OPINION OF THE COURT
KRUPSKI V. COSTA CROCIERE S. P. A.
560 U. S. ____ (2010)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 09-337
WANDA KRUPSKI, PETITIONER
v. COSTA
CROCIERE S. p. A.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eleventh circuit
[June 7, 2010]
Justice Sotomayor delivered the
opinion of the Court.
Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure governs when an amended pleading “relates back”
to the date of a timely filed original pleading and is thus itself
timely even though it was filed outside an applicable statute of
limitations. Where an amended pleading changes a party or a party’s
name, the Rule requires, among other things, that “the party to be
brought in by amendment … knew or should have known that the action
would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning
the proper party’s identity.” Rule 15(c)(1)(C). In this case, the
Court of Appeals held that Rule 15(c) was not satisfied because the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the proper defendant before
filing her original complaint. The court also held that relation
back was not appropriate because the plaintiff had unduly delayed
in seeking to amend. We hold that relation back under Rule
15(c)(1)(C) depends on what the party to be added knew or should
have known, not on the amending party’s knowledge or its timeliness
in seeking to amend the pleading. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
On February 21, 2007, petitioner,
Wanda Krupski, tripped over a cable and fractured her femur while
she was on board the cruise ship Costa Magica. Upon her return
home, she acquired counsel and began the process of seeking
compensation for her injuries. Krupski’s passenger ticket—which
explained that it was the sole contract between each passenger and
the carrier, App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a—included a variety of
requirements for obtaining damages for an injury suffered on board
one of the carrier’s ships. The ticket identified the carrier
as
“Costa Crociere S. p. A., an Italian corporation,
and all Vessels and other ships owned, chartered, operated,
marketed or provided by Costa Crociere, S. p. A., and all officers,
staff members, crew members, independent contractors, medical
providers, concessionaires, pilots, suppliers, agents and assigns
onboard said Vessels, and the manufacturers of said Vessels and all
their component parts.”
Id., at 27a.
The ticket required an injured party to submit
“written notice of the claim with full particulars … to the carrier
or its duly authorized agent within 185 days after the date of
injury.”
Id., at 28a. The ticket further required any
lawsuit to be “filed within one year after the date of injury” and
to be “served upon the carrier within 120 days after filing.”
Ibid. For cases arising from voyages departing from or
returning to a United States port in which the amount in
controversy exceeded $75,000, the ticket designated the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in
Broward County, Florida, as the exclusive forum for a lawsuit.
Id., at 36a. The ticket extended the “defenses,
limitations and exceptions … that may be invoked by the CARRIER” to
“all persons who may act on behalf of the CARRIER or on whose
behalf the CARRIER may act,” including “the CARRIER’s parents,
subsidiaries, affiliates, successors, assigns, representatives,
agents, employees, servants, concessionaires and contractors” as
well as “Costa Cruise Lines N. V.,” identified as the “sales and
marketing agent for the CARRIER and the issuer of this Passage
Ticket Contract.”
Id., at 29a. The front of the ticket
listed Costa Cruise Lines’ address in Florida and stated that an
entity called “Costa Cruises” was “the first cruise company in the
world” to obtain a certain certification of quality.
Id.,
at 25a.
On July 2, 2007, Krupski’s counsel notified
Costa Cruise Lines of Krupski’s claims. App. 69–70. On July 9,
2007, the claims administrator for Costa Cruise requested
additional information from Krupski “[i]n order to facilitate our
future attempts to achieve a pre-litigation settlement.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 23a–24a. The parties were unable to reach a
settlement, however, and on February 1, 2008—three weeks before the
1-year limitations period expired—Krupski filed a negligence action
against Costa Cruise, invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The
complaint alleged that Costa Cruise “owned, operated, managed,
supervised and controlled” the ship on which Krupski had injured
herself; that Costa Cruise had extended to its passengers an
invitation to enter onto the ship; and that Costa Cruise owed
Krupski a duty of care, which it breached by failing to take steps
that would have prevented her accident. App. 23–26. The complaint
further stated that venue was proper under the passenger ticket’s
forum selection clause and averred that, by the July 2007 notice of
her claims, Krupski had complied with the ticket’s presuit
requirements.
Id., at 23. Krupski served Costa Cruise on
February 4, 2008.
Over the next several months—after the
limitations period had expired—Costa Cruise brought Costa
Crociere’s existence to Krupski’s attention three times. First, on
February 25, 2008, Costa Cruise filed its answer, asserting that it
was not the proper defendant, as it was merely the North American
sales and marketing agent for Costa Crociere, which was the actual
carrier and vessel operator.
Id., at 31. Second, on March
20, 2008, Costa Cruise listed Costa Crociere as an interested party
in its corporate disclosure statement. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a.
Finally, on May 6, 2008, Costa Cruise moved for summary judgment,
again stating that Costa Crociere was the proper defendant. App. 5,
33–38.
On June 13, 2008, Krupski responded to Costa
Cruise’s motion for summary judgment, arguing for limited discovery
to determine whether Costa Cruise should be dismissed. According to
Krupski, the following sources of information led her to believe
Costa Cruise was the responsible party: The travel documents
prominently identified Costa Cruise and gave its Florida address;
Costa Cruise’s Web site listed Costa Cruise in Florida as the
United States office for the Italian company Costa Crociere; and
the Web site of the Florida Department of State listed Costa Cruise
as the only “Costa” company registered to do business in that
State.
Id., at 43–45, 56–59. Krupski also observed that
Costa Cruise’s claims administrator had responded to her claims
notification without indicating that Costa Cruise was not a
responsible party.
Id., at 45. With her response, Krupski
simultaneously moved to amend her complaint to add Costa Crociere
as a defendant.
Id., at 41–42, 52–54.
On July 2, 2008, after oral argument, the
District Court denied Costa Cruise’s motion for summary judgment
without prejudice and granted Krupski leave to amend, ordering that
Krupski effect proper service on Costa Crociere by September 16,
2008.
Id., at 71–72. Complying with the court’s deadline,
Krupski filed an amended complaint on July 11, 2008, and served
Costa Crociere on August 21, 2008.
Id., at 73, 88–89. On
that same date, the District Court issued an order dismissing Costa
Cruise from the case pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation,
Krupski apparently having concluded that Costa Cruise was correct
that it bore no responsibility for her injuries.
Id., at
85–86.
Shortly thereafter, Costa Crociere—represented
by the same counsel who had represented Costa Cruise, compare
id., at 31, with
id., at 100—moved to dismiss,
contending that the amended complaint did not relate back under
Rule 15(c) and was therefore untimely. The District Court agreed.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a–22a. Rule 15(c), the court explained,
imposes three requirements before an amended complaint against a
newly named defendant can relate back to the original complaint.
First, the claim against the newly named defendant must have arisen
“out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or
attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” Fed. Rules Civ.
Proc. 15(c)(1)(B), (C). Second, “within the period provided by
Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint” (which is
ordinarily 120 days from when the complaint is filed, see Rule
4(m)), the newly named defendant must have “received such notice of
the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the
merits.” Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i). Finally, the plaintiff must show
that, within the Rule 4(m) period, the newly named defendant “knew
or should have known that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s
identity.” Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
The first two conditions posed no problem, the
court explained: The claim against Costa Crociere clearly involved
the same occurrence as the original claim against Costa Cruise, and
Costa Crociere had constructive notice of the action and had not
shown that any unfair prejudice would result from relation back.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a–18a. But the court found the third
condition fatal to Krupski’s attempt to relate back, concluding
that Krupski had not made a mistake concerning the identity of the
proper party.
Id., at 18a–21a. Relying on Eleventh Circuit
precedent, the court explained that the word “mistake” should not
be construed to encompass a deliberate decision not to sue a party
whose identity the plaintiff knew before the statute of limitations
had run. Because Costa Cruise informed Krupski that Costa Crociere
was the proper defendant in its answer, corporate disclosure
statement, and motion for summary judgment, and yet Krupski delayed
for months in moving to amend and then in filing an amended
complaint, the court concluded that Krupski knew of the proper
defendant and made no mistake.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in an
unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Krupski v.
Costa Cruise Lines, N. V., LLC, 330 Fed. Appx. 892 (2009).
Rather than relying on the information contained in Costa Cruise’s
filings, all of which were made after the statute of limitations
had expired, as evidence that Krupski did not make a mistake, the
Court of Appeals noted that the relevant information was located
within Krupski’s passenger ticket, which she had furnished to her
counsel well before the end of the limitations period. Because the
ticket clearly identified Costa Crociere as the carrier, the court
stated, Krupski either knew or should have known of Costa
Crociere’s identity as a potential party.[
Footnote 1] It was therefore appropriate to treat
Krupski as having chosen to sue one potential party over another.
Alternatively, even assuming that she first learned of Costa
Crociere’s identity as the correct party from Costa Cruise’s
answer, the Court of Appeals observed that Krupski waited 133 days
from the time she filed her original complaint to seek leave to
amend and did not file an amended complaint for another month after
that. In light of this delay, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying relation
back.
We granted certiorari to resolve tension among
the Circuits over the breadth of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii),[
Footnote 2] 558 U. S. ___ (2010), and we now
reverse.
II
Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, an amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of
the original pleading when:
“(A) the law that provides the
applicable statute of limitations allows relation back;
“(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense
that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading; or
“(C) the amendment changes the party or the
naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule
15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule
4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought
in by amendment:
“(i) received such notice of the action that
it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and
“(ii) knew or should have known that the
action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake
concerning the proper party’s identity.” Rule 15(c)(1).
In our view, neither of the Court of Appeals’
reasons for denying relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) finds
support in the text of the Rule. We consider each reason in
turn.
A
The Court of Appeals first
decided that Krupski either knew or should have known of the proper
party’s identity and thus determined that she had made a deliberate
choice instead of a mistake in not naming Costa Crociere as a party
in her original pleading. 330 Fed. Appx., at 895. By focusing on
Krupski’s knowledge, the Court of Appeals chose the wrong starting
point. The question under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is not whether
Krupski knew or should have known the identity of Costa Crociere as
the proper defendant, but whether Costa Crociere knew or should
have known that it would have been named as a defendant but for an
error. Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) asks what the prospective
defendant knew or should have known during the Rule 4(m)
period, not what the
plaintiff knew or should have known
at the time of filing her original complaint.[
Footnote 3]
Information in the plaintiff’s
possession is relevant only if it bears on the defendant’s
understanding of whether the plaintiff made a mistake regarding the
proper party’s identity. For purposes of that inquiry, it would be
error to conflate knowledge of a party’s existence with the absence
of mistake. A mistake is “[a]n error, misconception, or
misunderstanding; an erroneous belief.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1092
(9th ed. 2009); see also Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 1446 (2002) (defining “mistake” as “a misunderstanding
of the meaning or implication of something”; “a wrong action or
statement proceeding from faulty judgment, inadequate knowledge, or
inattention”; “an erroneous belief”; or “a state of mind not in
accordance with the facts”). That a plaintiff knows of a party’s
existence does not preclude her from making a mistake with respect
to that party’s identity. A plaintiff may know that a prospective
defendant—call him party A—exists, while erroneously believing him
to have the status of party B. Similarly, a plaintiff may know
generally what party A does while misunderstanding the roles that
party A and party B played in the “conduct, transaction, or
occurrence” giving rise to her claim. If the plaintiff sues party B
instead of party A under these circumstances, she has made a
“mistake concerning the proper party’s identity” notwithstanding
her knowledge of the existence of both parties. The only question
under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), then, is whether party A knew or should
have known that, absent some mistake, the action would have been
brought against him.
Respondent urges that the key issue under Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is whether the plaintiff made a deliberate choice
to sue one party over another. Brief for Respondent 11–16. We agree
that making a deliberate choice to sue one party instead of another
while fully understanding the factual and legal differences between
the two parties is the antithesis of making a mistake concerning
the proper party’s identity. We disagree, however, with
respondent’s position that any time a plaintiff is aware of the
existence of two parties and chooses to sue the wrong one, the
proper defendant could reasonably believe that the plaintiff made
no mistake. The reasonableness of the mistake is not itself at
issue. As noted, a plaintiff might know that the prospective
defendant exists but nonetheless harbor a misunderstanding about
his status or role in the events giving rise to the claim at issue,
and she may mistakenly choose to sue a different defendant based on
that misimpression. That kind of deliberate but mistaken choice
does not foreclose a finding that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) has been
satisfied.
This reading is consistent with the purpose of
relation back: to balance the interests of the defendant protected
by the statute of limitations with the preference expressed in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in
particular, for resolving disputes on their merits. See,
e.g., Advisory Committee’s 1966 Notes 122; 3 Moore’s
Federal Practice §§15.02[1], 15.19[3][a] (3d ed. 2009). A
prospective defendant who legitimately believed that the
limitations period had passed without any attempt to sue him has a
strong interest in repose. But repose would be a windfall for a
prospective defendant who understood, or who should have
understood, that he escaped suit during the limitations period only
because the plaintiff misunderstood a crucial fact about his
identity. Because a plaintiff’s knowledge of the existence of a
party does not foreclose the possibility that she has made a
mistake of identity about which that party should have been aware,
such knowledge does not support that party’s interest in
repose.
Our reading is also consistent with the
history of Rule 15(c)(1)(C). That provision was added in 1966 to
respond to a recurring problem in suits against the Federal
Government, particularly in the Social Security context. Advisory
Committee’s 1966 Notes 122. Individuals who had filed timely
lawsuits challenging the administrative denial of benefits often
failed to name the party identified in the statute as the proper
defendant—the current Secretary of what was then the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare—and named instead the United States;
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare itself; the
nonexistent “Federal Security Administration”; or a Secretary who
had recently retired from office.
Ibid. By the time the
plaintiffs discovered their mistakes, the statute of limitations in
many cases had expired, and the district courts denied the
plaintiffs leave to amend on the ground that the amended complaints
would not relate back. Rule 15(c) was therefore “amplified to
provide a general solution” to this problem.
Ibid. It is
conceivable that the Social Security litigants knew or reasonably
should have known the identity of the proper defendant either
because of documents in their administrative cases or by dint of
the statute setting forth the filing requirements. See 42 U.
S. C. §405(g) (1958 ed., Supp. III). Nonetheless, the Advisory
Committee clearly meant their filings to qualify as mistakes under
the Rule.
Respondent suggests that our decision in
Nelson v.
Adams USA, Inc.,
529 U. S. 460 (2000),
forecloses the reading of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) we adopt today. We
disagree. In that case, Adams USA, Inc. (Adams), had obtained an
award of attorney’s fees against the corporation of which Donald
Nelson was the president and sole shareholder. After Adams became
concerned that the corporation did not have sufficient funds to pay
the award, Adams sought to amend its pleading to add Nelson as a
party and simultaneously moved to amend the judgment to hold Nelson
responsible. The District Court granted both motions, and the Court
of Appeals affirmed. We reversed, holding that the requirements of
due process, as codified in Rules 12 and 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, demand that an added party have the opportunity to
respond before judgment is entered against him.
Id., at
465–467. In a footnote explaining that relation back does not deny
the added party an opportunity to respond to the amended pleading,
we noted that the case did not arise under the “mistake clause” of
Rule 15(c):[
Footnote 4]
“Respondent Adams made no such mistake. It knew of Nelson’s role
and existence and, until it moved to amend its pleading, chose to
assert its claim for costs and fees only against [Nelson’s
company].”
Id., at 467, n. 1.
Contrary to respondent’s claim,
Nelson does not suggest that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) cannot
be satisfied if a plaintiff knew of the prospective defendant’s
existence at the time she filed her original complaint. In that
case, there was nothing in the initial pleading suggesting that
Nelson was an intended party, while there was evidence in the
record (of which Nelson was aware) that Adams sought to add him
only after learning that the company would not be able to satisfy
the judgment.
Id., at 463–464. This evidence countered any
implication that Adams had originally failed to name Nelson because
of any “mistake concerning the proper party’s identity,” and
instead suggested that Adams decided to name Nelson only after the
fact in an attempt to ensure that the fee award would be paid. The
footnote merely observes that Adams had originally been under no
misimpression about the function Nelson played in the underlying
dispute. We said, after all, that Adams knew of Nelson’s “role” as
well as his existence.
Id., at 467, n. 1. Read in
context, the footnote in
Nelson is entirely consistent
with our understanding of the Rule: When the original complaint and
the plaintiff’s conduct compel the conclusion that the failure to
name the prospective defendant in the original complaint was the
result of a fully informed decision as opposed to a mistake
concerning the proper defendant’s identity, the requirements of
Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) are not met. This conclusion is in keeping
with our rejection today of the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the
plaintiff’s knowledge to deny relation back.
B
The Court of Appeals offered a
second reason why Krupski’s amended complaint did not relate back:
Krupski had unduly delayed in seeking to file, and in eventually
filing, an amended complaint. 330 Fed. Appx., at 895. The Court of
Appeals offered no support for its view that a plaintiff’s dilatory
conduct can justify the denial of relation back under Rule
15(c)(1)(C), and we find none. The Rule plainly sets forth an
exclusive list of requirements for relation back, and the amending
party’s diligence is not among them. Moreover, the Rule mandates
relation back once the Rule’s requirements are satisfied; it does
not leave the decision whether to grant relation back to the
district court’s equitable discretion. See Rule 15(c)(1) (“An
amendment …
relates back … when” the three listed
requirements are met (emphasis added)).
The mandatory nature of the
inquiry for relation back under Rule 15(c) is particularly striking
in contrast to the inquiry under Rule 15(a), which sets forth the
circumstances in which a party may amend its pleading before trial.
By its terms, Rule 15(a) gives discretion to the district court in
deciding whether to grant a motion to amend a pleading to add a
party or a claim. Following an initial period after filing a
pleading during which a party may amend once “as a matter of
course,” “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court’s leave,” which the court
“should freely give … when justice so requires.” Rules
15(a)(1)–(2). We have previously explained that a court may
consider a movant’s “undue delay” or “dilatory motive” in deciding
whether to grant leave to amend under Rule 15(a).
Foman v.
Davis,
371
U. S. 178, 182 (1962). As the contrast between Rule 15(a) and
Rule 15(c) makes clear, however, the speed with which a plaintiff
moves to amend her complaint or files an amended complaint after
obtaining leave to do so has no bearing on whether the amended
complaint relates back. Cf. 6A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure §1498, pp. 142–143, and nn. 49–50
(2d ed. 1990 and Supp. 2010).
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) does permit a court to
examine a plaintiff’s conduct during the Rule 4(m) period, but not
in the way or for the purpose respondent or the Court of Appeals
suggests. As we have explained, the question under Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is what the prospective defendant reasonably should
have understood about the plaintiff’s intent in filing the original
complaint against the first defendant. To the extent the
plaintiff’s postfiling conduct informs the prospective defendant’s
understanding of whether the plaintiff initially made a “mistake
concerning the proper party’s identity,” a court may consider the
conduct. Cf.
Leonard v.
Parry, 219 F. 3d 25,
29 (CA1 2000) (“[P]ost-filing events occasionally can shed light on
the plaintiff’s state of mind at an earlier time” and “can inform
a defendant’s reasonable beliefs concerning whether her
omission from the original complaint represented a mistake (as
opposed to a conscious choice)”). The plaintiff’s postfiling
conduct is otherwise immaterial to the question whether an amended
complaint relates back.[
Footnote
5]
C
Applying these principles to the
facts of this case, we think it clear that the courts below erred
in denying relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). The District
Court held that Costa Crociere had “constructive notice” of
Krupski’s complaint within the Rule 4(m) period. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 15a–17a. Costa Crociere has not challenged this finding.
Because the complaint made clear that Krupski meant to sue the
company that “owned, operated, managed, supervised and controlled”
the ship on which she was injured, App. 23, and also indicated
(mistakenly) that Costa Cruise performed those roles,
id.,
at 23–27, Costa Crociere should have known, within the Rule 4(m)
period, that it was not named as a defendant in that complaint only
because of Krupski’s misunderstanding about which “Costa” entity
was in charge of the ship—clearly a “mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity.”
Respondent contends that because
the original complaint referred to the ticket’s forum requirement
and presuit claims notification procedure, Krupski was clearly
aware of the contents of the ticket, and because the ticket
identified Costa Crociere as the carrier and proper party for a
lawsuit, respondent was entitled to think that she made a
deliberate choice to sue Costa Cruise instead of Costa Crociere.
Brief for Respondent 13. As we have explained, however, that
Krupski may have known the contents of the ticket does not
foreclose the possibility that she nonetheless misunderstood
crucial facts regarding the two companies’ identities. Especially
because the face of the complaint plainly indicated such a
misunderstanding, respondent’s contention is not persuasive.
Moreover, respondent has articulated no strategy that it could
reasonably have thought Krupski was pursuing in suing a defendant
that was legally unable to provide relief.
Respondent also argues that Krupski’s failure
to move to amend her complaint during the Rule 4(m) period shows
that she made no mistake in that period.
Id., at 13–14.
But as discussed, any delay on Krupski’s part is relevant only to
the extent it may have informed Costa Crociere’s understanding
during the Rule 4(m) period of whether she made a mistake
originally. Krupski’s failure to add Costa Crociere during the Rule
4(m) period is not sufficient to make reasonable any belief that
she had made a deliberate and informed decision not to sue Costa
Crociere in the first instance.[
Footnote 6] Nothing in Krupski’s conduct during the Rule
4(m) period suggests that she failed to name Costa Crociere because
of anything other than a mistake.
It is also worth noting that Costa Cruise and
Costa Crociere are related corporate entities with very similar
names; “crociera” even means “cruise” in Italian. Cassell’s Italian
Dictionary 137, 670 (1967). This interrelationship and similarity
heighten the expectation that Costa Crociere should suspect a
mistake has been made when Costa Cruise is named in a complaint
that actually describes Costa Crociere’s activities. Cf.
Morel v.
DaimlerChrysler AG, 565 F. 3d 20,
27 (CA1 2009) (where complaint conveyed plaintiffs’ attempt to sue
automobile manufacturer and erroneously named the manufacturer as
Daimler-Chrysler Corporation instead of the actual manufacturer, a
legally distinct but related entity named DaimlerChrysler AG, the
latter should have realized it had not been named because of
plaintiffs’ mistake);
Goodman v.
Praxair, Inc.,
494 F. 3d 458, 473–475 (CA4 2007) (en banc) (where complaint
named parent company Praxair, Inc., but described status of
subsidiary company Praxair Services, Inc., subsidiary company knew
or should have known it had not been named because of plaintiff’s
mistake). In addition, Costa Crociere’s own actions contributed to
passenger confusion over “the proper party” for a lawsuit. The
front of the ticket advertises that “Costa Cruises” has achieved a
certification of quality, App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a, without
clarifying whether “Costa Cruises” is Costa Cruise Lines, Costa
Crociere, or some other related “Costa” company. Indeed, Costa
Crociere is evidently aware that the difference between Costa
Cruise and Costa Crociere can be confusing for cruise ship
passengers. See,
e.g., Suppa v.
Costa
Crociere, S. p. A., No. 07–60526–CIV, 2007 WL 4287508, *1, (SD
Fla., Dec. 4, 2007) (denying Costa Crociere’s motion to dismiss the
amended complaint where the original complaint had named Costa
Cruise as a defendant after “find[ing] it simply inconceivable that
Defendant Costa Crociere was not on notice … that … but for the
mistake in the original Complaint, Costa Crociere was the
appropriate party to be named in the action”).
In light of these facts, Costa Crociere should
have known that Krupski’s failure to name it as a defendant in her
original complaint was due to a mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Footnote 1
The Court of Appeals stated that it was
“imput[ing]” knowledge to Krupski. 330 Fed. Appx., at 895.
Petitioner uses the terms “imputed knowledge” and “constructive
knowledge” interchangeably in her brief, while respondent addresses
only actual knowledge. Because we reject the Court of Appeals’
focus on the plaintiff’s knowledge in the first instance, see
infra, at 8–13, the distinction among these types of
knowledge is not relevant to our resolution of this case.
Footnote 2
See,
e.g., Krupski v.
Costa Cruise Lines, N. V., LLC, 330 Fed. Appx. 892,
895 (CA11 2009)
(per curiam) (case below);
Rendall-Speranza v.
Nassim, 107 F. 3d 913,
918 (CADC 1997) (provision does not authorize relation back where
plaintiff “was fully aware of the potential defendant’s identity
but not of its responsibility for the harm alleged”);
Cornwell v.
Robinson, 23 F. 3d 694, 705 (CA2
1994) (no relation back where plaintiff knew the identities of the
responsible defendants and failed to name them);
Goodman
v.
Praxair, Inc., 494 F. 3d 458, 469–470 (CA4 2007)
(en banc) (rejecting argument that plaintiff’s knowledge of proper
corporate defendant’s existence and name meant that no mistake had
been made);
Arthur v.
Maersk, Inc., 434
F. 3d 196, 208 (CA3 2006) (“A ‘mistake’ is no less a ‘mistake’
when it flows from lack of knowledge as opposed to inaccurate
description”);
Leonard v.
Parry, 219 F. 3d
25, 28–29 (CA1 2000) (plaintiff’s knowledge of proper defendant’s
identity was not relevant to whether she made a “ ‘mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party’ ”). We express no
view on whether these decisions may be reconciled with each other
in light of their specific facts and the interpretation of Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) we adopt today.
Footnote 3
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) speaks generally of an
amendment to a “pleading” that changes “the party against whom a
claim is asserted,” and it therefore is not limited to the
circumstance of a plaintiff filing an amended complaint seeking to
bring in a new defendant. Nevertheless, because the latter is the
“typical case” of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s applicability, see 3 Moore’s
Federal Practice §15.19[2] (3d ed. 2009), we use this circumstance
as a shorthand throughout this opinion. See also
id.,
§15.19[3][a]; Advisory Committee’s 1966 Notes on Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 15, 28 U. S. C. App., pp. 122–123 (hereinafter
Advisory Committee’s 1966 Notes).
Footnote 4
The “mistake clause” at the time we decided
Nelson was set forth in Rule 15(c)(3). 529 U. S., at 467,
n. 1; 528 F. R. D. 525, 529 (1991). Rule 15(c) was
renumbered in 2007 without substantive change “as part of the
general restyling of the Civil Rules,” at which time it received
its current placement in Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). Advisory Committee’s
2007 Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15, 28 U. S. C. App.,
p. 37 (2006 ed., Supp. II).
Footnote 5
Similarly, we reject respondent’s suggestion
that Rule 15(c) requires a plaintiff to move to amend her complaint
or to file and serve an amended complaint within the Rule 4(m)
period. Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i) simply requires that the prospective
defendant has received sufficient “notice of the action” within the
Rule 4(m) period that he will not be prejudiced in defending the
case on the merits. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966
Amendment clarify that “the notice need not be formal.” Advisory
Committee’s 1966 Notes 122.
Footnote 6
The Court of Appeals concluded that Krupski
was not diligent merely because she did not seek leave to add Costa
Crociere until 133 days after she filed her original complaint and
did not actually file an amended complaint for another a month
after that. 330 Fed. Appx., at 895. It is not clear why Krupski
should have been found dilatory for not accepting at face value the
unproven allegations in Costa Cruise’s answer and corporate
disclosure form. In fact, Krupski moved to amend her complaint to
add Costa Crociere within the time period prescribed by the
District Court’s scheduling order. See App. 3, 6–7; Record, Doc.
23, p. 1.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment