OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
MILLER, SUPERINTENDENT, PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, ET AL.
v. FRENCH ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
No. 99-224. Argued April 18, 2000-Decided June 19,2000*
In 1975, prison inmates at Indiana's Pendleton Correctional
Facility brought a class action, and the District Court issued an
injunction, which remains in effect, to remedy violations of the
Eighth Amendment regarding conditions of confinement. Congress
subsequently enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PLRA), which, as relevant here, sets a standard for the entry and
termination of prospective relief in civil actions challenging
prison conditions. Specifically, 18 U. S. C. § 3626(b)(2) provides
that a defendant or intervenor may move to terminate prospective
relief under an existing injunction that does not meet that
standard; § 3626(b)(3) provides that a court may not terminate such
relief if it makes certain findings; and § 3626(e)(2) dictates that
a motion to terminate such relief "shall operate as a stay" of that
relief beginning 30 days after the motion is filed and ending when
the court rules on the motion. In 1997, petitioner prison officials
(hereinafter State) filed a motion to terminate the remedial order
under § 3626(b). Respondent prisoners moved to enjoin the operation
of the automatic stay, arguing that § 3626(e)(2) violates due
process and separation of powers principles. The District Court
enjoined the stay, the State appealed, and the United States
intervened to defend § 3626(e)(2)'s constitutionality. In
affirming, the Seventh Circuit concluded that § 3626(e)(2)
precluded courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin
the stay, but that the statute, so construed, was unconstitutional
on separation of powers grounds.
Held:
1. Congress clearly intended to make operation of the PLRA's
automatic stay provision mandatory, precluding courts from
exercising their equitable power to enjoin the stay. The Government
contends that (1) the Court should not interpret a statute as
displacing courts' traditional equitable authority to preserve the
status quo pending resolution on the merits absent the clearest
command to the contrary and (2) reading § 3626(e)(2) to remove that
equitable power would
*Together with No. 99-582,
United States v.
French et
al., also on certiorari to the same court.
328
Syllabus
raise serious separation of powers questions, and therefore
should be avoided under the canon of constitutional doubt. But
where, as here, Congress has made its intent clear, this Court must
give effect to that intent.
Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson, 370
U. S. 195, 215. Under § 3626(e)(2), a stay is automatic once a
state defendant has filed a § 3626(b) motion, and the command that
it "shall operate as a stay during" the specified time period
indicates that it is mandatory throughout that period. The
statute's plain meaning would be subverted were § 3626(e)(2)
interpreted merely as a burden-shifting mechanism that does not
prevent courts from suspending the stay. Viewing the automatic stay
provision in the context of § 3626 as a whole confirms the Court's
conclusion. Section 3626(e)(4) provides for an appeal from an order
preventing the automatic stay's operation, not from the
denial of a motion to enjoin a stay. This provision's
one-way nature only makes sense if the stay is required to operate
during a specific time period, such that any attempt by a district
court to circumvent the mandatory stay is immediately reviewable.
Mandamus is not a more appropriate remedy because it is granted
only in the exercise of sound discretion. Given that curbing the
courts' equitable discretion was a principal objective of the PLRA,
it would have been odd for Congress to have left § 3626(e)(2)'s
enforcement to that discretion. Section 3626(e)(3) also does not
support the Government's view, for it only permits the stay's
starting point to be delayed for up to 90 days; it does not affect
the stay's operation once it begins. While construing § 3626(e)(2)
to remove courts' equitable discretion raises constitutional
questions, the canon of constitutional doubt permits the Court to
avoid such questions only where the saving construction is not
plainly contrary to Congress' intent. Pp. 336-341.
2. Section 3626(e) does not violate separation of powers
principles.
The Constitution prohibits one branch of the Government from
encroaching on the central prerogatives of another. Article III
gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases,
but to
decide them, subject to review only by superior
Article III courts.
Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
514 U. S. 211,
218-219. Respondents contend that § 3626(e)(2) violates the
separation of powers principle by legislatively suspending a final
judgment of an Article III court in violation of
Plaut and
Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409. Unlike the situation in
Hayburn's Case, § 3626(e)(2) does not involve direct review
of a judicial decision by the Legislative or Executive Branch. Nor
does it involve the reopening of a final judgment, as was addressed
in
Plaut. Plaut was careful to distinguish legislation that
attempted to reopen the dismissal of a money damages suit from that
altering the prospective effect of injunctions entered by Article
III courts. Prospective relief under
329
a continuing, executory decree remains subject to alteration due
to changes in the underlying law. Cf.
Landgraf v.
USI
Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 273. This
conclusion follows from the Court's decision in
Pennsylvania
v.
Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421,
432
(Wheeling Bridge II), that prospective relief it issued
in
Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge
Co., 13 How. 518
(Wheeling Bridge I), became
unenforceable after Congress altered the law underlying the ongoing
relief. Applied here, the
Wheeling Bridge II principles
demonstrate that § 3626(e)(2)'s automatic stay does not
unconstitutionally suspend or reopen an Article III court's
judgment. It does not tell judges when, how, or what to do, but
reflects the change implemented by § 3626(b), which establishes new
standards for prospective relief. As
Plaut and
Wheeling
Bridge II instruct, when Congress changes the law underlying
the judgment awarding such relief, that relief is no longer
enforceable to the extent it is inconsistent with the new law.
Although the remedial injunction here is a final judgment for
purposes of appeal, it is not the last word of the judicial
department, for it is subject to the court's continuing supervisory
jurisdiction, and therefore may be altered according to subsequent
changes in the law. For the same reasons, § 3626(e)(2) does not
violate the separation of powers principle articulated in
United
States v.
Klein, 13 Wall. 128, where the Court found
unconstitutional a statute purporting to prescribe rules of
decision to the Federal Judiciary in cases pending before it. That
§ 3626(e)(2) does not itself amend the legal standard does not help
respondents; when read in the context of § 3626 as a whole, the
provision does not prescribe a rule of decision but imposes the
consequences of the court's application of the new legal standard.
Finally, Congress' imposition of the time limit in § 3626(e)(2)
does not offend the structural concerns underlying the separation
of powers. Whether that time is so short that it deprives litigants
of an opportunity to be heard is a due process question not before
this Court. Nor does the Court have occasion to decide here whether
there could be a time constraint on judicial action that was so
severe that it implicated structural separation of powers concerns.
Pp.341-350.
178 F.3d
437, reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and
in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined as to Parts I and II.
SOUTER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which GINSBURG, J., joined,
post, p. 350. BREYER,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined,
post, p. 353.
330
Counsel
Jon Laramore, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, argued
the cause for petitioners in No. 99-224. With him on the briefs
were
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General,
Jeffrey
A. Modisett, former Attorney General, and
Wayne E. Uhl
and
Geoffrey G.
Slaughter, Deputy Attorneys
General.
Deputy Solicitor General Underwood argued the cause for the
United States in No. 99-582. With her on the briefs were Solicitor
General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Lee, Irving L.
Gornstein, and Mark L. Gross.
Kenneth
J. Falk argued the cause for respondents in both
cases. With him on the brief were Jacquelyn E. Bowie, Hamid R.
Kashani, Steven R. Shapiro, and Elizabeth Alexander. t
tBriefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of Texas et al. by
John Cornyn, Attorney General
of Texas,
Andy Taylor, First Assistant Attorney General,
Shane Phelps, Deputy Attorney General,
Gregory S.
Coleman, Solicitor General,
Charles K. Eldred,
Assistant Attorney General, and
Robert Rigsby, Acting
Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, and by the
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:
Bill
Pryor of Alabama,
Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska,
Robert
A. Russell, Jr., of Arkansas,
Bill Lockyer of
California,
M. Jane Brady of Delaware,
Robert A.
Butterworth of Florida,
James E. Ryan of Illinois,
Carla J. Stovall of Kansas,
J.
Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland,
Jennifer M. Granholm
of Michigan,
Mike Moore of Mississippi,
Jeremiah W (Jay)
Nixon of Missouri,
Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana,
Don
Stenberg of Nebraska,
Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada,
Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire,
John J.
Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey,
Betty D. Montgomery of
Ohio,
W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma,
D. Michael
Fisher of Pennsylvania,
Charlie Condon of South
Carolina,
Mark Barnett of South Dakota,
Paul G.
Summers of Tennessee,
Jan Graham of Utah,
Christine O.
Gregoire of Washington, and
Gay
Woodhouse of Wyoming; for Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement, Inc., et al. by
Wayne W Schmidt, Bernard
J. Farber, James P. Manak, and
Richard
Weintraub; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by
Kent S.
Scheidegger and
Charles L. Hobson; for
the National Governors' Association et al. by
Richard Ruda
and
James I. Crowley; and for the Washington Legal
Foundation et al. by
Paul D. Clement, Daniel J.
Popeo, and
R. Shawn Gunnarson.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
Public Citizen by
Alan B. Morrison and
David C.
Vladeck; for Arizona State Prison
331
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) establishes standards for the
entry and termination of prospective relief in civil actions
challenging prison conditions. §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to
1321-77. If prospective relief under an existing injunction does
not satisfy these standards, a defendant or intervenor is entitled
to "immediate termination" of that relief. 18 U. S. C. § 3626(b)(2)
(1994 ed., Supp. IV). And under the PLRA's "automatic stay"
provision, a motion to terminate prospective relief "shall operate
as a stay" of that relief during the period beginning 30 days after
the filing of the motion (extendable to up to 90 days for "good
cause") and ending when the court rules on the motion. §§
3626(e)(2), (3). The superintendent of Indiana's Pendleton
Correctional Facility, which is currently operating under an
ongoing injunction to remedy violations of the Eighth Amendment
regarding conditions of confinement, filed a motion to terminate
prospective relief under the PLRA. Respondent prisoners moved to
enjoin the operation of the automatic stay provision of §
3626(e)(2), arguing that it is unconstitutional. The District Court
enjoined the stay, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed. We must decide whether a district court may enjoin the
operation of the PLRA's automatic stay provision and, if not,
whether that provision violates separation of powers
principles.
I A
This litigation began in 1975, when four inmates at what is now
the Pendleton Correctional Facility brought a class
System Inmates by
John P. Frank; and for Erwin
Chemerinsky et al. by
Mr. Chemerinsky, pro se.
Sarah B. Vandenbraak, Michael D. Hess, Leonard
J.
Koerner, and Lorna B. Goodman filed a brief for the Association of
State Correctional Administrators et al. as amici curiae.
332
action under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, on behalf of
all persons who were, or would be, confined at the facility against
the predecessors in office of petitioners (hereinafter State). 1
Record, Doc. No.1, p. 2. After a trial, the District Court found
that living conditions at the prison violated both state and
federal law, including the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, and the court issued an injunction to
correct those violations.
French v.
Owens, 538 F.
Supp. 910 (SD Ind. 1982), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in
part,
777 F.2d
1250 (CA7 1985). While the State's appeal was pending,
this Court decided
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 465
U. S. 89 (1984), which held that the Eleventh Amendment
deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over claims for injunctive
relief against state officials based on state law. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit remanded the action to the
District Court for reconsideration. 777 F. 2d, at 1251. On remand,
the District Court concluded that most of the state law violations
also ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment, and it issued an amended
remedial order to address those constitutional violations. The
order also accounted for improvements in living conditions at the
Pendleton facility that had occurred in the interim.
Ibid.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the amended remedial order as to
those aspects governing overcrowding and double celling, the use of
mechanical restraints, staffing, and the quality of food and
medical services, but it vacated those portions pertaining to
exercise and recreation, protective custody, and fire and
occupational safety standards.
Id., at 1258. This ongoing
injunctive relief has remained in effect ever since, with the last
modification occurring in October 1988, when the parties resolved
by joint stipulation the remaining issues related to fire and
occupational safety standards. 1 Record, Doc. No. 14.
333
B
In 1996, Congress enacted the PLRA. As relevant here, the PLRA
establishes standards for the entry and termination of prospective
relief in civil actions challenging conditions at prison
facilities. Specifically, a court "shall not grant or approve any
prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is
narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right." 18 U. S.
C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. IV). The same criteria apply to
existing injunctions, and a defendant or intervenor may move to
terminate prospective relief that does not meet this standard. See
§ 3626(b)(2). In particular, § 3626(b)(2) provides:
"In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a
defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the immediate
termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or
granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is
narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right."
A court may not terminate prospective relief, however, if it
"makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief
remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the
Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is
narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary to correct
the violation." § 3626(b)(3). The PLRA also requires courts to rule
"promptly" on motions to terminate prospective relief, with
mandamus available to remedy a court's failure to do so. §
3626(e)(1).
Finally, the provision at issue here, § 3626(e)(2), dictates
that, in certain circumstances, prospective relief shall be
334
stayed pending resolution of a motion to terminate.
Specifically, subsection (e)(2), entitled "Automatic Stay,"
states:
"Any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief made under
subsection (b) shall operate as a stay during the period-
"(A)(i) beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed, in
the case of a motion made under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection
(b); ...
"(ii) ... and "(B) ending on the date the court enters a final
order ruling on the motion."
As one of several 1997 amendments to the PLRA, Congress
permitted courts to postpone the entry of the automatic stay for
not more than 60 days for "good cause," which cannot include
general congestion of the court's docket. § 123, 111 Stat. 2470,
codified at 18 U. S. C. §3626(e)(3).*
C
On June 5, 1997, the State filed a motion under § 3626(b) to
terminate the prospective relief governing the conditions of
confinement at the Pendleton Correctional Facility. 1 Record, Doc.
No. 16. In response, the prisoner class moved for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction to enjoin the operation
of the automatic stay, arguing that § 3626(e)(2) is
unconstitutional as both a violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment and separation of powers principles. The
District Court granted
* As originally enacted, § 3626(e)(2) provided that "[a]ny
prospective relief subject to a pending motion [for termination]
shall be automatically stayed during the period ... beginning on
the 30th day after such motion is filed ... and ending on the date
the court enters a final order ruling on the motion." §802, 110
Stat. 1321-68 to 1321-69. The 1997 amendments to the PLRA revised
the automatic stay provision to its current form, and Congress
specified that the 1997 amendments "shall apply to pending cases."
18 U. S. C. § 3626 note (1994 ed., Supp. IV).
335
the prisoners' motion, enjoining the automatic stay. See
id., Doc. No. 23; see also
French v.
Duckworth, 178 F.3d
437,
440-441 (CA7 1999). The State appealed, and the
United States intervened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403(a) to
defend the constitutionality of § 3626(e)(2).
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
District Court's order, concluding that although § 3626(e)(2)
precluded courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin
operation of the automatic stay, the statute, so construed, was
unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds. See 178 F. 3d, at
447-448. The court reasoned that Congress drafted § 3626(e)(2) in
unequivocal terms, clearly providing that a motion to terminate
under § 3626(b)(2)
"shall operate" as a stay during a
specified time period.
Id., at 443. While acknowledging that
courts should not lightly assume that Congress meant to restrict
the equitable powers of the federal courts, the Court of Appeals
found "it impossible to read this language as doing anything less
than that."
Ibid. Turning to the constitutional question,
the court characterized § 3626(e)(2) as "a self-executing
legislative determination that a specific decree of a federal court
... must be set aside at least for a period of time."
Id.,
at 446. As such, it concluded that § 3626(e)(2) directly suspends a
court order in violation of the separation of powers doctrine under
Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211 (1995), and
mandates a particular rule of decision, at least during the
pendency of the § 3626(b)(2) termination motion, contrary to
United States v.
Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872). See 178
F. 3d, at 446. Having concluded that § 3626(e)(2) is
unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds, the Court of
Appeals did not reach the prisoners' due process claims. Over the
dissent of three judges, the court denied rehearing en bane. See
id., at 448-453 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en bane).
We granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 1045 (1999), to resolve a
conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether
336
§ 3626(e)(2) permits federal courts, in the exercise of their
traditional equitable authority, to enjoin operation of the PLRA's
automatic stay provision and, if not, to review the Court of
Appeals' judgment that § 3626(e)(2), so construed, is
unconstitutional. Compare
Ruiz v.
Johnson, 178 F.3d
385 (CA5 1999) (holding that district courts retain the
equitable discretion to suspend the automatic stay and that §
3626(e)(2) is therefore constitutional);
Hadix v.
Johnson, 144 F. 3d
925 (CA6 1998) (same), with
178 F.3d
437 (CA7 1999) (case below).
II
We address the statutory question first. Both the State and the
prisoner class agree, as did the majority and dissenting judges
below, that § 3626(e)(2) precludes a district court from exercising
its equitable powers to enjoin the automatic stay. The Government
argues, however, that § 3626(e)(2) should be construed to leave
intact the federal courts' traditional equitable discretion to
"stay the stay," invoking two canons of statutory construction.
First, the Government contends that we should not interpret a
statute as displacing courts' traditional equitable authority to
preserve the status quo pending resolution on the merits "[a]bsent
the clearest command to the contrary."
Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442
U. S. 682, 705 (1979). Second, the Government asserts that
reading § 3626(e)(2) to remove that equitable power would raise
serious separation of powers questions, and therefore should be
avoided under the canon of constitutional doubt. Like the Court of
Appeals, we do not lightly assume that Congress meant to restrict
the equitable powers of the federal courts, and we agree that
constitutionally doubtful constructions should be avoided where
"fairly possible."
Communications Workers v.
Beck,
487 U. S. 735,
762 (1988). But where Congress has made its intent clear, "we must
give effect to that intent."
Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson, 370
U. S. 195, 215 (1962).
337
The text of § 3626(e)(2) provides that "[a]ny motion to ...
terminate prospective relief made under subsection (b)
shall
operate as a stay" during a fixed period of time, i.
e.,
from 30 (or 90) days after the motion is filed until the court
enters a final order ruling on the motion. 18 U. S. C. § 3626(e)(2)
(1994 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). The stay is "automatic" once
a state defendant has filed a § 3626(b) motion, and the statutory
command that such a motion "shall operate as a stay during the
[specified time] period" indicates that the stay is
mandatory throughout that period of time. See
Lexecon
Inc. v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach,
523 U. S. 26, 35 (1998) ("[T]he mandatory 'shall' ... normally
creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion").
Nonetheless, the Government contends that reading the statute to
preserve courts' traditional equitable powers to enter appropriate
injunctive relief is consistent with this text because, in its
view, § 3626(e)(2) is simply a burdenshifting mechanism. That is,
the purpose of the automatic stay provision is merely to relieve
defendants of the burden of establishing the prerequisites for a
stay and to eliminate courts' discretion to deny a stay, even if
those prerequisites are established, based on the public interest
or hardship to the plaintiffs. Thus, under this reading, nothing in
§ 3626(e)(2) prevents courts from subsequently suspending the
automatic stay by applying the traditional standards for injunctive
relief.
Such an interpretation, however, would subvert the plain meaning
of the statute, making its mandatory language merely permissive.
Section 3626(e)(2) states that a motion to terminate prospective
relief
"shall operate as a stay
during" the specified
time period from 30 (or 90) days after the filing of the § 3626(b)
motion
until the court rules on that motion. (Emphasis
added.) Thus, not only does the statute employ the mandatory term
"shall," but it also specifies the points at which the operation of
the stay is to begin and end. In other words, contrary to JUSTICE
BREYER'S suggestion
338
that the language of § 3626(e)(2) "says nothing ... about the
district court's power to modify or suspend the operation of the
'stay,'"
post, at 358 (dissenting opinion), § 3626(e)(2)
unequivocally mandates that the stay "shall operate
during"
this specific interval. To allow courts to exercise their equitable
discretion to prevent the stay from "operating" during this
statutorily prescribed period would be to contradict § 3626(e)(2)'s
plain terms. It would mean that the motion to terminate merely
may operate as a stay, despite the statute's command that it
"shall" have such effect. If Congress had intended to accomplish
nothing more than to relieve state defendants of the burden of
establishing the prerequisites for a stay, the language of §
3626(e)(2) is, at best, an awkward and indirect means to achieve
that result.
Viewing the automatic stay provision in the context of § 3626 as
a whole further confirms that Congress intended to prohibit federal
courts from exercising their equitable authority to suspend
operation of the automatic stay. The specific appeal provision
contained in § 3626(e) states that "[a]ny order staying,
suspending, delaying, or barring the operation of the automatic
stay" of § 3626(e)(2) "shall be appealable" pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§ 1292(a)(1). § 3626(e)(4). At first blush, this provision might be
read as supporting the view that Congress expressly recognized the
possibility that a district court could exercise its equitable
discretion to enjoin the stay. The two Courts of Appeals that have
construed § 3626(e)(2) as preserving the federal courts' equitable
powers have reached that conclusion based on this reading of §
3626(e)(4). See
Ruiz v.
Johnson, 178 F. 3d, at 394;
Hadix v.
Johnson, 144 F. 3d, at 938. They reasoned
that Congress would not have provided for expedited review of such
orders had it not intended that district courts would retain the
power to enter the orders in the first place. See
ibid. In
other words, "Congress understood that there would be some cases in
which a conscientious district court acting in good faith would
perceive that equity required that it suspend"
339
the § 3626(e)(2) stay, and "Congress therefore permitted the
district court to do so, subject to appellate review."
Ruiz
v.
Johnson, supra, at 394.
The critical flaw in this construction, however, is that §
3626(e)(4) only provides for an appeal from an order
preventing the operation of the automatic stay. § 3626(e)(4)
("Any order staying, suspending, delaying, or barring the operation
of the automatic stay" under § 3626(e)(2) "shall be appealable").
If the rationale for the provision were that in some situations
equity demands that the automatic stay be suspended, then
presumably the
denial of a motion to enjoin the stay should
also be appealable. The one-way nature of the appeal provision only
makes sense if the automatic stay is required to operate during a
specific time period, such that any attempt by a district court to
circumvent the mandatory stay is immediately reviewable.
The Government contends that if Congress' goal were to prevent
courts from circumventing the PLRA's plain commands, mandamus would
have been a more appropriate remedy than appellate review. But that
proposition is doubtful, as mandamus is an extraordinary remedy
that is "granted only in the exercise of sound discretion."
Whitehouse v.
Illinois Central R. Co., 349 U. S. 366, 373
(1955). Given that curbing the equitable discretion of district
courts was one of the PLRA's principal objectives, it would have
been odd for Congress to have left enforcement of § 3626(e)(2) to
that very same discretion. Instead, Congress sensibly chose to make
available an immediate appeal to resolve situations in which courts
mistakenly believe-under the novel scheme created by the PLRA-that
they have the authority to enjoin the automatic stay, rather than
the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, which requires a showing of a
"clear and indisputable" right to the issuance of the writ. See
Mallard v.
United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist.
of Iowa, 490 U. S. 296, 309 (1989). In any event, § 3626(e) as
originally enacted did not provide for interlocutory review. It
was
340
only after some courts refused to enter the automatic stay, and
after the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit would not review
such a refusal, that Congress amended § 3626(e) to provide for
interlocutory review. See
In re Scott, 163 F. 3d 282, 284
(CAS 1998);
Ruiz v.
Johnson, supra, at 388;
see also 18 U. S. C. § 3626(e)(4) (1994 ed., Supp. IV).
Finally, the Government finds support for its view in §
3626(e)(3). That provision authorizes an extension, for "good
cause," of the starting point for the automatic stay, from 30 days
after the § 3626(b) motion is filed until 90 days after that motion
is filed. The Government explains that, by allowing the court to
prevent the entry of the stay for up to 60 days under the
relatively generous "good cause" standard, Congress by negative
implication has preserved courts' discretion to suspend the stay
after that time under the more stringent standard for
injunctive relief. To be sure, allowing a delay in entry of the
stay for 60 days based on a good cause standard does not by itself
necessarily imply that any other reason for preventing the
operation of the stay-for example, on the basis of traditional
equitable principles-is precluded. But § 3626(e)(3) cannot be read
in isolation. When §§ 3626(e)(2) and (3) are read together, it is
clear that the district court cannot enjoin the operation of the
automatic stay. The § 3626(b) motion "shall operate as a stay
during" a specific time period. Section 3626(e)(3) only adjusts the
starting point for the stay, and it merely permits that starting
point to be delayed. Once the 90-day period has passed, the §
3626(b) motion "shall operate as a stay" until the court rules on
the § 3626(b) motion. During that time, any attempt to enjoin the
stay is irreconcilable with the plain language of the statute.
Thus, although we should not construe a statute to displace
courts' traditional equitable authority absent the "clearest
command,"
Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U. S., at 705, or
an "inescapable inference" to the contrary,
Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, 398
(1946), we are con-
341
vinced that Congress' intent to remove such discretion is
unmistakable in § 3626(e)(2). And while this construction raises
constitutional questions, the canon of constitutional doubt permits
us to avoid such questions only where the saving construction is
not "plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."
Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast
Building &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575
(1988). "We cannot press statutory construction 'to the point of
disingenuous evasion' even to avoid a constitutional question."
United States v.
Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 96 (1985)
(quoting
George Moore Ice Cream Co. v.
Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379
(1933)); see also
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v.
Yeskey, 524 U.
S. 206, 212 (1998) (constitutional doubt canon does not apply
where the statute is unambiguous);
Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U. S. 833, 841 (1986)
(constitutional doubt canon "does not give a court the prerogative
to ignore the legislative will"). Like the Court of Appeals, we
find that § 3626(e)(2) is unambiguous, and accordingly, we cannot
adopt JUSTICE BREYER'S "more flexible interpretation" of the
statute.
Post, at 355. Any construction that preserved
courts' equitable discretion to enjoin the automatic stay would
effectively convert the PLRA's mandatory stay into a discretionary
one. Because this would be plainly contrary to Congress' intent in
enacting the stay provision, we must confront the constitutional
issue.
III
The Constitution enumerates and separates the powers of the
three branches of Government in Articles I, II, and III, and it is
this "very structure" of the Constitution that exemplifies the
concept of separation of powers.
INS v.
Chadha,
462 U. S. 919,
946 (1983). While the boundaries between the three branches are
not" 'hermetically' sealed," see
id., at 951, the
Constitution prohibits one branch from encroaching on the central
prerogatives of another, see
Loving v.
United States,
517 U. S. 748,
757 (1996);
Buckley v.
342
Valeo, 424 U.
S. 1, 121-122 (1976)
(per curiam). The powers of the
Judicial Branch are set forth in Article III, § 1, which states
that the "judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish," and provides that these
federal courts shall be staffed by judges who hold office during
good behavior, and whose compensation shall not be diminished
during tenure in office. As we explained in
Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S., at 218-219, Article III
"gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on
cases, but to
decide them, subject to review only by
superior courts in the Article III hierarchy."
Respondent prisoners contend that § 3626(e)(2) encroaches on the
central prerogatives of the Judiciary and thereby violates the
separation of powers doctrine. It does this, the prisoners assert,
by legislatively suspending a final judgment of an Article III
court in violation of
Plaut and
Hayburn's Case, 2
Dall. 409 (1792). According to the prisoners, the remedial order
governing living conditions at the Pendleton Correctional Facility
is a final judgment of an Article III court, and § 3626(e)(2)
constitutes an impermissible usurpation of judicial power because
it commands the district court to suspend prospective relief under
that order, albeit temporarily. An analysis of the principles
underlying
Hayburn's Case and
Plaut, as well as an
examination of § 3626(e)(2)'s interaction with the other provisions
of § 3626, makes clear that § 3626(e)(2) does not offend these
separation of powers principles.
Hayburn's Case arose out of a 1792 statute that
authorized pensions for veterans of the Revolutionary War. See Act
of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243. The statute provided that
the circuit courts were to review the applications and determine
the appropriate amount of the pension, but that the Secretary of
War had the discretion either to adopt or reject the courts'
findings.
Hayburn's Case, supra, at 408-410.
343
Although this Court did not reach the constitutional issue in
Hayburn's Case, the statements of five Justices, acting as
circuit judges, were reported, and we have since recognized that
the case "stands for the principle that Congress cannot vest review
of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the
Executive Branch."
Plaut, supra, at 218; see also
Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 677, n. 15
(1988). As we recognized in
Plaut, such an effort by a
coequal branch to "annul a final judgment" is "'an assumption of
Judicial power' and therefore forbidden." 514 U. S., at 224
(quoting
Bates v.
Kimball, 2 Chipman 77 (Vt.
1824)).
Unlike the situation in
Hayburn's Case, § 3626(e)(2) does
not involve the direct review of a judicial decision by officials
of the Legislative or Executive Branches. Nonetheless, the
prisoners suggest that § 3626(e)(2) falls within
Hayburn's
prohibition against an indirect legislative "suspension" or
reopening of a final judgment, such as that addressed in
Plaut. See
Plaut, supra, at 226 (quoting
Hayburn's
Case, supra, at 413 (letter of Iredell, J., and Sitgreaves, D.
J.) (" '[N]o decision of any court of the United States can, under
any circumstances, ... be liable to a revision, or even suspension,
by the [l]egislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind
appears to be vested' ")). In
Plaut, we held that a federal
statute that required federal courts to reopen final judgments that
had been entered before the statute's enactment was
unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds. 514 U. S., at
211. The plaintiffs had brought a civil securities fraud action
seeking money damages.
Id., at 213. While that action was
pending, we ruled in
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U. S. 350 (1991),
that such suits must be commenced within one year after the
discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three
years after such violation. In light of this intervening decision,
the
Plaut plaintiffs' suit was untimely, and the District
Court accordingly dismissed the action as time barred.
Plaut,
supra, at 214. After the judgment dismissing the
344
case had become final, Congress enacted a statute providing for
the reinstatement of those actions, including the
Plaut
plaintiffs', that had been dismissed under
Lamp! but that
would have been timely under the previously applicable statute of
limitations. 514 U. S., at 215.
We concluded that this retroactive command that federal courts
reopen final judgments exceeded Congress' authority.
Id., at
218-219. The decision of an inferior court within the Article III
hierarchy is not the final word of the department (unless the time
for appeal has expired), and "[i]t is the obligation of the last
court in the hierarchy that rules on the case to give effect to
Congress's latest enactment, even when that has the effect of
overturning the judgment of an inferior court, since each court, at
every level, must 'decide according to existing laws.'"
Id.,
at 227 (quoting
United States v.
Schooner Peggy, 1
Cranch 103, 109 (1801)). But once a judicial decision achieves
finality, it "becomes the last word of the judicial department."
514 U. S., at 227. And because Article III "gives the Federal
Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to
decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in
the Article III hierarchy,"
id., at 218-219, the "judicial
Power is one to render dispositive judgments," and Congress cannot
retroactively command Article III courts to reopen final judgments,
id., at 219 (quoting Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 926 (1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Plaut, however, was careful to distinguish the situation
before the Court in that case-legislation that attempted to reopen
the dismissal of a suit seeking money damages-from legislation that
"altered the prospective effect of injunctions entered by Article
III courts." 514 U. S., at 232. We emphasized that "nothing in our
holding today calls ... into question" Congress' authority to alter
the prospective effect of previously entered injunctions.
Ibid. Prospective relief under a continuing, executory
decree remains subject to alteration due to changes in the
underlying law. Cf.
Land-
345
graf v.
USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 273 (1994)
("When the intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety
of prospective relief, application of the new provision is not
retroactive"). This conclusion follows from our decisions in
Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge
Co., 13 How. 518 (1852)
(Wheeling Bridge 1), and
Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge
Co., 18 How. 421 (1856)
(Wheeling Bridge II).
In
Wheeling Bridge I, we held that a bridge across the
Ohio River, because it was too low, unlawfully "obstruct[edJ the
navigation of the Ohio," and ordered that the bridge be raised or
permanently removed. 13 How., at 578. Shortly thereafter, Congress
enacted legislation declaring the bridge to be a "lawful
structur[eJ," establishing the bridge as a "'post-roa[dJ for the
passage of the mails of the United States,'" and declaring that the
Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company was authorized to maintain the
bridge at its then-current site and elevation.
Wheeling Bridge
II, supra, at 429. After the bridge was destroyed in a storm,
Pennsylvania sued to enjoin the bridge's reconstruction, arguing
that the statute legalizing the bridge was unconstitutional because
it effectively annulled the Court's decision in
Wheeling
Bridge 1. We rejected that argument, concluding that the decree
in
Wheeling Bridge I provided for ongoing relief by
"directing the abatement of the obstruction" which enjoined the
defendants' from any continuance or reconstruction of the
obstruction. Because the intervening statute altered the underlying
law such that the bridge was no longer an unlawful obstruction, we
held that it was "quite plain the decree of the court cannot be
enforced."
Wheeling Bridge II, supra, at 431-432. The Court
explained that had
Wheeling Bridge I awarded money damages
in an action at law, then that judgment would be final, and
Congress' later action could not have affected plaintiff's right to
those damages. See 18 How., at 431. But because the decree entered
in
Wheeling Bridge I provided for pro spec-
346
tive relief-a continuing injunction against the continuation or
reconstruction of the bridge-the ongoing validity of the injunctive
relief depended on "whether or not [the bridge] interferes with the
right of navigation." 18 How., at 431. When Congress altered the
underlying law such that the bridge was no longer an unlawful
obstruction, the injunction against the maintenance of the bridge
was not enforceable. See
id., at 432.
Applied here, the principles of
Wheeling Bridge II
demonstrate that the automatic stay of § 3626(e)(2) does not
unconstitutionally "suspend" or reopen a judgment of an Article III
court. Section 3626(e)(2) does not by itself "tell judges when,
how, or what to do." 178 F. 3d, at 449 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc). Instead, § 3626(e)(2) merely
reflects the change implemented by § 3626(b), which does the "heavy
lifting" in the statutory scheme by establishing new standards for
prospective relief. See
Berwanger v.
Cottey,
178 F.3d
834, 839
(CA7 1999). Section 3626 prohibits the
continuation of prospective relief that was "approved or granted in
the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly
drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation
of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means to correct
the violation," § 3626(b)(2), or in the absence of "findings based
on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct
a current and ongoing violation of a Federal right, extends no
further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the
least intrusive means to correct the violation," § 3626(b)(3).
Accordingly, if prospective relief under an existing decree had
been granted or approved absent such findings, then that
prospective relief must cease, see § 3626(b)(2), unless and until
the court makes findings on the record that such relief remains
necessary to correct an ongoing violation and is narrowly tailored,
see § 3626(b)(3). The PLRA's automatic stay provision assists in
the enforce-
347
ment of §§ 3626(b)(2) and (3) by requiring the court to stay any
prospective relief that, due to the change in the underlying
standard, is no longer enforceable, i.
e., prospective
relief that is not supported by the findings specified in §§
3626(b)(2) and (3).
By establishing new standards for the enforcement of prospective
relief in § 3626(b), Congress has altered the relevant underlying
law. The PLRA has restricted courts' authority to issue and enforce
prospective relief concerning prison conditions, requiring that
such relief be supported by findings and precisely tailored to what
is needed to remedy the violation of a federal right. See
Benjamin v.
Jacobson, 172 F.3d
144, 163
(CA2 1999) (en bane);
Imprisoned Citizens
Union v.
Ridge, 169 F.3d
178, 184-185
(CA3 1999);
Tyler v.
Murphy,
135 F.3d
594, 597
(CA8 1998);
Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail v.
Rouse, 129 F.3d
649, 657
(CA1 1997). We note that the constitutionality
of § 3626(b) is not challenged here; we assume, without deciding,
that the new standards it pronounces are effective. As
Plaut
and
Wheeling Bridge II instruct, when Congress changes the
law underlying a judgment awarding prospective relief, that relief
is no longer enforceable to the extent it is inconsistent with the
new law. Although the remedial injunction here is a "final
judgment" for purposes of appeal, it is not the "last word of the
judicial department."
Plaut, 514 U. S., at 227. The
provision of prospective relief is subject to the continuing
supervisory jurisdiction of the court, and therefore may be altered
according to subsequent changes in the law. See
Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U. S. 367, 388
(1992). Prospective relief must be "modified if, as it later turns
out, one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties has
become impermissible under federal law."
Ibid.; see also
Railway Employees v.
Wright, 364 U. S. 642, 646-647
(1961) (a court has the authority to alter the prospective effect
of an injunction to reflect a change in circumstances, whether of
law or fact, that has occurred since the injunction was
348
entered);
Lauf v.
E. G.
Skinner &
Co., 303 U. S.
323, 329 (1938) (applying the Norris-LaGuardia Act's
prohibition on a district court's entry of injunctive relief in the
absence of findings).
The entry of the automatic stay under § 3626(e)(2) helps to
implement the change in the law caused by §§ 3626(b)(2) and (3). If
the prospective relief under the existing decree is not supported
by the findings required under § 3626(b)(2), and the court has not
made the findings required by § 3626(b)(3), then prospective relief
is no longer enforceable and must be stayed. The entry of the stay
does not reopen or "suspend" the previous judgment, nor does it
divest the court of authority to decide the merits of the
termination motion. Rather, the stay merely reflects the changed
legal circumstances-that prospective relief under the existing
decree is no longer enforceable, and remains unenforceable unless
and until the court makes the findings required by §
3626(b)(3).
For the same reasons, § 3626(e)(2) does not violate the
separation of powers principle articulated in
United States
v.
Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872). In that case, Klein, the
executor of the estate of a Confederate sympathizer, sought to
recover the value of property seized by the United States during
the Civil War, which by statute was recoverable if Klein could
demonstrate that the decedent had not given aid or comfort to the
rebellion. See
id., at 131. In
United States v.
Padelford, 9 Wall. 531, 542-543 (1870), we held that a
Presidential pardon satisfied the burden of proving that no such
aid or comfort had been given. While Klein's case was pending,
Congress enacted a statute providing that a pardon would instead be
taken as proof that the pardoned individual had in fact aided the
enemy, and if the claimant offered proof of a pardon the court must
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Klein, 13 Wall.,
at 133-134. We concluded that the statute was unconstitutional
because it purported to "pre-
349
scribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the
government in cases pending before it."
Id., at 146.
Here, the prisoners argue that Congress has similarly prescribed
a rule of decision because, for the period of time until the
district court makes a final decision on the merits of the motion
to terminate prospective relief, § 3626(e)(2) mandates a particular
outcome: the termination of prospective relief. As we noted in
Plaut, however, "[w]hatever the precise scope of
Klein,
... later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does
not take hold when Congress 'amendes] applicable law.''' 514 U. S.,
at 218 (quoting
Robertson v.
Seattle Audubon Soc.,
503 U. S. 429,
441 (1992)). The prisoners concede this point but contend that,
because § 3626(e)(2) does not itself amend the legal standard,
Klein is still applicable. As we have explained, however, §
3626(e)(2) must be read not in isolation, but in the context of §
3626 as a whole. Section 3626(e)(2) operates in conjunction with
the new standards for the continuation of prospective relief; if
the new standards of § 3626(b)(2) are not met, then the stay "shall
operate" unless and until the court makes the findings required by
§ 3626(b)(3). Rather than prescribing a rule of decision, §
3626(e)(2) simply imposes the consequences of the court's
application of the new legal standard.
Finally, the prisoners assert that, even if § 3626(e)(2) does
not fall within the recognized prohibitions of
Hayburn's Case,
Plaut, or
Klein, it still offends the principles of
separation of powers because it places a deadline on judicial
decisionmaking, thereby interfering with core judicial functions.
Congress' imposition of a time limit in § 3626(e)(2), however, does
not in itself offend the structural concerns underlying the
Constitution's separation of powers. For example, if the PLRA
granted courts 10 years to determine whether they could make the
required findings, then certainly the PLRA would raise no
apprehensions that Congress had encroached on the core function of
the Judiciary to decide "cases and controversies properly before
them."
United
350
Opinion of SOUTER, J.
States v.
Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 20 (1960).
Respondents' concern with the time limit, then, must be its
relative brevity. But whether the time is so short that it deprives
litigants of a meaningful opportunity to be heard is a due process
question, an issue that is not before us. We leave open, therefore,
the question whether this time limit, particularly in a complex
case, may implicate due process concerns.
In contrast to due process, which principally serves to protect
the personal rights of litigants to a full and fair hearing,
separation of powers principles are primarily addressed to the
structural concerns of protecting the role of the independent
Judiciary within the constitutional design. In this action, we have
no occasion to decide whether there could be a time constraint on
judicial action that was so severe that it implicated these
structural separation of powers concerns. The PLRA does not deprive
courts of their adjudicatory role, but merely provides a new legal
standard for relief and encourages courts to apply that standard
promptly.
Through the PLRA, Congress clearly intended to make operation of
the automatic stay mandatory, precluding courts from exercising
their equitable powers to enjoin the stay. And we conclude that
this provision does not violate separation of powers principles.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit is reversed, and the action is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
I agree that 18 U. S. C. § 3626(e)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. IV) is
unambiguous and join Parts I and II of the majority opinion. I also
agree that applying the automatic stay may raise the due process
issue, of whether a plaintiff has a fair chance to preserve an
existing judgment that was valid when entered.
Ante this
page. But I believe that applying the statute may
351
also raise a serious separation-of-powers issue if the time it
allows turns out to be inadequate for a court to determine whether
the new prerequisite to relief is satisfied in a particular case.1
I thus do not join Part III of the Court's opinion and on remand
would require proceedings consistent with this one. I respectfully
dissent from the terms of the Court's disposition.
A prospective remedial order may rest on at least three
different legal premises: the underlying right meant to be secured;
the rules of procedure for obtaining relief, defining requisites of
pleading, notice, and so on; and, in some cases, rules lying
between the other two, such as those defining a required level of
certainty before some remedy may be ordered, or the permissible
scope of relief. At issue here are rules of the last variety.2
Congress has the authority to change rules of this sort by
imposing new conditions precedent for the continuing enforcement of
existing, prospective remedial orders and requiring courts to apply
the new rules to those orders. Cf.
Plaut v.
Spendthrift
Farm, Inc., 514
U. S. 211, 232 (1995). If its legislation gives courts adequate
time to determine the applicability of a new rule to an old order
and to take the action necessary to apply it or to vacate the
order, there seems little basis for claiming that Congress has
crossed
1 The Court forecloses the possibility of a separation-of-powers
challenge based on insufficient time under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA): "In this action, we have no occasion to
decide whether there could be a time constraint on judicial action
that was so severe that it implicated these structural separation
of powers concerns. The PLRA does not deprive courts of their
adjudicatory role, but merely provides a new legal standard for
relief and encourages courts to apply that standard promptly."
Ante, at 350.
2 Other provisions of the PLRA narrow the scope of the
underlying entitlements that an order can protect, but some orders
may have been issued to secure constitutional rights unaffected by
the PLRA. In any event, my concern here is solely with the PLRA's
changes to the requisites for relief.
352
Opinion of SOUTER, J.
the constitutional line to interfere with the performance of any
judicial function. But if determining whether a new rule applies
requires time (say, for new factfinding) and if the statute
provides insufficient time for a court to make that determination
before the statute invalidates an extant remedial order, the
application of the statute raises a serious question whether
Congress has in practical terms assumed the judicial function. In
such a case, the prospective order suddenly turns unenforceable not
because a court has made a judgment to terminate it due to changed
law or fact, but because no one can tell in the time allowed
whether the new rule requires modification of the old order. One
way to view this result is to see the Congress as mandating
modification of an order that may turn out to be perfectly
enforceable under the new rule, depending on judicial factfinding.
If the facts are taken this way, the new statute might well be
treated as usurping the judicial function of determining the
applicability of a general rule in particular factual
circumstances.3 Cf.
United States v.
Klein, 13 Wall.
128, 146 (1872).
Whether this constitutional issue arises on the facts of this
action, however, is something we cannot yet tell, for the
3 The constitutional question inherent in these possible
circumstances does not seem to be squarely addressed by any of our
cases. Congress did not engage in discretionary review of a
particular judicial judgment, cf.
Plaut v.
Spendthrift
Farm, Inc., 514
U. S. 211, 218, 226 (1995) (characterizing
Hayburn's
Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792)), or try to modify a final,
nonprospective judgment, cf. 514 U. S., at 218-219. Nor would a
stay result from the judicial application of a change in the
underlying law, cf.
Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 431 (1856);
Plaut,
supra, at 218 (characterizing
United States v.
Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872)). Instead, if the time is
insufficient for a court to make a judicial determination about the
applicability of the new rules, the stay would result from the
inability of the Judicial Branch to exercise the judicial power of
determining whether the new rules applied at all. Cf.
Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) ("It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is").
353
District Court did not address the sufficiency of the time
provided by the statute to make the findings required by §
3626(b)(3) in this particular action.4 Absent that determination, I
would not decide the separation-of-powers question, but simply
remand for further proceedings. If the District Court determined
both that it lacked adequate time to make the requisite findings in
the period before the automatic stay would become effective, and
that applying the stay would violate the separation of powers, the
question would then be properly presented.
JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, dissenting.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) says that "any
party or intervener" may move to terminate any "prospective relief"
previously granted by the court, 18 U. S. C. § 3626(b)(1) (1994
ed., Supp. IV), and that the court shall terminate (or modify) that
relief unless it is "necessary to correct a current and ongoing
violation of [a] Federal right, extends no further than necessary
to correct the violation ... [and is] the least intrusive means" to
do so. 18 U. S. C. § 3626(b)(3).
We here consider a related procedural provision of the PLRA. It
says that "[a]ny motion to modify or terminate prospective relief
... shall operate as a stay" of that prospective relief "during the
period" beginning (no later than) the 90th day after the filing of
the motion and ending when the motion is decided. § 3626(e)(2).
This provision means
4 Neither did the Court of Appeals. It merely speculated that
"[i]t may be ... that in some cases the courts will not be able to
carry out their adjudicative function in a responsible way within
the time limits imposed by (e)(2),"
French v.
Duckworth, 178 F.3d
437, 447
(CA7 1999), without deciding whether this
action presented such a situation. The court then concluded that
"under
Klein [the Congress] cannot take away the power of
the court in a particular case to preserve the status quo while it
ponders these weighty questions."
Ibid.
354
approximately the following: Suppose that a district court, in
1980, had entered an injunction governing present and future prison
conditions. Suppose further that in 1996 a party filed a motion
under the PLRA asking the court to terminate (or to modify) the
1980 injunction. That district court would have no more than 90
days to decide whether to grant the motion. After those 90 days,
the 1980 injunction would terminate automatically-regaining life
only if, when, and to the extent that the judge eventually decided
to deny the PLRA motion.
The majority interprets the words "shall operate as a stay" to
mean, in terms of my example, that the 1980 injunction must become
ineffective after the 90th day,
no matter what. The
Solicitor General, however, believes that the view adopted by the
majority interpretation is too rigid and calls into doubt the
constitutionality of the provision. He argues that the statute is
silent as to whether the district court can modify or suspend the
operation of the automatic stay. He would find in that silence
sufficient authority for the court to create an exception to the
90-day time limit where circumstances make it necessary to do so.
As so read, the statute would neither displace the courts'
traditional equitable authority nor raise significant
constitutional difficulties. See
Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442
U. S. 682, 705 (1979) (only "clearest" congressional "command"
displaces courts' traditional equity powers);
Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast
Building &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988)
(the Court will construe a statute to avoid constitutional problems
"unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress").
I agree with the Solicitor General and believe we should adopt
that" 'reasonable construction'" of the statute.
Ibid.
(quoting
Hooper v.
California, 155 U. S. 648, 657
(1895), stating "'every reasonable construction must be resorted
to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality' ").
355
I
At the outset, one must understand why a more flexible
interpretation of the statute might be needed. To do so, one must
keep in mind the extreme circumstances that at least some prison
litigation originally sought to correct, the complexity of the
resulting judicial decrees, and the potential difficulties arising
out of the subsequent need to review those decrees in order to make
certain they follow Congress' PLRA directives. A hypothetical
example based on actual circumstances may help.
In January 1979, a Federal District Court made 81 factual
findings describing extremely poor-indeed "barbaric and
shocking"-prison conditions in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Morales Feliciano v.
Romero Barcelo, 497 F. Supp.
14,32 (PR 1979). These conditions included prisons typically
operating with twice the number of prisoners they were designed to
hold; inmates living in 16 square feet of space (i.
e., only
4 feet by 4 feet); inmates without medical care, without
psychiatric care, without beds, without mattresses, without hot
water, without soap or towels or toothbrushes or underwear; food
prepared on a budget of $1.50 per day and "tons of food ...
destroyed because of ... rats, vermin, worms, and spoilage"; "no
working toilets or showers," "urinals [that] flush into the sinks,"
"plumbing systems ... in a state of collapse," and a "stench" that
was "omnipresent"; "exposed wiring ... no fire extinguisher, ...
[and] poor ventilation"; "calabozos," or dungeons, "like cages with
bars on the top" or with two slits in a steel door opening onto a
central corridor, the floors of which were "covered with raw
sewage" and which contained prisoners with severe mental illnesses,
"caged like wild animals," sometimes for months; areas of a prison
where mentally ill inmates were "kept in cells naked, without beds,
without mattresses, without any private possessions, and most of
them without toilets that work and without drinking water."
Id., at 20-23, 26-
356
27, 29, 32. These conditions had led to epidemics of
communicable diseases, untreated mental illness, suicides, and
murders.
Id., at 32.
The District Court held that these conditions amounted to
constitutionally forbidden "cruel and unusual punishment."
Id., at 33-36. It entered 30 specific orders designed to
produce constitutionally mandated improvement by requiring the
prison system to, for example, screen food handlers for
communicable diseases, close the "calabozos," move mentally ill
patients to hospitals, fix broken plumbing, and provide at least 35
square feet (i.
e., 5 feet by 7 feet) of living space to
each prisoner.
Id., at 39-41.
The very pervasiveness and seriousness of the conditions
described in the court's opinion made those conditions difficult to
cure quickly. Over the next decade, the District Court entered
further orders embodied in 15 published opinions, affecting 21
prison institutions. These orders concerned,
inter alia,
overcrowding, security, disciplinary proceedings, prisoner
classification, rehabilitation, parole, and drug addiction
treatment. Not surprisingly, the related proceedings involved
extensive evidence and argument consuming thousands of pages of
transcript. See
Morales Feliciano v.
Romero Barcelo,
672 F. Supp. 591, 595 (PR 1986). Their implementation involved the
services of two monitors, two assistants, and a Special Master.
Along the way, the court documented a degree of "administrative
chaos" in the prison system,
Morales Feliciano v.
Hernandez Colon, 697 F. Supp. 37, 44 (PR 1988), and entered
findings of contempt of court against the Commonwealth, followed by
the assessment and collection of more than $74 million in fines.
See
Morales Feliciano v.
Hernandez Colon, 775 F.
Supp. 487, 488, and n. 2 (PR 1991).
Prison conditions subsequently have improved in some respects.
Morales Feliciano v.
Rossello Gonzalez, 13 F. Supp.
2d 151, 179 (PR 1998). I express no opinion as to whether, or which
of, the earlier orders are still needed. But my
357
brief summary of the litigation should illustrate the potential
difficulties involved in making the determination of continuing
necessity required by the PLRA. Where prison litigation is as
complex as the litigation I have just described, it may prove
difficult for a district court to reach a fair and accurate
decision about which orders remain necessary, and are the "least
intrusive means" available, to prevent or correct a continuing
violation of federal law. The orders, which were needed to resolve
serious constitutional problems and may still be needed where
compliance has not yet been assured, are complex, interrelated, and
applicable to many different institutions. Ninety days might not
provide sufficient time to ascertain the views of several different
parties, including monitors, to allow them to present evidence, and
to permit each to respond to the arguments and evidence of the
others.
It is at least possible, then, that the statute, as the majority
reads it, would sometimes terminate a complex system of orders
entered over a period of years by a court familiar with the local
problem-perhaps only to reinstate those orders later, when the
termination motion can be decided. Such an automatic termination
could leave constitutionally prohibited conditions unremedied, at
least temporarily. Alternatively, the threat of termination could
lead a district court to abbreviate proceedings that fairness would
otherwise demand. At a minimum, the mandatory automatic stay would
provide a recipe for uncertainty, as complex judicial orders that
have long governed the administration of particular prison systems
suddenly turn off, then (perhaps selectively) back on. So read, the
statute directly interferes with a court's exercise of its
traditional equitable authority, rendering temporarily ineffective
pre-existing remedies aimed at correcting past, and perhaps
ongoing, violations of the Constitution. That interpretation, as
the majority itself concedes, might give rise to serious
constitutional problems.
Ante, at 350.
358
II
The Solicitor General's more flexible reading of the statute
avoids all these problems. He notes that the relevant language says
that the motion to modify or terminate prospective relief "shall
operate as a stay" after a period of 30 days, extendable for "good
cause" to 90 days. 18 U. S. c. § 3626(e)(2); see also Brief for
United States 12. The language says nothing, however, about the
district court's power to modify or suspend the operation of the
"stay." In the Solicitor General's view, the "stay" would determine
the legal status quo; but the district court would retain its
traditional equitable power to change that status quo once the
party seeking the modification or suspension of the operation of
the stay demonstrates that the stay "would cause irreparable
injury, that the termination motion is likely to be defeated, and
that the merits of the motion cannot be resolved before the
automatic stay takes effect."
Ibid. Where this is shown, the
"court has discretion to suspend the automatic stay and require
prison officials to comply with outstanding court orders until the
court resolves the termination motion on the merits,"
id.,
at 12-13, subject to immediate appellate review, 18 U. S. C. §
3626(e)(4).
Is this interpretation a "reasonable construction" of the
statute?
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U. S.,
at 575. I note first that the statutory language is open to the
Solicitor General's interpretation. A district court ordinarily can
stay the operation of a judicial order (such as a stay or
injunction), see
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
FCC,
316 U. S. 4, 9-10, and n. 4 (1942), when a party demonstrates
the need to do so in accordance with traditional equitable criteria
(irreparable injury, likelihood of success on the merits, and a
balancing of possible harms to the parties and the public, see
Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 931
(1975);
Yakus v.
United States, 321 U. S. 414, 440
(1944)). There is no logical inconsistency in saying both (1) a
motion (to terminate) "shall operate as a stay," and (2) the court
retains the power
359
to modify or delay the operation of the stay in appropriate
circumstances. The statutory language says nothing about this
last-mentioned power. It is
silent. It does not direct the
district court to leave the stay in place come what may.
Nor does this more flexible interpretation deprive the
procedural provision of meaning. The filing of the motion to
terminate prospective relief will still, after a certain period,
operate as a stay without further action by the court. Thus, the
motion automatically changes the status quo and imposes upon the
party wishing to suspend the automatic stay the burden of
demonstrating strong, special reasons for doing so. The word
"automatic" in the various subsection titles does not prove the
contrary, for that word often means selfstarting, not unstoppable.
See Websters Third New International Dictionary 148 (1993). Indeed,
the Bankruptcy Act uses the words "automatic stay" to describe a
provision stating that "a petition filed ... operates as a stay" of
certain other judicial proceedings-despite the fact that a later
portion of that same provision makes clear that under certain
circumstances the bankruptcy court may terminate, annul, or modify
the stay. 11 U. S. c. § 362(d); see also 143 Congo Rec. S12269
(Nov. 9, 1997) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (explaining that §
3626(e)(2) was modeled after the Bankruptcy Act provision). And the
Poultry Producers Financial Protection Act of 1987 specifies that a
court of appeals decree affirming an order of the Secretary of
Agriculture "shall operate as an injunction" restraining the "live
poultry dealer" from violating that order, 7 U. S. C. § 228b-3(g);
yet it appears that no one has ever suggested that a court of
appeals lacks the power to modify that "injunction" where
appropriate. Moreover, the change in the legal status quo that the
automatic stay would bring about, and the need to demonstrate a
special need to lift the stay (according to traditional equitable
criteria), mean that the stay would remain in effect in all but
highly unusual cases.
360
In addition, the surrounding procedural prOVlSlons are most
naturally read as favoring the flexible interpretation. The
immediately preceding provision requires the court to rule
"promptly" upon the motion to terminate and says that "[m]andamus
shall lie to remedy any failure to issue a prompt ruling." 18 U. s.
C. § 3626(e)(1). If a motion to terminate takes effect
automatically through the "stay" after 30 or 90 days, it is
difficult to understand what purpose would be served by providing
for mandamus-a procedure that itself (in so complicated a matter)
could take several weeks. But if the automatic stay might be
modified or lifted in an unusual case, providing for mandamus makes
considerable sense. It guarantees that an appellate court will make
certain that unusual circumstances do in fact justify any such
modification or lifting of the stay. A later provision that
provides for immediate appeal of any order "staying, suspending,
delaying, or barring the operation of the automatic stay" can be
read as providing for similar appellate review for similar reasons.
§ 3626(e)(4).
Further, the legislative history is neutral, for it is silent on
this issue. Yet there is relevant judicial precedent. That
precedent does not read statutory silence as denying judges
authority to exercise their traditional equitable powers. Rather,
it reads statutory silence as authorizing the exercise of those
powers. This Court has said, for example, that "[o]ne thing is
clear. Where Congress wished to deprive the courts of this historic
power, it knew how to use apt wordsonly once has it done so and in
a statute born of the exigencies of war."
Scripps-Howard,
supra, at 17. Compare
Lockerty v.
Phillips,
319 U. S. 182,
186-187 (1943) (finding that courts were deprived of equity powers
where the statute explicitly removed jurisdiction), with
Scripps-Howard, supra, at 8-10 (refusing to read silence as
depriving courts of their historic equity power), and
Califano, 442 U. S., at 705-706 (same). These cases
recognize the importance of permitting courts in equity cases to
tailor relief, and related
361
relief procedure, to the exigencies of particular cases and
individual circumstances. In doing so, they recognize the fact that
in certain circumstances justice requires the flexibility necessary
to treat different cases differently-the rationale that underlies
equity itself. Cf.
Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329 (1944)
("The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the
Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities
of the particular case").
Finally, the more flexible interpretation is consistent with
Congress' purposes as revealed in the statute. Those purposes
include the avoidance of new judicial relief that is overly broad
or no longer necessary and the reassessment of pre-existing relief
to bring it into conformity with these standards. But Congress has
simultaneously expressed its intent to maintain relief that is
narrowly drawn and necessary to end unconstitutional practices. See
18 U. S. C. §§ 3626(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(3). The statute, as flexibly
interpreted, risks interfering with the first set of objectives
only to the extent that the speedy appellate review provided in the
statute fails to control district court error. The same
interpretation avoids the improper provisional termination of
relief that is constitutionally necessary. The risk of an
occasional small additional delay seems a comparatively small price
to pay (in terms of the statute's entire set of purposes) to avoid
the serious constitutional problems that accompany the majority's
more rigid interpretation.
The upshot is a statute that, when read in light of its
language, structure, purpose, and history, is open to an
interpretation that would allow a court to modify or suspend the
automatic stay when a party, in accordance with traditional
equitable criteria, has demonstrated a need for such an exception.
That interpretation reflects this Court's historic reluctance to
read a statute as depriving courts of their traditional equitable
powers. It also avoids constitutional difficulties that might arise
in unusual cases.
362
I do not argue that this interpretation reflects the most
natural reading of the statute's language. Nor do I assert that
each individual legislator would have endorsed that reading at the
time. But such an interpretation is a reasonable construction of
the statute. That reading harmonizes the statute's language with
other basic legal principles, including constitutional principles.
And, in doing so, it better fits the full set of legislative
objectives embodied in the statute than does the more rigid reading
that the majority adopts.
For these reasons, I believe that the Solicitor General's more
flexible reading is the proper reading of the statute before us. I
would consequently vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand this action for further proceedings.
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