OCTOBER TERM, 1995
Syllabus
LANE
v. PENA, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, ETAL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 95-365. Argued April 15, 1996-Decided June 20,1996
Respondents terminated petitioner Lane's enrollment at the
United States Merchant Marine Academy on the ground that his
recently diagnosed diabetes mellitus rendered him ineligible to be
commissioned for service in the Navy/Merchant Marine Reserve
Program or as a Naval Reserve Officer. Alleging that his separation
from the Academy violated § 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973-which prohibits, among other things, discrimination on the
basis of disability "under any program or activity conducted by any
Executive agency"-Lane brought this suit seeking reinstatement to
the Academy, compensatory damages, and other remedies. The District
Court ordered him reinstated, but ultimately ruled that he must be
denied compensatory damages because Congress has not waived the
Federal Government's sovereign immunity against monetary damages
awards for § 504(a) violations. The Court of Appeals summarily
affirmed.
Held: Congress has not waived the Government's sovereign
immunity against monetary damages awards for § 504(a) violations.
Pp. 191-200.
(a) The requisite "unequivocal expression" of congressional
intent to grant such a waiver, see,
e. g., Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95, is
lacking in the text of § 505(a)(2), which decrees that the remedies
available for violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964-including monetary damages awards, see,
e. g., Franklin
v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60, 70-apply
also to § 504(a) violations "by any ... Federal provider of
[financial] assistance." This provision makes no mention whatsoever
of "program[s] or activit[ies] conducted by any Executive agency,"
the plainly more far-reaching language Congress employed in §
504(a) itself. The lack of the necessary clarity of expression in §
505(a)(2) is underscored by the precision with which Congress has
waived the Government's sovereign immunity in §§ 501 and 505(a)(1)
of the Act and in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Lane's contention
that the larger statutory scheme indicates congressional intent to
"level the playing field" by subjecting the Government to the same
remedies as any and all other § 504(a) defendants is rejected.
Franklin, supra, at 69-71, distinguished. Pp. 191-197.
188
Syllabus
(b) The "equalization" provision of § 1003 of the Rehabilitation
Act Amendments of 1986-which, after waiving the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from federal-court suit for violations of § 504
and other civil rights statutes, specifies that legal and equitable
remedies are available in such a suit "to the same extent as ... in
the suit against any public or private entity other than a
State"-does not reveal congressional intent to equalize the
remedies available against all defendants for § 504(a) violations,
such that federal agencies, like private entities, must be subject
to monetary damages. Although Lane's argument to this effect is not
without force, it is ultimately defeated by the existence of at
least two other conceivable, if not entirely satisfactory,
interpretations of the equalization provision: (1) that "public ...
entit[ies]" refers to the nonfederal public entities receiving
federal financial assistance that are covered by each of the
referenced federal statutes; and (2) that "public or private
entit[ies]" is meant only to subject the States to the scope of
remedies available against
either public or private § 504
defendants, whatever the lesser (or perhaps the greater) of those
remedies might be. Pp. 197-200.
Affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and
GINSBURG, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which BREYER, J., joined,
post, p.200.
Walter A. Smith, Jr., argued the cause for
petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Daniel B. Kohrman, Audrey
J.
Anderson, Arthur B. Spitzer, and Steven R. Shapiro.
Beth S.
Brinkmann argued the cause for
respondents.
With her on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant
Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Barbara
C. Biddle, and Christine N. Kohl.
*
*Linda D. Kilb, Arlene B. Mayerson, and
Patricia
Shiu filed a brief for the American Association of Retired
Persons et al. as
amici curiae urging reversal.
Michael A. Greene and
Jerry W Lee filed a brief
for the American Diabetes Association as
amicus curiae.
189
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Section
504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 355, 29 U. S. C.
§ 791
et seq. (Act or Rehabilitation Act), prohibits, among
other things, discrimination on the basis of disability "under any
program or activity conducted by any Executive agency." 29 U. S. C.
§ 794(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The question presented in this case
is whether Congress has waived the Federal Government's sovereign
immunity against awards of monetary damages for violations of this
provision.
I
The United States Merchant Marine Academy is a federal service
academy that trains students to serve as commercial merchant marine
officers and as commissioned officers in the United States Armed
Forces. The Academy is administered by the Maritime Administration,
an organization within the Department of Transportation. Petitioner
James Griffin Lane entered the Academy as a first-year student in
July 1991 after meeting the Academy's requirements for appointment,
including passing a physical examination conducted by the
Department of Defense. During his first year at the Academy,
however, Lane was diagnosed by a private physician as having
diabetes mellitus. Lane reported the diagnosis to the Academy's
Chief Medical Officer. The Academy's Physical Examination Review
Board conducted a hearing in September 1992 to determine Lane's
"medical suitability" to continue at the Academy, following which
the Board reported to the Superintendent of the Academy that Lane
suffered from insulin-dependent diabetes.
In December 1992, Lane was separated from the Academy on the
ground that his diabetes was a "disqualifying condition," rendering
him ineligible to be commissioned for service in the Navy/Merchant
Marine Reserve Program or as a Naval Reserve Officer. After
unsuccessfully challenging his separation before the Maritime
Administrator, Lane brought
190
suit in Federal District Court against the Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and other defendants, alleging that
his separation from the Academy violated § 504(a) of the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. § 794(a). He sought reinstatement
to the Academy, compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and
costs.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Lane,
concluding that his separation from the Academy solely on the basis
of his diabetes violated the Act. The court ordered Lane reinstated
to the Academy, and the Government did not dispute the propriety of
this injunctive relief. The Government did, however, dispute the
propriety of a compensatory damages award, claiming that the United
States was protected against a damages suit by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. The District Court disagreed; it ruled that
Lane was entitled to a compensatory damages award against the
Government for its violation of § 504(a), but deferred resolution
of the specific amount of damages due. 867 F. Supp. 1050 (DC
1994).
Shortly thereafter, however, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled in
Dorsey v.
United
States Dept. of Labor, 41 F.3d
1551 (1994), that the Act did not waive the Federal
Government's sovereign immunity against monetary damages for
violations of § 504(a). The court denied compensatory damages based
on the absence, in any statutory text, of an "unequivocal
expression" of congressional intent to waive the Government's
immunity as to monetary damages, and this Court's instruction that
waivers of sovereign immunity may not be implied, see,
e. g.,
Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95
(1990).
In light of
Dorsey, the District Court vacated its prior
order to the extent that it awarded damages to Lane and held that
Lane was not entitled to a compensatory damages award against the
Federal Government. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a-6a. Lane appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit first
rejected Lane's request for initial en banc review to reconsider
Dorsey, then granted the
191
Government's motion for summary affirmance. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 1a. We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. 1036 (1996), to resolve
the disagreement in the Courts of Appeals on the important question
whether Congress has waived the Federal Government's immunity
against monetary damages awards for violations of § 504(a) of the
Rehabilitation Act. Compare,
e. g., Dorsey, supra, at
1554-1555, with
J. L. v.
Social Security
Admin., 971 F.2d
260 (CA9 1992), and
Doe v.
Attorney General,
941 F.2d
780 (CA9 1991).
II
Section 504(a) of the Act provides that
"[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States
Postal Service." 29 U. S. C. § 794(a).
Section 505(a)(2) of the Act describes the remedies available
for a violation of § 504(a): "The remedies, procedures, and rights
set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be
available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by
any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such
assistance under [§ 504]." § 794a(a)(2). Because Title VI provides
for monetary damages awards, see
Franklin v.
Gwinnett
County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60, 70 (1992)
(noting that "a clear majority" of the Court confirmed in
Guardians Assn. v.
Civil Servo Comm'n of New York
City, 463 U. S.
582 (1983), that damages are available under Title VI for
intentional violations thereof), Lane reads §§ 504(a) and 505(a)(2)
together to establish a waiver of the Federal Government's
sovereign immunity against monetary damages awards for violations
of § 504(a) committed by Executive agencies.
192
While Lane's analysis has superficial appeal, it overlooks one
critical requirement firmly grounded in our precedents:
A waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be
unequivocally expressed in statutory text, see,
e.
g., United States v.
Nordic Village, Inc.,
503 U. S. 30,
33-34, 37 (1992), and will not be implied,
Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, supra, at 95. Moreover, a
waiver of the Government's sovereign immunity will be strictly
construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign. See,
e. g., United States v.
Williams,
514 U. S. 527,
531 (1995) (when confronted with a purported waiver of the Federal
Government's sovereign immunity, the Court will "constru[e]
ambiguities in favor of immunity");
Library of Congress v.
Shaw, 478 U.
S. 310, 318 (1986);
Lehman v.
Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 161 (1981)
("[L]imitations and conditions upon which the Government consents
to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not
to be implied"). To sustain a claim that the Government is liable
for awards of monetary damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity
must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims.
Nordic
Village, 503 U. S., at 34. A statute's legislative history
cannot supply a waiver that does not appear clearly in any
statutory text; "the 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of
sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in
statutory text."
Id., at 37.
The clarity of expression necessary to establish a waiver of the
Government's sovereign immunity against monetary damages for
violations of § 504 is lacking in the text of the relevant
provisions. The language of § 505(a)(2), the remedies provision, is
telling. In that section, Congress decreed that the remedies
available for violations of Title VI would be similarly available
for violations of § 504(a) "by any recipient of Federal assistance
or Federal provider of such assistance." 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(2).
This provision makes no mention whatsoever of "program[s] or
activit[ies] conducted by any Executive agency," the plainly more
far-reaching
193
language Congress employed in § 504(a) itself. Whatever might be
said about the somewhat curious structure of the liability and
remedy provisions, it cannot be disputed that a reference to
"Federal provider[s]" of financial assistance in § 505(a)(2) does
not, without more, establish that Congress has waived the Federal
Government's immunity against monetary damages awards beyond the
narrow category of § 504(a) violations committed by federal funding
agencies acting as such-that is, by "Federal provider[s]."
The lack of clarity in § 505(a)(2)'s "Federal provider"
provision is underscored by the precision with which Congress has
waived the Federal Government's sovereign immunity from
compensatory damages claims for violations of § 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. § 791, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability in employment decisions
by the Federal Government. In § 505(a)(1), Congress expressly
waived the Federal Government's sovereign immunity against certain
remedies for violations of § 501:
"The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 717
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [which allows monetary damages] ...
shall be available, with respect to any complaint under section 501
of this Act, to any employee or applicant for employment aggrieved
by the final disposition of such complaint, or by the failure to
take final action on such complaint." 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(1).
Section 505(a)(1)'s broad language-"any complaint under section
501"-suggests by comparison with § 505(a)(2) that Congress did not
intend to treat all § 504(a) defendants alike with regard to
remedies. Had Congress wished to make Title VI remedies available
broadly for
all § 504(a) violations, it could easily have
used language in § 505(a)(2) that is as sweeping as the "any
complaint" language contained in § 505(a)(1).
194
But our analysis need not end there. In the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Congress made perfectly plain that compensatory damages would
be available for certain violations of § 501 by the Federal
Government (as well as other § 501 defendants), subject to express
limitations:
"In an action brought by a complaining party under the powers,
remedies, and procedures set forth in ... section 794a(a)(1) of
title 29 [which applies to violations of § 501 by the Federal
Government] ... against a respondent who engaged in unlawful
intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is
unlawful because of its disparate impact) under section 791 of
title 29 and the regulations implementing section 791 of title 29,
or who violated the requirements of section 791 of title 29 or the
regulations implementing section 791 of title 29 concerning the
provision of a reasonable accommodation, ... the complaining party
may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in
subsection (b) of this section ... from the respondent." Rev. Stat.
§ 1977A, as added, 105 Stat. 1072, 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a)(2).
The Act's attorney's fee provision makes a similar point.
Section 505(b) provides that, "[i]n any action or proceeding to
enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this title, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs." 29 U. S. C. § 794a(b). This provision likewise illustrates
Congress' ability to craft a clear waiver of the Federal
Government's sovereign immunity against particular remedies for
violations of the Act. The clarity of these provisions is in sharp
contrast to the waiver Lane seeks to tease out of §§ 504 and
505(a)(2) of the Act.
Lane insists nonetheless that § 505(a)(2) compels a result in
his favor, arguing that the Department of Transportation is a
"Federal provider" within the meaning of § 505(a)(2) and thus is
liable for a compensatory damages award regardless
195
of our resolution of the broader sovereign immunity question.
Reply Brief for Petitioner 8-9. We disagree. The Department of
Transportation, whatever its other activities, is not a "Federal
provider" of financial assistance
with respect to the Merchant
Marine Academy, which the Department itself administers through
the Maritime Administration. At oral argument, Lane's counsel
effectively conceded as much. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7 (acknowledging
that the Department of Transportation is not a federal provider
with respect to the Academy "because of this Court's decision in
[Department of Transp. v.
Paralyzed Veterans of
America, 477 U.
S. 597, 612 (1986)], which indicates that funds that are
actually provided to an entity that the Federal Government manages
itself, which is what DOT does here ... for the Merchant Marine
Academy," do not render the agency a "Federal provider"). Lane
argues that § 505(a)(2)'s reference to "Federal provider[s]" is not
limited by the text of the provision itself to the
funding
activities of those providers, but instead reaches "any act" of
an agency that serves as a "Federal provider" in any context. Reply
Brief for Petitioner 9, and n. 11. In light of our established
practice of construing waivers of sovereign immunity narrowly in
favor of the sovereign, however, we decline Lane's invitation to
read the statutory language so broadly.
Lane next encourages us to look not only at the language of the
liability and remedies provisions but at the larger statutory
scheme, from which he would discern congressional intent to "level
the playing field" by subjecting the Federal Government to the same
remedies as any and all other § 504(a) defendants. A statutory
scheme that would subject the Federal Government to awards of
injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and monetary damages when it
acts as a "Federal provider," but would not subject it to monetary
damages awards when, and only when, a federal Executive agency
itself commits a violation of § 504(a), Lane posits, is so
illogi-
196
cal as to foreclose the conclusion that Congress intended to
create such a scheme.
The statutory scheme on which Lane hinges his argument is
admittedly somewhat bewildering. But the lack of perfect
correlation in the various provisions does not indicate, as Lane
suggests, that the reading proposed by the Government is entirely
irrational. It is plain that Congress is free to waive the Federal
Government's sovereign immunity against liability without waiving
its immunity from monetary damages awards. The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) illustrates this nicely. Under the provisions
of the APA, "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute," is expressly authorized to
bring "[a]n action in a court of the United States seeking relief
other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency
or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an
official capacity or under color of legal authority." 5 U. S. C. §
702 (emphasis added).
In any event, Lane's "equal treatment" argument largely misses
the crucial point that, when it comes to an award of money damages,
sovereign immunity places the Federal Government on an entirely
different footing than private parties. Petitioner's reliance on
Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60 (1992), then,
is misplaced. In
Franklin, we held only that the implied
private right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 supports a claim for monetary damages. "[A]bsent clear
direction to the contrary by Congress," we stated, "the federal
courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a
cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute."
Id., at 70-71.
Franklin, however, involved an action
against nonfederal defendants under Title IX. Although the
Government does not contest the propriety of the injunctive relief
Lane obtained, the Federal Government's sovereign immunity
prohibits wholesale application of
Franklin to ac-
197
tions against the Government to enforce § 504(a). As the
Government puts it, "[w]here a cause of action is authorized
against the federal government, the available remedies are not
those that are 'appropriate,' but only those for which sovereign
immunity has been expressly waived." Brief for Respondents 28.
And Lane's "equal treatment" argument falters as well on a point
previously discussed: Section 505(a)(2) itself indicates
congressional intent to treat federal Executive agencies
differently from other § 504(a) defendants for purposes of
remedies. See
supra, at 192-193. The existence of the §
505(a) (2) remedies provision brings this case outside the "general
rule" we discussed in
Franklin: This is not a case in which
"a right of action exists to enforce a federal right and Congress
is silent on the question of remedies." 503 U. S., at 69. Title IX,
the statute at issue in
Franklin, made no mention of
available remedies.
Id., at 71. The Rehabilitation Act, by
sharp contrast, contains a provision labeled "Remedies and attorney
fees," § 505. Congress has thus spoken to the question of remedies
in § 505(a)(2), the only "remedies" provision directly addressed to
§ 504 violations, and has done so in a way that suggests that it
did not in fact intend to waive the Federal Government's sovereign
immunity against monetary damages awards for Executive agencies'
violations of § 504(a). Given the existence of a statutory
provision that is directed precisely to the remedies available for
violations of § 504, it would be a curious application of our
sovereign immunity jurisprudence to conclude, as the dissent
appears to do, see
post, at 209-210, that the lack of clear
reference to Executive agencies in any express remedies provision
indicates congressional intent to subject the Federal Government to
monetary damages.
III
Even if §§ 504(a) and 505(a)(2) together do not establish the
requisite unequivocal waiver of immunity, Lane insists, the
"equalization" provision contained in § 1003 of the Reha-
198
bilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845, 42 U. S. C. §
2000d-7, reveals congressional intent to equalize the remedies
available against all defendants for § 504(a) violations. Section
1003 was enacted in response to our decision in
Atascadero State
Hospital v.
Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234 (1985),
where we held that Congress had not unmistakably expressed its
intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in the
Rehabilitation Act, and that the States accordingly were not
"subject to suit in federal court by litigants seeking retroactive
monetary relief under § 504."
Id., at 235. By enacting §
1003, Congress sought to provide the sort of unequivocal waiver
that our precedents demand. That section provides:
"(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment
... from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the provisions of any other
Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal
financial assistance.
"(2) In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute
referred to in paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies both at
law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same
extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in the
suit against any public or private entity other than a State." 42
U. S. C. § 2000d-7(a).
The "public entities" to which § 1003 refers, Lane concludes,
must include the federal Executive agencies named in § 504(a), and
those agencies must be subject to the same remedies under § 504(a),
including monetary damages, as are private entities.
Although Lane's argument is not without some force, § 1003
ultimately cannot bear the weight Lane would assign
199
it. The equalization provision is susceptible of at least two
interpretations other than the across-the-board leveling of
liability and remedies that Lane proposes. Under the first such
interpretation, as proposed by the Government, the "public ...
entit[ies]" to which the statute refers are "the non-federal public
entities receiving federal financial assistance that are covered
by" each of the statutes to which § 1003(a)(1) refers: The
Rehabilitation Act, Title VI, Title IX, and the Age Discrimination
Act of 1975. Brief for Respondents 22. The Government's suggestion
is a plausible one: that § 1003(a)(2) refers to municipal
hospitals, local school districts, and the like, which are
unquestionably subject to
each of the Acts listed in §
1003(a)(1). Section 504 alone among the listed Acts, however,
extends its coverage to "program[s] or activit[ies] conducted by
any Executive agency."
Section 1003 is also open to a second interpretation, one
similar to the "leveling" interpretation suggested by petitioner:
By reference to "public or private entit[ies]," Congress meant only
to subject the States to the scope of remedies available against
either public or private § 504 defendants, whatever the
lesser (or perhaps the greater) of those remedies might be. Lane's
reading of the statuteone that would suggest that
all §
504(a) defendants, including the States, are subject to precisely
the same remedies for violations of that provision-would
effectively read out of the statute the very language on which he
seeks to rely. That is, if the same remedies are available against
all governmental and nongovernmental defendants under § 504(a), the
"public or private" language is entirely superfluous. Congress
could have achieved the result Lane suggests simply by subjecting
States to the same remedies available against "every other entity,"
without further elaboration. The fact that § 1003(a)(2) itself
separately mentions public and private entities suggests that there
is a distinction to be made in
200
terms of the remedies available against the two classes of
defendants.
Although neither of these conceivable readings of § 1003(a)(2)
is entirely satisfactory, their existence points up a fact fatal to
Lane's argument: Section 1003(a) is not so free from ambiguity that
we can comfortably conclude, based thereon, that Congress intended
to subject the Federal Government to awards of monetary damages for
violations of § 504(a) of the Act. Given the care with which
Congress responded to our decision in
Atascadero by crafting
an unambiguous waiver of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in
§ 1003, it would be ironic indeed to conclude that that same
provision "unequivocally" establishes a waiver of the Federal
Government's sovereign immunity against monetary damages awards by
means of an admittedly ambiguous reference to "public ...
entit[ies]" in the remedies provision attached to the unambiguous
waiver of the States' sovereign immunity.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, dissenting.
The Court relies on an amalgam of judge-made rules to defeat the
clear intent of Congress to authorize an award of damages against a
federal Executive agency that violates § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794. To reach this unfortunate result,
the majority ignores the Act's purpose, text, and legislative
history, relying instead on an interpretation of the structure of
§§ 504 and 505 that the Court admits is "curious,"
ante, at
193, and "somewhat bewildering,"
ante, at 196.
The relevant facts are undisputed. The Department of
Transportation violated § 504 by separating petitioner Lane
201
from the Merchant Marine Academy because he has diabetes. Lane
was injured by that violation, and he is therefore entitled to
maintain an action against the agency under § 504. The parties and
the Court agree that damages are an appropriate form of relief for
most violations of § 504, including wrongful conduct by private
recipients of federal funding, by state actors, and by federal
agencies acting in a funding capacity. The only issue in the case
is whether Congress carved out a special immunity from damages
liability for federal agencies acting in a nonfunding capacity, as
the Department of Transportation was acting in this instance. I
think it plain that Congress did not.
I
Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act to "develop and
implement, through research, training, services, and the guarantee
of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated programs of
vocational rehabilitation and independent living" for the disabled.
29 U. S. C. § 701, as amended by Pub. L. 95-602, Title I, §
122(a)(1), 92 Stat. 2984. As originally enacted in 1973, § 504 of
the Act provided:
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." Pub. L. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394.
Although the Court pays scant attention to the principle, we
have previously held that congressional intent with respect to a
statutory provision must be interpreted in the light of the
contemporary legal context.
Franklin v.
Gwinnett County
Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60, 71 (1992). A
review of the relevant authorities convinces me that § 504 created
a private cause of action with a damages remedy.
The text of § 504 was modeled on the language of § 601 of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
202
discrimination by any recipient of federal funds on the basis of
race, color, or national origin.1 Following passage of Title VI,
federal courts unanimously held that § 601 created a private cause
of action. See
Cannon v.
University of Chicago,
441 U. S. 677,
696 (1979). Although we have never expressly ruled on the question,
our opinion in
Cannon implicitly ratified that judgment.
Id., at 703.
Our explicit holding in
Cannon was that Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, which was also patterned on Title VI,
created a private cause of action.2 This conclusion stemmed, in
part, from our understanding that Congress meant Title IX to be
interpreted and applied in the same manner as Title VI.
Id.,
at 696. We presumed, consistent with well-established principles of
statutory interpretation, that Congress was aware of the relevant
legal context when it passed Title IX.
Id., at 696-697. We
also noted that between the enactment of Title VI in 1964 and the
enactment of Title IX in 1972 we had consistently found implied
remedies in less clear statutory text.
Id., at 698.
Congress passed § 504 in 1973, just one year after enacting
Title IX. Relying on analysis like that set forth in
Cannon,
the Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that Congress intended §
504 to provide a private right of action for victims of prohibited
discrimination.3
IThe precise language of §601 is as follows: "No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U. S. C. §200Od.
2 Section 901 of Title IX provides: "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... " 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §
1681(a).
3 See, e. g., Kampmeier v. Nyquist,
553 F.2d
296, 299 (CA2 1977); NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc.,
599 F.2d
1247, 1258-1259 (CA3 1979); Pandazides v. Virginia Ed. of Ed.,
13 F.3d
823 (CA4 1994); Camenisch v. University of Texas,
616 F.2d
127, 130-131 (CA5 1980), vacated on other
203
In my opinion the Courts of Appeals are undoubtedly
correct.4
Our decision in
Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 503 U. S.
60 (1992), makes it equally clear that all traditional forms of
relief, including damages, are available in a private action to
enforce § 504. In
Franklin we held that a plaintiff could
seek monetary damages against a school system accused of violating
her rights under Title IX. We canvassed the long history of the
principle that "where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done."
Bell v.
Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684
(1946). See
Franklin, 503 U. S., at 65-71. Applying this
rule to the implied cause of action in Title IX, we rejected the
government's contention that "whatever the traditional presumption
may have been when the Court decided
Bell v.
Hood, it
has disappeared in succeeding decades."
Id., at 68. From
Franklin it follows ineluctably that the original version of
§ 504-enacted, it bears repeating, one year after Title
IX-authorized a damages remedy for persons aggrieved by violations
of the provision's discrimination ban.
II
Against this background, Congress passed legislation in 1978 to
extend § 504's prohibition against discrimination on
grounds,
451 U. S.
390 (1981);
Jennings v.
Alexander, 715 F.2d
1036, 1040
1041 (CA6 1983), rev'd on other grounds
sub
nom. Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U. S. 287 (1985);
Lloyd v.
Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d
1277,
1284-1287 (CA7 1977);
Miener v.
Missouri, 673 F.2d
969, 973-974
(CA8), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 909 (1982);
Kling v.
County of Los Angeles, 633 F. 2d 876, 878
(CA9 1980), rev'd on other grounds,
474 U. S. 936 (1985);
Pushkin v.
Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d
1372, 1376-1380 (CAW
1981); Jones v.
Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 681 F.2d
1376, 1377, n. 1 (CAll 1982), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1099
(1984).
4 See Conference Report on the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1974, S. Rep. No. 93-1270, p. 27 (1974) (hereinafter Conference
Report on 1974 Amendments) (noting that § 504 was intended to
"permit a judicial remedy through a private action").
204
the basis of handicap to cover the actions of federal Executive
agencies. The amendment was part of a lengthy piece of legislation
intended to strengthen the protections embodied in the original
Act. See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental
Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955
(statement of purpose). The legislation evidenced Congress'
continued commitment to the broad goals of the earlier Act by, for
example, adding provisions aimed at improving accountability and
enforcement, see,
e. g., Pub. L. 95-602, Title I, §§
122(a)(10), 106, 109(4), 29 U. S. C. §§ 711-715, 751, 761b;
expanding federal support for research programs, see,
e.
g., Pub. L. 95-602, Title I, §§ 109(4), 104(c)(1), 29 U. S.
C. §§ 761a, 762a; augmenting funding for projects such as job
training and the removal of physical barriers in public places,
see,
e. g., Pub. L. 95-602, Title I, §§ 116(2),
120(a), 29 U. S. C. § 777
et seq., § 794b; and creating
local rehabilitation centers across the Nation, see Pub. L. 95-602,
Title I, § 115(a), 29 U. S. C. § 775. Together, the amendments
represented a substantial financial investment in the future of the
disabled in this country.
As part of this general expansion of the original Act, Congress
amended § 504 to forbid discrimination against the handicapped
"under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service." 5 29 U.
S. C. § 794(a). The question we ad-
5 Section 504 was amended: "by striking out the period at the
end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof 'or under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States
Postal Service. The head of each such agency shall promulgate such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the amendments to this
section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and
Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed
regulation shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees
of the Congress, and such regulation may take effect no earlier
than the thirtieth day after the date on which such regulation is
so submitted to such committees.''' 92 Stat. 2982.
205
dress here is whether this unambiguous extension of § 504 to
federal agencies was meant to waive the Government's sovereign
immunity to damages liability. The answer is surely "yes." Section
504 as originally enacted was understood to create a private right
of action for aggrieved individuals and to authorize a damages
remedy. Congress, acting in 1978, had no reason to expect the
courts to require a clearer statement respecting the remedies
available against a federal defendant than those available against
any other § 504 defendant. And the text of the amendment-which
simply inserted the phrase extending coverage to federal agencies
into the existing sentence prohibiting discrimination by federal
grantees-gives no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to
create a different remedial scheme for the agencies.
The Court rejects this conclusion, however, because it reads
another part of the 1978 amendment, § 505(a)(2), as a limitation on
the remedies available against Executive agencies under § 504. In
my judgment, the Court errs by misinterpreting the language and
structure of § 505 and ignoring its legislative history.
Congress' intent to strengthen the Act's protections is clearly
evident in § 505. The inclusion of an attorney's fees provision in
§ 505(b) fortified the Act's enforcement mechanisms. This
assistance to plaintiffs was necessary, according to the Senate
Report accompanying the amendments, because "the rights extended to
handicapped individuals under title V ... are, and will remain, in
need of constant vigilance by handicapped individuals to assure
compliance .... "
The remedies provision, § 505(a), was also meant to ensure
compliance with the 1973 Act, not to restrict remedies that
Congress had made available under § 504, as the majority
6 Section 505 originated in the Senate.
206
would have it. The section's legislative history demonstrates
Congress' intent.
Between the enactment of § 504 in 1973 and the passage of §
505(a)(2) in 1978,7 the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare promulgated model regulations for federal agencies to use
in implementing the antidiscrimination principle announced in §
504. See 43 Fed. Reg. 2132 (1978).8 Because of the common
understanding that § 504 was patterned on § 601 of Title VI, 42 U.
S. C. § 2000d, and intended to be enforced in the same manner,9 the
Department simply directed the agencies to follow the procedures
they used to enforce Title VI. See 43 Fed. Reg. 2137, § 85.5
(1978). This directive resulted in uniform enforcement mechanisms
for allegations of discrimination by federal grantees on the basis
of handicap, race, color, or national origin.10 Moreover, it
avoided needless duplication of effort. Section 601 is accompanied
by additional provisions explaining Congress' in-
7 The full text of § 505(a)(2) reads as follows: "The remedies,
procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act
or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal
provider of such assistance under section 504 of this Act." 29 U.
S. C. § 794a(a)(2).
8 The Department acted pursuant to a directive from President
Ford.
See Exec. Order No. 11914, "Nondiscrimination With Respect to
the Handicapped in Federally Assisted Programs," issued on April
28, 1976; 41 Fed. Reg. 17871. Congress had encouraged the President
to take this step. See Conference Report on 1974 Amendments, at 28
("The Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, because of that Department's experience in dealing with
handicapped persons and with the elimination of discrimination in
other areas, should assume responsibility for coordinating the
section 504 enforcement effort .... The conferees ... urge ...
delegation of responsibility to the Secretary [through an Executive
Order]").
9 See
id., at 27 (the "language of section 504, in
following [Title VI and Title IX], ... envisions the implementation
of a compliance program which is similar to those Acts").
10 Congress plainly intended this result. See
ibid.
("This approach to implementation of section 504 ... would ...
provide for administrative due process").
207
tentions with respect to implementation of the provision's
mandate. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-1
et seq. As originally
enacted, § 504 stood alone. It therefore made sense to allow
federal agencies to take advantage of the details included in Title
VI and the regulations promulgated to enforce § 601.
In enacting § 505(a)(2), Congress explicitly recognized and
approved the application of Title VI's enforcement procedures to §
504. Thus, despite the Court's narrow focus on the incorporation of
the remedies provided by Title VI, § 505(a)(2) provides that the
"remedies,
procedures, and rights" set forth in Title VI are
available to an individual aggrieved by the conduct of a federal
grant recipient. 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(2) (emphasis added). As the
Senate Report explained:
"It is the committee's understanding that the regulations
promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
with respect to procedures, remedies, and rights under section 504
conform with those promulgated under title VI. Thus, this amendment
codifies existing practice as a specific statutory requirement." S.
Rep. No. 95-890, at 19.
Viewed in this context, the reference in § 505(a)(2) to "Federal
provider[s]" that the Court finds so puzzling is easily understood:
The compliance mechanisms defined in Title VI include remedies,
procedures, and rights applicable to the providers of federal
financial assistance as well as to the recipients of such
assistance. See 29 U. S. C. § 2000d-1
et seq.; see,
e. g., 34 CFR §§ 100.6-100.10 (1995) and Part 101
(Department of Education regulations implementing Title VI); 45 CFR
§§ 80.6-80.10 (1995) and Part 81 (same for Department of Health and
Human Services);
id., §§ 611.6-611.10 (same for National
Science Foundation).
Section 505(a)(1), the analogous provision for violations of §
501's prohibition on handicap discrimination in federal
208
employment, has a similar history.ll The provision was intended
to "aid in attaining" the goals of § 501 "by providing for
individuals aggrieved on the basis of their handicap the same
rights, procedures, and remedies provided [to] individuals
aggrieved on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin."
S. Rep. No. 95-890, at 18-19. Like § 504, § 501 is not accompanied
by any provisions concerning implementation. Section 505(a)(1)
directs the executive to look to Title VII for appropriate
"remedies,
procedures, and rights." 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(1)
(emphasis added).
Unlike § 501 and the clause of § 504 relating to recipients of
federal financial assistance, the prohibition on handicap
discrimination in programs or activities conducted by federal
Executive agencies had no simple statutory analogue. The Court
opines that if "Congress [had] wished to make Title VI remedies
available broadly for
all § 504(a) violations, it could
easily have used language in § 505(a)(2) that is as sweeping as the
'any complaint' language contained in § 505(a)(1)."
Ante, at
193. I agree. Congress did not so intend, however, because, in the
words of the United States, "[i]t would have been odd for Congress
to have provided that Title VI remedies applied in Section 504
cases involving discrimination by executive agencies because Title
VI [unlike § 504] does not prohibit discrimination in programs or
activi-
11 Section 505(a)(1) provides: "The remedies, procedures, and
rights set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U. S. C. §2000e-16), including the application of sections 706(f)
through 706(k) (42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f) through (k)), shall be
available, with respect to any complaint under section 501 of this
Act, to any employee or applicant for employment aggrieved by the
final disposition of such complaint, or by the failure to take
final action on such complaint. In fashioning an equitable or
affirmative action remedy under such section, a court may take into
account the reasonableness of the cost of any necessary work place
accommodation, and the availability of alternatives therefor or
other appropriate relief in order to achieve an equitable and
appropriate remedy." 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(1).
209
ties conducted by executive agencies," Brief for Respondents 16,
n. 8.
The oddity extends beyond the nomenclature used to describe §
504 defendants. There are at least two substantive differences
between federal Executive agencies and federal grantees as
defendants under the provision. First, Title VI provides remedies
that are appropriate against recipients of federal financial
assistance, such as the withdrawal of funding for continuing
violations, see 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-1, but that make no sense if
applied against an agency defendant. Second, some violations that
an agency might commit concern discrimination more closely
analogous to statutory provisions outside of Title VI. Thus, the
standard enforcement procedures adopted for alleged violations of §
504 involving
employment discrimination by federal agencies
require the agency to follow §
501 enforcement procedures.
See,
e. g., 7 CFR § 15e.170(b) (1995) (Department of
Agriculture regulations implementing § 504's mandate to federal
agencies); 15 CFR §8c.70 (1995) (same for Department of Commerce);
45 CFR § 85.61 (1995) (same for Department of Health and Human
Services).
Viewed in its historical context, § 505(a)(2) simply has no
application to violations of § 504 committed by federal agencies
acting in a nonfunding capacity. Section 505(a)(2) delineates the
remedies, procedures, and rights available to persons aggrieved by
the conduct of federal grantees and federal funding agencies. It is
silent on the remedies, procedures and rights available for
transgressions of § 504 by federal Executive agencies acting in a
nonfunding capacity. The relief to which petitioner is entitled is
rooted in § 504 itself.
In my opinion, § 504 is amply sufficient to meet petitioner's
needs. By failing to dictate explicitly the remedies available
against federal agencies, Congress left in place the remedies that
accompany § 504's implied cause of action. As Congress understood
in both 1973 and 1978, these remedies
210
include monetary damages.12 Thus, as of 1978, the Rehabilitation
Act provided the relief sought by petitioner in this case.
Under the Court's current jurisprudence, however, § 504
apparently must be read in a vacuum. Since the advent of
United
States v.
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30 (1992), the
Court not only requires the traditional clear statement of a waiver
of sovereign immunity but steadfastly refuses to consider the
legislative history of a statute, no matter how opaque the
statutory language or crystalline the history. 13 I shall not
review my objections to that holding here. See
id., at 39-46
(dissenting opinion). Suffice it to say that Congress had no reason
to suspect in 1978 that 14 years later this Court would adopt (and
apply retroactively) a radically new and unforgiving approach to
waivers of sovereign immunity.
III
Not surprisingly, given its lack of fidelity to the statutory
text and history, the Court's reasoning leads to two implausible
conclusions. To credit the Court's analysis, one must believe that
Congress intended a damages remedy against a federal Executive
agency acting indirectly in the provision
12 Aware that procedures were also needed, Congress added
language in § 504 directing federal agencies to promulgate
appropriate procedures. 29 U. S. C. § 794(a) ("The head of each
such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the amendments to this section made by the
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental
Disabilities Act of 1978").
13 The Court distinguishes
Franklin v.
Gwinnett County
Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60 (1992), on
the ground that
Franklin involved a nonfederal defendant
whereas this case concerns a federal defendant.
Ante, at
196197. This argument cannot be reconciled with the reasoning of
our opinion.
Franklin relied on cases in which pecuniary
awards against the United States had been upheld. See 503 U. S., at
67 (citing
Kendall v.
United States ex rel. Stokes,
12 Pet. 524 (1838), and
Dooley v.
United States,
182 U. S. 222
(1901)). That being so, there is no basis for restricting
application of the rule to the facts of that case.
211
of funding to nonfederal entities, but not against an agency
acting directly in the conduct of its own programs and
activities.14 Surely such an unexpected result would have merited
comment in a committee report or on the floor of the House or
Senate. Yet there is not a scintilla of evidence in the purpose or
legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act or its amendments
supporting this interpretation of the statute.
In addition, the majority's holding necessarily presumes that
Congress intended to impose harsher remedies on the States (which
come under the § 504 provision prohibiting handicap discrimination
by federal grantees) than on federal agencies for comparable
misconduct. Given the special respect owed to the States-a respect
that provided the
ratio decidendi for our decision in
Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242
(1985)-this suggestion is wholly unconvincing. And once again, the
legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act contains no mention
of such an intent and no hint of a policy justification for this
distinction.
The Court's strict approach to statutory waivers of sovereign
immunity leads it to concentrate so carefully on textual details
that it has lost sight of the primary purpose of judicial
construction of Acts of Congress. We appropriately rely on canons
of construction as tie breakers to help us discern Congress' intent
when its message is not entirely clear. The presumption against
waivers of sovereign immunity serves that neutral purpose in
doubtful cases. A rule that refuses to honor such a waiver because
it could have been expressed with even greater clarity, or a rule
that refuses to accept guidance from relevant and reliable
legislative history, does not facilitate-indeed, actually
obstructs-the neutral performance of the Court's task of carrying
out the will of Congress.
14 Even under the majority's interpretation, "Federal provider"
must refer exclusively to Executive agencies. Otherwise § 505(a)(2)
would create remedies against entities that may not be held liable
under § 504.
212
The prompt congressional reaction to our decision in
Atascadero illustrates the lack of wisdom of the Court's
rigid approach to waivers of sovereign immunity.15 It was true in
that case, as it is in this, that Congress could have drafted a
clearer statement of its intent. Our task, however, is not to
educate busy legislators in the niceties and details of scholarly
draftsmanship, but rather to do our best to determine what message
they intended to convey. When judge-made rules require Congress to
use its valuable time enacting and reenacting provisions whose
original intent was clear to all but the most skeptical and hostile
reader, those rules should be discarded.
I respectfully dissent.
15 The Court decided
Atascadero in 1985. Congress passed
legislation to override the decision in 1986. See Rehabilitation
Act Amendments of 1986,100 Stat. 1845,42 U. S. C. §2000d-7; see
also
ante, at 198. In recent years Congress has enacted
numerous pieces of legislation designed to override statutory
opinions of this Court. See
Landgraf v.
USI Film
Products, 511 U.
S. 244,250-251 (1994) (listing eight decisions legislatively
overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991). Additional examples are
cited in Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L. J. 331, App. I (1991).
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