On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit.
The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
is granted. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
Page 460 U.S.
1098 , 1099
Justice REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice
O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
Respondent Norman Longval robbed a drug store in Swampscott,
Massachusetts. Longval, who had a previous record for larcenies and
had served time for armed robbery, stole the get-away car and
carried a shotgun during the robbery.
One of Longval's codefendants, Richard Ellard, pleaded guilty.
Ellard stated that he was drunk at the time and did not carry the
gun. The sentencing judge noted that Ellard had not been in serious
trouble before, and sentenced him to three years imprisonment and
three years probation with a special term of probation requiring
him to obtain treatment for alcoholism.
Longval stood trial for armed robbery, assault with a deadly
weapon, and unlawfully carrying a sawed-off shotgun, and was
convicted. The trial judge sentenced Longval to 40-50 years in
prison. The state appellate court later reduced this sentence to
30-40 years.
Longval sought a writ of error from the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, claiming that the trial judge had improperly
threatened him in an effort to coerce him into pleading guilty. The
Supreme Judicial Court appointed a special master, who found that
during the presentation of the prosecution's case-in-chief, the
trial judge told Longval's defense attorney, in substance,
that:
the evidence in this case as it is coming in is very
serious-robbery of a drug store, taking drugs, use of a shot gun. I
am wondering if you and the commonwealth have had any discussion
regarding a plea [of guilty]. I strongly suggest that you ask your
client to consider a plea, because, if the jury returns a verdict
of guilty, I might be disposed to impose a substantial prison
sentence. You know that I am capable of doing that because you know
of the sentences in a previous trial.
693 F.2d
236, 237 (CA1 1982).
Page 460 U.S.
1098 , 1100
The special master did not construe this statement as a threat.
Rather, he thought the judge made "a statement to a young lawyer of
the judge's then general impression of the evidence as it had
developed to that point."
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Longval's conviction. 378
Mass. 246,
390
N.E.2d 1117 (1979). It found that the judge had merely advised
Longval's attorney of the sentences he had imposed in other cases
and of the seriousness of the offense described in the evidence
that had been presented, and advised him "not to forego any
advantage that might accrue to him by means of plea bargaining."
Id., at 251-252,
390
N.E.2d 1117.
Longval unsuccessfully petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in
the District Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.
651 F.2d
818 ( CA1 1981). We granted a petition for a writ of
certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and
remanded for further consideration in light of United States v.
Goodwin, ___ U.S. ___, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1982). ___ U.S. ___
(1982).
On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its original view.
693 F.2d
236. It held that the trial judge's comments led to "a
reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness," id., at 237, that
requires resentencing before a different judge. The Court of
Appeals thought that a judge may not make "a forceful
recommendation to consider pleading [guilty], ending on a note of
the judge's power to impose a substantial sentence if [the
recommendation] is not complied with." Id., at 238. Thus, the Court
of Appeals adopted a per se rule that requires resentencing
whenever a state trial judge makes any statement that is
"susceptible of appearing from the defendant's perspective to be an
attempt to coerce him to plead." Id., at 237.
The Court of Appeals relied upon North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711
(1969), and Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21 (1974). The
respondents in Pearce had obtained reversal of their criminal
convictions on federal constitutional grounds. They were retried,
convicted, and then given sen-
Page 460 U.S.
1098 , 1101
tences that were up to two and a half times as long as their
original sentences. This Court held that the harsher sentences
suggested that the states were punishing criminal defendants for
exercising their federal constitutional rights. We stated that the
sentencing authority could only impose longer sentences if it
explained its reasons on the record. Blackledge extended Pearce to
establish a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in cases
where prosecutors press more serious charges on defendants who
obtain reversals of their convictions.
I think the decision below is quite problematic. First, in this
case, unlike Pearce and Blackledge, there is a fully credible
alternative explanation for the trial judge's behavior, one that
was credited by the state court. The Supreme Judicial Court
construed the judge's comments simply to inform Longval of the
facts of life in his courtroom. This Court has often stressed the
importance of providing criminal defendants with full information.
For example, in Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969), we
reversed a conviction on a guilty plea because we were not certain
that the defendant had "a full understanding of what the plea
connotes and of its consequence." Id., at 244. Surely defendants
should be as well informed of the possible consequences of a
not-guilty plea. If this judge routinely handed out long sentences
after convictions of serious crimes, it would be in Longval's
interest to know that; certainly the prosecutor with whom Longval
and his counsel had engaged in plea bargaining negotiations already
knew the judge's sentencing habits. It seems incongruous at best to
want defendants to be fully informed and then to adopt a per se
rule condemning judges who provide them with information.
Second, in Goodwin, supra, we held that the Pearce-Blackledge
presumption does not apply where a prosecutor presses more serious
charges in a plea bargaining situation. The rationale of the
decision is that vindictiveness is less likely during pre-trial
plea bargaining than after a trial and an appeal. The Court of
Appeals sought to distinguish Goodwin on the ground that this case
involves a judge rather than a prosecutor, and judges are expected
to be impartial. I believe the Good-
Page 460 U.S.
1098 , 1102
win rationale is fully applicable in this case. If anything, the
impartial position of the judge suggests that we should be more
reluctant to apply a presumption of vindictiveness to judges than
to prosecutors.
Guilty pleas result from discussions and negotiations between
opposing advocates and require them to predict the probability of
conviction and the severity of the sentence that is likely to be
imposed. It is at least arguable that this process is made fairer
when the accused has complete information concerning the sentence
he is likely to receive. Because I doubt whether a per se
presumption of judicial vindictiveness is warranted in cases such
as this, I would grant certiorari.
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