BREYER, J., DISSENTING
MCDONALD V. CHICAGO
561 U. S. ____ (2010)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 08-1521
OTIS McDONALD, et al., PETITIONERS
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the seventh circuit
[June 28, 2010]
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor join, dissenting.
In my view, Justice Stevens has
demonstrated that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
“substantive due process” does not include a general right to keep
and bear firearms for purposes of private self-defense. As he
argues, the Framers did not write the Second Amendment with this
objective in view. See
ante, at 41–44 (dissenting
opinion). Unlike other forms of substantive liberty, the carrying
of arms for that purpose often puts others’ lives at risk. See
ante, at 35–37. And the use of arms for private
self-defense does not warrant federal constitutional protection
from state regulation. See
ante, at 44–51.
The Court, however, does not expressly rest
its opinion upon “substantive due process” concerns. Rather, it
directs its attention to this Court’s “incorporation” precedents
and asks whether the Second Amendment right to private self-defense
is “fundamental” so that it applies to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See
ante, at 11–19.
I shall therefore separately consider the
question of “incorporation.” I can find nothing in the Second
Amendment’s text, history, or underlying rationale that could
warrant characterizing it as “fundamental” insofar as it seeks to
protect the keeping and bearing of arms for private self-defense
purposes. Nor can I find any justification for interpreting the
Constitution as transferring ultimate regulatory authority over the
private uses of firearms from democratically elected legislatures
to courts or from the States to the Federal Government. I therefore
conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment does not “incorporate” the
Second Amendment’s right “to keep and bear Arms.” And I
consequently dissent.
I
The Second Amendment says: “A
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” Two years ago, in
District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U. S. ___ (2008), the Court rejected the
pre-existing judicial consensus that the Second Amendment was
primarily concerned with the need to maintain a “well regulated
Militia.” See
id., at ___ (Stevens, J., dissenting) (slip
op., at 2–3, and n. 2, 38–45);
United States v.
Miller,
307
U. S. 174, 178 (1939). Although the Court acknowledged that
“the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the
citizens’ militia by taking away their arms
was the reason
that right … was codified in a written Constitution,” the Court
asserted that “individual self defense … was the
central
component of the right itself.”
Heller, supra, at ___
(slip op., at 26) (first emphasis added). The Court went on to hold
that the Second Amendment restricted Congress’ power to regulate
handguns used for self-defense, and the Court found
unconstitutional the District of Columbia’s ban on the possession
of handguns in the home.
Id., at ___ (slip op., at
64).
The Court based its conclusions
almost exclusively upon its reading of history. But the relevant
history in
Heller was far from clear: Four dissenting
Justices disagreed with the majority’s historical analysis. And
subsequent scholarly writing reveals why disputed history provides
treacherous ground on which to build decisions written by judges
who are not expert at history.
Since
Heller, historians, scholars,
and judges have continued to express the view that the Court’s
historical account was flawed. See,
e.g., Konig, Why the
Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the
Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary
America, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1295 (2009); Finkelman, It Really Was
About a Well Regulated Militia, 59 Syracuse L. Rev. 267
(2008); P. Charles, The Second Amendment: The Intent and Its
Interpretation by the States and the Supreme Court (2009); Merkel,
The District of Columbia v. Heller and
Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. 349 (2009); Kozuskanich, Originalism in a
Digital Age: An Inquiry into the Right to Bear Arms, 29 J. Early
Republic 585 (2009); Cornell, St. George Tucker’s Lecture Notes,
the Second Amendment, and Originalist Methodology, 103 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1541 (2009); Posner, In Defense of Looseness:
The Supreme Court and Gun Control, New Republic, Aug. 27, 2008, pp.
32–35; see also Epstein, A Structural Interpretation of the Second
Amendment: Why
Heller is (Probably) Wrong on Originalist
Grounds, 59 Syracuse L. Rev. 171 (2008).
Consider as an example of these critiques an
amici brief filed in this case by historians who
specialize in the study of the English Civil Wars. They tell us
that
Heller misunderstood a key historical point. See
Brief for English/Early American Historians as
Amici
Curiae (hereinafter English Historians’ Brief) (filed by 21
professors at leading universities in the United States, United
Kingdom, and Australia).
Heller’s conclusion that
“individual self-defense” was “the
central component” of
the Second Amendment’s right “to keep and bear Arms” rested upon
its view that the Amendment “codified a
pre-existing
right” that had “nothing whatever to do with service in a militia.”
554 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26, 19–20). That view in turn
rested in significant part upon Blackstone having described the
right as “ ‘the right of having and using arms for
self-preservation and defence,’ ” which reflected the
provision in the English Declaration of Right of 1689 that gave the
King’s Protestant “ ‘subjects’ ” the right to
“ ‘have Arms for their defence suitable to their Conditions,
and as allowed by law.’ ”
Id., at ___ (slip op., at
19–20) (quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 140 (1765) (hereinafter Blackstone) and 1 W. & M., c.
2, §7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 441 (1689)). The Framers, said the
majority, understood that right “as permitting a citizen to
‘repe[l] force by force’ when ‘the intervention of society in his
behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.’ ” 554 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 21) (quoting St. George Tucker, 1 Blackstone’s
Commentaries 145–146, n. 42 (1803)).
The historians now tell us, however, that the
right to which Blackstone referred had, not
nothing, but
everything, to do with the militia. As properly understood
at the time of the English Civil Wars, the historians claim, the
right to bear arms “ensured that
Parliament had the power”
to arm the citizenry: “to defend the realm” in the case of a
foreign enemy, and to “secure the right of
‘self-preservation,’ ” or “self-defense,” should “
the
sovereign usurp the English Constitution.” English Historians’
Brief 3, 8–13, 23–24 (emphasis added). Thus, the Declaration of
Right says that private persons can possess guns only “as allowed
by law.” See
id., at 20–24. Moreover, when Blackstone
referred to “ ‘the right of having and using arms for
self-preservation and defence,’ ” he was referring to the
right of the people “
to take part in the militia to defend
their political liberties
,” and
to the right of
Parliament (which represented the people) to
raise a
militia even when the King sought to deny it that power.
Id., at 4, 24–27 (emphasis added) (quoting 1 Blackstone
140). Nor can the historians find any convincing reason to believe
that the Framers had something different in mind than what
Blackstone himself meant. Compare
Heller, supra, at ___
(slip op., at 21–22) with English Historians’ Brief 28–40. The
historians concede that at least one historian takes a different
position, see
id., at 7, but the Court, they imply, would
lose a poll taken among professional historians of this period,
say, by a vote of 8 to 1.
If history, and history alone, is what
matters, why would the Court not now reconsider
Heller in
light of these more recently published historical views? See
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
PSKS,
Inc.,
551 U. S.
877, 923–924 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that
stare decisis interests are at their lowest with respect
to recent and erroneous constitutional decisions that create
unworkable legal regimes);
Citizens United v.
Federal
Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 47)
(listing similar factors); see also
Wallace v.
Jaffree,
472
U. S. 38, 99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“
[S]tare
decisis may bind courts as to matters of law, but it cannot
bind them as to matters of history”). At the least, where
Heller’s historical foundations are so uncertain, why
extend its applicability?
My aim in referring to this history is to
illustrate the reefs and shoals that lie in wait for those
nonexpert judges who place virtually determinative weight upon
historical considerations. In my own view, the Court should not
look to history alone but to other factors as well—above all, in
cases where the history is so unclear that the experts themselves
strongly disagree. It should, for example, consider the basic
values that underlie a constitutional provision and their
contemporary significance. And it should examine as well the
relevant consequences and practical justifications that might, or
might not, warrant removing an important question from the
democratic decisionmaking process. See
ante, at 16–20
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing shortcomings of an
exclusively historical approach).
II
A
In my view, taking
Heller as a given, the Fourteenth Amendment does not
incorporate the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for
purposes of private self-defense. Under this Court’s precedents, to
incorporate the private self-defense right the majority must show
that the right is,
e.g., “fundamental to the American
scheme of justice,”
Duncan v.
Louisiana,
391 U. S. 145, 149 (1968); see
ibid., n. 14; see also
ante, at 44
(plurality opinion) (finding that the right is “fundamental” and
therefore incorporated). And this it fails to do.
The majority here, like that in
Heller, relies almost exclusively upon history to make the
necessary showing.
Ante, at 20–33. But to do so for
incorporation purposes is both wrong and dangerous. As Justice
Stevens points out, our society has historically made mistakes—for
example, when considering certain 18th- and 19th-century property
rights to be fundamental.
Ante, at 19 (dissenting
opinion). And in the incorporation context, as elsewhere, history
often is unclear about the answers. See Part I,
supra;
Part III,
infra.
Accordingly, this Court, in
considering an incorporation question, has never stated that the
historical status of a right is the only relevant consideration.
Rather, the Court has either explicitly or implicitly made clear in
its opinions that the right in question has remained fundamental
over time. See,
e.g., Apodaca v.
Oregon,
406 U. S. 404, 410
(1972) (plurality opinion) (stating that the incorporation “inquiry
must focus upon the function served” by the right in question in
“
contemporary society” (emphasis added));
Duncan
v.
Louisiana,
391 U. S. 145, 154 (1968) (noting that
the right in question “continues to receive strong support”);
Klopfer v.
North Carolina,
386 U. S. 213, 226
(1967) (same). And, indeed, neither of the parties before us in
this case has asked us to employ the majority’s history-constrained
approach. See Brief for Petitioners 67–69 (arguing for
incorporation based on trends in contemporary support for the
right); Brief for Respondents City of Chicago et al. 23–31
(hereinafter Municipal Respondents) (looking to current state
practices with respect to the right).
I thus think it proper, above all where
history provides no clear answer, to look to other factors in
considering whether a right is sufficiently “fundamental” to remove
it from the political process in every State. I would include among
those factors the nature of the right; any contemporary
disagreement about whether the right is fundamental; the extent to
which incorporation will further other, perhaps more basic,
constitutional aims; and the extent to which incorporation will
advance or hinder the Constitution’s structural aims, including its
division of powers among different governmental institutions (and
the people as well). Is incorporation needed, for example, to
further the Constitution’s effort to ensure that the government
treats each individual with equal respect? Will it help maintain
the democratic form of government that the Constitution foresees?
In a word, will incorporation prove consistent, or inconsistent,
with the Constitution’s efforts to create governmental institutions
well suited to the carrying out of its constitutional promises?
Finally, I would take account of the Framers’
basic reason for believing the Court ought to have the power of
judicial review. Alexander Hamilton feared granting that power to
Congress alone, for he feared that Congress, acting as judges,
would not overturn as unconstitutional a popular statute that it
had recently enacted, as legislators. The Federalist No. 78, p. 405
(G. Carey & J. McClellan eds. 2001) (A. Hamilton) (“This
independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of
those ill humours, which” can, at times, lead to “serious
oppressions of the minor part in the community”). Judges, he
thought, may find it easier to resist popular pressure to suppress
the basic rights of an unpopular minority. See
United
States v.
Carolene Products Co.,
304 U. S. 144, 152,
n. 4 (1938). That being so, it makes sense to ask whether that
particular comparative judicial advantage is relevant to the case
at hand. See,
e.g., J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust
(1980).
B
How do these
considerations apply here? For one thing, I would apply them only
to the private self-defense right directly at issue. After all, the
Amendment’s militia-related purpose is primarily to protect
States from
federal regulation, not to protect
individuals from militia-related regulation.
Heller, 554
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26); see also
Miller, 307 U.
S., at 178. Moreover, the Civil War Amendments, the electoral
process, the courts, and numerous other institutions today help to
safeguard the States and the people from any serious threat of
federal tyranny. How are state militias additionally necessary? It
is difficult to see how a right that, as the majority concedes, has
“largely faded as a popular concern” could possibly be so
fundamental that it would warrant incorporation through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Ante, at 22. Hence, the
incorporation of the Second Amendment cannot be based on the
militia-related aspect of what
Heller found to be more
extensive Second Amendment rights.
For another thing, as
Heller concedes, the private self-defense right that the
Court would incorporate has nothing to do with “the
reason” the Framers “codified” the right to keep and bear
arms “in a written Constitution.” 554 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
26) (emphasis added).
Heller immediately adds that the
self-defense right was nonetheless “the
central component
of the right.”
Ibid. In my view, this is the historical
equivalent of a claim that water runs uphill. See Part I,
supra. But, taking it as valid, the Framers’ basic
reasons for including language in the Constitution would
nonetheless seem more pertinent (in deciding about the contemporary
importance of a right) than the particular
scope
17th- or 18th-century listeners would have then assigned to the
words they used. And examination of the Framers’ motivation tells
us they did not think the private armed self-defense right was of
paramount importance. See Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 Yale L. J. 1131, 1164 (1991) (“[T]o see the
[Second] Amendment as primarily concerned with an individual right
to hunt, or protect one’s home,” would be “like viewing the heart
of the speech and assembly clauses as the right of persons to meet
to play bridge”); see also,
e.g., Rakove, The Second
Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 103, 127–128 (2000); Brief for Historians on Early
American Legal, Constitutional, and Pennsylvania History as
Amici Curiae 22–33.
Further, there is no popular consensus that
the private self-defense right described in
Heller is
fundamental. The plurality suggests that two
amici briefs
filed in the case show such a consensus, see
ante, at
42–43, but, of course, numerous
amici briefs have been
filed opposing incorporation as well. Moreover, every State
regulates firearms extensively, and public opinion is sharply
divided on the appropriate level of regulation. Much of this
disagreement rests upon empirical considerations. One side believes
the right essential to protect the lives of those attacked in the
home; the other side believes it essential to regulate the right in
order to protect the lives of others attacked with guns. It seems
unlikely that definitive evidence will develop one way or the
other. And the appropriate level of firearm regulation has thus
long been, and continues to be, a hotly contested matter of
political debate. See,
e.g., Siegel, Dead or Alive:
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122
Harv. L. Rev. 191, 201–246 (2008). (Numerous sources
supporting arguments and data in Part II–B can be found in the
Appendix,
infra.)
Moreover, there is no reason here to believe
that incorporation of the private self-defense right will further
any other or broader constitutional objective. We are aware of no
argument that gun-control regulations target or are passed with the
purpose of targeting “discrete and insular minorities.”
Carolene Products Co.,
supra, at 153, n. 4;
see,
e.g., ante, at 49–51 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Nor will incorporation help to assure equal respect
for individuals. Unlike the First Amendment’s rights of free
speech, free press, assembly, and petition, the private
self-defense right does not comprise a necessary part of the
democratic process that the Constitution seeks to establish. See,
e.g., Whitney v.
California,
274 U. S. 357, 377
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Unlike the First Amendment’s
religious protections, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’
insistence upon fair criminal procedure, and the Eighth Amendment’s
protection against cruel and unusual punishments, the private
self-defense right does not significantly seek to protect
individuals who might otherwise suffer unfair or inhumane treatment
at the hands of a majority. Unlike the protections offered by many
of these same Amendments, it does not involve matters as to which
judges possess a comparative expertise, by virtue of their close
familiarity with the justice system and its operation. And, unlike
the Fifth Amendment’s insistence on just compensation, it does not
involve a matter where a majority might unfairly seize for itself
property belonging to a minority.
Finally, incorporation of the right
will work a significant disruption in the constitutional
allocation of decisionmaking authority, thereby interfering with
the Constitution’s ability to further its objectives.
First, on any reasonable accounting,
the incorporation of the right recognized in
Heller would
amount to a significant incursion on a traditional and important
area of state concern, altering the constitutional relationship
between the States and the Federal Government. Private gun
regulation is the quintessential exercise of a State’s “police
power”—
i.e., the power to “protec[t] … the lives, limbs,
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of
all property within the State,” by enacting “all kinds of
restraints and burdens” on both “persons and property.”
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 62 (1873) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court has long recognized that the
Constitution grants the States special authority to enact laws
pursuant to this power. See,
e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr,
518
U. S. 470, 475 (1996) (noting that States have “great latitude”
to use their police powers (internal quotation marks omitted));
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts,
471 U. S. 724,
756 (1985). A decade ago, we wrote that there is “no better example
of the police power” than “the suppression of violent crime.”
United States v.
Morrison,
529 U. S. 598, 618
(2000). And examples in which the Court has deferred to state
legislative judgments in respect to the exercise of the police
power are legion. See,
e.g., Gonzales v.
Oregon,
546
U. S. 243, 270 (2006) (assisted suicide);
Washington
v.
Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721
(1997) (same);
Berman v.
Parker,
348 U. S. 26, 32 (1954)
(“We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known
as the police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its
outer limits is fruitless …”).
Second, determining the
constitutionality of a particular state gun law requires finding
answers to complex empirically based questions of a kind that
legislatures are better able than courts to make. See,
e.g., Los Angeles v.
Alameda Books,
Inc.,
535 U. S.
425, 440 (2002) (plurality opinion);
Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v.
FCC,
520 U. S. 180, 195–196
(1997). And it may require this kind of analysis in virtually every
case.
Government regulation of the right to bear
arms normally embodies a judgment that the regulation will help
save lives. The determination whether a gun regulation is
constitutional would thus almost always require the weighing of the
constitutional right to bear arms against the “primary concern of
every government—a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of
its citizens.”
United States v.
Salerno,
481 U. S. 739, 755
(1987). With respect to other incorporated rights, this sort of
inquiry is
sometimes present. See,
e.g.,
Brandenburg v.
Ohio,
395 U. S. 444, 447
(1969)
(per curiam) (free speech);
Sherbert v.
Verner,
374
U. S. 398, 403 (1963) (religion);
Brigham City v.
Stuart,
547
U. S. 398, 403–404 (2006) (Fourth Amendment);
New York
v.
Quarles,
467 U. S. 649, 655
(1984) (Fifth Amendment);
Salerno, supra, at 755 (bail).
But here, this inquiry—calling for the fine tuning of protective
rules—is likely to be part of a daily judicial diet.
Given the competing interests, courts will
have to try to answer empirical questions of a particularly
difficult kind. Suppose, for example, that after a gun regulation’s
adoption the murder rate went up. Without the gun regulation would
the murder rate have risen even faster? How is this conclusion
affected by the local recession which has left numerous people
unemployed? What about budget cuts that led to a downsizing of the
police force? How effective was that police force to begin with?
And did the regulation simply take guns from those who use them for
lawful purposes without affecting their possession by
criminals?
Consider too that countless gun regulations of
many shapes and sizes are in place in every State and in many local
communities. Does the right to possess weapons for self-defense
extend outside the home? To the car? To work? What sort of guns are
necessary for self-defense? Handguns? Rifles? Semiautomatic
weapons? When is a gun semi-automatic? Where are different kinds of
weapons likely needed? Does time-of-day matter? Does the presence
of a child in the house matter? Does the presence of a convicted
felon in the house matter? Do police need special rules permitting
patdowns designed to find guns? When do registration requirements
become severe to the point that they amount to an unconstitutional
ban? Who can possess guns and of what kind? Aliens? Prior drug
offenders? Prior alcohol abusers? How would the right interact with
a state or local government’s ability to take special measures
during, say, national security emergencies? As the questions
suggest, state and local gun regulation can become highly complex,
and these “are only a few uncertainties that quickly come to mind.”
Caperton v.
A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. ___,
___ (2009) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (slip op., at 10).
The difficulty of finding answers to these
questions is exceeded only by the importance of doing so. Firearms
cause well over 60,000 deaths and injuries in the United States
each year. Those who live in urban areas, police officers, women,
and children, all may be particularly at risk. And gun regulation
may save their lives. Some experts have calculated, for example,
that Chicago’s handgun ban has saved several hundred lives, perhaps
close to 1,000, since it was enacted in 1983. Other experts argue
that stringent gun regulations “can help protect police officers
operating on the front lines against gun violence,” have reduced
homicide rates in Washington, D. C., and Baltimore, and have
helped to lower New York’s crime and homicide rates.
At the same time, the opponents of regulation
cast doubt on these studies. And who is right? Finding out may
require interpreting studies that are only indirectly related to a
particular regulatory statute, say one banning handguns in the
home. Suppose studies find more accidents and suicides where there
is a handgun in the home than where there is a long gun in the home
or no gun at all? To what extent do such studies justify a ban?
What if opponents of the ban put forth counter studies?
In answering such questions judges cannot
simply refer to judicial homilies, such as Blackstone’s
18th-century perception that a man’s home is his castle. See 4
Blackstone 223. Nor can the plurality so simply reject, by mere
assertion, the fact that “incorporation will require judges to
assess the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions.”
Ante, at 44. How can the Court assess the strength of the
government’s regulatory interests without addressing issues of
empirical fact? How can the Court determine if a regulation is
appropriately tailored without considering its impact? And how can
the Court determine if there are less restrictive alternatives
without considering what will happen if those alternatives are
implemented?
Perhaps the Court could lessen the difficulty
of the mission it has created for itself by adopting a
jurisprudential approach similar to the many state courts that
administer a state constitutional right to bear arms. See
infra, at 19–20 (describing state approaches). But the
Court has not yet done so. Cf.
Heller, 544 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 57–64) (rejecting an “ ‘interest-balancing’
approach” similar to that employed by the States);
ante,
at 44 (plurality opinion). Rather, the Court has haphazardly
created a few simple rules, such as that it will not touch
“prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill,” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,” or
“laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale
of arms.”
Heller, 544 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 54–55);
Ante, at 39 (plurality opinion). But why these rules and
not others? Does the Court know that these regulations are
justified by some special gun-related risk of death? In fact, the
Court does not know. It has simply invented rules that sound
sensible without being able to explain why or how Chicago’s handgun
ban is different.
The fact is that judges do not know the
answers to the kinds of empirically based questions that will often
determine the need for particular forms of gun regulation. Nor do
they have readily available “tools” for finding and evaluating the
technical material submitted by others.
District Attorney’s
Office for Third Judicial Dist. v.
Osborne, 557 U. S.
___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 21); see also
Turner
Broadcasting, 520 U. S., at 195–196
. Judges cannot
easily make empirically based predictions; they have no way to
gather and evaluate the data required to see if such predictions
are accurate; and the nature of litigation and concerns about
stare decisis further make it difficult for judges to
change course if predictions prove inaccurate. Nor can judges rely
upon local community views and values when reaching judgments in
circumstances where prediction is difficult because the basic facts
are unclear or unknown.
At the same time, there is no institutional
need to send judges off on this “mission-almost-impossible.”
Legislators are able to “amass the stuff of actual experience and
cull conclusions from it.”
United States v.
Gainey,
380
U. S. 63, 67 (1965). They are far better suited than judges to
uncover facts and to understand their relevance. And legislators,
unlike Article III judges, can be held democratically responsible
for their empirically based and value-laden conclusions. We have
thus repeatedly affirmed our preference for “legislative not
judicial solutions” to this kind of problem, see,
e.g.,
Patsy v.
Board of Regents of Fla.,
457 U. S. 496, 513
(1982), just as we have repeatedly affirmed the Constitution’s
preference for democratic solutions legislated by those whom the
people elect.
In
New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann,
285 U. S. 262, 310–311
(1932), Justice Brandeis stated in dissent:
“Some people assert that our present plight is due,
in part, to the limitations set by courts upon experimentation in
the fields of social and economic science; and to the
discouragement to which proposals for betterment there have been
subjected otherwise. There must be power in the States and the
Nation to remould, through experimentation, our economic practices
and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs. I
cannot believe that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the
States which ratified it, intended to deprive us of the power to
correct [the social problems we face].”
There are 50 state legislatures.
The fact that this Court may already have refused to take this wise
advice with respect to Congress in
Heller is no reason to
make matters worse here.
Third, the ability of States to
reflect local preferences and conditions—both key virtues of
federalism—here has particular importance. The incidence of gun
ownership varies substantially as between crowded cities and
uncongested rural communities, as well as among the different
geographic regions of the country. Thus, approximately 60% of
adults who live in the relatively sparsely populated Western States
of Alaska, Montana, and Wyoming report that their household keeps a
gun, while fewer than 15% of adults in the densely populated
Eastern States of Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Massachusetts say
the same.
The nature of gun violence also varies as
between rural communities and cities. Urban centers face
significantly greater levels of firearm crime and homicide, while
rural communities have proportionately greater problems with
nonhomicide gun deaths, such as suicides and accidents. And
idiosyncratic local factors can lead to two cities finding
themselves in dramatically different circumstances: For example, in
2008, the murder rate was 40 times higher in New Orleans than it
was in Lincoln, Nebraska.
It is thus unsurprising that States and local
communities have historically differed about the need for gun
regulation as well as about its proper level. Nor is it surprising
that “primarily, and historically,” the law has treated the
exercise of police powers, including gun control, as “matter[s] of
local concern.”
Medtronic, 518 U. S., at 475 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Fourth, although incorporation of any
right removes decisions from the democratic process, the
incorporation of this particular right does so without strong
offsetting justification—as the example of Oak Park’s handgun ban
helps to show. See Oak Park, Ill., Municipal Code, §27–2–1 (1995).
Oak Park decided to ban handguns in 1983, after a local attorney
was shot to death with a handgun that his assailant had smuggled
into a courtroom in a blanket. Brief for Oak Park Citizens
Committee for Handgun Control as
Amicus Curiae 1, 21
(hereinafter Oak Park Brief). A citizens committee spent months
gathering information about handguns.
Id., at 21. It
secured 6,000 signatures from community residents in support of a
ban.
Id., at 21–22. And the village board enacted a ban
into law.
Id., at 22.
Subsequently, at the urging of ban opponents
the Board held a community referendum on the matter.
Ibid.
The citizens committee argued strongly in favor of the ban.
Id., at 22–23. It pointed out that most guns owned in Oak
Park were handguns and that handguns were misused more often than
citizens used them in self-defense.
Id., at 23. The ban
opponents argued just as strongly to the contrary.
Ibid.
The public decided to keep the ban by a vote of 8,031 to 6,368.
Ibid. And since that time, Oak Park now tells us, crime
has decreased and the community has seen no accidental handgun
deaths.
Id., at 2.
Given the empirical and local value-laden
nature of the questions that lie at the heart of the issue, why, in
a Nation whose Constitution foresees democratic decisionmaking, is
it so
fundamental a matter as to require taking that power
from the people? What is it here that the people did not know? What
is it that a judge knows better?
* * *
In sum, the police power, the
superiority of legislative decisionmaking, the need for local
decisionmaking, the comparative desirability of democratic
decisionmaking, the lack of a manageable judicial standard, and the
life-threatening harm that may flow from striking down regulations
all argue against incorporation. Where the incorporation of other
rights has been at issue,
some of these problems have
arisen. But in this instance
all these problems are
present,
all at the same time, and
all are likely
to be present in most, perhaps nearly all, of the cases in which
the constitutionality of a gun regulation is at issue. At the same
time, the important factors that favor incorporation in other
instances—
e.g., the protection of broader constitutional
objectives—are not present here. The upshot is that all factors
militate against incorporation—with the possible exception of
historical factors.
III
I must, then, return to history.
The plurality, in seeking to justify incorporation, asks whether
the interests the Second Amendment protects are “ ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’ ”
Ante, at 19 (quoting
Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at
721; internal quotation marks omitted). It looks to selected
portions of the Nation’s history for the answer. And it finds an
affirmative reply.
As I have made clear, I do not
believe history is the only pertinent consideration. Nor would I
read history as broadly as the majority does. In particular, since
we here are evaluating a more particular right—namely, the right to
bear arms for purposes of private self-defense—general historical
references to the “right to keep and bear arms” are not always
helpful. Depending upon context, early historical sources may mean
to refer to a militia-based right—a matter of considerable
importance 200 years ago—which has, as the majority points out,
“largely faded as a popular concern.”
Ante, at 22. There
is no reason to believe that matters of such little contemporary
importance should play a significant role in answering the
incorporation question. See
Apodaca, 406 U. S., at 410
(incorporation “inquiry must focus upon the function served” by the
right in question in “contemporary society”);
Wolf v.
Colorado,
338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949)
(incorporation must take into account “the movements of a free
society” and “the gradual and empiric process of inclusion and
exclusion” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. U. S. Const.,
Art. I, §910 (prohibiting federal officeholders from accepting a
“Title, of any kind whatever, from [a] foreign State”—presumably a
matter of considerable importance 200 years ago).
That said, I can find much in the historical
record that shows that some Americans in some places at certain
times thought it important to keep and bear arms for private
self-defense. For instance, the reader will see that many States
have constitutional provisions protecting gun possession. But, as
far as I can tell, those provisions typically do no more than
guarantee that a gun regulation will be a
reasonable
police power regulation. See Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second
Amendment, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 686, 716–717 (2007) (the
“courts of every state to consider the question apply a deferential
‘reasonable regulation’ standard”) (hereinafter Winkler,
Scrutinizing); see also
id., at 716–717 (explaining the
difference between that standard and ordinary rational-basis
review). It is thus altogether unclear whether such provisions
would prohibit cities such as Chicago from enacting laws, such as
the law before us, banning handguns. See
id., at 723. The
majority, however, would incorporate a right that is likely
inconsistent with Chicago’s law; and the majority would
almost certainly
strike down that law. Cf.
Heller, 554 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 57–64) (striking
down the District of Columbia’s handgun ban).
Thus, the specific question before us is not
whether there are references to the right to bear arms for
self-defense throughout this Nation’s history—of course there
are—or even whether the Court should incorporate a simple
constitutional requirement that firearms regulations not
unreasonably burden the right to keep and bear arms, but rather
whether there is a consensus that
so substantial a private
self-defense right as the one described in
Heller applies
to the States. See,
e.g., Glucksberg,
supra, at 721 (requiring “a careful description” of the
right at issue when deciding whether it is “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). On this question, the reader will have to make up his or
her own mind about the historical record that I describe in part
below. In my view, that record is insufficient to say that the
right to bear arms for private self-defense, as explicated by
Heller, is fundamental in the sense relevant to the
incorporation inquiry. As the evidence below shows, States and
localities have consistently enacted firearms regulations,
including regulations similar to those at issue here, throughout
our Nation’s history. Courts have repeatedly upheld such
regulations. And it is, at the very least, possible, and perhaps
likely, that incorporation will impose on every, or nearly every,
State a different right to bear arms than they currently
recognize—a right that threatens to destabilize settled state legal
principles. Cf. 554 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 57–64) (rejecting
an “ ‘interest-balancing’ approach” similar to that employed
by the States).
I thus cannot find a historical consensus with
respect to whether the right described by
Heller is
“fundamental” as our incorporation cases use that term. Nor can I
find sufficient historical support for the majority’s conclusion
that that right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.” Instead, I find no more than ambiguity and uncertainty
that perhaps even expert historians would find difficult to
penetrate. And a historical record that is so ambiguous cannot
itself provide an adequate basis for incorporating a private right
of self-defense and applying it against the States.
The Eighteenth Century
The opinions in
Heller collect much
of the relevant 18th-century evidence. See 554 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 5–32);
id., at ___ (Stevens, J., dissenting) (slip
op., at 5–31);
id., at ___ (Breyer, J., dissenting) (slip
op., at 4–7). In respect to the relevant question—the “deeply
rooted nature” of a right to keep and bear arms for purposes of
private self-defense—that evidence is inconclusive, particularly
when augmented as follows:
First, as I have noted earlier in
this opinion, and Justice Stevens argued in dissent, the history
discussed in
Heller shows that the Second Amendment was
enacted primarily for the purpose of protecting militia-related
rights. See
supra, at 4;
Heller, supra, at ___
(slip op., at 5–31). Many of the scholars and historians who have
written on the subject apparently agree. See
supra, at
2–5.
Second, historians now tell us that
the right to which Blackstone referred, an important link in the
Heller majority’s historical argument, concerned the right
of Parliament (representing the people) to form a militia to oppose
a tyrant (the King) threatening to deprive the people of their
traditional liberties (which did not include an unregulated right
to possess guns). Thus, 18th-century language referring to a “right
to keep and bear arms” does not
ipso facto refer to a
private right of self-defense—certainly not unambiguously so. See
English Historians’ Brief 3–27; see also
supra, at
2–5.
Third, scholarly articles indicate
that firearms were heavily regulated at the time of the
framing—perhaps more heavily regulated than the Court in
Heller believed. For example, one scholar writes that
“[h]undreds of individual statutes regulated the possession and use
of guns in colonial and early national America.” Churchill, Gun
Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms, 25 Law
& Hist. Rev. 139, 143 (2007). Among these statutes was a ban on
the private firing of weapons in Boston, as well as comprehensive
restrictions on similar conduct in Philadelphia and New York. See
Acts and Laws of Massachusetts, p. 208 (1746); 5 J. Mitchell, &
H. Flanders, Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania From 1682 to 1801,
pp. 108–109 (1898); 4 Colonial Laws of New York ch. 1233, p. 748
(1894); see also Churchill,
supra, at 162–163 (discussing
bans on the shooting of guns in Pennsylvania and New York).
Fourth, after the Constitution was
adopted, several States continued to regulate firearms possession
by, for example, adopting rules that would have prevented the
carrying of loaded firearms in the city,
Heller, 554 U.
S., at ___ (slip op., at 5–7) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also
id., at ___ (slip op., at 59–60). Scholars have thus
concluded that the primary Revolutionary era limitation on a
State’s police power to regulate guns appears to be only that
regulations were “aimed at a legitimate public purpose” and
“consistent with reason.” Cornell, Early American Gun Regulation
and the Second Amendment, 25 Law & Hist. Rev. 197, 198
(2007).
The Pre-Civil War Nineteenth Century
I would also augment the majority’s account of
this period as follows:
First, additional States began to
regulate the discharge of firearms in public places. See,
e.g., Act of Feb. 17, 1831, §6, reprinted in 3 Statutes of
Ohio and the Northwestern Territory 1740 (S. Chase ed. 1835); Act
of Dec. 3, 1825, ch. CCXCII, §3, 1825 Tenn. Priv. Acts 306.
Second, States began to regulate the
possession of concealed weapons, which were both popular and
dangerous. See,
e.g., C. Cramer, Concealed Weapon Laws of
the Early Republic 143–152 (1999) (collecting examples); see also
1837–1838 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 137, pp. 200–201 (banning the
wearing, sale, or giving of Bowie knives); 1847 Va. Acts ch. 7, §8,
p. 110, (“Any free person who shall habitually carry about his
person, hidden from common observation, any pistol, dirk, bowie
knife, or weapon of the like kind, from the use of which the death
of any person might probably ensue, shall for every offense be
punished by [a] fine not exceed fifty dollars”).
State courts repeatedly upheld the validity of
such laws, finding that, even when the state constitution granted a
right to bear arms, the legislature was permitted to,
e.g., “abolish” these small, inexpensive, “most dangerous
weapons entirely from use,” even in self-defense.
Day v.
State, 37 Tenn. 496, 500 (1857); see also,
e.g.,
State v.
Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399, 400 (1858)
(upholding concealed weapon ban because it “prohibited only a
particular mode of bearing arms which is found dangerous
to the peace of society”);
State v.
Chandler, 5
La. Ann. 489, 489–490 (1850) (upholding concealed weapon ban and
describing the law as “absolutely necessary to counteract a vicious
state of society, growing out of the habit of carrying concealed
weapons”);
State v.
Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616–617
(1840).
The Post-Civil War Nineteenth Century
It is important to read the majority’s account
with the following considerations in mind:
First, the Court today properly
declines to revisit our interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. See
ante, at 10. The Court’s case for
incorporation must thus rest on the conclusion that the right to
bear arms is “fundamental.” But the very evidence that it advances
in support of the conclusion that Reconstruction-era Americans
strongly supported a private self-defense right shows with equal
force that Americans wanted African-American citizens to have the
same rights to possess guns as did white citizens.
Ante, at 22–33. Here, for example is what Congress said
when it enacted a Fourteenth Amendment predecessor, the Second
Freedman’s Bureau Act. It wrote that the statute, in order to
secure “the constitutional right to bear arms … for all citizens,”
would assure that each citizen:
“shall have …
full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal
security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of
estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right to
bear arms, [by securing] … to … all the citizens of [every] … State
or district without
respect to race or color, or previous
condition of slavery.” §14, 14 Stat. 176–177 (emphasis
added).
This sounds like an
antidiscrimination
provision. See Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth
Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem of
Incorporation, 18 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 361, 383–384 (2009)
(discussing evidence that the Freedmen’s Bureau was focused on
discrimination).
Another Fourteenth Amendment predecessor, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, also took aim at
discrimination.
See §1, 14 Stat. 27 (citizens of “every race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude . . . shall have the same right [to engage in various
activities] and to full and equal benefit of all laws … as is
enjoyed by white citizens”). And, of course, the Fourteenth
Amendment itself insists that all States guarantee their citizens
the “equal protection of the laws.”
There is thus every reason to believe that the
fundamental concern of the Reconstruction Congress was the
eradication of discrimination, not the provision of a new
substantive right to bear arms free from reasonable state police
power regulation. See,
e.g., Brief for Municipal
Respondents 62–69 (discussing congressional record evidence that
Reconstruction Congress was concerned about discrimination).
Indeed, why would those who wrote the Fourteenth Amendment have
wanted to give such a right to Southerners who had so recently
waged war against the North, and who continued to disarm and
oppress recently freed African-American citizens? Cf. Act of Mar.
2, 1867, §6, 14 Stat. 487 (disbanding Southern militias because
they were,
inter alia, disarming the freedmen).
Second, firearms regulation in the
later part of the 19th century was common. The majority is correct
that the Freedmen’s Bureau points to a right to bear arms, and it
stands to reason, as the majority points out, that “[i]t would have
been nonsensical for Congress to guarantee the … equal benefit of a
… right that does not exist.”
Ante, at 32. But the
majority points to no evidence that there existed during this
period a fundamental right to bear arms for private self-defense
immune to the reasonable exercise of the state police power. See
Emberton, The Limits of Incorporation: Violence, Gun Rights, and
Gun Regulation in the Reconstruction South, 17 Stan. L. & Pol’y
Rev. 615, 621–622 (2006) (noting that history shows that
“nineteenth-century Americans” were “not opposed to the idea that
the state should be able to control the use of firearms”).
To the contrary, in the latter half of the
19th century, a number of state constitutions adopted or amended
after the Civil War explicitly recognized the legislature’s general
ability to limit the right to bear arms. See Tex. Const., Art. I,
§13 (1869) (protecting “the right to keep and bear arms,” “under
such regulations as the legislature may prescribe”); Idaho Const.,
Art. I, §11 (1889) (“The people have the right to bear arms …; but
the Legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law”);
Utah Const., Art. I, §6 (1896) (same). And numerous other state
constitutional provisions adopted during this period explicitly
granted the legislature various types of regulatory power over
firearms. See Brief for Thirty-Four Professional Historians
et al. as
Amici Curiae 14–15 (hereinafter Legal
Historians’ Brief).
Moreover, four States largely banned the
possession of all nonmilitary handguns during this period. See 1879
Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 186, §1 (prohibiting citizens from carrying
“publicly or privately, any … belt or pocket pistol, revolver, or
any kind of pistol, except the army or navy pistol, usually used in
warfare, which shall be carried openly in the hand”); 1876 Wyo.
Comp. Laws ch. 52, §1 (forbidding “concealed or ope[n]” bearing of
“any fire arm or other deadly weapon, within the limits of any
city, town or village”); Ark. Act of Apr. 1, 1881, ch. 96, §1
(prohibiting the “wear[ing] or carry[ng]” of “any pistol … except
such pistols as are used in the army or navy,” except while
traveling or at home); Tex. Act of Apr. 12, 1871, ch. 34
(prohibiting the carrying of pistols unless there are “immediate
and pressing” reasonable grounds to fear “immediate and pressing”
attack or for militia service). Fifteen States banned the concealed
carry of pistols and other deadly weapons. See Legal Historians’
Brief 16, n. 14. And individual municipalities enacted
stringent gun controls, often in response to local conditions—Dodge
City, Kansas, for example, joined many western cattle towns in
banning the carrying of pistols and other dangerous weapons in
response to violence accompanying western cattle drives. See Brief
for Municipal Respondents 30 (citing Dodge City, Kan., Ordinance
No. 16, §XI (Sept. 22, 1876)); D. Courtwright, The Cowboy
Subculture, in Guns in America: A Reader 96 (J. Dizard et al.
eds. 1999) (discussing how Western cattle towns required cowboys to
“check” their guns upon entering town).
Further, much as they had during the period
before the Civil War, state courts routinely upheld such
restrictions. See,
e.g., English v.
State, 35
Tex. 473 (1871);
Hill v.
State, 53 Ga. 472, 475
(1874);
Fife v.
State, 31 Ark. 455, 461 (1876);
State v.
Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 373 (1891).
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in upholding a ban on possession of
nonmilitary handguns and certain other weapons, summarized the
Reconstruction understanding of the states’ police power to
regulate firearms:
“Admitting the right of self-defense in its
broadest sense, still on sound principle every good citizen is
bound to yield his preference as to the means to be used, to the
demands of the public good;
and where certain weapons are
forbidden to be kept or used by the law of the land, in order
to the prevention of
[sic] crime—a great public end—
no
man can be permitted to disregard this general end, and demand of
the community the right, in order to gratify his whim or willful
desire to use a particular weapon in his particular
self-defense. The law allows ample means of self-defense,
without the use of the weapons which we have held may be rightfully
prescribed by this statute. The object being to banish these
weapons from the community by an absolute prohibition for the
prevention of crime, no man’s particular safety, if such case could
exist, ought to be allowed to defeat this end.”
Andrews v.
State, 50 Tenn. 165, 188–189 (1871) (emphasis added).
The Twentieth and Twenty-First
Centuries
Although the majority does not discuss 20th-
or 21st-century evidence concerning the Second Amendment at any
length, I think that it is essential to consider the recent history
of the right to bear arms for private self-defense when considering
whether the right is “fundamental.” To that end, many States now
provide state constitutional protection for an individual’s right
to keep and bear arms. See Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to
Keep and Bear Arms, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 191, 205 (2006)
(identifying over 40 States). In determining the importance of this
fact, we should keep the following considerations in mind:
First, by the end of the 20th
century, in every State and many local communities, highly detailed
and complicated regulatory schemes governed (and continue to
govern) nearly every aspect of firearm ownership: Who may sell guns
and how they must be sold; who may purchase guns and what type of
guns may be purchased; how firearms must be stored and where they
may be used; and so on. See generally Legal Community Against
Violence, Regulating Guns In America (2008), available at http://
www.lcav.org/publications-briefs/regulating_guns. asp (all Internet
materials as visited June 24, 2010, and available in Clerk of
Court’s case file) (detailing various arms regulations in every
State).
Of particular relevance here, some
municipalities ban handguns, even in States that constitutionally
protect the right to bear arms. See Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code,
§8–20–050(c) (2009); Oak Park, Ill., Municipal Code, §§27–2–1,
27–1–1 (1995); Toledo, Ohio, Municipal Code, ch. 549.25 (2010).
Moreover, at least seven States and Puerto Rico ban assault weapons
or semiautomatic weapons. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §12280(b) (West
Supp. 2009); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §53–202c (2007); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§134–8 (1993); Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §4–303(a) (Lexis 2002);
Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 140, §131M (West 2006); N. J. Stat. Ann.
§2C:39-5 (West Supp. 2010); N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §265.02(7) (West
Supp. 2008); 25 Laws P. R. Ann. §456m (Supp. 2006); see also 18 U.
S. C. §922
(o) (federal machinegun ban).
Thirteen municipalities do the same. See
Albany, N. Y., City Code §193–16(A) (2005); Aurora, Ill., Code of
Ordinances §29–49(a) (2009); Buffalo, N. Y., City Code §180–1(F)
(2000); Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code §8–24–025(a) (2010);
Cincinnati, Ohio, Municipal Code §708–37(a) (2008); Cleveland,
Ohio, Codified Ordinances §628.03(a) (2008); Columbus, Ohio, City
Code §2323.31 (2007); Denver, Colo., Municipal Code §38–130(e)
(2008); Morton Grove, Ill., Village Code §6–2–3(A); N. Y. C. Admin.
Code §10–303.1 (2009); Oak Park, Ill., Village Code §27–2–1 (2009);
Rochester, N. Y., City Code §47–5(F) (2008); Toledo, Ohio,
Municipal Code §549.23(a). And two States, Maryland and Hawaii, ban
assault pistols. See Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §134–8; Md. Crim. Law
Code Ann. §4–303 (Lexis 2002).
Second, as I stated earlier, state
courts in States with constitutions that provide gun rights have
almost uniformly interpreted those rights as providing protection
only against
unreasonable regulation of guns. See,
e.g., Winkler, Scrutinizing 686 (the “courts of every
state to consider” a gun regulation apply the “ ‘reasonable
regulation’ ” approach);
State v.
McAdams,
714 P. 2d 1236, 1238 (Wyo. 1986);
Robertson v.
City & County of Denver, 874 P. 2d 325, 328
(Colo. 1994).
When determining reasonableness those courts
have normally adopted a highly deferential attitude towards
legislative determinations. See Winkler, Scrutinizing 723
(identifying only six cases in the 60 years before the article’s
publication striking down gun control laws: three that banned “the
transportation of any firearms for any purpose whatsoever,” a
single “permitting law,” and two as-applied challenges in “unusual
circumstances”). Hence, as evidenced by the breadth of existing
regulations, States and local governments maintain substantial
flexibility to regulate firearms—much as they seemingly have
throughout the Nation’s history—even in those States with an arms
right in their constitutions.
Although one scholar implies that state
courts are less willing to permit total gun prohibitions, see
Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for
Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56
UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1458 (2009), I am aware of no instances in
the past 50 years in which a state court has struck down as
unconstitutional a law banning a particular class of firearms, see
Winkler, Scrutinizing 723.
Indeed, state courts have specifically upheld
as constitutional (under their state constitutions) firearms
regulations that have included handgun bans. See
Kalodimos
v.
Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 499, 470
N. E. 2d 266, 273 (1984) (upholding a handgun ban because the
arms right is merely a right “to possess some form of weapon
suitable for self-defense or recreation”);
Cleveland v.
Turner, No. 36126, 1977 WL 201393, *5 (Ohio Ct. App., Aug.
4, 1977) (handgun ban “does not absolutely interfere with the right
of the people to bear arms, but rather proscribes possession of a
specifically defined category of handguns”);
State v.
Bolin 378 S. C. 96, 99, 662 S. E. 2d 38, 39
(2008) (ban on handgun possession by persons under 21 did not
infringe arms right because they can “posses[s] other types of
guns”). Thus, the majority’s decision to incorporate the private
self-defense right recognized in
Heller threatens to alter
state regulatory regimes, at least as they pertain to handguns.
Third, the plurality correctly points
out that
only a few state courts, a “paucity” of state
courts, have specifically upheld handgun bans.
Ante, at
39. But which state courts have struck them down? The absence of
supporting information does not help the majority find support. Cf.
United States v.
Wells,
519 U. S. 482, 496
(1997) (noting that it is “treacherous to find in congressional
silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Silence does not show or tend to show a
consensus that a private self-defense right (strong enough to
strike down a handgun ban) is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.”
* * *
In sum, the Framers did not write
the Second Amendment in order to protect a private right of armed
self-defense. There has been, and is, no consensus that the right
is, or was, “fundamental.” No broader constitutional interest or
principle supports legal treatment of that right as fundamental. To
the contrary, broader constitutional concerns of an institutional
nature argue strongly against that treatment.
Moreover, nothing in 18th-,
19th-, 20th-, or 21st-century history shows a consensus that the
right to private armed self-defense, as described in
Heller, is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history or
tradition” or is otherwise “fundamental.” Indeed, incorporating the
right recognized in
Heller may change the law in many of
the 50 States. Read in the majority’s favor, the historical
evidence is at most ambiguous. And, in the absence of any other
support for its conclusion, ambiguous history cannot show that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a private right of self-defense
against the States.
With respect, I dissent.
APPENDIX
Sources Supporting Data in Part II–B
Popular Consensus
Please see the following sources to support the paragraph on
popular opinion on pages 9–10:
•Briefs filed in this case that argue against incorporation
include: Brief for United States Conference of Mayors as
Amicus
Curiae 1, 17–33 (organization representing “all United States
cities with populations of 30,000 or more”); Brief for American
Cities et al. as
Amici Curiae 1–3 (brief filed on
behalf of many cities,
e.g., Philadelphia, Seattle, San
Francisco, Oakland, Cleveland); Brief for Representative Carolyn
McCarthy et al. as
Amici Curiae 5–10; Brief for State
of Illinois et al. as
Amici Curiae 7–35.
•Wilkinson, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law,
95 Va. L. Rev. 253, 301 (2009) (discussing divided public
opinion over the correct level of gun control).
Data on Gun Violence
Please see the following sources to support
the sentences concerning gun violence on page 13:
•Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, M. Zawitz &
K. Strom, Firearm Injury and Death from Crime, 1993–1997, p. 2
(Oct. 2000) (over 60,000 deaths and injuries caused by firearms
each year).
•Campbell, et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive
Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 Am.
J. of Pub. Health 1089, 1092 (2003) (noting that an abusive
partner’s access to a firearm increases the risk of homicide
eightfold for women in physically abusive relationship).
•American Academy of Pediatrics, Firearm-Related Injuries
Affecting the Pediatric Population, 105 Pediatrics 888 (2000)
(noting that in 1997 “firearm-related deaths accounted for 22.5% of
all injury deaths” for individuals between 1 and 19).
•Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law
Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted, 2006, (Table) 27
(noting that firearms killed 93% of the 562 law enforcement
officers feloniously killed in the line of duty between 1997 and
2006), online at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/
table27.html.
•Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, D. Duhart,
Urban, Suburban, and Rural Victimization, 1993–1998, pp. 1, 9 (Oct.
2000) (those who live in urban areas particularly at risk of
firearm violence).
•Wintemute, The Future of Firearm Violence Prevention, 281 JAMA
475 (1999) (“half of all homicides occurred in 63 cities with 16%
of the nation’s population”).
Data on the Effectiveness of Regulation
Please see the following sources to support
the sentences concerning the effectiveness of regulation on page
13:
•See Brief for Professors of Criminal Justice as
Amici
Curiae 13 (noting that Chicago’s handgun ban saved several
hundred lives, perhaps close to 1,000, since it was enacted in
1983).
•Brief for Association of Prosecuting Attorneys et al. as
Amici Curiae 13–16, 20 (arguing that stringent gun
regulations “can help protect police officers operating on the
front lines against gun violence,” and have reduced homicide rates
in Washington, D. C., and Baltimore).
•Brief for United States Conference of Mayors as
Amici
Curiae 4–13 (arguing that gun regulations have helped to lower
New York’s crime and homicide rates).
Data on Handguns in the Home
Please see the following sources referenced in
the sentences discussing studies concerning handguns
in the
home on pages 13–14:
•Brief for Organizations Committed to Protecting the Public’s
Health, Safety, and Well-Being as
Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents 13–16 (discussing studies that show handgun
ownership in the home is associated with increased risk of
homicide).
•Wiebe, Firearms in US Homes as a Risk Factor for Unintentional
Gunshot Fatality, 35 Accident Analysis and Prevention 711, 713–714
(2003) (showing that those who die in firearms accidents are nearly
four times more likely than average to have a gun in their
home).
•Kellerman et al., Suicide in the Home in Relation to Gun
Ownership, 327 New England J. Medicine 467, 470 (1992)
(demonstrating that “homes with one or more handguns were
associated with a risk of suicide almost twice as high as that in
homes containing only long guns”).
Data on Regional Views and Conditions
Please see the following sources referenced in
the section on the diversity of regional views and conditions on
page 16:
•Okoro, et al., Prevalence of Household Firearms and
Firearm-Storage Practices in the 50 States and the District of
Columbia: Findings From the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System, 2002, 116 Pediatrics 370, 372 (2005) (presenting data on
firearm ownership by State).
•Heller, 554 U. S., at ___ (Breyer, J., dissenting) (slip op.,
at 19–20) (discussing various sources showing that gun violence
varies by state, including Wintemute, The Future of Firearm
Violence Prevention, 281 JAMA 475 (1999)).
•Heller, supra, at ___ (Breyer, J., dissenting) (slip op., at
19–20) (citing Branas, Nance, Elliott, Richmond, & Schwab,
Urban-Rural Shifts in Intentional Firearm Death, 94 Am. J. Public
Health 1750, 1752 (2004)) (discussing the fact that urban centers
face significantly greater levels of firearm crime and homicide,
while rural communities have proportionately greater problems with
nonhomicide gun deaths, such as suicides and accidents).
•Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008 Crime
in the United States, tbl. 6 (noting that murder rate is 40 times
higher in New Orleans than it is in Lincoln, Nebraska).
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment