OCTOBER TERM, 1996
Syllabus
LOPEZ ET AL.
v. MONTEREY COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
No.95-1201. Argued October 8, 1996-Decided November 6,1996
As a jurisdiction covered by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, appellee Monterey County (hereinafter County) must obtain
federal preclearance-either from the Attorney General of the United
States or from the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia-of any voting practice different from its practices on
November 1, 1968. On that date, the County had nine separate and
independent inferior court districts, the judges of which were
elected exclusively by their respective districts' voters. Between
1972 and 1983, the County adopted six ordinances, which ultimately
merged all the districts into a single, countywide municipal court
served by judges whom County residents elected at large. This
consolidation took place against a backdrop of California laws,
some of which governed courts generally and others of which applied
to the County's courts specifically. In 1991, appellants, Hispanic
voters residing in the County, sued in the District Court, alleging
that the County had violated § 5 by failing to obtain federal
preclearance of the consolidation ordinances. The three-judge
District Court ordered the County to obtain federal preclearance of
the challenged ordinances. But the County did not submit the
ordinances to the appropriate federal authorities. Instead, the
County began to work with appellants to develop a new judicial
election plan that they believed would be less retrogressive than
the at-large, countywide election scheme. The State of California,
as intervenor, opposed the parties' proposed plans. Ultimately, the
District Court ordered the County to conduct judicial elections
under an at-large, countywide election plan. In essence, four years
after the filing of the complaint, the District Court ordered the
County to hold elections under the very same scheme that appellants
had originally challenged under § 5 as unprecleared.
Held:
1. This Court leaves to the District Court to resolve on remand
appellee State's threshold contentions that, although the County
perhaps should have submitted the consolidation ordinances for
federal preclearance before implementing them, intervening changes
in California law have transformed the County's judicial election
scheme into a state plan, for which § 5 preclearance is not needed;
that appellants' suit was barred
10
Syllabus
by laches; that it is constitutionally improper to designate the
County a covered jurisdiction under § 5; and that the consolidation
ordinances did not alter a voting "standard, practice, or
procedure" subject to § 5 preclearance. Pp. 19-20.
2. The District Court's order that the County conduct elections
under its unprecleared, at-large judicial election plan conflicts
with
Clark v.
Roemer, 500 U. S. 646, 652-653,
in which the Court held, among other things, that a voting change
subject to § 5 is unenforceable unless precleared and that § 5
plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction prohibiting implementation
of an unprecleared change. Thus, an injunction is required where,
as here, a district court must decide whether to allow illegal
elections to go forward.
Id., at 654. There is no "extreme
circumstance" here that might justify allowing the 1996 elections
to proceed, cf. id., at 654-655, and the District Court has not
independently crafted a remedial electoral plan such as might
render the preclearance requirements inapplicable, see
McDaniel v.
Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130,148150. Nor
is the preclearance process' basic nature changed by the
complicating factors that a simple injunction could leave the
County without a judicial election system because a return to the
1968 plan appears impractical, and that the parties seem unable to
fashion a plan that does not contravene California law. Congress
gave exclusive authority to pass on an election change's
discriminatory effect or purpose to the federal authorities
designated in § 5. See id., at 151. On a complaint alleging failure
to preclear election changes under § 5, a three-judge district
court may determine only whether § 5 covers a contested change,
whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and if the
requirements were not satisfied, what temporary remedy, if any, is
appropriate. See
City of Lockhart v.
United States,
460 U. S. 125,
129, n. 3. The goal of a three-judge district court facing a § 5
challenge must be to ensure that the covered jurisdiction submits
its election plan to the appropriate federal authorities for
preclearance as expeditiously as possible. Here, by protracting
this litigation in order to obtain a plan that complied both with §
5 and with state law, the District Court interposed itself into the
§ 5 approval process in a way that the statute does not
contemplate. Cf.,
e. g., Upham v.
Seamon, 456 U. S. 37, 42-43
(per curiam). pp.20-25.
Reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Joaquin G. Avila argued the cause for appellants. With him on
the briefs were Robert Rubin, Anthony Chavez, Antonia Hernandez,
and Richard M. Pearl.
11
Alan Jenkins argued the cause for the United States as amicus
curiae urging reversal. With him on the briefs were Solicitor
General Days, Assistant Attorney General Patrick, Deputy Solicitor
General Bender, Steven H. Rosenbaum, and Eileen Penner.
Daniel G.
Stone, Deputy Attorney General of
California, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief
for state appellees were
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney
General,
Floyd D. Shimomura, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, and
Linda A. Cabatic, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General. *
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal
presents a challenge to an order by a threejudge District Court for
the Northern District of California that authorized Monterey County
to conduct judicial elections under an election plan that has not
received federal approval pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.
I
The State of California has 58 counties, one of which is
Monterey County (hereinafter County). In 1971, the Attorney General
designated the County a covered jurisdiction under § 4(b) of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §
1973b(b). 36 Fed. Reg. 5809 (1971); see 28 CFR pt. 51, App. (1995).
As a result, the County became subject to the federal preclearance
requirements set forth in § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c.
*Sidney S. Rosdeitcher, Paul C. Saunders, Norman Redlich,
Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Brenda Wright, Samuel L.
Walters, Laughlin McDonald, Neil Bradley, Steven R. Shapiro, Elaine
R. Jones, Norman J. Chachkin, and Jacqueline A. Berrien filed a
brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae
urging reversal.
Sharon L. Browne and
Deborah J.
La Fetra
filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as
amicus
curiae urging affirmance.
Barbara McDowell and
Elwood G.
Lui filed a
brief for the California Judges Association as
amicus
curiae.
12
Section 5 governs changes in voting procedures, with the purpose
of preventing jurisdictions covered by its requirements from
enacting or seeking to administer voting changes that have a
discriminatory purpose or effect. As a jurisdiction covered by § 5,
Monterey County must obtain federal preclearance-either
administrative or judicial-of any voting practice different from
the practices in effect on November 1, 1968. To obtain
administrative preclearance of a changed voting practice, a covered
jurisdiction submits the enactment to the Attorney General of the
United States. If the Attorney General does not formally object to
the new procedure within 60 days of submission, the jurisdiction
may enforce the legislation. A covered jurisdiction may also obtain
judicial preclearance-either directly or after the Attorney General
has objected to the voting change-by securing in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia a declaratory judgment
that the new practice "does not have the purpose and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color .... "
Ibid.
On November 1, 1968, the County had nine inferior court
districts. Two of these districts were municipal court districts,
each served by two judges, and the other seven were justice court
districts, each served by a single judge. Both municipal and
justice courts were trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Municipal
courts served districts with populations exceeding 40,000, and
justice courts served those districts with smaller populations. The
justice courts differed from the municipal courts in other
respects. They were not courts of record and were served by judges
who often worked part time and did not have to be members of the
bar. Comment, Trial Court Consolidation in California, 21 UCLA L.
Rev. 1081, 1086 (1974). (On January 1, 1990, however, a state
constitutional amendment specified that all courts, including
justice courts, were courts of record. Cal. Const.,
13
Art. VI, § 1 (1988). A few years later, California voters
eliminated justice courts altogether. Art. VI, §§ 1, 5(b).)
Each of the municipal and justice courts operated separately and
independently. Judges for each court were elected at large by the
voters of their respective districts, and they served only the
judicial district in which they were elected. The municipal and
justice court districts varied widely in population and judicial
workloads. For example, a 1972 survey showed that the
Monterey-Carmel Municipal Court District had a population of
106,700, with more than enough work for two full-time judges. By
contrast, the San Ardo Justice Court District had a population of
3,500, with a caseload that required less than a quarter of one
judge's time.
Between 1972 and 1983, the County adopted six ordinances, which
ultimately merged the seven justice court districts and the two
municipal court districts into a single, countywide municipal
court, served by nine judges whom County residents elected at
large. (At present, 10 judges serve on the municipal court.) Each
judge was elected to serve for a term of six years. Judicial
elections were conducted under various interim schemes in 1974,
1976, 1978, and 1982. Additionally, the County conducted at-large,
countywide judicial elections in 1986, 1988, and 1990.
The County's reorganization of its inferior court system took
place against a backdrop of state laws governing the general
administration and organization of state courts. State law
authorizes a county board of supervisors, "[a]s public convenience
requires, ... [to] divide the county into judicial districts for
the purpose of electing judges .... " Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 71040
(West 1976). The board also "may change district boundaries and
create other districts."
Ibid.; see also Cal. Govt. Code
Ann. § 25200 (West 1988) ("The board of supervisors may divide the
county into election ... and other districts required by law,
change their boundaries, and create other districts, as convenience
re-
14
quires"). A county's judicial election scheme must comply with
several state constitutional and statutory requirements. Municipal
court districts must include at least 40,000 residents, Cal.
Const., Art. VI, § 5(a); cities may not be split into more than one
judicial district, ibid.; Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 71040 (West 1976);
municipal court judges must be residents of the judicial district
to which they are elected or appointed, § 71140; and, according to
the State, judges' jurisdictional and electoral bases must be
coextensive, Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 16(b);
Koski v.
James, 47 Cal. App. 3d 349, 354, 120 Cal. Rptr. 754, 758
(1975).
In addition to these generally applicable laws, the state
legislature has enacted various pieces of legislation directed at
the judicial systems of particular California counties, including
laws aimed specifically at Monterey County's judicial system. Cal.
Govt. Code Ann., Tit. 8, ch. 10 (West 1993). Some of these laws
have reflected changes in the County's judicial districts resulting
from the consolidation process. * The State has also enacted
legislation dealing with the administration of the County's
judicial system, such as appoint-
*See,
e. g., 1953 Cal. Stats., ch. 206, § 2 ("This
article applies to the municipal court established in a district
embracing the Cities of Carmel and Monterey"); 1975 Cal. Stats.,
ch. 966, § 2 ("This article applies only to municipal courts
established in ... [a] district embracing the Cities of Monterey,
Carmel, Seaside, Sand City, and Del Rey Oaks designated as the
Monterey-Carmel Judicial District; [and a] district embracing the
City of Salinas designated as the Salinas Judicial District"); 1977
Cal. Stats., ch. 995, § 1 ("This article applies to all of the
municipal courts established in the County of Monterey, which are
in judicial districts entitled as follows: the Monterey Peninsula
Judicial District, the Salinas Judicial District, and the North
Monterey County Judicial District"); 1979 Cal. Stats., ch. 694, § 2
("There is in the County of Monterey, on and after the effective
date of this section, a single municipal court district which
embraces the former Salinas Judicial District, Monterey Peninsula
Judicial District and North Monterey County Judicial District");
1989 Cal. Stats., ch. 608, § 1 (codified at Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §
73560 (West 1993)) ("This article applies to the Monterey County
Municipal Court District, which encompasses the entire County of
Monterey").
15
ment and compensation of court personnel. Cal. Govt. Code Ann.
§§ 73564-73569 (West 1993).
Although it was subject to § 5 preclearance requirements, the
County did not submit any of the consolidation ordinances for
federal preclearance under § 5. The State, however, in 1983
submitted for administrative preclearance a state law, 1983 Cal.
Stats., ch. 1249, that mentioned Monterey County's prospective
consolidation of the last two justice court districts with the
remaining municipal court district. The Department of Justice
requested additional information concerning this aspect of the
state legislation. In its response, the State included the last of
the County's six consolidation ordinances, which was adopted in
1983. The Attorney General interposed no objection to the 1983
state law. The State's submission may well have served to preclear
the 1983 county ordinance. See 28 CFR § 51.14(2) (1981); 28 CFR §
51.15(a) (1987). The United States points out, however, that the
1983 submission to the Department of Justice did not identify or
describe any of the County's previous consolidation ordinances. The
State does not contest this point. Thus, under our precedent, these
previous consolidation ordinances do not appear to have received
federal preclearance approval.
Clark v.
Roemer,
500 U. S. 646,
657-658 (1991);
McCain v.
Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236, 249
(1984).
On September 6, 1991, appellants, five Hispanic voters residing
in the County, sued the County in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California, alleging that the County
had violated § 5 by failing to obtain federal preclearance of the
six judicial district consolidation ordinances it had adopted
between 1972 and 1983. They raised no claim under § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act or constitutional challenge. A three-judge District
Court was convened. On March 31,1993, the District Court ruled that
the challenged ordinances were election changes subject to § 5 and
consequently unenforceable without federal preclearance. The
District Court directed the County to submit the
16
ordinances to federal officials for preclearance. I t also
denied the County's motion to join the State as an indispensable
party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), finding that the
State had no legally protected interest in the outcome of the
action.
In August 1993, the County filed a declaratory judgment action
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
seeking judicial preclearance of the challenged ordinances.
Appellants intervened. But before that court made any findings, the
County voluntarily dismissed its action, without prejudice. The
County and appellants subsequently stipulated that the County was"
'unable to establish that the [consolidation ordinances] adopted by
the County between 1968 and 1983 did not have the effect of denying
the right to vote to Latinos in Monterey County due to the
retrogressive effect several of these ordinances had on Latino
voting strength .... '" 871 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (N. D. Cal. 1994).
The parties thereupon returned to the threejudge District Court,
and several years of litigation ensued.
In essence, the County and appellants ceased to litigate the
case as adversaries. Instead, they embarked on a joint attempt,
opposed by the State and others as intervenors, to persuade the
District Court to order a judicial election plan they viewed as
less retrogressive than an at-large, countywide election scheme. In
late 1993 and early 1994, the County and appellants jointly
proposed two plans to the District Court. Each plan divided the
County into different election areas, with judges from each area to
serve on the countywide municipal court. The State objected to
these schemes on the ground that they contravened California law,
including the constitutional requirements that a judge's
jurisdictional and electoral bases be coextensive, Cal. Const.,
Art. VI, § 16(b), and that cities not be split into more than one
judicial district, Art. VI, § 5(a). Appellants and the County
acknowledged these conflicts, but asked the District
17
Court to suspend operation of these state constitutional
provisions in the County.
For some time, the District Court was reluctant to implement
either of the proposed plans, ruling that it was "not satisfied
that a plan necessarily ha[s] to conflict with [Article VI, § 16(b)
in order to meet the requirements of] the Voting Rights Act." 871
F. Supp., at 1256. Finally, the County and appellants filed with
the District Court a stipulation that the County could not "'devise
or prepare any plan for the election of municipal court judges in
Monterey County that [did] not conflict with at least one state law
and still compl[ied] with the Voting Rights Act.'"
Id., at
1257. The parties supported the stipulation with information on
County demographics, the presence of politically cohesive Hispanic
communities and Anglo bloc voting, and a legacy of discrimination
that had affected Hispanic citizens' right to vote. They also set
forth a number of potential election plans that they believed
complied with § 5, all of which violated some aspect of state
law.
In June 1994, the District Court decided to give appellants, the
County, the State, and the United States, which had at this point
weighed in as
amicus curiae, another chance to develop a
workable solution. It enjoined the upcoming 1994 elections. It
directed the County to attempt to obtain changes in state law that
would permit the implementation of a judicial election plan that
complied with § 5 requirements. It asked the State to assist the
County in creating an acceptable judicial election plan.
Nevertheless, in late 1994, the parties were back in court, still
without a satisfactory plan. The County had sought amendments to
the State Constitution and statutes, but was unsuccessful.
In a December 20, 1994, order, the District Court concluded that
it had to devise a remedy that would permit judicial elections to
take place, pending implementation of a permanent, federally
precleared voting plan. Otherwise, voters would be deprived of
their right to elect judges. The
18
District Court recognized that neither appellants nor the County
thought feasible a return to the election scheme in effect on
November 1, 1968. Instead, it decided to adopt one of the plans the
County and appellants previously had proposed. Under this scheme,
the County was divided into four election districts. Voters in
three of the districts, in which Hispanics constituted a majority,
would each elect one judge. Voters in the fourth district would
elect the other seven judges. Judges elected under the plan would
serve for 18-month terms, until January 1997. All 10 judges would
serve on the countywide municipal court. The District Court
acknowledged that the interim plan was inconsistent with state law,
but reasoned that the intrusion on state interests was minimal. The
County submitted the interim plan to the Attorney General for
preclearance, and it was precleared on March 6, 1995. In a special
election conducted on June 6, 1995, seven judges were elected.
(Apparently, terms of three of the judges holding seats in the
seven-member election district had not expired by June 1995.)
Shortly after the June 1995 special election, this Court issued
its decision in
Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995),
which prompted the three-judge District Court to reconsider the
soundness of its interim election plan.
Miller, ruled the
District Court, cast "substantial doubt" on the constitutionality
of its previous order, "as that plan used race as a significant
factor in dividing the County into election areas." App. 167.
Without ruling that the interim plan was in fact unconstitutional,
the District Court decided to change course. It denied the County's
request to extend the terms of judges elected in the 1995 special
election, concerned that such an extension would be "inappropriate"
in light of the possible constitutional infirmity of the interim
plan. A return to the judicial election system in existence before
the adoption of the consolidation ordinances was not "legal,
feasible or desired."
Ibid. In the District Court's
19
view, its only option was to order the County to conduct an
at-large, countywide judicial election in March 1996, while
enjoining future elections pending preclearance of a permanent
plan. Judges elected in 1996 would serve for the usual 6-year
terms. The District Court also joined the State as an indispensable
party, based on the State's argument that the County was doing
nothing more than administering a state statute that required
countywide elections, rather than administering its own county
ordinance. Thus, in essence, four years after the filing of the
complaint in this case, the District Court ordered the County to
hold elections under the very same scheme that appellants
originally challenged under § 5 as unprecleared.
On January 22, 1996, appellants filed an emergency application
in this Court to enjoin the 1996 elections pending appeal. We
granted the application on February 1, 516 U. S. 1104 (1996), and
noted probable jurisdiction on April 1, 517 U. S. 1118 (1996).
II A
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act applies whenever a covered
jurisdiction "enact[s] or seek[s] to administer any ... standard,
practice, or procedure" different from that in force on the date of
§ 5 coverage. As a threshold matter, the State contends that,
although the County perhaps should have submitted the consolidation
ordinances to federal authorities before implementing them,
intervening changes in California law have transformed the County's
judicial election scheme into a state plan. Therefore, asserts the
State, the County is not administering County consolidation
ordinances in conducting municipal court elections, but is merely
implementing California law, for which § 5 preclearance is not
needed. The District Court was "not persuaded" by this argument,
but ruled that the State could continue to seek to show that the
County was merely administering California law. See
20
Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 71040 (West 1976); see also Cal. Govt.
Code Ann. § 25200 (West 1988). We leave this issue about the scope
of § 5 to the District Court to resolve on remand.
The State raises other threshold issues that the District Court
did not have the opportunity to address. The State contends that
appellants' suit was barred by laches; that it is constitutionally
improper to designate the County a covered jurisdiction under § 5;
and that the consolidation ordinances did not alter a voting
"standard, practice, or procedure" subject to § 5 preclearance. We
express no view on these claims, leaving it to the District Court
to decide them in the first instance.
B
A jurisdiction subject to § 5's requirements must obtain either
judicial or administrative preclearance before implementing a
voting change. No new voting practice is enforceable unless the
covered jurisdiction has succeeded in obtaining preclearance.
Clark v.
Roemer, 500 U. S., at
652-653;
McDaniel v.
Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130, 137
(1981);
Connor v.
Waller, 421 U. S. 656 (1975)
(per curiam). If a voting change subject to § 5 has not been
precleared, § 5 plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction
prohibiting implementation of the change.
Clark v.
Roemer, supra, at 652-653 (citing
Allen v.
State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 572
(1969)). The District Court's order that the County conduct
elections under the unprecleared, at-large judicial election plan
conflicts with these principles and with our decision in
Clark v.
Roemer, supra.
Clark concerned the propriety of a three-judge District
Court's refusal to enjoin elections under an unprecleared Louisiana
judicial election plan. There, Louisiana had not submitted for
preclearance a number of statutory and constitutional voting
changes relating to elections of state judges, many of which were
adopted in the late 1960's and 1970's.
Id., at 649. The
District Court nonetheless permitted elections to go forward, with
the winners allowed to take office
21
if Louisiana filed a judicial preclearance action within 90
days.
Id., at 651. We held that the District Court erred in
authorizing these elections in the absence of preclearance,
pointing out that although Louisiana had been aware for at least
three years that the judgeships were not precleared, it had still
failed to file for judicial preclearance.
Id., at 655.
We acknowledged in
Clark that earlier decisions such as
Perkins v.
Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), and
Berry v.
Doles, 438 U. S. 190 (1978)
(per curiam), held that where a covered jurisdiction had
already conducted elections under an unprecleared plan, it might be
appropriate for the district court to afford local officials an
opportunity to seek federal approval before ordering a new
election. 500 U. S., at 654. But those cases raised an issue
different from the one in
Clark. In
Perkins and
Berry, the District Courts confronted the question whether
to set aside illegal elections that had already taken place. By
contrast, the District Court in
Clark had to decide whether
to allow illegal elections to go forward in the first place. In
this situation, "§ 5's prohibition against implementation of
unprecleared changes required the District Court to enjoin the
election." 500 U. S., at 654.
The District Court faced fundamentally the same problem here as
in
Clark. The County did not preclear the ordinances as
required by § 5. For several years, the County had been on notice
that its electoral changes were subject to § 5's preclearance
requirements, yet it never obtained judicial or administrative
preclearance of the consolidation ordinances. In
Clark, we
left open the question whether a district court may ever deny a § 5
plaintiff's motion for an injunction and allow a covered
jurisdiction to conduct an election under an unprecleared voting
plan. We suggested that "[a]n extreme circumstance might be present
if a seat's unprecleared status is not drawn to the attention of
the [covered jurisdiction] until the eve of the election and there
are equitable principles that justify allowing the election to
pro-
22
ceed."
Id., at 654-655. We found no such exigency to
exist in
Clark, and we find none here.
The State contends that there is a difference between a district
court's failing to enjoin an unprecleared election scheme-the
situation in
Clark-and its ordering, pursuant to its
equitable remedial authority, an election under an unprecleared
plan. Regardless whether this distinction is meaningful, it does
not advance the argument that the County's judicial elections may
be held without § 5 preclearance. We have recognized, at least in
cases raising claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, that § 5
preclearance requirements may not apply where a district court
independently crafts a remedial electoral plan.
McDaniel v.
Sanchez, supra, 148-150 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-295, pp.
18-19 (1975)). But where a court adopts a proposal "reflecting the
policy choices ... of the people [in a covered jurisdiction] ...
the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act is
applicable." 452 U. S., at 153. The at-large, countywide system
under which the District Court ordered the County to conduct
elections undoubtedly "reflect[ed] the policy choices" of the
County; it was the same system that the County had adopted in the
first place. It was, therefore, error for the District Court to
order elections under that system before it had been precleared by
either the Attorney General or the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.
We appreciate the predicament that the District Court faced. The
County did not submit the consolidation ordinances for preclearance
when they were adopted many years ago, and the District Court
concluded that changes have occurred in the intervening years that
make unrealistic a return to the judicial election plan of 1968,
now nearly 30 years old. Since there may be no practical way to go
back to the 1968 plan, simply enjoining the elections would leave
the County without a judicial election system. The County and
appellants seem unable to fashion an election plan that does
23
not contravene the California Constitution, and the State has
vigorously opposed each of the parties' proposals as violative of
state law.
These complications do not, however, change the basic nature of
the § 5 preclearance process. Congress designed the preclearance
procedure "to forestall the danger that local decisions to modify
voting practices will impair minority access to the electoral
process."
McDaniel, 452 U. S., at 149 (footnote omitted).
Congress chose to accomplish this purpose by giving exclusive
authority to pass on the discriminatory effect or purpose of an
election change to the Attorney General and to the District Court
for the District of Columbia. As we explained in
McDaniel,
"[b]ecause a large number of voting changes must necessarily
undergo the preclearance process, centralized review enhances the
likelihood that recurring problems will be resolved in a consistent
and expeditious way."
Id., at 151 (footnote omitted). Once a
covered jurisdiction has complied with these preclearance
requirements, § 5 provides no further remedy.
Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S., at 549-550.
This congressional choice in favor of specialized review
necessarily constrains the role of the three-judge district court.
On a complaint alleging failure to preclear election changes under
§ 5, that court lacks authority to consider the discriminatory
purpose or nature of the changes.
Perkins v.
Matthews,
supra, at 385 ("What is foreclosed to such district court is
what Congress expressly reserved for consideration by the District
Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General-the
determination whether a covered change does or does not have the
purpose or effect 'of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color' "). The three-judge district court may
determine only whether § 5 covers a contested change, whether § 5's
approval requirements were satisfied, and if the requirements were
not satisfied, what temporary remedy, if any, is appropriate. See
City of Lockhart v.
United States, 460 U. S. 125,
24
129, n. 3 (1983);
United States v.
Board of
Supervisors of Warren Cty., 429 U. S. 642, 645-647
(1977)
(per curiam); Perkins, supra, at 385;
Allen,
supra, at 558-559. The goal of a three-judge district court
facing a § 5 challenge must be to ensure that the covered
jurisdiction submits its election plan to the appropriate federal
authorities for preclearance as expeditiously as possible.
In this case, nearly five years after appellants brought their
challenge, neither the Attorney General nor the District Court for
the District of Columbia has yet made any findings regarding the
retrogressive effect-or lack thereof-of the consolidation
ordinances adopted between 1972 and 1983. The County dismissed its
declaratory judgment action before the District Court for the
District of Columbia made any findings, and it has never submitted
the consolidation ordinances to the Attorney General for review.
Although the District Court initially ordered the County to obtain
preclearance of the ordinances, when the County failed to follow
through, the District Court did not enforce its order.
The District Court itself holds some responsibility for
protracting this litigation. Because of its concern that the
judicial election plans proposed by the County and appellants
unnecessarily conflicted with California law, the District Court
several times ordered the parties to submit to it an election plan
that complied both with § 5's substantive requirements and with
state law, before the County submitted the plan to federal
officials. In so doing, it interposed itself into the § 5 approval
process in a way that the statute does not contemplate. Cf.
Upham v.
Seamon, 456 U. S. 37, 42-43 (1982)
(per curiam); United States v.
Board of Supervisors of
Warren Cty., supra, at 645-647;
Perkins, 400 U. S., at
385. In their briefs, both parties raise detailed arguments
regarding the effect of the consolidation ordinances on the
County's minority voters, but § 5 requires either the Attorney
General or the District Court for the District of Columbia to
resolve
25
in the first instance whether the consolidated municipal court
system is retrogressive compared to the system existing in
1968.
The County has not discharged its obligation to submit its
voting changes to either of the forums designated by Congress. The
requirement of federal scrutiny should be satisfied without further
delay. See
Berry v.
Doles, 438 U. S., at 192. The
State appears willing to assist the County in pursuing the issue
before either the Attorney General or the District Court for the
District of Columbia, and its effort will doubtless be of
assistance.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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