OCTOBER TERM, 1992
Syllabus
McNEIL
v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
No. 92-6033. Argued April 19, 1993-Decided May 17, 1993
Four months after petitioner McNeil, proceeding without counsel,
filed this Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit for money damages
arising from his alleged injury by the United States Public Health
Service, he submitted a claim for such damages to the Department of
Health and Human Services, which promptly denied the claim. The
District Court subsequently dismissed McNeil's complaint as
premature under an FTCA provision, 28 U. S. C. § 2675(a), which
requires that a claimant exhaust his administrative remedies before
bringing suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, although decisions in
other Circuits have permitted a prematurely filed FTCA action to
proceed if no substantial progress has taken place in the
litigation before the administrative remedies are exhausted.
Held: An FTCA action may not be maintained when the
claimant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to
filing suit, but did so before substantial progress was made in the
litigation. Section 2675(a)'s unambiguous text-which commands that
an "action shall not be instituted ... unless the claimant shall
have first presented the claim to the appropriate ... agency and
his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency"-requires
rejection of McNeil's contention that his action was timely because
it was commenced when he lodged his complaint with the District
Court. The complaint was filed too early, since McNeil's claim had
not previously been presented to the Public Health Service nor
"finally denied" by that agency. Also unpersuasive is McNeil's
argument that his action was timely because it should be viewed as
having been "instituted" on the date when his administrative claim
was denied. In its statutory context, the normal interpretation of
the word "institute" is synonymous with the words "begin" and
"commence." The most natural reading of the statute indicates that
Congress intended to require complete exhaustion of Executive
remedies before invocation of the judicial process. Moreover, given
the clarity of the statutory text, it is certainly not a "trap for
the unwary." Pp. 110-113.
964 F.2d
647, affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
107
Allen E. Shoen berger, by appointment of the Court,
507
William K. Kelley argued the cause for the United
States.
With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson,
Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor
General Mahoney, Mark B. Stern, and Henry D. Gabriel.*
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides that an "action
shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for
money damages" unless the claimant has first exhausted his
administrative remedies.1 The question presented is whether such an
action may be maintained when the claimant failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to filing suit, but did so before
substantial progress was made in the litigation.
I
On March 6, 1989, petitioner, proceeding without counsel, lodged
a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, alleging that the United States Public Health
Service had caused him serious injuries while "conducting human
research and experimentation on prisoners" in the custody of the
Illinois Department of Cor-
*
Joseph A. Power, Jr., and
Arthur H. Bryant filed
a brief for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P.
C., as
amicus curiae urging reversal.
1 Title 28 U. S. C. § 2675(a) provides, in pertinent part:
"An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the
United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have
first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his
claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and
sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to
make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is
filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be
deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this
section."
108
rections. He invoked the federal court's jurisdiction under the
FTCA and prayed for a judgment of $20 million. App. 3-7.
Four months later, on July 7, 1989, petitioner submitted a claim
for damages to the Department of Health and Human Services.2 The
Department denied the claim on July 21, 1989. On August 7, 1989,
petitioner sent a letter to the District Court enclosing a copy of
the Department's denial of his administrative claim and an
affidavit in support of an earlier motion for appointment of
counsel. Petitioner asked that the court accept the letter "as a
proper request, whereas plaintiff can properly commence his legal
action accordingly."
Id., at 10.
For reasons that are not entirely clear, the United States was
not served with a copy of petitioner's complaint until July 30,
1990.3
Id., at 2. On September 19, 1990, the United States
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that petitioner's
action was barred by the 6-month statute of limitation.4 The motion
was based on the assumption that
2 Petitioner sought damages of $500,000 in his administrative
claim, not the $20 million for which he prayed in his earlier
federal court action. Pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2675(b), a claimant
is barred from seeking in federal court "any sum in excess of the
amount of the claim presented to the federal agency." That is, had
petitioner properly filed an action in district court after his
administrative claim was denied, he would have been limited in his
recovery to $500,000.
3 Entries in the District Court docket indicate that plaintiff
had previously filed a motion for leave to proceed
in forma
pauperis, that later in August he filed a motion for
appointment of counsel, and that he ultimately paid a filing fee
that caused the District Court to dismiss the motion for leave to
file
in forma pauperis as moot. In all events, in April
1990, the District Court ordered service to be effected by a United
States Marshal "because plaintiff is incarcerated and proceeding
pro se." App. 1.
4 Title 28 U. S. C. § 2401(b) provides:
"A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred
unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency
within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun
within six months after
109
the complaint had been filed on April 15, 1990, when petitioner
paid the court filing fees, and that that date was more than six
months after the denial of petitioner's administrative claim. In
response to the motion, petitioner submitted that the complaint was
timely because his action had been commenced on March 6, 1989, the
date when he actually lodged his complaint and the Clerk assigned
it a docket number.
The District Court accepted March 6, 1989, as the operative date
of filing, but nonetheless granted the Government's motion to
dismiss. Petitioner's suit was not out of time, the District Court
reasoned, but, rather, premature. The court concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction to entertain an action "commenced before
satisfaction of the administrative exhaustion requirement under §
2675(a)."
Id., at 21.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The court explained:
"According to 28 U. S. C. § 2401(b), a tort claim against the
United States must be 'begun within six months after the date of
mailing ... of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to
which it was presented.' The administrative denial was mailed on
July 21, 1989, so McNeil had between then and January 21, 1990, to
begin his action. The complaint filed in March 1989 was too early.
This left two options. Perhaps the document filed in March 1989
loitered on the docket, springing into force when the agency acted.
Or perhaps the request for counsel in August 1989, during the
six-month period, marks the real 'beginning' of the action. The
district court rejected both options, and McNeil, with the
assistance of counsel appointed by this court, renews the arguments
here.
the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice
of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was
presented."
110
"March 1989 was too early. The suit did not linger, awaiting
administrative action. Unless McNeil began a fresh suit within six
months after July 21, 1989, he loses."
964 F.2d
647, 648-649 (1992).
The court reviewed the materials filed in August 1989 and
concluded that the District Court had not committed plain error in
refusing to construe them as having commenced a new action.5
Because decisions in other Circuits permit a prematurely filed
FTCA action to proceed if no substantial progress has taken place
in the litigation before the administrative remedies are exhausted,
see
Kubrick v.
United States, 581
F.2d 1092, 1098 (CA3 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
444 U. S. 111 (1979), and
Celestine v.
Veterans Administration Hospital,
746 F.2d
1360, 1363 (CA8 1984),6 we granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict. 506 U. S. 1074 (1993).
II
As the case comes to us, we assume that the Court of Appeals
correctly held that nothing done by petitioner after the denial of
his administrative claim on July 21, 1989, constituted the
commencement of a new action. The narrow question before us is
whether his action was timely either be-
5 In dissent, Judge Ripple expressed the opinion that petitioner
had properly raised the issue in the District Court and on appeal,
964 F. 2d, at 649, n. 1, and that in any event it was "clear that
the plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, attempted to refile
the action after the denial of the administrative claim."
Id., at 649. Our grant of certiorari did not encompass the
question whether a new action had been filed in August and we
therefore express no opinion as to the correctness of the Court of
Appeals' ruling on that issue.
6 Decisions in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits agree with the
position taken in the Seventh Circuit in this case. See
Gregory v.
Mitchell, 634 F.2d
199, 204
(CA5 1981);
Reynolds v.
United
States, 748 F.2d
291, 292
(CA5 1984); Jerves v.
United States,
966 F.2d
517, 521
(CA9 1992).
111
cause it was commenced when he lodged his complaint with the
District Court on March 6, 1989, or because it should be viewed as
having been "instituted" on the date when his administrative claim
was denied.
The text of the statute requires rejection of the first
possibility. The command that an "action shall not be instituted
... unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the
appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally
denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered
mail" is unambiguous. We are not free to rewrite the statutory
text. As of March 6, 1989, petitioner had neither presented his
claim to the Public Health Service, nor had his claim been "finally
denied" by that agency. As the Court of Appeals held, petitioner's
complaint was filed too early.
The statutory text does not speak with equal clarity to the
argument that petitioner's subsequent receipt of a formal denial
from the agency might be treated as the event that "instituted" his
action. Petitioner argues the word "instituted" that is used in §
2675(a), see n. 1,
supra, is not synonymous with the word
"begun" in § 2401(b), see n. 4,
supra, or with the word
"commence" as used in certain other statutes and rules. See,
e.
g., Hallstrom v.
Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20 (1989).
He suggests that an action is not "instituted" until the occurrence
of the events that are necessary predicates to the invocation of
the court's jurisdictionnamely, the filing of his complaint and the
formal denial of the administrative claim. This construction, he
argues, is consistent with the underlying purpose of § 2675(a): As
long as no substantial progress has been made in the litigation by
the time the claimant has exhausted his administrative remedies,
the federal agency will have had a fair opportunity to investigate
and possibly settle the claim before the par-
112
ties must assume the burden of costly and time-consuming
litigation.7
We find this argument unpersuasive. In its statutory context, we
think the normal interpretation of the word "institute" is
synonymous with the words "begin" and "commence." The most natural
reading of the statute indicates that Congress intended to require
complete exhaustion of Executive remedies before invocation of the
judicial process. Every premature filing of an action under the
FTCA imposes some burden on the judicial system 8 and on the
Department of Justice which must assume the defense of such
actions. Although the burden may be slight in an individual case,
the statute governs the processing of a vast multitude of claims.
The interest in orderly administration of this body of litigation
is best served by adherence to the straightforward statutory
command.
7Prior to 1966, FTCA claimants had the option of filing suit in
federal court without first presenting their claims to the
appropriate federal agency. Moreover, federal agencies had only
limited authority to settle claims. See Federal Tort Claims Act of
1946, ch. 753, §§ 403(a), 420, 60 Stat. 843, 845. Because the vast
majority of claims ultimately were settled before trial, the
Department of Justice proposed that Congress amend the FTCA to
"requir[e] all claims to be presented to the appropriate agency for
consideration and possible settlement before a court action could
be instituted. This procedure would make it possible for the claim
first to be considered by the agency whose employee's activity
allegedly caused the damage. That agency would have the best
information concerning the activity which gave rise to the claim.
Since it is the one directly concerned, it can be expected that
claims which are found to be meritorious can be settled more
quickly without the need for filing suit and possible expensive and
time-consuming litigation." S. Rep. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
3 (1966).
The Senate Judiciary Committee further noted that "the
improvements contemplated by [the 1966 amendments] would not only
benefit private litigants, but would also be beneficial to the
courts, the agencies, and the Department of Justice itself."
Id., at 2.
8 Even petitioner concedes that at least one objective of the
1966 amendments to the FTCA was to "reduce unnecessary congestion
in the courts."
Id., at 4. See Brief for Petitioner 24.
113
Moreover, given the clarity of the statutory text, it is
certainly not a "trap for the unwary." It is no doubt true that
there are cases in which a litigant proceeding without counsel may
make a fatal procedural error, but the risk that a lawyer will be
unable to understand the exhaustion requirement is virtually
nonexistent. Our rules of procedure are based on the assumption
that litigation is normally conducted by lawyers. While we have
insisted that the pleadings prepared by prisoners who do not have
access to counsel be liberally construed, see
Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.
S. 519 (1972); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 106 (1976),9
and have held that some procedural rules must give way because of
the unique circumstance of incarceration, see
Houston v.
Lack, 487 U.
S. 266 (1988)
(pro se prisoner's notice of appeal deemed
filed at time of delivery to prison authorities), we have never
suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should
be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel.lO As we have noted before, "in the long run,
experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural
requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of
evenhanded administration of the law."
Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U.
S. 807, 826 (1980).
The FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court
until they have exhausted their administrative remedies. Because
petitioner failed to heed that clear statutory command, the
District Court properly dismissed his suit.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
9 Again, the question whether the Court of Appeals should have
liberally construed petitioner's letter of August 7, 1989, as
instituting a new action is not before us. See n. 5, supra.
10 Indeed, we have previously recognized a systemic interest in
having a party represented by independent counsel even when the
party is a lawyer. See
Kay v.
Ehrler, 499 U. S. 432 (1991).
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