
1961(1) defines "pattern of racketeering activity" to include
conduct that is "chargeable"
257
or "indictable" under a host of state and federal laws.4 RICO
broadly defines "enterprise" in § 1961(4) to "includ[e] any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity." Nowhere in either § 1962(c) or the
RICO definitions in § 1961 is there any indication that an economic
motive is required.
The phrase "any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce" comes the closest of
any language in subsection (c) to suggesting a need for an economic
motive. Arguably an enterprise engaged in
4 Section 1961(1) provides: "'racketeering activity' means (A)
any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson,
robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing
in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under
State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;
(B) any act which is indictable under any of the following
provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating
to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections
471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659
(relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable
under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894
(relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1029
(relating to fraud and related activity in connection with access
devices), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling
information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343
(relating to wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial
institution fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene
matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section
1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section
1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law
enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness,
victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating
against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1951 (relating
to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952
(relating to racketeering) ...
(C) any act which is
indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing
with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any
offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud
in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture,
importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise
dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any
law of the United States .... "
258
interstate or foreign commerce would have a profit-seeking
motive, but the language in § 1962(c) does not stop there; it
includes enterprises whose activities "affect" interstate or
foreign commerce. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 35
(1969) defines "affect" as "to have a detrimental influence on-used
especially in the phrase
affecting commerce." An enterprise
surely can have a detrimental influence on interstate or foreign
commerce without having its own profit-seeking motives.
The Court of Appeals thought that the use of the term
"enterprise" in §§ 1962(a) and (b), where it is arguably more tied
in with economic motivation, should be applied to restrict the
breadth of use of that term in § 1962(c). 968 F. 2d, at 629.
Respondents agree and point to our comment in
Sedima, S.
P. R. L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 489
(1985), regarding the term "violation," that "[w]e should not
lightly infer that Congress intended the term [violation] to have
wholly different meanings in neighboring subsections."
We do not believe that the usage of the term "enterprise" in
subsections (a) and (b) leads to the inference that an economic
motive is required in subsection (c). The term "enterprise" in
subsections (a) and (b) plays a different role in the structure of
those subsections than it does in subsection (c). Section 1962(a)
provides that it "shall be unlawful for any person who has received
any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
racketeering activity ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation
of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce." Correspondingly, § 1962(b)
states that it "shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern
of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt
to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign com-
259
merce." The "enterprise" referred to in subsections (a) and (b)
is thus something acquired through the use of illegal activities or
by money obtained from illegal activities. The enterprise in these
subsections is the victim of unlawful activity and may very well be
a "profit-seeking" entity that represents a property interest and
may be acquired. But the statutory language in subsections (a) and
(b) does not mandate that the enterprise be a "profit-seeking"
entity; it simply requires that the enterprise be an entity that
was acquired through illegal activity or the money generated from
illegal activity.
By contrast, the "enterprise" in subsection (c) connotes
generally the vehicle through which the unlawful pattern of
racketeering activity is committed, rather than the victim of that
activity. Subsection (c) makes it unlawful for "any person employed
by or associated with any enterprise ... to conduct or participate
... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity .... " Consequently, since the enterprise
in subsection (c) is not being acquired, it need not have a
property interest that can be acquired nor an economic motive for
engaging in illegal activity; it need only be an association in
fact that engages in a pattern of racketeering activity.5 Nothing
in subsections (a) and (b) directs us to a contrary conclusion.
The Court of Appeals also relied on the reasoning of
United
States v.
Bagaric, 706 F.2d
42 (CA2), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 840 (1983), to support its
conclusion that subsection (c) requires an economic motive. In
upholding the convictions, under RICO, of members of a political
terrorist group, the
Bagaric court relied in part on the
congressional statement of findings which prefaces RICO and refers
to the activities of groups that" 'drai[n] billions of dollars from
Ameri-
5 One commentator uses the terms "prize," "instrument,"
"victim," and "perpetrator" to describe the four separate roles the
enterprise may play in § 1962. See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud
Action in Context: Reflections on
Bennett v. Berg, 58 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 237,307-325 (1982).
260
ca's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force,
fraud, and corruption.'" 706 F. 2d, at 57, n. 13 (quoting OCCA, 84
Stat. 922). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
that the sort of activity thus condemned required an economic
motive.
We do not think this is so. Respondents and the two Courts of
Appeals, we think, overlook the fact that predicate acts, such as
the alleged extortion, may not benefit the protesters financially
but still may drain money from the economy by harming businesses
such as the clinics which are petitioners in this case.
We also think that the quoted statement of congressional
findings is a rather thin reed upon which to base a requirement of
economic motive neither expressed nor, we think, fairly implied in
the operative sections of the Act. As we said in
H.
J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
492 U. S. 229,
248 (1989): "The occasion for Congress' action was the perceived
need to combat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons
chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although it had
organized crime as its focus, was not limited in application to
organized crime."
In
United States v.
Turkette, 452 U. S. 576 (1981), we
faced the analogous question whether "enterprise" as used in §
1961(4) should be confined to "legitimate" enterprises. Looking to
the statutory language, we found that "[t]here is no restriction
upon the associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise
includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact."
Id., at 580. Accordingly, we resolved that § 1961(4)'s
definition of "enterprise" "appears to include both legitimate and
illegitimate enterprises within its scope; it no more excludes
criminal enterprises than it does legitimate ones."
Id., at
580-581. We noted that Congress could easily have narrowed the
sweep of the term "enterprise" by inserting a single word,
"legitimate."
Id., at 581. Instead, Congress did nothing to
indicate that "enter-
261
prise" should exclude those entities whose sole purpose was
criminal.
The parallel to the present case is apparent. Congress has not,
either in the definitional section or in the operative language,
required that an "enterprise" in § 1962(c) have an economic
motive.
The Court of Appeals also found persuasive guidelines for RICO
prosecutions issued by the Department of Justice in 1981. The
guidelines provided that a RICO indictment should not charge an
association as an enterprise, unless the association exists "'for
the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an
economic goal .... '"
United States v.
Ivic,
700 F. 2d, at 64, quoting U. S. Dept. of Justice, United States
Attorneys' Manual § 9-110.360 (1984) (emphasis added). The Second
Circuit believed these guidelines were entitled to deference under
administrative law principles. See 700 F. 2d, at 64. Whatever may
be the appropriate deference afforded to such internal rules, see,
e. g., Crandon v.
United States,
494 U. S. 152,
177 (1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment), for our purposes
we need note only that the Department of Justice amended its
guidelines in 1984. The amended guidelines provide that an
association-in-fact enterprise must be "directed toward an economic
or other identifiable goal." U. S. Dept. of Justice, United
States Attorney's Manual § 9-110.360 (Mar. 9, 1984) (emphasis
added).
Both parties rely on legislative history to support their
positions. We believe the statutory language is unambiguous and
find in the parties' submissions respecting legislative history no
such "clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary" that
would warrant a different construction.
Reves v.
Ernst &
Young, 507 U. S. 170, 177
(1993), citing
United States v.
Turkette, supra, at
580, quoting
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v.
GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108
(1980).
262
Respondents finally argue that the result here should be
controlled by the rule of lenity in criminal cases. But the rule of
lenity applies only when an ambiguity is present; "'it is not used
to beget one .... The rule comes into operation at the end of the
process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the
beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to
wrongdoers.'"
Turkette, supra, at 587-588, n. 10, quoting
Callanan v.
United States, 364 U. S. 587, 596 (1961)
(footnote omitted). We simply do not think there is an ambiguity
here which would suffice to invoke the rule of lenity. "'[T]he fact
that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated
by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth.'"
Sedima, 473 U. S., at 499 (quoting
Haroco,
Inc. v.
American Nat. Bank &
Trust Co. of
Chicago, 747 F.2d
384, 398 (CA7 1984)).6
We therefore hold that petitioners may maintain this action if
respondents conducted the enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity. The questions whether respondents committed
the requisite predicate acts, and whether the commission of these
acts fell into a pattern, are not before us. We hold only that RICO
contains no economic motive requirement.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Reversed.
6 Several of the respondents and several
amici argue that
application of RICO to antiabortion protesters could chill
legitimate expression protected by the First Amendment. However,
the question presented for review asked simply whether the Court
should create an unwritten requirement limiting RICO to cases where
either the enterprise or racketeering activity has an overriding
economic motive. None of the respondents made a constitutional
argument as to the proper construction of RICO in the Court of
Appeals, and their constitutional argument here is directed almost
entirely to the nature of their activities, rather than to the
construction of RICO. We therefore decline to address the First
Amendment question argued by respondents and the
amici.
263
JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion and write separately to explain why
the First Amendment does not require reading an economic-motive
requirement into the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO or statute), and to stress that the Court's opinion does
not bar First Amendment challenges to RICO's application in
particular cases.
Several respondents and
amici argue that we should avoid
the First Amendment issues that could arise from allowing RICO to
be applied to protest organizations by construing the statute to
require economic motivation, just as we have previously interpreted
other generally applicable statutes so as to avoid First Amendment
problems. See,
e. g., Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference
v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127, 138 (1961)
(holding that antitrust laws do not apply to businesses combining
to lobby the government, even where such conduct has an
anticompetitive purpose and an anticompetitive effect, because the
alternative "would raise important constitutional questions" under
the First Amendment); see also
Lucas v.
Alexander,
279 U. S. 573,
577 (1929) (a law "must be construed with an eye to possible
constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to its
validity"). The argument is meritless in this case, though, for
this principle of statutory construction applies only when the
meaning of a statute is in doubt, see
Noerr, supra, and here
"the statutory language is unambiguous,"
ante, at 261.
Even if the meaning of RICO were open to debate, however, it
would not follow that the statute ought to be read to include an
economic-motive requirement, since such a requirement would
correspond only poorly to free-speech concerns. Respondents and
amici complain that, unless so limited, the statute permits
an ideological organization's opponents to label its vigorous
expression as RICO predicate acts, thereby availing themselves of
powerful remedial provisions that could destroy the organization.
But an
264
SOUTER,~,concurring
economic-motive requirement would protect too much with respect
to First Amendment interests, since it would keep RICO from
reaching ideological entities whose members commit acts of violence
we need not fear chilling. An economic-motive requirement might
also prove to be underprotective, in that entities engaging in
vigorous but fully protected expression might fail the proposed
economicmotive test (for even protest movements need money) and so
be left exposed to harassing RICO suits.
An economic-motive requirement is, finally, unnecessary, because
legitimate free-speech claims may be raised and addressed in
individual RICO cases as they arise. Accordingly, it is important
to stress that nothing in the Court's opinion precludes a RICO
defendant from raising the First Amendment in its defense in a
particular case. Conduct alleged to amount to Hobbs Act extortion,
for example, or one of the other, somewhat elastic RICO predicate
acts may turn out to be fully protected First Amendment activity,
entitling the defendant to dismissal on that basis. See
NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 917 (1982)
(holding that a state common-law prohibition on malicious
interference with business could not, under the circumstances, be
constitutionally applied to a civil-rights boycott of white
merchants). And even in a case where a RICO violation has been
validly established, the First Amendment may limit the relief that
can be granted against an organization otherwise engaging in
protected expression. See
NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.
S. 449 (1958) (invalidating under the First Amendment a court
order compelling production of the NAACP's membership lists, issued
to enforce Alabama's requirements for out-of-state corporations
doing business in the State). See also
NAACP v.
Claiborne
Hardware Co., supra, at 930-932 (discussing First Amendment
limits on the assessment of derivative liability against
ideological organizations);
Oregon Natural Resources Council
v.
Mohla, 944 F.2d
531 (CA9 1991) (applying a heightened pleading stand-
265
ard to a complaint based on presumptively protected First
Amendment conduct).
This is not the place to catalog the speech issues that could
arise in a RICO action against a protest group, and I express no
view on the possibility of a First Amendment claim by the
respondents in this case (since, as the Court observes, such claims
are outside the question presented, see
ante, at 262, n. 6).
But I think it prudent to notice that RICO actions could deter
protected advocacy and to caution courts applying RICO to bear in
mind the First Amendment interests that could be at stake.
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