Philadelphia municipal regulation requiring city employees to be
residents of the city held to be constitutional as a
bona
fide continuing residence requirement and not to violate the
right of interstate travel of appellant, whose employment as a city
fireman was terminated under the regulation because he moved his
residence from Philadelphia to New Jersey.
19 Pa.Commw. 383, 339 A.2d 634, affirmed.
PER CURIAM.
After 16 years of service, appellant's employment in the
Philadelphia Fire Department was terminated because he moved his
permanent residence from Philadelphia to New Jersey in
contravention of a municipal regulation requiring employees of the
city of Philadelphia to be residents of the city. He challenges the
constitutionality of the regulation and the authorizing ordinances
[
Footnote 1] as violative of
his federally protected right of interstate travel. The regulation
was sustained by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, [
Footnote 2] and review was denied by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. [
Footnote 3] His timely appeal is here pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1257(2).
The Michigan Supreme Court held that Detroit's similar
Page 424 U. S. 646
requirement for police officers was not irrational, and did not
violate the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. [
Footnote
4] We dismissed the appeal from that judgment because no
substantial federal question was presented.
Detroit Police
Officers Assn. v. City of Detroit, 405 U.S. 950 (1972). We
have therefore held that this kind of ordinance is not irrational.
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332,
422 U. S.
343-345 (1975);
see Wardwell v. Board of Education
of Cincinnati, 529 F.2d 625, 628 (CA6 1976).
We have not, however, specifically addressed the contention made
by appellant in this case that his constitutionally recognized
right to travel interstate as defined in
Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618
(1969);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.
S. 330 (1972); and
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, 415 U. S. 250
(1974), is impaired. Each of those cases involved a statutory
requirement of residence in the State for at least one year before
becoming eligible either to vote, as in
Dunn, or to
receive welfare benefits, as in
Shapiro and
Memorial
Hospital. [
Footnote 5]
Neither in those cases nor in any others have we questioned the
validity of a condition placed upon municipal employment that a
person be a resident at the time of his application. [
Footnote 6] In this case, appellant claims a
constitutional right to be employed by the city of Philadelphia
Page 424 U. S. 647
while he is living elsewhere. [
Footnote 7] There is no support in our cases for such a
claim.
We have previously differentiated between a requirement of
continuing residency and a requirement of prior residency of a
given duration. Thus, in
Shapiro, supra at
394 U. S. 636,
we stated: "The residence requirement and the one-year waiting
period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites." And
in
Memorial Hospital, supra at
415 U. S. 255,
quoting
Dunn, supra at
405 U. S. 342
n. 13, the Court explained that
Shapiro and
Dunn
did not question "
the validity of appropriately defined and
uniformly applied bona fide residence
requirements.'"
This case involves that kind of
bona fide continuing
residence requirement. The judgment of the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania is therefore affirmed.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN
would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument.
[
Footnote 1]
§ 7-401(u) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter of 1951; §
20-101 of the Philadelphia Code (as amended); and § 30.01 of the
Philadelphia Civil Service Regulations.
[
Footnote 2]
19 Pa.Commw. 383, 339 A.2d 634 (1975).
[
Footnote 3]
In an unreported order entered on September 2, 1975, that court
denied a petition for review.
[
Footnote 4]
Detroit Police Officers Assn. v. City of Detroit, 385
Mich. 519,
190 N.W.2d
97 (1971).
[
Footnote 5]
Although there is a durational residence requirement in the
Philadelphia ordinances, appellant does not have standing to
challenge that requirement.
[
Footnote 6]
Nor did any of those cases involve a public agency's
relationship with its own employees, which, of course, may justify
greater control than that over the citizenry at large.
Cf.
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.
S. 563,
391 U. S. 568
(1968);
CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.
S. 548 (1973);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U. S. 601
(1973).
[
Footnote 7]
Appellant seeks review of other alleged errors as if presented
in a petition for a writ of certiorari. We decline to review those
issues.
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