OCTOBER TERM, 1991
Syllabus
McCARTHY
v. MADIGAN ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH
CIRCUIT
No.90-6861. Argued December 9, 1991-Decided March 4,1992
While a federal prisoner, petitioner McCarthy filed a damages
action under
Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U. S.
388, alleging that respondent prison officials had violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by their deliberate indifference to his
needs and medical condition resulting from a back operation and a
history of psychiatric problems. The District Court dismissed his
complaint on the ground that he had failed to exhaust the Federal
Bureau of Prisons' administrative remedy procedure, which,
inter
alia, includes rapid filing and response timetables to promote
efficient dispute resolution but does not provide for any kind of
hearing or for the granting of any particular type of relief. The
court then denied McCarthy's motion for reconsideration, rejecting
his argument that exhaustion was not required because he sought
only money damages, which the Bureau could not provide. The Court
of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Exhaustion of the Bureau of Prisons' administrative
procedure is not required before a federal prisoner can initiate a
Bivens action solely for money damages. Pp. 144-156.
(a) Exhaustion serves the twin purposes of protecting
administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.
Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required.
Otherwise, the federal courts must exercise sound judicial
discretion, determining whether to require exhaustion by balancing
the individual's interest in retaining prompt access to a federal
judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests
favoring exhaustion. Individual interests have weighed heavily
where resort to the administrative remedy would occasion undue
prejudice to subsequent assertion of a court action, where there is
some doubt as to whether the agency is empowered to grant effective
relief, or where the administrative body is shown to be biased or
has otherwise predetermined the issue before it. Pp. 144-149.
(b) Congress has not required exhaustion of a federal prisoner's
Bivens claim. And, given the type of claim McCarthy
raises and the particular characteristics of the Bureau's general
grievance procedure, McCarthy's individual interests outweigh
countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion. The
procedure's short, successive filing deadlines and the absence of
any monetary remedy heavily burden a
141
petitioning inmate's individual interests. In contrast, while
the Bureau has a substantial interest in encouraging internal
resolution of grievances and in preventing the undermining of its
authority by unnecessary resort of prisoners to the federal courts,
other institutional concerns do not weigh heavily in favor of
exhaustion. The Bureau's alleged failure to render medical care
implicates only tangentially its authority to carry out the control
and management of the federal prisons, and the Bureau does not
bring to bear any special expertise on the type of issue presented
for resolution here. Nor are the interests of judicial economy
advanced substantially by the grievance procedure, which does not
create a formal factual record of the type that can be relied on
conclusively by a court for disposition of a prisoner's claim on
the pleadings or at summary judgment without the aid of affidavits.
Pp. 149-156.
914 F.2d
1411, reversed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined.
REHNQUIST, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined,
post, p. 156.
Paul M. Smith argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioner.
Deputy Solicitor General Mahoney argued the cause for
respondents. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Starr,
Assistant Attorney General Mueller, Amy L. Wax, Victor D. Stone,
and William D. Braun.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue
in this case is whether a federal prisoner must resort to the
internal grievance procedure promulgated by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons before he may initiate a suit, pursuant to the authority of
Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971),
solely for money damages. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit ruled that exhaustion of the grievance procedure was
required.
914 F.2d
1411 (1990). We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among
the Courts of Appeals.1 499 U. S. 974 (1991).
1 Compare
Hessbrook v.
Lennon, 777 F.2d
999 (CA5 1985) (exhaustion required), and
Brice
v.
Day, 604 F.2d
664 (CAlO 1979) (same), cert. denied, 444 U. S. lO86 (1980),
with
Muhammad v.
Carlson, 739 F.2d
122 (CA3
142
I
While he was a prisoner in the federal penitentiary at
Leavenworth, petitioner John J. McCarthy filed a
pro se
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas against four prison employees: the hospital administrator,
the chief psychologist, another psychologist, and a physician.
McCarthy alleged that respondents had violated his constitutional
rights under the Eighth Amendment by their deliberate indifference
to his needs and medical condition resulting from a back operation
and a history of psychiatric problems. On the first page of his
complaint, he wrote:
"This Complaint seeks Money Damages Only." App.7.
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
petitioner had failed to exhaust prison administrative remedies.
Id., at 12. Under 28 CFR pt. 542 (1991), setting forth the
general "Administrative Remedy Procedure for Inmates" at federal
correctional institutions, a prisoner may "seek formal review of a
complaint which relates to any aspect of his imprisonment." §
542.10.2 When an inmate files a complaint or appeal, the
responsible officials are directed to acknowledge the filing with a
"signed receipt" which is returned to the inmate, to "[c]onduct an
investigation," and to "[r]espond to and sign all complaints or
appeals." §§ 542.11(a)(2) to (4). The general grievance regulations
do not provide for any kind of hearing or for the granting of any
particular type of relief.
1984) (exhaustion not required), and
Goar v.
Civiletti, 688 F.2d
27 (CA6 1982) (same).
2 Certain categories of filings, however, "will not be accepted"
under the general procedure. These include, among others, "tort
claims." See 28 CFR § 542.12 (1991). The Bureau of Prisons has
interpreted this "tort claims" exception to include claims under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, but not constitutional claims for
relief recognized under the
Bivens case. Brief for
Respondents 3, n. 1. Claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act are
governed by a separate administrative procedure. See §§ 543.30 to
543.32.
143
To promote efficient dispute resolution, the procedure includes
rapid filing and response timetables. An inmate first seeks
informal resolution of his claim by consulting prison personnel. §
542.13(a). If this informal effort fails, the prisoner "may file a
formal written complaint on the appropriate form, within fifteen
(15) calendar days of the date on which the basis of the complaint
occurred." § 542.13(b). Should the warden fail to respond to the
inmate's satisfaction within 15 days, the inmate has 20 days to
appeal to the Bureau's Regional Director, who has 30 days to
respond. If the inmate still remains unsatisfied, he has 30 days to
make a final appeal to the Bureau's general counsel, who has
another 30 days to respond. §§ 542.14 and 542.15. If the inmate can
demonstrate a "valid reason for delay," he "shall be allowed" an
extension of any of these time periods for filing. § 542.13(b).
Petitioner McCarthy filed with the District Court a motion for
reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
arguing that he was not required to exhaust his administrative
remedies, because he sought only money damages which, he claimed,
the Bureau could not provide.3 1 Record, Exh. 7. The court denied
the motion. App. 14.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming, observed that because
Bivens actions are a creation of the judiciary, the courts
may impose reasonable conditions upon their filing. 914 F. 2d, at
1412. The exhaustion rule, the court reasoned, "is not keyed to the
type of relief sought, but to the need for prelim-
3 McCarthy actually had initiated a grievance prior to filing
his complaint in the District Court. Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 7.
But he did not exhaust the procedures at that time and, in any
event, he concedes that that grievance related to his request for a
private cell and not to the medical issues at the heart of his
federal complaint. After his initial grievance was dismissed, he
filed a grievance with respect to the medical issues. It was
accepted, even though it was late, but was denied by the warden on
the merits. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. McCarthy's subsequent appeal to
the Bureau's regional office was rejected because it was filed
late.
Id., at 16; Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 7.
144
inary fact-finding" to determine "whether there is a possible
Bivens cause of action."
Ibid. Accordingly,"
'[a]lthough the administrative apparatus could not award money
damages ... , administrative consideration of the possibility of
corrective action and a record would have aided a court in
measuring liability and determining the
extent of the
damages.'"
Ibid., quoting
Goar v.
Civiletti,
688 F.2d
27, 29 (CA6 1982) (emphasis in original). Exhaustion of the
general grievance procedure was required notwithstanding the fact
that McCarthy's request was solely for money damages.
II
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is one
among related doctrines-including abstention, finality, and
ripeness-that govern the timing of federal-court decisionmaking. Of
"paramount importance" to any exhaustion inquiry is congressional
intent.
Patsy v.
Board of Regents of Florida,
457 U. S. 496,
501 (1982). Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is
required.
Coit Independence Joint Venture v.
FSLIC,
489 U. S. 561,
579 (1989);
Patsy, 457 U. S., at 502, n. 4. But where
Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial
discretion governs.
McGee v.
United States, 402 U. S. 479, 483, n. 6
(1971). See also
Patsy, 457 U. S., at 518 (WHITE, J.,
concurring in part) ("[E]xhaustion is 'a rule of judicial
administration,' ... and unless Congress directs otherwise,
rightfully subject to crafting by judges"). Nevertheless, even in
this field of judicial discretion, appropriate deference to
Congress' power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under
which a claim may be heard in a federal court requires fashioning
of exhaustion principles in a manner consistent with congressional
intent and any applicable statutory scheme.
Id., at 501-502,
and n. 4.
A
This Court long has acknowledged the general rule that parties
exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before
145
seeking relief from the federal courts. See,
e. g., Myers
v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50-51, and
n. 9 (1938) (discussing cases as far back as 1898). Exhaustion is
required because it serves the twin purposes of protecting
administrative agency authority and promoting judicial
efficiency.
As to the first of these purposes, the exhaustion doctrine
recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to Congress'
delegation of authority to coordinate branches of Government, that
agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for
the programs that Congress has charged them to administer.
Exhaustion concerns apply with particular force when the action
under review involves exercise of the agency's discretionary power
or when the agency proceedings in question allow the agency to
apply its special expertise.
McKart v.
United States,
395 U. S. 185,
194 (1969). See also
Bowen v.
City of New York,
476 U. S. 467,
484 (1986). The exhaustion doctrine also acknowledges the
commonsense notion of dispute resolution that an agency ought to
have an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the
programs it administers before it is haled into federal court.
Correlatively, exhaustion principles apply with special force when
"frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes"
could weaken an agency's effectiveness by encouraging disregard of
its procedures.
McKart v.
United States, 395 U. S.,
at 195.
As to the second of the purposes, exhaustion promotes judicial
efficiency in at least two ways. When an agency has the opportunity
to correct its own errors, a judicial controversy may well be
mooted, or at least piecemeal appeals may be avoided. See,
e.
g., Parisi v.
Davidson, 405 U. S. 34, 37
(1972); McKart v.
United States, 395 U. S., at 195.
And even where a controversy survives administrative review,
exhaustion of the administrative procedure may produce a useful
record for subsequent judicial consideration, especially in a
complex or technical factual context. See,
e. g.,
Weinberger
146
v.
Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 765 (1975)
(exhaustion may allow agency "to compile a record which is adequate
for judicial review").
B
Notwithstanding these substantial institutional interests,
federal courts are vested with a "virtually unflagging obligation"
to exercise the jurisdiction given them.
Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817-818
(1976). "We have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
given."
Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821).
Accordingly, this Court has declined to require exhaustion in some
circumstances even where administrative and judicial interests
would counsel otherwise. In determining whether exhaustion is
required, federal courts must balance the interest of the
individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum
against countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.
"[A]dministrative remedies need not be pursued if the litigant's
interests in immediate judicial review outweigh the government's
interests in the efficiency or administrative autonomy that the
exhaustion doctrine is designed to further."
West v.
Bergland, 611 F.2d
710, 715 (CA8 1979), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 821 (1980).
Application of this balancing principle is "intensely practical,"
Bowen v.
City of New York, 476 U. S., at 484, citing
Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331, n. 11
(1976), because attention is directed to both the nature of the
claim presented and the characteristics of the particular
administrative procedure provided.
C
This Court's precedents have recognized at least three broad
sets of circumstances in which the interests of the individual
weigh heavily against requiring administrative exhaustion. First,
requiring resort to the administrative remedy may occasion undue
prejudice to subsequent assertion
147
of a court action. Such prejudice may result, for example, from
an unreasonable or indefinite timeframe for administrative action.
See
Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575, n. 14
(1973) (administrative remedy deemed inadequate "[m]ost often ...
because of delay by the agency"). See also
Coit Independence
Joint Venture v.
FSLIC, 489 U. S., at 587 ("Because the
Bank Board's regulations do not place a reasonable time limit on
FSLIC's consideration of claims, Coit cannot be required to exhaust
those procedures");
Walker v.
Southern R. Co.,
385 U. S. 196,
198 (1966) (possible delay of 10 years in administrative
proceedings makes exhaustion unnecessary);
Smith v.
Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U. S. 587, 591-592
(1926) (claimant "is not required indefinitely to await a decision
of the rate-making tribunal before applying to a federal court for
equitable relief"). Even where the administrative decisionmaking
schedule is otherwise reasonable and definite, a particular
plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm if unable to secure immediate
judicial consideration of his claim.
Bowen v.
City of New
York, 476 U. S., at 483 (disabilitybenefit claimants "would be
irreparably injured were the exhaustion requirement now enforced
against them");
Aircraft &
Diesel Equipment Corp.
v.
Hirsch, 331
U. S. 752, 773 (1947) ("impending irreparable injury flowing
from delay incident to following the prescribed procedure" may
contribute to finding that exhaustion is not required). By the same
token, exhaustion principles apply with less force when an
individual's failure to exhaust may preclude a defense to criminal
liability.
Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 497, n. 5
(1977) (plurality opinion);
McKart v.
United States,
395 U. S., at 197.
Second, an administrative remedy may be inadequate "because of
some doubt as to whether the agency was empowered to grant
effective relief."
Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U. S., at
575, n. 14. For example, an agency, as a preliminary matter, may be
unable to consider whether to grant relief because it lacks
institutional competence to resolve the par-
148
ticular type of issue presented, such as the constitutionality
of a statute. See,
e. g., Moore v.
East Cleveland,
431 U. S., at 497, n. 5;
Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 76 (1976).
In a similar vein, exhaustion has not been required where the
challenge is to the adequacy of the agency procedure itself, such
that "'the question of the adequacy of the administrative remedy
... [is] for all practical purposes identical with the merits of
[the plaintiff's] lawsuit.'"
Barry v.
Barchi, 443 U.
S. 55, 63, n. 10 (1979) (quoting
Gibson v.
Berryhill,
411 U. S., at 575). Alternatively, an agency may be competent to
adjudicate the issue presented, but still lack authority to grant
the type of relief requested.
McNeese v.
Board of Ed. for
Community Unit School Dist. 187,
373 U. S. 668, 675 (1963)
(students seeking to integrate public school need not file
complaint with school superintendent because the "Superintendent
himself apparently has no power to order corrective action" except
to request the Attorney General to bring suit);
Montana National
Bank of Billings v.
Yellowstone County, 276 U. S. 499, 505 (1928)
(taxpayer seeking refund not required to exhaust where "any such
application [would have been] utterly futile since the county board
of equalization was powerless to grant any appropriate relief" in
face of prior controlling court decision).
Third, an administrative remedy may be inadequate where the
administrative body is shown to be biased or has otherwise
predetermined the issue before it.
Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U. S., at 575, n. 14;
Houghton v.
Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968) (in view of Attorney
General's submission that the challenged rules of the prison were
"validly and correctly applied to petitioner," requiring
administrative review through a process culminating with the
Attorney General "would be to demand a futile act");
Association
of National Advertisers, Inc. v.
FTC, 201 U. S. App. D.
C. 165, 170-171,
627 F.2d
1151, 1156-1157 (1979) (bias of Federal Trade Commission
chairman), cert. denied, 447 U. S. 921 (1980). See also
Patsy v.
Florida International University,
149
634 F.2d
900, 912-913 (CA5 1981) (en bane) (administrative procedures
must "not be used to harass or otherwise discourage those with
legitimate claims"), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Patsy
v.
Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496 (1982).
III
In light of these general principles, we conclude that
petitioner McCarthy need not have exhausted his constitutional
claim for money damages. As a preliminary matter, we find that
Congress has not meaningfully addressed the appropriateness of
requiring exhaustion in this context. Although respondents'
interests are significant, we are left with a firm conviction that,
given the type of claim McCarthy raises and the particular
characteristics of the Bureau's general grievance procedure,
McCarthy's individual interests outweigh countervailing
institutional interests favoring exhaustion.
A
Turning first to congressional intent, we note that the general
grievance procedure was neither enacted nor mandated by Congress.
Respondents, however, urge that Congress, in effect, has acted to
require exhaustion by delegating power to the Attorney General and
the Bureau of Prisons to control and manage the federal prison
system. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 4001(b) and 4042. Brief for Respondents
3, 16; Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42. We think respondents confuse what
Congress could be claimed to allow by implication with what
Congress affirmatively has requested or required. By delegating
authority, in the most general of terms, to the Bureau to
administer the federal prison system, Congress cannot be said to
have spoken to the particular issue whether prisoners in the
custody of the Bureau should have direct access to the federal
courts.
Respondents next argue that Congress, by enactment of § 7 of the
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 94 Stat. 352, 42 U.
S. C. § 1997e, has articulated a policy favoring
150
exhaustion of the prison grievance procedure prior to the filing
of a constitutional claim against prison officials. Section 1997e
imposes a limited exhaustion requirement for a claim brought by a
state prisoner under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
provided that the underlying state prison administrative remedy
meets specified standards. See
Patsy v.
Board of Regents
of Florida, 457 U. S., at 507-512. Section 1997e has no direct
application in this case, because at issue here is a
Bivens
claim by a
federal prisoner against federal prison
officials. We find it significant that Congress, in enacting §
1997e, stopped short of imposing a parallel requirement in the
federal prison context.
Section 1997e is not only inapplicable to
Bivens claims,
but-by its own terms-cuts against respondents' claim that the
particular procedure now at issue need be exhausted. First, unlike
the rule of exhaustion proposed here, § 1997e does not authorize
dismissal of an action for failure to exhaust. Instead, it provides
that the action is to be stayed for a maximum of 90 days. See §
1997e(a)(1). Second, § 1997e does not mechanically require
exhaustion in every case where an acceptable state procedure is in
place. Rather, it directs federal courts to abstain "if the court
believes that such a [waiting] requirement would be appropriate and
in the interests of justice." § 1997e(a)(1). In other words, if an
inmate fails to meet filing deadlines under an administrative
scheme, a court has ample discretion to determine that exhaustion
nonetheless should be forgone. Third, in contrast to the absence of
any provision for the award of money damages under the Bureau's
general grievance procedure, the statute conditions exhaustion on
the existence of "effective administrative remedies."4 It is
diffi-
4 The Conference Committee Report states: "It is the intent of
the Congress that the court not find such a requirement [of
exhaustion] appropriate in those situations in which the action
brought ... raises issues
151
cult to see why a stricter rule of exhaustion than Congress
itself has required in the state prison context should apply in the
federal prison context.
Respondents also argue that requiring exhaustion is appropriate
because
Bivens relief gives way when necessary to
accommodate either the effective functioning of Government or an
articulated congressional policy. Brief for Respondents 15. We have
recognized that a
Bivens remedy does not lie in two
situations: (1) where Congress has provided an equally effective
alternative remedy and declared it to be a substitute for recovery
under the Constitution, and (2) where, in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress, special factors counsel hesitation.
Carlson v.
Green, 446 U. S. 14, 18-19 (1980). As to
the first exception, Congress did not create the remedial scheme at
issue here and that scheme, in any case, as noted above, cannot be
considered to be equally effective with respect to a claim for
money damages. As to the second exception, respondents appear to
confuse the presence of
special factors with
any
factors counseling hesitation. In
Carlson, the Court held
that "special factors" do not free prison officials from
Bivens liability, because prison officials do not enjoy an
independent status in our constitutional scheme, nor are they
likely to be unduly inhibited in the performance of their duties by
the assertion of a
Bivens claim.
Carlson v.
Green, 446 U. S., at 19.
Interpreting the "special factors" exception in
Schweiker
which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved by the
grievance resolution system .... " H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-897, p.
15 (1980).
The Attorney General, charged under the statute with certifying
the adequacy of state administrative remedial schemes, has provided
by regulation: "The [state] grievance procedure shall afford a
successful grievant
a meaningful remedy." 28 CFR §40.6
(1991) (emphasis added). At the time of promulgating these
regulations, the Department of Justice observed on the public
record: "Presumably, where monetary relief was the sole adequate
remedy and could not be obtained through a grievance procedure,
exhaustion would not be appropriate." 46 Fed. Reg. 3845 (1981).
152
u. S. 367 (1983), the Court found the
Bivens remedy
displaced because Congress had legislated an elaborate and
comprehensive remedial scheme.
Schweiker, 487 U. S., at
425; Bush, 462 U. S., at 388. "When the design of a
Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it
considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional
violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we
have not created additional
Bivens remedies."
Schweiker, 487 U. S., at 423. Here Congress has enacted
nothing.
B
Because Congress has not
required exhaustion of a federal
prisoner's
Bivens claim, we turn to an evaluation of the
individual and institutional interests at stake in this case. The
general grievance procedure heavily burdens the individual
interests of the petitioning inmate in two ways. First, the
procedure imposes short, successive filing deadlines that create a
high risk of forfeiture of a claim for failure to comply. Second,
the administrative "remedy" does not authorize an award of monetary
damages-the only relief requested by McCarthy in this action. The
combination of these features means that the prisoner seeking only
money damages has everything to lose and nothing to gain from being
required to exhaust his claim under the internal grievance
procedure.
The filing deadlines for the grievance procedure require an
inmate, within 15 days of the precipitating incident, not only to
attempt to resolve his grievance informally but also to file a
formal written complaint with the prison warden. 28 CFR § 542.13
(1991). Then, he must successively hurdle 20-day and 30-day
deadlines to advance to the end of the grievance process. § 542.15.
Other than the Bureau's general and quite proper interest in having
early notice of any claim, we have not been apprised of any urgency
or exigency justifying this timetable. Cf.
Yakus v.
United States, 321 U. S. 414, 435 (1944) ("The sixty days'
period allowed for protest of the Administrator's regulations
cannot be said to be
153
unreasonably short in view of the urgency and exigencies of
wartime price regulation"). As a practical matter, the filing
deadlines, of course, may pose little difficulty for the
knowledgeable inmate accustomed to grievances and court actions.
But they are a likely trap for the inexperienced and unwary inmate,
ordinarily indigent and unrepresented by counsel, with a
substantial claim.
Respondents argue that the deadlines are not jurisdictional and
may be extended for any "valid" reason. See 28 CFR §§ 542.13(b) and
542.15 (1991). Yet the regulations do not elaborate upon what a
"valid" reason is. Moreover, it appears that prison
officials-perhaps the very officials subject to suit-are charged
with determining what is a "valid" reason.
All in all, these deadlines require a good deal of an inmate at
the peril of forfeiting his claim for money damages. The "first" of
"the principles that necessarily frame our analysis of prisoners'
constitutional claims" is that "federal courts must take cognizance
of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates."
Turner v.
Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 84 (1987).
Because a prisoner ordinarily is divested of the privilege to vote,
the right to file a court action might be said to be his remaining
most "fundamental political right, because preservative of all
rights."
Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370
(1886). The rapid filing deadlines counsel strongly against
exhaustion as a prerequisite to the filing of a federalcourt
action.5
5 Petitioner concedes that if his complaint contained a prayer
for injunctive relief, exhaustion principles would apply
differently. Brief for Petitioner 20, n. 20. Were injunctive relief
sought, the grievance procedure probably would be capable of
producing the type of corrective action desired. Additionally,
because of the continuing nature of conduct subject to injunctive
relief, the short filing deadlines would pose less difficulty
because the limitations period would be triggered anew by ongoing
conduct.
154
As we have noted, the grievance procedure does not include any
mention of the award of monetary relief. Respondents argue that
this should not matter, because "in most cases there are other
things that the inmate wants." Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. This may be
true in some instances. But we cannot presume, as a general matter,
that when a litigant has deliberately forgone any claim for
injunctive relief and has singled out discrete past wrongs,
specifically requesting monetary compensation only, that he is
likely interested in "other things." The Bureau, in any case, is
always free to offer an inmate administrative relief in return for
withdrawal of his lawsuit. We conclude that the absence of any
monetary remedy in the grievance procedure also weighs heavily
against imposing an exhaustion requirement.
In the alternative, respondents argue that, despite the absence
of any provision in the general grievance procedure for the award
of money damages, such damages in fact are available for most
prisoners asserting
Bivens claims. As to
Bivens
claims that could have been brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA),6 respondents contend that a grievance asking for money
damages can be "converted" by prison officials to a FTCA claim for
which prison officials are au-
6 Respondents contend that
Bivens claims are almost
always categorizable as FTCA claims, especially in view of the
Attorney General's concession that corrections guards are "law
enforcement" officers within the meaning of the exception to the
intentional-tort exception of the FTCA. Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. As to
those claims that are not categorizable as FTCA claims, respondents
concede that the Bureau of Prisons has no authority to offer a
monetary settlement.
Id., at 40. Instead, they contend that
the Department of Justice has a general settlement authority under
the federal regulations that might be exercised to dispose of
general grievance claims. 28 CFR § 50.15(c)(2) (1991). Nothing in
the record indicates that this authority has ever been exercised to
recompense a prisoner with a
Bivens claim. Moreover, it is
highly unlikely that a monetary settlement would be made in the
course of an administrative proceeding, because the regulation
provides that "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances" a monetary
settlement will not be paid "before entry of an adverse verdict,
judgment, or award." § 50.15(c)(3).
155
thorized, under 28 CFR § 543.30 (1991), to award money damages.
This "conversion" authority does not appear in the regulations
having to do with the grievance procedure, which raises substantial
doubt that an inmate would have sufficient notice as to how his
claim would be treated. In any event, respondents have not pointed
to anything in the record showing that prison officials have a
practice of converting a claim filed under the general grievance
procedure to a claim under the FTCA procedure. We agree with
petitioner that it is implausible to think that they do. The
availability of a money damages remedy is, at best, uncertain, and
the uncertainty of the administrative agency's authority to award
relief counsels against requiring exhaustion. See
Hillsborough v.
Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 626
(1946);
Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Board ofComm'rs of Weld
County, 247 U. S.
282, 287 (1918).
We do not find the interests of the Bureau of Prisons to weigh
heavily in favor of exhaustion in view of the remedial scheme and
particular claim presented here. To be sure, the Bureau has a
substantial interest in encouraging internal resolution of
grievances and in preventing the undermining of its authority by
unnecessary resort by prisoners to the federal courts. But other
institutional concerns relevant to exhaustion analysis appear to
weigh in hardly at all. The Bureau's alleged failure to render
medical care implicates only tangentially its authority to carry
out the control and management of the federal prisons. Furthermore,
the Bureau does not bring to bear any special expertise on the type
of issue presented for resolution here.
The interests of judicial economy do not stand to be advanced
substantially by the general grievance procedure. No formal
factfindings are made. The paperwork generated by the grievance
process might assist a court somewhat in ascertaining the facts
underlying a prisoner's claim more quickly than if it has only a
prisoner's complaint to review. But the grievance procedure does
not create a formal factual
156
REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring in judgment
record of the type that can be relied on conclusively by a court
for disposition of a prisoner's claim on the pleadings or at
summary judgment without the aid of affidavits.
C
In conclusion, we are struck by the absence of supporting
material in the regulations, the record, or the briefs that the
general grievance procedure here was crafted with any thought
toward the principles of exhaustion of claims for money damages.
The Attorney General's professed concern for internal dispute
resolution has not translated itself into a more effective
grievance procedure that might encourage the filing of an
administrative complaint as opposed to a court action. Congress, of
course, is free to design or require an appropriate administrative
procedure for a prisoner to exhaust his claim for money damages.
Even without further action by Congress, we do not foreclose the
possibility that the Bureau itself may adopt an appropriate
administrative procedure consistent with congressional intent.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE
THOMAS join, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court's holding that a federal prisoner need
not exhaust the procedures promulgated by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons. My view, however, is based entirely on the fact that the
grievance procedure at issue does not provide for any award of
monetary damages. As a result, in cases such as this one where
prisoners seek monetary relief, the Bureau's administrative remedy
furnishes no effective remedy at all, and it is therefore improper
to impose an exhaustion requirement. See
McNeese v.
Board
of Ed. for Community Unit School Dist. 187,
373 U. S. 668, 675
(1963);
Montana National Bank of Billings v.
Yellowstone
County, 276 U. S.
499, 505 (1928).
157
Because I would base the decision on this ground, I do not join
the Court's extensive discussion of the general principles of
exhaustion, nor do I agree with the implication that those general
principles apply without modification in the context of a
Bivens claim. In particular, I disagree with the Court's
reliance on the grievance procedure's filing deadlines as a basis
for excusing exhaustion. As the majority observes,
ante, at
146-147, we have previously refused to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies where the administrative process subjects
plaintiffs to unreasonable delay or to an indefinite timeframe for
decision. See
Coit Independence Joint Venture v.
FSLIC, 489 U.
S. 561, 587 (1989);
Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575, n. 14
(1973);
Walker v.
Southern R. Co., 385 U. S. 196, 198
(1966);
Smith v.
Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,
270 U. S. 587,
591-592 (1926). This principle rests on our belief that when a
plaintiff might have to wait seemingly forever for an agency
decision, agency procedures are "inadequate" and therefore need not
be exhausted.
Coit Independence Joint Venture v.
FSLIC,
supra, at 587.
But the Court makes strange use of this principle in holding
that filing deadlines imposed by agency procedures may provide a
basis for finding that those procedures need not be exhausted.
Ante, at 152-153. Whereas before we have held that
procedures without "reasonable time limit[sJ" may be inadequate
because they make a plaintiff wait too long,
Coit Independence
Joint Venture v.
FSLIC, supra, at 587, today the
majority concludes that strict filing deadlines might also
contribute to a finding of inadequacy because they make a plaintiff
move too quickly. But surely the second proposition does not follow
from the first. In fact, short filing deadlines will almost always
promote quick decisionmaking by an agency, the very result that we
have advocated repeatedly in the cases cited above. So long as
there is an escape clause, as there is here, and the time limit is
within a
158
REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring in judgment
zone of reasonableness, as I believe it is here, the length of
the period should not be a factor in deciding the adequacy of the
remedy.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment