OCTOBER TERM, 1997
Syllabus
LEWIS
v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT
No.96-7151. Argued November 12, 1997-Decided March 9, 1998
A federal indictment charged petitioner Lewis and her husband
with beating and killing his 4-year-old daughter while they lived
at an Army base in Louisiana. Relying on the federal Assimilative
Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U. S. C. § 13(a)-which provides that
"[w]hoever within ... any [federal enclave] is guilty of any act or
omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of
Congress, would be punishable ... within the jurisdiction of the
State ... in which such place is situated, ... shall be guilty of a
like offense and subject to like punishment" -the indictment
charged the defendants under a Louisiana statute defining
first-degree murder to include "killing ... [w]hen the offender has
the specific intent to kill or ... harm ... a victim under the age
of twelve .... " Upon her conviction of Louisiana first-degree
murder, the District Court sentenced Lewis to life imprisonment
without parole. The Fifth Circuit held that the Louisiana statute
was not assimilated into federal law under the ACA because the
federal seconddegree murder statute applicable to federal enclaves,
18 U. S. C. § 1111 (1988 ed.), governed the crime at issue. The
court nonetheless affirmed Lewis' conviction on the ground that, in
finding her guilty of the state charge, the jury had necessarily
found all of the requisite elements of federal second-degree
murder. And it affirmed her sentence on the ground that it was no
greater than the maximum sentence (life) permitted by § 1111.
Held:
1. Because the ACA does not make Louisiana's first-degree murder
statute part of federal law, the federal second-degree murder
statute, § 1111, governs the crime at issue. Pp. 159-172.
(a) The basic question before this Court is the meaning of the
ACA phrase "not made punishable by
any enactment of
Congress." (Emphasis added.) The Court rejects an absolutely
literal reading of the italicized words because that would
dramatically separate the ACA from its basic purpose of borrowing
state law to fill gaps in the federal criminallaw applicable on
federal enclaves, and would conflict with the ACA's history and
features. See,
e. g.,
Williams v.
United
States, 327 U. S.
711, 718-719. On the other hand, the Court cannot find a
convincing justification in language, purpose, or precedent for the
Government's
156
Syllabus
narrow interpretation that "any enactment" refers, with limited
exceptions, only to federal enactments that share the same
statutory elements as the relevant state law.
Id., at 717,
distinguished. Rather, the ACA's language and its gap-filling
purpose taken together indicate that, to determine whether a
particular state statute is assimilated, a court must first ask the
question that the ACA's language requires: Is the defendant's "act
or omission ... made punishable by
any enactment of
Congress." (Emphasis added.) If the answer is "no," that will
normally end the matter because the ACA presumably would assimilate
the state statute. If the answer is "yes," however, the court must
ask the further question whether the federal statutes that apply to
the "act or omission" reveal a legislative intent to preclude
application of the state law in question, say, because the federal
statutes reveal an intent to occupy so much of a field as would
exclude use of the particular state statute, see,
e. g.,
id., at 724. Pp. 159-166.
(b) Application of these principles to this case reveals that
federal law does not assimilate the child murder provision of
Louisiana's firstdegree murder statute. Among other things, § 1111
defines first-degree murder to include "willful, deliberate,
malicious, and premeditated killing," as well as certain listed
felony murders and instances of transferred intent, and says that
"murder in the second degree" is "any other murder" and is
punishable by imprisonment for "any term of years or for life." In
contrast, the Louisiana statute defines first-degree murder as,
inter alia, the killing of someone under 12 with a "specific
intent to kill or ... harm," and makes it punishable by "death or
life imprisonment" without parole. Here, the defendant's "act or
omission" is "made punishable by a[n] enactment of Congress"
because § 1111 makes Lewis' "act ... punishable" as second-degree
murder. Moreover, applicable federal law indicates an intent to
punish conduct such as the defendant's to the exclusion of the
state statute at issue. Even though the two statutes cover
different forms of behavior, other § 1111 features, taken together,
demonstrate Congress' intent to completely cover all types of
federal enclave murder as an integrated whole. These features
include the fact that § 1111 is drafted in a detailed manner to
cover all variants of murder; the way in which its "first-degree"
and "second-degree" provisions are linguistically interwoven; the
fact that its "first-degree" list is detailed; the fact that that
list sets forth several circumstances at the same level of
generality as does the Louisiana law; and the extreme breadth of
the possible federal sentences, ranging all the way from
any
term of years, to death. Also supporting preclusive intent are the
circumstances that Congress has recently focused directly several
times upon the § 1111 first-degree list's content, subtracting
certain specified felonies or adding others; that, by drawing the
line between
157
first and second degree, Congress has carefully decided just
when it does, and does not, intend for murder to be punishable by
death, a major way in which the Louisiana statute (which provides
the death penalty) differs from the federal second-degree provision
(which does not); that, when writing and amending the ACA, Congress
has referred to murder as an example of a crime covered by, not as
an example of a gap in, federal law; that § 1111 applies only on
federal enclaves, so that assimilation of Louisiana law would treat
enclave residents differently from those living elsewhere in that
State, by subjecting them to two sets of "territorial" criminal
laws in addition to the general federal criminal laws that apply
nationwide; and that there apparently is not a single reported case
in which a federal court has used the ACA to assimilate a state
murder law. Given all these considerations, there is no gap for
Louisiana's statute to fill. Pp. 166-172.
2. Lewis is entitled to resentencing. As she argues and the
Government concedes, the Fifth Circuit erred in affirming her life
sentence because § 1111, unlike the Louisiana statute, does not
make such a sentence mandatory for second-degree murder, but
provides for a sentence of "any term of years or life." Moreover,
the federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for a range of 168 to 210
months' imprisonment for a firsttime offender like her who murders
a "vulnerable victim." Although a judge could impose a higher
sentence by departing from the Guidelines range, it is for the
District Court to make such a determination in the first instance.
Pp. 172-173.
92 F.3d
1371, vacated and remanded.
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ.,
joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which THOMAS, J., joined,
post, p. 173. KENNEDY, J., filed a
dissenting opinion,
post, p. 180.
Frank Granger argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioner.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States. With
him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Waxman, Acting
Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General
Dreeben, and Deborah Watson.*
*
John Lanahan and
Barbara E. Bergman filed a
brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
amicus curiae.
158
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA or Act) assimilates
into federal law, and thereby makes applicable on federal enclaves
such as Army bases, certain criminal laws of the State in which the
enclave is located. It says:
"Whoever within or upon any [federal enclave] is guilty of any
act or omission which, although not made punishable by any
enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted
within the jurisdiction of the State ... in which such place is
situated, ... shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like
punishment." 18 U. S. C. § 13(a).
The question in this case is whether the ACA makes applicable on
a federal Army base located in Louisiana a state first-degree
murder statute that defines first-degree murder to include the
"killing of a human being ... [w]hen the offender has the specific
intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim under
the age of twelve .... " La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30(A)(5) (West
1986 and Supp. 1997).
We hold that the ACA does not make the state provision part of
federal law. A federal murder statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1111,
therefore governs the crime at issue-the killing of a 4-year-old
child "with malice aforethought" but without "premeditation." Under
that statute this crime is seconddegree, not first-degree,
murder.
I
A federal grand jury indictment charged that petitioner, Debra
Faye Lewis, and her husband James Lewis, beat and killed James'
4-year-old daughter while all three lived at Fort Polk, a federal
Army base in Louisiana. Relying on the ACA, the indictment charged
a violation of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 14:30 (West 1986 and Supp. 1993). Upon her conviction,
the Dis-
159
trict Court sentenced Debra Lewis to life imprisonment without
parole. See § 14:30(C) (West 1986).
On appeal the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana's statute did
not apply at Fort Polk.
92 F.3d
1371 (1996). It noted that the Act made state criminal statutes
applicable on federal enclaves only where the wrongful" 'act or
omission'" was" 'not made punishable by any enactment of
Congress.'"
Id., at 1373-1374 (citing 18 U. S. C. § 13).
Because Congress made Lewis' acts "punishable" as federal
seconddegree murder, and the federal and state laws were directed
at roughly the same sort of conduct, the Fifth Circuit reasoned
that the ACA did not permit the application of Louisiana's
first-degree murder statute to petitioner's acts. 92 F. 3d, at
1375-1377. The court nonetheless affirmed Lewis' conviction on the
ground that in convicting her of the state charge the jury had
necessarily found all of the requisite elements of federal
second-degree murder.
Id., at 1378; cf.
Rutledge v.
United States, 517 U. S. 292, 305-306
(1996). And it affirmed the sentence on the ground that it was no
greater than the maximum sentence (life) permitted by the federal
second-degree murder statute. 92 F. 3d, at 13791380.
We granted certiorari primarily to consider the Fifth Circuit's
ACA determination. We conclude that the holding was correct, though
we also believe that Lewis is entitled to resentencing on the
federal second-degree murder conviction.
II
The ACA applies state law to a defendant's acts or omissions
that are "not made punishable by
any enactment of Congress."
18 U. S. C. § 13(a) (emphasis added). The basic question before us
concerns the meaning of the italicized phrase. These words say that
the ACA does not assimilate a state statute if the defendant's
"act" or "omission" is punished by "any [federal] enactment." If
the words are taken literally, Louisiana's law could not possibly
apply to Lewis,
160
for there are several federal "enactments" that make Lewis' acts
punishable, for example, the federal (second-degree) murder
statute, § 1111, and the federal assault law, § 113. We agree with
the Government, however, that this is not a sensible interpretation
of this language, since a literal reading of the words "any
enactment" would dramatically separate the statute from its
intended purpose.
The ACA's basic purpose is one of borrowing state law to fill
gaps in the federal criminal law that applies on federal enclaves.
See
Williams v.
United States, 327 U. S. 711, 718719
(1946) (ACA exists "to fill in gaps" in federal law where Congress
has not "define[d] the missing offenses");
United States v.
Sharpnack, 355
U. S. 286, 289 (1958) (ACA represents congressional decision of
"adopting for otherwise undefined offenses the policy of general
conformity to local law");
United States v.
Press
Publishing Co., 219
U. S. 1, 9-10 (1911) (state laws apply to crimes "which were
not previously provided for by a law of the United States");
Franklin v.
United States, 216 U. S. 559, 568 (1910)
(assimilation occurs where state laws "not displaced by specific
laws enacted by Congress").
In the 1820's, when the ACA began its life, federal statutory
law punished only a few crimes committed on federal enclaves, such
as murder and manslaughter. See 1 Stat. 113. The federal courts
lacked the power to supplement these few statutory crimes through
the use of the common law. See
United States v.
Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812). Consequently James Buchanan,
then a Congressman, could point out to his fellow House Members a
"palpable defect in our system," namely, that "a great variety of
actions, to which a high degree of moral guilt is attached, and
which are punished ... at the common law, and by every State ...
may be committed with impunity" on federal enclaves. 40 Annals of
Congo 930 (1823). Daniel Webster sought to cure this palpable
defect by introducing a bill that both increased the number of
federal crimes and also made "the residue"
161
criminal, see 1 Congo Deb. 338 (1825), by assimilating state law
where federal statutes did not provide for the "punishment" of an
"offence." 4 Stat. 115. This law, with only a few changes, has
become today's ACA. See Williams,
supra, at 719-723
(describing history of ACA).
Two features of the Act indicate a congressional intent to
confine the scope of the words "any enactment" more narrowly than
(and hence extend the Act's reach beyond what) a literal reading
might suggest. First, a literal interpretation of the words "any
enactment" would leave federal criminal enclave law subject to gaps
of the very kind the Act was designed to fill. The Act would be
unable to assimilate even a highly specific state law aimed
directly at a serious, narrowly defined evil, if the language of
any federal statute, however broad and however clearly aimed at a
different kind of harm, were to cover the defendant's act. Were
there only a state, and no federal, law against murder, for
example, a federal prohibition of assault could prevent the state
statute from filling the obvious resulting gap.
At the same time, prior to its modern amendment the ACA's
language more clearly set limits upon the scope of the word "any."
The original version of the ACA said that assimilation of a
relevant state law was proper when "any offence shall be committed
... the punishment of which
offence is not specially
provided for by any law of the United States." 4 Stat. 115
(emphasis added); see also 30 Stat. 717 (later reenactment also
using "offense"). The word "offense" avoided the purpose-thwarting
interpretation of the Act discussed above, for it limited the
relevant federal "enactment" to an enactment that punished
offenses of the same kind as those punished by state law.
Presumably, a federal assault statute would not have provided
punishment for the "offense" that state murder law condemned.
Congress changed the Act's language in 1909, removing the word
"offense" and inserting the words "act or thing," 35 Stat. 1145,
which later became the current "act or omission." But Con-
162
gress did so for reasons irrelevant here, see H. R. Rep. No.2,
60th Cong., 1st Sess., 25 (1908) (stating that, technically
speaking, conduct otherwise not forbidden by law was not an
"offense"), and did not intend to alter the basic meaning of the
Act. See
Williams, supra, at 722-723.
For these or similar reasons, many lower courts have interpreted
the words "any enactment" more narrowly than a literal reading
might suggest. And they have applied the Act to assimilate state
statutes in circumstances they thought roughly similar to those
suggested by our assault/ murder example above. See,
e. g.,
United States v.
Kaufman, 862 F.2d
236, 238 (CA9 1988) (existence of federal law punishing the
carrying of a gun does not prevent assimilation of state law
punishing threatening someone with a gun);
Fields v.
United States, 438 F.2d
205, 207-208 (CA2 1971) (assimilation of state malicious
shooting law proper despite existence of federal assault statute);
United States v.
Brown, 608 F.2d
551, 553-554 (CA5 1979) (child abuse different in kind from
generic federal assault, and so state law could be assimilated).
But see
United States v.
Chaussee, 536 F.2d
637, 644 (CA7 1976) (stating a more literal test). Like the
Government, we conclude that Congress did not intend the relevant
words-"any enactment"-to carry an absolutely literal meaning.
On the other hand, we cannot accept the narrow interpretation of
the relevant words (and the statute's consequently broader reach)
that the Solicitor General seems to urge. Drawing on our language
in
Williams, supra, at 717, some lower courts have said that
the words "any enactment" refer only to federal enactments that
make criminal the same "precise acts" as those made criminal by the
relevant state law. See,
e. g., United States v.
Johnson,
967 F. 2d 1431, 1436 (CAlO 1992). The Government apparently
interprets this test to mean that, with limited exceptions, the ACA
would assimilate a state law so long as that state law defines a
crime in terms of at least one element that does
163
not appear in the relevant federal enactment. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 27 ("[I]n the great majority of cases the question of whether
the State law offense has been made punishable by an enactment of
Congress can be resolved by asking, is there a Federal statute that
contains precisely the same essential elements as the State
statute"). But this interpretation of federal "enactments" is too
narrow.
The Government's view of the "precise acts" test-which comes
close to a "precise elements" test-would have the ACA assimilate
state law even where there is no gap to fill. Suppose, for example,
that state criminal law (but not federal criminal law) makes
possession of a state bank charter an element of an offense it
calls "bank robbery"; or suppose that state law makes purse
snatching criminal under a statute that is indistinguishable from a
comparable federal law but for a somewhat different definition of
the word "purse." Where, one might ask, is the gap? As Congress has
enacted more and more federal statutes, including many that are
applicable only to federal enclaves, see,
e. g., 18 U. S. C.
§ 113 (assault); § 1460 (possession with intent to sell obscene
materials), such possibilities become more realistic. And to that
extent the Government's broad view of assimilation threatens not
only to fill nonexistent gaps, but also to rewrite each federal
enclave-related criminal law in 50 different ways, depending upon
special, perhaps idiosyncratic, drafting circumstances in the
different States. See Williams, 327 U. S., at 718 (ACA may not be
used to "enlarg[e] ... modif[y] or repea[l] existing provisions of
the Federal Code"). It would also leave residents of federal
enclaves randomly subject to three sets of criminal laws (special
federal territorial criminallaw, general federal criminal law, and
state criminal law) where their state counterparts would be subject
only to the latter two types.
Nothing in the Act's language or in its purpose warrants
imposing such narrow limits upon the words "any enactment" and
thereby so significantly broadening the statute's
164
reach. Nor does the use by this Court of the words "precise
acts" in the leading case in which this Court has applied the Act,
Williams, 327 U. S., at 717, help the Government in this
respect. In
Williams, the Court held that the ACA did not
assimilate a State's "statutory rape" crime (with a cut-off age of
18) both because federal adultery and fornication statutes covered
the defendant's "precise acts," and because the policies underlying
a similar federal statute (with a cutoff age of 16) made clear
there was no gap to fill.
Id., at 724-725. The Court's
opinion refers to both of these circumstances and does not decide
whether the Act would, or would not, have applied in the absence of
only one. We cannot find a convincing justification in language,
purpose, or precedent for the Government's interpretation. Hence,
we conclude that, just as a literal interpretation would produce an
ACA that is too narrow, see
supra, at 161-162, so the
Government's interpretation would produce an ACA that is too
broad.
In our view, the ACA's language and its gap-filling purpose
taken together indicate that a court must first ask the question
that the ACA's language requires: Is the defendant's "act or
omission ... made punishable by any enactment of Congress." 18 U.
S. C. § 13(a) (emphasis added). If the answer to this question is
"no," that will normally end the matter. The ACA presumably would
assimilate the statute. If the answer to the question is "yes,"
however, the court must ask the further question whether the
federal statutes that apply to the "act or omission" preclude
application of the state law in question, say, because its
application would interfere with the achievement of a federal
policy, see John
son v.
Yellow Cab Transit Co.,
321 U. S. 383,
389-390 (1944), because the state law would effectively rewrite an
offense definition that Congress carefully considered, see
Williams, 327 U. S., at 718, or because federal statutes
reveal an intent to occupy so much of a field as would exclude use
of the particular state statute at issue, see id., at 724 (no
assimilation where Congress has "covered the field with uniform
fed-
165
erallegislation"). See also
Franklin, 216 U. S., at 568
(assimilation proper only where state laws "not displaced by
specific laws enacted by Congress").
There are too many different state and federal criminal laws,
applicable in too many different kinds of circumstances, bearing
too many different relations to other laws, to common-law
tradition, and to each other, for a touchstone to provide an
automatic general answer to this second question. Still, it seems
fairly obvious that the Act will not apply where both state and
federal statutes seek to punish approximately the same wrongful
behavior-where, for example, differences among elements of the
crimes reflect jurisdictional, or other technical, considerations,
or where differences amount only to those of name, definitional
language, or punishment. See,
e. g., United States v.
Adams, 502 F. Supp. 21, 25 (SD Fla. 1980)
(misdemeanor/felony difference did not justify assimilation).
The Act's basic purpose makes it similarly clear that
assimilation may not rewrite distinctions among the forms of
criminal behavior that Congress intended to create. Wil
liams,
supra, at 717-718 (nothing in the history or language of the
ACA to indicate that once Congress has "defined a penal offense, it
has authorized such definition to be enlarged" by state law).
Hence, ordinarily, there will be no gap for the Act to fill where a
set of federal enactments taken together make criminal a single
form of wrongful behavior while distinguishing (say, in terms of
seriousness) among what amount to different ways of committing the
same basic crime.
At the same time, a substantial difference in the kind of
wrongful behavior covered (on the one hand by the state statute, on
the other, by federal enactments) will ordinarily indicate a gap
for a state statute to fill-unless Congress, through the
comprehensiveness of its regulation, cf.
Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U. S. 597, 604-605
(1991), or through language revealing a conflicting policy, see
166
Williams, supra, at 724-725, indicates to the contrary in
a particular case. See also
Johnson v.
Yellow Cab,
supra, at
389-390; Blackburn v.
United States,
100 F.3d
1426, 1435 (CA9 1996). The primary question (we repeat) is one
of legislative intent: Does applicable federal law indicate an
intent to punish conduct such as the defendant's to the exclusion
of the particular state statute at issue?
III
We must now apply these principles to this case. The relevant
federal murder statute-applicable only on federal enclaves-read as
follows in 1993, the time of petitioner's crime:
"§ 1111. Murder
"(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or
any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated
killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason,
espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse,
burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a premeditated design
unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being
other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.
"Any other murder is murder in the second degree.
"(b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States,
"Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree, shall suffer
death unless the jury qualifies its verdict by adding thereto
'without capital punishment', in which event he shall be sentenced
to imprisonment for life; "Whoever is guilty of murder in the
second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for
life." 18 U. S. C. § 1111 (1988 ed.).
167
This statute says that "murder in the first degree" shall be
punished by death or life imprisonment. It says that "murder in the
second degree" shall be punished by imprisonment for "any term of
years or for life." It defines firstdegree murder as a "willful,
deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing," and also adds
certain kinds of felony murder (i.
e., murder occurring
during the commission of other crimes) and certain instances of
transferred intent (i.
e., D's killing of A, while intending
to murder B). It defines second-degree murder as "[a]ny other
murder."
Louisiana's statute says the following:
"A. First degree murder is the killing of a human being: "(1)
When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping,
aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated rape, forcible
rape, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, drive-by shooting, first
degree robbery, or simple robbery.
"(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to
inflict great bodily harm upon a fireman or peace officer engaged
in the performance of his lawful duties;
"(3) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to
inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person; or "(4) When
the offender has specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily
harm and has offered, has been offered, has given, or has received
anything of value for the killing.
"(5) When the offender has the specific intent to kill or to
inflict great bodily harm upon a victim under the age of twelve or
sixty-five years of age or older.
"(6) When the offender has the specific intent to kill or to
inflict great bodily harm while engaged in the distribution,
exchange, sale, or purchase, or any attempt thereof, of a
controlled dangerous substance listed in
168
Schedules I, II, III, IV; or V of the Uniform Controlled
Dangerous Substances Law.
"(7) When the offender has specific intent to kill and is
engaged in the activities prohibited by R. S. 14:107.1(C)(1).
"C. Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be
punished by death or life imprisonment at hard labor without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in
accordance with the determination of the jury." La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 14:30 (West 1986 and Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
This statute says that murder in the first degree shall be
punished by "death or life imprisonment" without parole. It defines
first-degree murder as the "killing of a human being" with a
"specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm" where the
"offender" is committing certain other felonies or has been paid
for the crime or kills more than one victim, or kills a fireman, a
peace officer, someone over the age of 64, or someone under the age
of 12. In this case, the jury found that the defendant killed a
child under the age of 12 with a "specific intent to kill or to
inflict great bodily harm" upon that child.
In deciding whether the ACA assimilates Louisiana's law, we
first ask whether the defendant's "act or omission" is "made
punishable by any enactment of Congress." 18 U. S. C. § 13(a)
(emphasis added); see
supra, at 164. The answer to this
question is "yes." An "enactment of Congress," namely, § 1111,
makes the defendant's "act ... punishable" as second-degree murder.
This answer is not conclusive, however, for reasons we have pointed
out. Rather, we must ask a second question. See
supra, at
164-165. Does applicable federal law indicate an intent to punish
conduct such as the defendant's to the exclusion of the particular
state statute at issue?
169
We concede at the outset the Government's claim that the two
statutes cover different forms of behavior. The federal
second-degree murder statute covers a wide range of conduct; the
Louisiana first-degree murder provision focuses upon a narrower
(and different) range of conduct. We also concede that, other
things being equal, this consideration argues in favor of
assimilation. Yet other things are not equal; and other features of
the federal statute convince us that Congress has intended that the
federal murder statute preclude application of a first-degree
murder statute such as Louisiana's to a killing on a federal
enclave.
The most obvious such feature is the detailed manner in which
the federal murder statute is drafted. It purports to make criminal
a particular form of wrongful behavior, namely, "murder," which it
defines as "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought." It covers all variants of murder. It divides
murderous behavior into two parts: a specifically defined list of
"first-degree" murders and all "other" murders, which it labels
"second-degree." This fact, the way in which "first-degree" and
"second-degree" provisions are linguistically interwoven; the fact
that the "first-degree" list is detailed; and the fact that the
list sets forth several circumstances at the same level of
generality as does Louisiana's statute, taken together, indicate
that Congress intended its statute to cover a particular
fieldnamely, "unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought"-as an integrated whole. The complete coverage of the
federal statute over all types of federal enclave murder is
reinforced by the extreme breadth of the possible sentences,
ranging all the way from any term of years, to death. There is no
gap for Louisiana's statute to fill.
Several other circumstances offer support for the conclusion
that Congress' omissions from its "first-degree" murder list
reflect a considered legislative judgment. Congress, for example,
has recently focused directly several times upon the content of the
"first-degree" list, subtracting certain speci-
170
fied circumstances or adding others. See Pub. L. 99-646, 100
Stat. 3623 (substituting "aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse"
for "rape"); Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2138 (adding "escape, murder,
kidnaping, treason, espionage," and "sabotage" to first-degree
list). By drawing the line between first and second degree,
Congress also has carefully decided just when it does, and when it
does not, intend for murder to be punishable by death-a major way
in which the Louisiana first-degree murder statute (which provides
the death penalty) differs from the federal second-degree provision
(which does not). 18 U. S. C. § 1111(b); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
14:30(C) (West Supp. 1997). The death penalty is a matter that
typically draws specific congressional attention. See,
e.
g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
103-322, § 60003, 108 Stat. 1968 (section entitled "Specific
Offenses For Which [the] Death Penalty Is Authorized"). As this
Court said in
Williams, "[w]here offenses have been
specifically defined by Congress and the public has been guided by
such definitions for many years," it is unusual for Congress
through general legislation like the ACA "to amend such definitions
or the punishments prescribed for such offenses, without making
clear its intent to do so." 327 U. S., at 718 (footnote
omitted).
Further, Congress when writing and amending the ACA has referred
to the conduct at issue here-murder-as an example of a crime
covered by, not as an example of a gap in, federal law. See H. R.
Rep. No. 1584, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 (1940) ("Certain of the
major crimes ... such ... as murder" are "expressly defined" by
Congress; assimilation of state law is proper as to "other
offenses"); 1 Congo Deb. 338 (1825) (Daniel Webster explaining
original assimilation provision as a way to cover "the residue" of
crimes not "provide[d] for" by Congress; at the time federal law
contained a federal enclave murder provision, see 1 Stat. 113); see
also
United States v.
Sharpnack, 355 U. S., at 289,
and n. 5 (citing 18 U. S. C. § 1111 for proposition that Congress
has
171
increasingly "enact[ed] for the enclaves specific criminal
statutes" and "to that extent, [has] excluded the state laws from
that field").
Finally, the federal criminal statute before us applies only on
federal enclaves. § 1111(b). Hence, there is a sense in which
assimilation of Louisiana law would treat those living on federal
enclaves differently from those living elsewhere in Louisiana, for
it would subject them to two sets of "territorial" criminal laws in
addition to the general federal criminallaws that apply nationwide.
See
supra, at 163. Given all these considerations, it is
perhaps not surprising that we have been unable to find a single
reported case in which a federal court has used the ACA to
assimilate a state murder law to fill a supposed "gap" in the
federal murder statute.
The Government, arguing to the contrary, says that Louisiana's
provision is a type of "child protection" statute, filling a "gap"
in federal enclave-related criminal law due to the fact that
Congress left "child abuse," like much other domestic relations
law, to the States. See Brief for United States 23, 29-30. The fact
that Congress, when writing various criminal statutes, has focused
directly upon "child protection" weakens the force of this
argument. See,
e. g., 21 U. S. C. §§ 859(a)-(b) (person
selling drugs to minors is subject to twice the maximum sentence as
one who deals to adults, and repeat offenders who sell to children
subject to
three times the normal maximum); 18 U. S. C. §
1201(g) ("special rule" for kidnaping offenses involving minors,
with enhanced penalties in certain cases); §§ 2241(c) and 2243
(prohibiting sexual abuse of minors); § 2251 (prohibiting sexual
exploitation of children); § 2251A (selling and buying of
children); § 2258 (failure to report child abuse). And, without
expressing any view on the merits of lower court cases that have
assimilated state child abuse statutes despite the presence of a
federal assault law, § 113, see,
e. g., United States v.
Brown, 608 F. 2d, at 553-554;
United States v.
Fesler, 781 F.2d
384, 390-391 (CA5 1986), we note that the
172
federal assault prohibition is less comprehensive than the
federal murder statute, and the relevant statutory relationships
are less direct than those at issue here. We conclude that the
consideration to which the Government points is not strong enough
to open a child-related "gap" in the comprehensive effort to define
murder on federal enclaves.
For these reasons we agree with the Fifth Circuit that federal
law does not assimilate the child victim provision of Louisiana's
first-degree murder statute.
IV
The Fifth Circuit affirmed petitioner's conviction on the ground
that the jury, in convicting petitioner under the Louisiana
statute, necessarily found all of the requisite elements of the
federal second-degree murder offense. 92 F. 3d, at 1379; cf.
Rutledge v.
United States, 517 U. S., at 305306.
Petitioner does not contest the legal correctness of this
conclusion.
Petitioner, however, does argue that the Fifth Circuit was wrong
to affirm her sentence (life imprisonment). She points out that the
federal second-degree murder statute, unlike Louisiana's
first-degree murder statute, does not make a life sentence
mandatory. See 18 U. S. C. § 1111(b) (sentence of "any term of
years or for life"). Moreover, the Sentencing Guidelines provide
for a range of 168 to 210 months' imprisonment for a first-time
offender who murders a "vulnerable victim," United States
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §§ 2Alo2, 3Alo1, and ch.
5, pt. A (Nov. 1994), although a judge could impose a higher
sentence by departing from the Guidelines range. See id., ch. 5,
pt. K; see also
Koon v.
United States, 518 U. S. 81, 92-96 (1996)
(describing circumstances for departures).
The Government concedes petitioner's point. The Solicitor
General writes:
"If the jury had found petitioner guilty of second degree murder
under federal law, the district court would have
173
been required to utilize the Sentencing Guidelines provisions
applicable to that offense, and the court might have imposed a
sentence below the statutory maximum. An upward departure from that
range, if appropriate, could reach the statutory maximum of a life
sentence, but it is for the district court in the first instance to
make such a determination. Resentencing under the Guidelines is
therefore appropriate if this Court vacates petitioner's conviction
on the assimilated state offense and orders entry of a judgment of
conviction for federal second degree murder." Brief for United
States 38 (footnote and citations omitted).
We consequently vacate the Fifth Circuit's judgment in respect
to petitioner's sentence and remand the case for resentencing.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in
the judgment.
As the proliferation of opinions indicates, this is a most
difficult case. I agree with the Court's conclusion that the
Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U. S. C. § 13(a), does not
incorporate Louisiana's first-degree murder statute into the
criminal law governing federal enclaves in that State. I write
separately because it seems to me that the Court's manner of
reaching that result turns the language of the ACA into an empty
vessel, and invites the lower courts to fill it with free-ranging
speculation about the result that Congress would prefer in each
case. Although I agree that the ACA is not a model of legislative
draftsmanship, I believe we have an obligation to search harder for
its meaning before abandoning the field to judicial intuition.
The Court quotes the text of the ACA early in its opinion, but
then identifies several policy reasons for leaving it behind. The
statutory language is deceptively simple.
174
SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
"Whoever within or upon any [federal enclave] is guilty of any
act or omission which, although not made punishable by any
enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted
within the jurisdiction of the State ... in which such place is
situated, ... shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a
like punishment." § 13(a).
At first glance, this appears to say that state law is not
assimilated if the defendant can be prosecuted under any federal
statute. The Court acknowledges this, but concludes that "a literal
reading of the words 'any enactment' would dramatically separate
the statute from its intended purpose,"
ante, at 160,
because, for example, a general federal assault statute would
prevent assimilation of a state prohibition against murder.
It seems to me that the term "any enactment" is not the text
that poses the difficulty. Whether a federal assault statute (which
is assuredly an "enactment") prevents assimilation of a state
murder statute to punish an assault that results in death depends
principally upon whether fatal assault constitutes the same "act or
omission" that the assault statute punishes. Many hypotheticals
posing the same issue can readily be conceived of. For example,
whether a state murder statute is barred from assimilation by a
federal double-parking prohibition, when the behavior in question
consists of the defendant's stopping and jumping out of his car in
the traffic lane to assault and kill the victim. The federal
parking prohibition is sure enough an "enactment," but the issue is
whether the "act or omission" to which it applies is a different
one. So also with a federal statute punishing insurance fraud,
where the murderer kills in order to collect a life insurance
policy on the victim.
Many lower courts have analyzed situations like these under what
they call the "precise acts" test, see,
e. g.,
United
States v.
Kaufman, 862 F.2d
236 (CA9 1988), which in practice is no test at all but an
appeal to vague policy intuitions.
175
See,
e. g.,
United States v.
Brown,
608 F.2d
551 (CA5 1979) (striking a child is not the same "precise act"
for purposes of a federal assault law and a state law against child
abuse). I am skeptical of any interpretation which leaves a statute
doing no real interpretive work in most of the hard cases which it
was drafted to resolve. On that score, however, the Court's
solution is no improvement. After rejecting proposals from the
petitioner and from the United States that would have given the ACA
more definite content (on the policy grounds that they would
produce too little, and too much, assimilation, respectively), the
Court invites judges to speculate about whether Congress would
approve of assimilation in each particular case.
"[T]he court must ask ... whether the federal statutes that
apply to the 'act or omission' preclude application of the state
law in question, say, because its application would interfere with
the achievement of a federal policy, because the state law would
effectively rewrite an offense definition that Congress carefully
considered, or because federal statutes reveal an intent to occupy
so much of a field as would exclude use of the particular state
statute at issue .... The primary question (we repeat) is one of
legislative intent: Does applicable federallaw indicate an intent
to punish conduct such as the defendant's to the exclusion of the
particular state statute at issue?" Ante, at 164, 166
(citations omitted).
Those questions simply transform the ACA into a mirror that
reflects the judge's assessment of whether assimilation of a
particular state law would be good federal policy.
I believe that the statutory history of the ACA supports a more
principled and constraining interpretation of the current language.
The original version of the ACA provided for assimilation whenever
"any offence shall be committed ... , the punishment of which
offence is not specially provided for by any law of the United
States." 4 Stat. 115.
176
SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
Subsequent amendments replaced the word "offence" with "act or
thing," 35 Stat. 1145, and eventually the present formulation, "act
or omission." But we held in
Williams v.
United
States, 327 U. S.
711, 722-723 (1946), that those amendments were designed to
respond to a perceived technical deficiency, and that they did not
intend to change the meaning of the Act.
Williams reached that conclusion by studying the
legislative history of the ACA amendments. Although I am not
prepared to endorse that particular methodology, reading the ACA
against the backdrop of its statutory predecessors does shed some
light on its otherwise puzzling language. An "act or omission ...
made punishable by [law]" is the very definition of a criminal
"offense," and certainly might have been another way to express
that same idea. In addition, the ACA still provides that a
defendant charged with an assimilated state crime "shall be guilty
of a
like offense and subject to a like punishment." 18 U.
S. C. § 13(a) (emphasis added). Since an interpretation that
ascribes greater substantive significance to the amendments would
produce such a vague and unhelpful statute, I think that
Williams's reading of the ACA was essentially correct. A
defendant may therefore be prosecuted under the ACA for an
"offense" which is "like" the one defined by state law if, and only
if, that same "offense" is not also defined by federal law.
That interpretation would hardly dispel all of the confusion
surrounding the ACA, because courts would still have to decide
whether the assimilated state offense is "the same" as some crime
defined by federal law. As JUSTICE KENNEDY points out in dissent,
"[t]here is a methodology at hand for this purpose, and it is the
Blockburger test we use in double jeopardy law."
Post, at 182. Two offenses are different, for double
jeopardy purposes, whenever each contains an element that the other
does not. See,
e. g., Blockburger v.
United States,
284 U. S. 299,
304 (1932). That test can be
177
easily and mechanically applied, and has the virtue of producing
consistent and predictable results.
The
Blockburger test, however, establishes what
constitutes the "same offence" for purposes of the traditional
practice that underlies the Double Jeopardy Clause, U. S. Const.,
Arndt. 5. That constitutional guarantee not only assumes a scheme
of "offences" much more orderly than those referred to by the ACA
(since they are the offenses designed by a single sovereign), but
also pursues policy concerns that are entirely different. When it
is fair to try a defendant a second time has little to do with when
it is desirable to subject a defendant to two separate criminal
prohibitions. Thus, for example, double jeopardy law treats greater
and lesser included offenses as the same, see,
e. g., Harris
v.
Oklahoma, 433 U. S. 682 (1977)
(per curiam), so that a person tried for felony murder
cannot subsequently be prosecuted for the armed robbery that
constituted the charged felony. That is fair enough; but it is
assuredly
not desirable that a jurisdiction (the federal
enclave) which has an armed robbery law not have a felony-murder
law. Contrariwise, as the Court's opinion points out,
ante,
at 163,
Blockburger's emphasis on the formal elements of
crimes causes it to
deny the "sameness" of some quite
similar offenses because of trivial differences in the way they are
defined. In other words, the
Blockburger test gives the
phrase "same offence" a technical meaning that reflects our double
jeopardy traditions, see
Grady v.
Corbin, 495 U. S. 508, 528-536
(1990) (SCALIA, J., dissenting), but that is neither a layman's
understanding of the term nor a meaning that produces sensible
results for purposes of "gap filling." There is no reason to
assume, it seems to me, that Congress had the term of art in the
Double Jeopardy Clause in mind when it enacted the ACA.
JUSTICE KENNEDY contends that all of these concerns can be
accommodated through adjustments to the
Blockburger test. In
his view, for example, "the existence of a lesser included federal
offense does not prevent the assimilation of
178
SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
a greater state offense under the ACA, or vice versa."
Post, at 183. He proposes that courts should "look beyond
slight differences in wording and jurisdictional elements to
discern whether, as a practical matter, the elements of the two
crimes are the same."
Post, at 182. In order to avoid
overruling
Williams, he also suggests that assimilation is
improper when "Congress ... adverts to a specific element of an
offense and sets it at a level different from the level set by
state law."
Post, at 183. I admire JUSTICE KENNEDY'S effort
to construct an interpretation of the ACA that yields more certain
and predictable results, but the modifications he proposes largely
dispel the virtues of familiarity, clarity, and predictability that
would make
Blockburger the means to such an end. Ultimately,
moreover, those modifications are driven by a view of the policies
underlying the Act which I do not share. JUSTICE KENNEDY contends
that the ACA is primarily about federalism, and that respect for
that principle requires a strong presumption in favor of
assimilation.
Post, at 181-182. To the extent that we can
divine anything about the ACA's "purpose" from the historical
context which produced it, I agree with the Court that the statute
was apparently designed "to fill gaps in the federal criminal law"
at a time when there was almost no federal criminal law.
Ante, at 160; see also
Williams, supra, at
718-719.
Rejecting
Blockburger's elements test leaves me without
an easy and mechanical answer to the question of when a state and
federal offense are the "same" under the ACA. But the language of
the original 1825 ACA suggests that the focus of that inquiry
should be on the way that crimes were traditionally defined and
categorized at common law. It provided that
" ... if any offence shall be committed in [an enclave], the
punishment of which offence is not specially provided for by any
law of the United States, such offence shall .... receive the same
punishment as the laws of the state ... .
179
provide for the like offence when committed within the body of
any county of such state." 4 Stat. 115.
Congress did not provide any methodology for determining whether
an "offence" under state law is "provided for by any law of the
United States"; the statute appears, instead, to presume the
reader's familiarity with a set of discrete "offence[sJ" existing
apart from the particular provisions of either state or federal
statutory law.
In my opinion, the legal community of that day could only have
regarded such language as a reference to the traditional vocabulary
and categories of the common law. Indeed, the original ACA was at
least in part a response to our decision in
United States v.
Hudson, 7 Cranch 32 (1812), which held that the federal
courts could not recognize and punish common-law crimes in the
absence of a specific federal statute. The common law's taxonomy of
criminal behavior developed over the centuries through the
interplay of statutes and judicial decisions, and its basic
categories of criminal offenses remain familiar today: murder,
rape, assault, burglary, larceny, fraud, forgery, and so on. I
believe that a contemporary reader of the original ACA would have
understood it to apply if, and only if, the federal criminal
statutes simply failed to cover some significant "offence" category
generally understood to be part of the common law.
Since 1825, of course, state and federal legislatures have
created a tremendous variety of new statutory crimes that both cut
across and expand the old common-law categories. Some of those new
"offences" may have become so well established in our common legal
culture that their absence from the federal criminal law would now
represent a significant gap in its coverage-a gap of the sort the
ACA was designed to fill. That possibility introduces an
unavoidable element of judgment and discretion into the application
of the ACA, and to that extent my interpretation is subject to the
same criticisms I have leveled at the approaches taken by the Court
and by JUSTICE KENNEDY. But I think that
180
danger is more theoretical than practical. The structure of the
criminal law, like the basic categories of human vice, has remained
quite stable over the centuries. There have been a few genuine
innovations recently; I have in mind, for example, antitrust or
securities crimes which did not exist in 1825. But Congress has
been the principal innovator in most of those areas, and I doubt
that courts will confront many new "offence" candidates that are
not already covered by the federal criminal law. Regardless, the
approach outlined above would produce more predictable results than
the majority's balancing test, and has the additional virtue of
being more firmly grounded in the text and statutory history.
It also produces a clear answer in this case. Ms. Lewis's
conduct is not just punishable under some federal criminal statute;
it is punishable
as murder under 18 U. s. C. § 111l.
Louisiana's murder statutes are structured somewhat differently
from their federal counterparts, but they are still unquestionably
murder statutes. Because that "offence" is certainly "made
punishable by any enactment of Congress," there is no gap for the
ACA to fill. That remains true even if the common-law category at
the appropriate level of generality is instead
murder in the
first degree. That "offence" is also defined and punished by
the federal criminal law, although the prosecutors in this case
apparently did not believe that they could establish its elements.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment, and in Part IV of the
majority's opinion.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, dissenting.
As the majority recognizes, the touchstone for interpreting the
Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) is the intent of Congress.
Ante, at 166. One of Congress' purposes in enacting the ACA
was to fill gaps in federal criminal law.
Ante, at 160. The
majority fails to weigh, however, a second, countervailing policy
behind the ACA: the value of federalism. The intent of Congress was
to preserve state law
181
except where it is "displaced by specific laws enacted by
Congress."
Franklin v.
United States, 216 U. S. 559, 568
(1910). In other words, the ACA embodies Congress' "policy of
general conformity to local law."
United States v.
Sharpnack, 355
U. S. 286, 289 (1958). The majority quotes these passages with
approval,
ante, at 160, yet ignores the principles of
federalism upon which they rest.
A central tenet of federalism is concurrent jurisdiction over
many subjects. See
McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 425, 435 (1819). One result of concurrent jurisdiction is
that, outside federal enclaves, citizens can be subject to the
criminal laws of both state and federal sovereigns for the same act
or course of conduct. See
Heath v.
Alabama, 474 U. S. 82, 88-89
(1985). The ACA seeks to mirror the results of concurrent
jurisdiction in enclaves where, but for its provisions, state laws
would be suspended in their entirety. Congress chose this means to
recognize and respect the power of both sovereigns. We should
implement this principle by assimilating state law except where
Congress has manifested a contrary intention in "specific [federal]
laws."
Franklin, supra, at 568. But see
ante, at 163
(suggesting that persons within federal enclaves should not be
"randomly subject" to state as well as federal law, even though
both sovereigns regulate those outside enclaves).
The majority recognizes that assimilation is not barred simply
because the conduct at issue could be punished under a federal
statute. It is correct, then, to assume that assimilation depends
on whether Congress has proscribed the same offense.
Ante,
at 161-162. Yet in trying to define the same offense, the majority
asks whether assimilation would interfere with a federal policy,
rewrite a federal offense, or intrude upon a field occupied by the
Federal Government.
Ante, at 164-165. The majority's
standards are a roundabout way to ask whether specific federal laws
conflict with state laws. The standards take too little note of the
value of federalism and the concomitant presumption in favor of
182
assimilation. And for many concrete cases, they are too vague to
be of help.
A more serious problem with the majority's approach, however, is
that it undervalues the best indicia of congressional intent: the
words of the criminal statutes in question and the factual elements
they define. There is a methodology at hand for this purpose, and
it is the
Blockburger test we use in double jeopardy law.
See
Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932); see
also
Missouri v.
Hunter, 459 U. S. 359, 366-367
(1983)
(Block burger is a rule for divining congressional
intent). Under
Block burger, we examine whether "[e]ach of
the offenses created requires proof of a different element." 284 U.
S., at 304. In other words, does "each provision requir[e] proof of
a fact which the other does not"?
Ibid.
The same-elements test turns on the texts of the statutes in
question, the clearest and most certain indicators of the will of
Congress. The test is straightforward, and courts and Congress are
already familiar with its dynamic. Following
Blockburger, a
same-elements approach under the ACA would respect federalism by
allowing a broad scope for assimilation of state law. The majority
rejects this approach, however, because federal and state statutes
may have trivial differences in wording or may differ in
jurisdictional elements.
Ante, at 163, 165.
It would be simpler and more faithful to federalism to use a
same-elements inquiry as the starting point for the ACA analysis.
Courts could use this standard and still accommodate the majority's
concerns. Under this view, we would look beyond slight differences
in wording and jurisdictional elements to discern whether, as a
practical matter, the elements of the two crimes are the same. The
majority frets that a small difference in the definitions of purses
in federal and state purse-snatching laws would by itself permit
assimilation.
Ante, at 163. But a slight difference in
definition need not by itself allow assimilation. See Amar &
Marcus,
183
Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1,
38-44 (1995) (advocating a similar approach for double jeopardy
claims involving combinations of federal and state offenses). The
majority also wonders whether one could assimilate state laws
forbidding robbery of state-chartered banks because a federal
bank-robbery law did not require a state charter.
Ante, at
163. But again, a jurisdictional element need not by itself allow
assimilation, if all substantive elements of the offenses are
identical.
Because the purposes of the ACA and double jeopardy law differ,
some other adjustments to
Blockburger may be necessary. For
instance,
Blockburger treats greater and lesser included
offenses as the same to protect the finality of a single
prosecution, but finality is not the purpose of the ACA. Congress
chooses to allow greater and lesser included offenses to coexist at
the federal level, though a particular offender cannot be convicted
of both. So too the existence of a lesser included federal offense
does not prevent the assimilation of a greater state offense under
the ACA, or vice versa. See
ante, at 171 (citing cases
finding federal assault statute does not prevent assimilation of
state child-abuse laws).
Another way in which the ACA differs from double jeopardy law is
compelled by our own precedent interpreting the ACA. See
Williams v.
United States, 327 U. S. 711 (1946).
Congress sometimes adverts to a specific element of an offense and
sets it at a level different from the level set by state law. When
the federal and state offenses have otherwise identical elements,
assimilation is not proper. In the
Williams case, for
example, a state statutory-rape law set the age of majority at 18.
Id., at 716. Congress had enacted a federal carnal-knowledge
statute, setting the age of majority at 16.
Id., at 714, n.
6. Once Congress had adverted to and set the age of majority, state
law could not be used to rewrite and broaden this particular
element. See id., at 717-718, 724-725. Because Congress had
manifested
184
a clear intent to the contrary, assimilation was improper. The
same would be true if a state grand-larceny law required a theft of
at least $200, while a federal grand-larceny law required a theft
of $250 or more.
Congress could have defined first-degree murder to include the
killing of children younger than 3, even though state law set the
requisite age at 12. Had Congress done so, Wil
liams would
apply and assimilation of state law would be improper if all other
elements were the same. Here, on the other hand, Congress has not
taken a victim's age into account at all in defining first-degree
murder. The state offense includes a substantive age element
missing from the federal statute, so the two do not share the same
elements and assimilation is proper. The majority's analysis is
more obscure and leads it to an incorrect conclusion. For these
reasons, and with all respect, I dissent.
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