OCTOBER TERM, 1994
Syllabus
KANSASv. COLORADO
ON EXCEPTIONS TO REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER No. 105, Orig. Argued
March 21, 1995-Decided May 15, 1995
Kansas and Colorado negotiated the Arkansas River Compact to
settle disputes and remove causes of future controversies over the
river's waters and to equitably divide and apportion those waters
and the benefits arising from the United States' construction,
operation, and maintenance of John Martin Reservoir. Under Article
IV-D, the Compact is not intended to impede or prevent future
beneficial developmentincluding construction of dams and reservoirs
and the prolonged or improved functioning of existing
works-provided that such development does not "materially
deplet[e]" stateline flows "in usable quantity or availability for
use." In this action, the Special Master recommended that the
Court, among other things, find that post-Compact well pumping in
Colorado has resulted in a violation of Article IV-D of the
Compact; find that Kansas has failed to prove that the operation of
Colorado's Winter Water Storage Program (WWSP) violates the
Compact; and dismiss Kansas' claim that Colorado's failure to abide
by the Trinidad Reservoir Operating Principles (Operating
Principles) violates the Compact. Both Kansas and Colorado have
filed exceptions.
Held: The exceptions are overruled. Pp. 681-694.
(a) Article IV-D permits development of projects so long as
their operation does not result in a material depletion of usable
flow to Kansas users. Kansas' exception to the dismissal of its
Trinidad Reservoir claim fails because Kansas has not established
that Colorado's failure to obey the Operating Principles resulted
in such a violation. Pp.681-683.
(b) Because Kansas failed to meet its burden of proving its WWSP
claim despite being given every reasonable opportunity to do so by
the Special Master, there is no support for its exception to the
Special Master's conclusion on that claim. P. 684.
(c) In selecting what method should be used to determine
depletions of "usable" flow, the Special Master properly rejected
the Spronk method-which Kansas' exception proposes is correct-as
less compatible with Kansas' hydrological model than the method
ultimately adopted by the Special Master. Pp. 684-687.
(d) In ruling on Colorado's exception to the Special Master's
conclusion that laches does not bar Kansas' well-pumping claim, it
is not necessary to decide whether the laches doctrine applies to a
case involving
674
Syllabus
the enforcement of an interstate compact because Colorado has
failed to prove that Kansas lacked due diligence in bringing its
claim. Colorado errs in arguing that Kansas officials had
sufficient evidence about increased well pumping in Colorado to
determine that a Compact violation existed in 1956. The evidence
available through 1985 was vague and conflicting. pp. 687-689.
(e) This Court disagrees with both the legal and factual claims
Colorado raises in its exception to the Special Master's finding
that the Compact limits annual pumping by pre-Compact wells to
15,000 acre-feet, the highest amount actually pumped in those
years. Kansas' failure to object to the replacement of pumps or
increased pumping by preCompact wells does not support Colorado's
legal argument that the limit should be the maximum amount of
pumping possible using wells existing prior to the Compact.
Regardless of the parties' subsequent practice, such improvements
to and increased pumping by existing wells clearly fall within
Article IV-D's prohibition. In making the factual determination
that 15,000 acre-feet per year is the appropriate limit, the
Special Master properly relied on reports by the United States
Geological Survey and the Colorado Legislature, reports that have
since been used by the Colorado State Engineer. Pp. 689-691.
(f) The Court agrees with the Special Master's conclusion that
the 1980 Operating Plan for the John Martin Reservoir (Plan) was
separately bargained for and thus there is no evidence to support
the claim raised in Colorado's exception that the benefits to
Kansas from the Plan were in settlement of its well claims. The
Plan does not state that post-Compact well pumping in Colorado or
Kansas was a cause of changes in the river's regime, and it
expressly reserves the parties' rights under the Compact. Pp.
691-693.
(g) The Special Master concluded that, regardless whether the
burden of proof applied to Kansas' well-pumping claim is clear and
convincing evidence or preponderance of the evidence, the
post-Compact well pumping in Colorado had caused material
depletions of usable river flows in violation of the Compact. Thus,
this Court need not resolve the issue raised by Colorado's
exception: that clear and convincing evidence is the correct
standard. Pp. 693-694.
Exceptions overruled, and case remanded.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court.
John B. Draper, Special Assistant Attorney General of
Kansas, argued the cause for plaintiff. With him on the briefs were
Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General,
John W
675
Campbell, Deputy Attorney General, and
Leland E.
Rolfs and
Mary Ann Heckman, Assistant Attorneys
General.
David W Robbins, Special Assistant Attorney General of
Colorado, argued the cause for defendant. With him on the briefs
were
Gale Norton, Attorney General,
Stephen K.
Erkenbrack, Chief Deputy Attorney General,
Timothy M.
Tymkovich, Solicitor General, and
Dennis M. Montgomery,
Special Assistant Attorney General.
Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United
States.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant
Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and
Patricia L. Weiss.
*
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This original action involves a dispute between Kansas,
Colorado, and the United States over alleged violations of the
Arkansas River Compact. The Special Master has filed a report
(Report) detailing his findings and recommendations concerning the
liability phase of the trial. Both Kansas and Colorado have filed
exceptions to those findings and recommendations. We agree with the
Special Master's disposition of the liability issues. Accordingly,
we overrule the parties' exceptions.
I
The Continental Divide in the United States begins at the
Canadian border in the mountains of northwestern Montana. From
there, it angles southeast through Montana and Wyoming until it
enters Colorado. It then runs roughly due south through Colorado,
following first the crest of the Front Range of the Rocky
Mountains, and then shifting slightly west to follow the crest of
the Sawatch Range. The Arkansas River rises on the east side of the
Continental Divide,
* Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming,
Donald M. Gerstein, Assistant Attorney General, and
Dennis C.
Cook, Special Assistant Attorney General,
filed a brief for the State of Wyoming as
amicus curiae.
676
between Climax and Leadville, Colorado. Thence it flows south
and east through Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, emptying
into the Mississippi River, which in turn flows into the Gulf of
Mexico. As if to prove that the ridge that separates them is indeed
the Continental Divide, a short distance away from the source of
the Arkansas, the Colorado River rises and thence flows southwest
through Colorado, Utah, and Arizona, and finally empties into the
Gulf of Baja, California.
The Arkansas River flows at a steep gradient from its source
south to Canon City, Colorado, whence it turns east and enters the
Royal Gorge. As it flows through the Royal Gorge, the Arkansas
River is at some points half a mile below the summit of the
bordering cliffs. The Arkansas River thence descends gradually
through the high plains of eastern Colorado and western Kansas; its
elevation at the Colorado- Kansas border is 3,350 feet. It then
makes its great bend northward through Kansas, and from there flows
southeasterly through northeastern Oklahoma and across Arkansas.
The Arkansas River covers about 1,450 miles from its source in the
Colorado Rockies to the point in southeastern Arkansas where it
flows into the Mississippi River. It is the fourth longest river in
the United States, and it drains in an area of 185,000 square
miles.
The first Europeans to see the Arkansas River were members of
the expedition of Francisco Coronado, in the course of their search
for the fabled Seven Golden Cities of Cibola. In 1541, they crossed
the Arkansas River near what is now the Colorado-Kansas border. One
year later, those in the expedition of Hernando DeSoto would see
the Arkansas River 1,000 miles downstream at its mouth. The western
borders of the Louisiana Purchase, acquired from France in 1803,
included within them most, if not all, of the Arkansas River
drainage basin. Zebulon Pike, in his expedition of 1805-1806, in
the course of which he sighted the mountain peak named after him,
traveled up the Arkansas River.
677
John C. Fremont traversed the river in the other direction in
his expedition of 1843-1844.
Today, as a result of the Kerr McClellan Project, the Arkansas
River is navigable for oceangoing vessels all the way from its
mouth to Tulsa, Oklahoma. The Arkansas River is unique in that the
pronunciation of its name changes from State to State. In Colorado,
Oklahoma, and Arkansas, it is pronounced as is the name of the
State of Arkansas, but in Kansas, it is pronounced Ar- KAN
-sas.
The reach of the Arkansas River system at issue here is a
fertile agricultural region that extends from Pueblo, Colorado, to
Garden City, Kansas. This region has been developed in Colorado by
23 major canal companies and in Kansas by 6 canal companies, which
divert the surface flows of the Arkansas River and distribute them
to individual farmers. Report 35-38. Also relevant to this dispute,
the United States has constructed three large water storage
projects in the Arkansas River basin.
Id., at 43-48. The
John Martin Reservoir, located on the Arkansas River about 60 miles
west of the Kansas border, was authorized by Congress in 1936, 49
Stat. 1570, and was completed in 1948. It is the largest of the
federal reservoirs, and initially it had a storage capacity of
about 700,000 acre-feeU Report 45. The Pueblo Reservoir, located on
the Arkansas River about 150 miles west of the Kansas border, was
authorized by Congress in 1962, and was substantially completed in
1975.
Id., at 44. In 1977, the storage capacity of the
Pueblo Reservoir was estimated to be about 357,000 acre-feet.
Ibid. Finally, the Trinidad Reservoir, located on the
Purgatoire River (a major tributary of the Arkansas River) was
approved by Congress in 1958, and was completed in 1977.
Id., at 43. The total capacity of the Trinidad Reservoir is
about 114,000 acrefeet.
Ibid.
1 An acre-foot is equivalent to 325,900 gallons of water; it
represents the volume of water necessary to cover one acre of land
with one foot of water. Report xvii.
678
Twice before in this century, the States of Kansas and Colorado
have litigated in this Court regarding their respective rights to
the waters of the Arkansas River. See
Kansas v.
Colorado, 206
U. S. 46 (1907);
Colorado v.
Kansas, 320 U. S. 383 (1943). In
the first suit, the Court denied Kansas' request to enjoin
diversions of the Arkansas River by Colorado because the depletions
alleged by Kansas were insufficient to warrant injunctive relief.
Kansas v.
Colorado, supra, at 114-117. In the second
suit, Colorado sought to enjoin lower court litigation brought
against Colorado water users, while Kansas sought an equitable
apportionment of the Arkansas River.
Colorado v.
Kansas,
supra, at 388-389. The Court granted Colorado an injunction,
but concluded that Kansas was not entitled to an equitable
apportionment. 320 U. S., at 400. The Court suggested that the
States resolve their differences by negotiation and agreement,
pursuant to the Compact Clause of the Constitution.
Id., at
392. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
In 1949, after three years of negotiations, Kansas and Colorado
approved, and Congress ratified, the Arkansas River Compact
(Compact). See 63 Stat. 145; see also Report 5-6; App. to Report
1-17 (reprinting text of Compact). Article VIII of the Compact
creates the Arkansas River Compact Administration (Administration)
and vests it with the power and responsibility for administering
the Compact.
Id., at 11-15. The Administration is composed
of a nonvoting presiding officer designated by the President of the
United States, and three voting representatives from each State.
Each State has one vote, and every decision, authorization, or
other action by the Administration requires a unanimous vote.
Id., at 12-13 (Article VIII-D).
The Compact's primary purposes are to "[s]ettle existing
disputes and remove causes of future controversy ... concerning the
waters of the Arkansas River" and to "[e]quitably divide and
apportion" the waters of the Arkansas River, "as well as the
benefits arising from the construction, opera-
679
tion and maintenance by the United States of John Martin
Reservoir."
Id., at 1-2 (Articles I-A, I-B). Article IV-D,
the provision of the Compact most relevant to this dispute,
states:
"This Compact is not intended to impede or prevent future
beneficial development of the Arkansas River basin in Colorado and
Kansas by Federal or State agencies, by private enterprise, or by
combinations thereof, which may involve construction of dams,
reservoir, and other works for the purposes of water utilization
and control, as well as the improved or prolonged functioning of
existing works: Provided, that the waters of the Arkansas
River ... shall not be materially depleted in usable quantity or
availability for use to the water users in Colorado and Kansas
under this Compact by such future development or construction."
Id., at 5 (emphasis added).
In 1983, Kansas conducted an independent investigation of
possible violations of the Compact arising from the impact of
increases in post-Compact well pumping in Colorado and the
operation of two of the federal reservoirs. Report 9-10. In
December 1985, Kansas brought this original action against the
State of Colorado to resolve disputes arising under the Compact.
Id., at 10. The Court granted Kansas leave to file its
complaint,
Kansas v.
Colorado, 475 U. S. 1079 (1986),
and appointed Judge Wade H. McCree, Jr., to serve as Special
Master,
Kansas v.
Colorado, 478 U. S. 1018 (1986).
Upon Judge McCree's death, the Court appointed Arthur L.
Littleworth as Special Master.
Kansas v.
Colorado,
484 U. S. 910 (1987).
Kansas advanced three principal claims, each involving an
alleged Compact violation. See Report 58. First, Kansas alleged
that increases in groundwater well pumping in Colorado in the years
following adoption of the Compact have caused a significant decline
in the Arkansas River's surface
680
flow in violation of Article IV -D of the Compact. Second,
Kansas claimed that Colorado's Winter Water Storage Program
(WWSP)-a program whereby the Bureau of Reclamation of the
Department of the Interior (Bureau of Reclamation) and Colorado use
excess capacity at the Pueblo Reservoir to store a portion of the
winter flow of the Arkansas River-violates the Compact. Third,
Kansas claimed that Colorado's failure to abide by the Trinidad
Reservoir Operating Principles (Operating Principles) constituted a
violation of the Compact.
Ibid.
The Special Master bifurcated the trial into a liability phase
and a remedy phase. At the conclusion of the liability phase, the
Special Master filed his Report, outlining his findings and
recommendations. In his Report, the Special Master recommended,
among other things, that the Court: (1) find that post-Compact well
pumping in Colorado has "materially depleted" the "usable" flow at
the Colorado-Kansas border (stateline) in violation of Article IV-D
of the Compact, Report 336; (2) find that "Kansas has failed to
prove that operation of the [WWSPJ program has violated the
[CJompact,"
ibid.; and (3) "dismiss the Kansas claim arising
from the operation of Trinidad Reservoir,"
ibid.2
Both Kansas and Colorado have filed exceptions to the Special
Master's Report. Kansas excepts to the Special Master's rejection
of its (1) Trinidad Reservoir claim, see
id., at 373-433;
(2) WWSP claim, see
id., at 306-335; and (3) preferred
method for determining the usability of depletions of stateline
flows, see
id., at 291-305. Colorado excepts to the Special
Master's determination that: (1) Kansas was not guilty of
inexcusable delay in making its post-Compact wellpumping claim and
that Colorado was not prejudiced by this
2 Colorado presented two counterclaims against Kansas. The
Special Master recommended that the Court grant Kansas' motions to
dismiss those counterclaims. Report 337. Colorado has not filed
exceptions to those recommendations. We adopt the Special Master's
recommendations on Colorado's counterclaims.
681
delay, see
id., at 147-170; (2) pre-Compact wells in
Colorado are limited to pumping the highest amount pumped in the
years during which the Compact was negotiated and that the highest
amount of such pumping was 15,000 acre-feet per year, see
id., at 182-200; (3) increases in usable state line flows
resulting from the operating plan for the John Martin Reservoir
adopted by the Administration in 1980 (1980 Operating Plan) were
"separately bargained for" and, therefore, should not offset
depletions caused by post-Compact well pumping in Colorado, see
id., at 171-181; and (4) Kansas need only meet the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard to prove a breach of
Article IV -D of the Compact, see
id., at 65-70.
We turn to the parties' exceptions.
II A
In 1958, Congress authorized construction of the Trinidad
Project, a dam and a reservoir system on the Purgatoire River
slightly upstream from the city of Trinidad, Colorado. See
id., at 382-388. Recognizing that Article IV-D of the
Compact prohibited any development of the Arkansas River basin that
resulted in a material depletion of usable river flow, the Bureau
of Reclamation conducted studies regarding the future operation of
the Trinidad Project.
Id., at 388390. The Bureau of
Reclamation established Operating Principles whereby the Trinidad
Project could be administered "without adverse effect on downstream
water users and the inflow to John Martin Reservoir."
Id.,
at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Governor of Kansas
reviewed the Bureau of Reclamation's proposed Operating Principles
and indicated that if five additional conditions were accepted,
then "Kansas would be in a position to approve the amended
Operating Principles and to support completion of the project."
Id., at 392-393. In June 1967, the
682
Administration approved the Operating Principles as well as
Kansas' five additional conditions.
Id., at 395.
In 1979, Colorado began storage of water at the Trinidad
Reservoir.
Id., at 396. Kansas immediately complained that
the Operating Principles were being violated.
Id., at 397.
In 1988, at the request of the Administration, the Bureau of
Reclamation conducted a study of the Trinidad Reservoir. It
concluded that two storage practices at the Trinidad Reservoir
constituted a "'departure from the intent of the operating
principles.' "
Ibid.
At trial, Kansas argued that the Operating Principles were
binding on the State of Colorado and that any departure from them
constituted a violation of the Compact "regardless of injury."
Id., at 408 (internal quotation marks omitted). Kansas,
however, "offered no evidence, apart from the Bureau studies, to
show that the actual operation of the Trinidad project caused it to
receive less water than under historical, without-project
conditions."
Id., at 412. Instead, Kansas sought to quantify
depletions by "comparing the flows into John Martin Reservoir 'as
they would have occurred under the Operating Principles with the
flows that occurred under actual operations.'"
Id., at 409.
The Special Master concluded that in order to prove a violation of
the Compact, Kansas was required to demonstrate that "the Trinidad
operations caused a material depletion within the meaning of
Article IV-D."
Id., at 431. The Special Master recommends
that we dismiss Kansas' Trinidad claim because "Kansas has not
established, and did not attempt to establish, such injury."
Ibid.
Kansas argues that "[d]eparture from the Operating Principles is
ipso facto a violation of the Compact, and it [is] entirely
sufficient, for purposes of quantifying the effects of the
violation, to compare the actual operation with simulated operation
as it should have been under the Operating Principles." Kansas'
Exceptions to Special Master's Report 12. But, it must be recalled,
this is an original action to enforce
683
the terms of the Compact.3 Article IV-D provides that the
Compact is not intended to prevent future beneficial development of
the Arkansas River basin-including dams and reservoirs-provided
that the river flow shall not be materially depleted. The Compact
thus permits the development of projects such as Pueblo Reservoir
so long as their operation does not result in a material depletion
of usable flow to Kansas users. For Kansas to prevail in its
contention, it would have to show that the Operating Principles had
the effect of amending the Compact by granting either party the
right to sue the other for violation of the Operating Principles
even though the violation resulted in no material depletion of
usable flow at stateline. Although the Administration is empowered
to "[p]rescribe procedures for the administration of thee]
Compact," App. to Report 11 (Article VIII-B(2)), it must do so
"consistent with the provisions of th[e] Compact," ibid.
(Article VIII-B(l)) (emphasis added); see also Report 416 ("[T]he
Compact Administration was not delegated power to change the
Compact"). The theory advocated by Kansas is inconsistent with
Article IV -D, which allows for the development and operation of
dams and reservoirs so long as there is no resultant material
depletion of usable flows at stateline.
Thus Kansas, in order to establish a Compact violation based
upon failure to obey the Operating Principles, was required to
demonstrate that this failure resulted in a material depletion
under Article IV-D. Kansas "has not established, and did not
attempt to establish, such injury."
Id., at 431. We overrule
Kansas' exception to the Special Master's dismissal of its Trinidad
Reservoir claim.
3 The Special Master did "not address the possible question of
whether Kansas has a claim for violation of the Operating
Principles that is independent of the Compact, that is, a cause of
action based upon a separate agreement with Colorado, or as a third
party beneficiary under the repayment contract, or otherwise."
Report 408, n. 6. We express no view as to that question.
684
B
In 1964, the Bureau of Reclamation and Colorado began planning a
program to use excess capacity at Pueblo Reservoir in order to
store a portion of the winter-time flow of the Arkansas River for
beneficial use at other times. Under the WWSP, winter-time
flow-much of which was used previously to flood uncultivated
cropland-is instead stored at the Pueblo Reservoir. Kansas contends
that the Special Master erred in finding that it had failed to
prove that the WWSP had "materially depleted" usable stateline
flows. We disagree.
In his Report, the Special Master concluded:
"Kansas has not proved that the WWSP has caused material
Stateline depletions. Kansas' case has not been helped by its own
contradictions in quantifying impacts to usable flow-ranging during
this trial from 255,000 acre-feet initially, to 44,000 to 40,000;
nor by the fact that depletions are essentially eliminated if
accretions are taken into account." Report 335.
The Special Master examined the computer models submitted by
Kansas and Colorado and determined that "the depletions shown by
the Kansas model are well within the model's range of error."
Id., at 334-335. As a result, "[o]ne [could not] be sure
whether impact or error [was] being shown."
Id., at 335.
We believe that the Special Master gave Kansas every reasonable
opportunity to meet its burden of proving its WWSP claim. Kansas,
however, failed to prove that operation of the WWSP program
resulted in material depletions of usable flows in violation of
Article IV-D. See
ibid. Therefore, we overrule Kansas'
exception to the Special Master's conclusion that Kansas had failed
to prove its WWSP claim.
C
Article IV-D of the Compact permits future development and
construction along the Arkansas River Basin provided
685
that it does not materially deplete stateline flows "in
usable quantity or availability." App. to Report 5 (Article
IV-D) (emphasis added). In order to establish a violation of
Article IV -D, Kansas was required to establish that development in
Colorado resulted in material depletions of "usable" river flow.
The Compact does not define the term "usable." Cf.
Colorado
v.
Kansas, 320 U. S., at 396-397 ("The critical matter is
the amount of divertible flow at times when water is most needed
for irrigation. Calculations of average annual flow, which include
flood flows, are, therefore, not helpful in ascertaining the
dependable supply of water usable for irrigation"). At trial,
Kansas presented three methods for determining depletions of
"usable" flow.
Kansas' first expert, Timothy J. Durbin, analyzed flow data for
the period between 1951 and 1985 by plotting actual river
diversions in Kansas against actual stateline flows. Report
293-294. U sing these data, Durbin developed criteria to determine
what river flows were usable. Durbin concluded that during the
summer months, April through October, (1) 78% of the stateline
flows were diverted; (2) flows greater than 40,000 acre-feet per
month were not usable; and (3) flows greater than 140,000 acre-feet
for the whole period were not usable.
Id., at 293. With
respect to the winter months, November through March, Durbin
concluded that (1) 24% of the winter flow was diverted; (2) flows
greater than 7,500 acre-feet per month were not usable; and (3)
flows greater than 40,000 acre-feet for the whole period were not
usable.
Id., at 293-294.
After Colorado isolated errors in Durbin's analysis, Kansas
presented a replacement case. Kansas' second group of experts, led
by Stephen P. Larson, adopted the same methodology but revised
certain exhibits and made minor corrections in data. As a result,
Larson modified Durbin's coefficients, using 72% for the summer
months and 25% for the winter months.
Id., at 295.
686
Later, well after trial had begun, Kansas enlisted the aid of
Brent Spronk, who proposed yet another method to quantify
depletions of "usable" stateline flow.
Id., at 300-305.
Spronk attempted to determine the "percentage of days in each month
when flows were being fully used in Kansas."
Id., at 301.
Instead of seasonal averages, the Spronk approach yielded
coefficients that varied from month to month. Spronk then
multiplied these monthly coefficients by the estimated depletions
in flow predicted by Kansas' hydrological model.
Id., at
301-302.
The Special Master concluded that "the Durbin approach, using
Larson's coefficients, is the best of the several methods presented
for determining usable flow" and that it provided "a reasonable way
in which to determine depletions of usable flow."
Id., at
305. We agree. Each of the three methods that Kansas proposed for
calculating usable depletions required two steps: (1) a calculation
of total depletions using the Kansas hydrological model, and (2) an
application of "usability" criteria. See Brief for United States in
Response to Exeptions of Kansas and Colorado 30. Each of the three
methods proposed by Kansas was dependent on the Kansas hydrological
model to estimate total depletions. The Spronk method required the
Kansas hydrological model to predict accurately depletions for each
and every month. Report 303. But as Durbin, Kansas' first expert,
testified, Kansas' hydrological model was only a "'good predictor'
when 'looking at long periods of time.'"
Id., at 303, n. 130
(quoting Durbin's testimony). Thus, the Spronk method required the
Kansas hydrological model to do something it was not designed to
do, i.
e., predict accurately depletions on a monthly basis.
Id., at 303 ("The Spronk analysis assumes that the H-I model
can accurately predict changes of Stateline flow on a monthly
basis"). Because the Spronk method for determining "usable" river
flows was less compatible with Kansas' hydrological model than the
other methods proposed, we conclude that the Special Master
properly rejected
687
the Spronk method in favor of the Durbin approach, as modified
by the Larson coefficients.
III A
The Special Master concluded that Kansas was not guilty of
inexcusable delay in making its well-pumping claim, and that
Colorado had not been prejudiced by Kansas' failure to press its
claim earlier.
Id., at 170. Colorado has excepted to this
determination. Colorado argues that the equitable doctrine of
laches should bar Kansas' claim for relief. See Colorado's
Exceptions to Special Master's Report (Colorado's Exceptions)
24-64. We overrule Colorado's exception.
The defense of laches "requires proof of (1) lack of diligence
by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2)
prejudice to the party asserting the defense."
Costello v.
United States, 365 U. S. 265, 282
(1961); see also Black's Law Dictionary 875 (6th ed. 1990) ("
'Doctrine of laches,' is based upon maxim that equity aids the
vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. It is defined
as neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together with
lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to the
adverse party, operates as bar in court of equity"). This Court has
yet to decide whether the doctrine oflaches applies in a case
involving the enforcement of an interstate compact. Cf.
Illinois v.
Kentucky, 500 U. S. 380, 388 (1991)
(in the context of an interstate boundary dispute, "the laches
defense is generally inapplicable against a State");
Block
v.
North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands,
461 U. S. 273,
294 (1983) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("The common law has long
accepted the principle
'nullum tempus occurrit regi'
-neither laches nor statutes of limitations will bar the
sovereign");
Colorado v.
Kansas, supra, at 394 (In
the context of a suit seeking an equitable apportionment of river
flows, facts demonstrating a delay in filing a complaint "might
well preclude the award of the relief [requested]. But, in any
event, they
688
gravely add to the burden [the plaintiff] would otherwise
bear"). We need not, however, foreclose the applicability of laches
in such cases, because we conclude that Colorado has failed to
prove an element necessary to the recognition of that defense. See
Costello, supra, at 282.
Colorado argues that Kansas knew or should have known by 1956,
or at the latest, before 1968, that both the number of post-Compact
wells and the amount of post-Compact pumping in Colorado had
increased substantially. Colorado's Exceptions 37, 39. Colorado
argues that by 1956 Kansas had sufficient information about
increased well pumping in Colorado and its potential impact on
usable stateline flows to call for an investigation to determine if
a Compact violation existed.
Id., at 46.
The Special Master concluded that prior to 1984, Kansas had made
no formal complaint to the Administration regarding post-Compact
well pumping in Colorado. Report 155156. Nevertheless, the Special
Master concluded that Colorado's evidence did not "deal with the
issue of impact on usable flow at the Stateline,"
id., at
161, and did "not demonstrate that [the Kansas officials] were
aware of the number of wells, the extent of Colorado's pumping, or
the impact or even potential impact of pumping on usable Stateline
flows,"
id., at 164. The Special Master explained the
difficulty of assessing the impact of increases in post-Compact
well pumping on usable stateline flows because of changing
conditions during the 1970's and early 1980's:
"The 1970s were generally dry years and some reduction in flow
was to have been expected. Pueblo Dam came on line in 1976 and
began to reregulate native flows. Transmountain imports increased,
which to some extent provided an offset to pumping. The 1980
Operating Plan was placed into effect, which Colorado alleges
offset the impacts of increased pumping downstream from John Martin
Reservoir. The Winter Water Storage Program was instituted.
Moreover, there was no quan-
689
titative or specific entitlement against which depletions to
usable flow could be judged. Nor were there any agreed upon
criteria for establishing what flows were usable." Id., at
162-163.
As late as 1985, Colorado officials refused to permit an
investigation by the Administration of well development in Colorado
because they claimed that the evidence produced by Kansas did not"
'suggest that well development in Colorado has had an impact on
usable stateline flows.'''
Id., at 163 (quoting memorandum
of J. William McDonald, chief of the Colorado delegation to the
Administration). In light of the vague and conflicting evidence
available to Kansas, we conclude that Colorado has failed to
demonstrate lack of diligence, i.
e., inexcusable delay, on
the part of Kansas.
Accordingly, we overrule Colorado's exception to the Special
Master's conclusion that the defense of laches should not bar
Kansas' well-pumping claim.
B
The Compact prohibits
"future beneficial development of
the Arkansas River basin" that "materially deplete[s]" the usable
flows of the Arkansas River. App. to Report 5 (Article IV-D)
(emphasis added). Because some wells in Colorado were in existence
prior to the Compact, both parties agree that a certain amount of
post-Compact well pumping is allowable under the Compact. Report
182. Kansas and Colorado, however, dispute the extent of this
allowance. The Special Master determined that the "highest annual
amount shown to have been pumped during the negotiations, namely
15,000 acre-feet, should be allowed under the [C]ompact."
Id., at 200. Colorado makes both a legal and a factual
challenge to this determination. Colorado's Exceptions 66-73,
73-84.
Colorado argues as a legal matter that the Compact does not
limit the pumping by pre-Compact wells to the highest amount
actually pumped in pre-Compact years; rather, Colo-
690
rado claims that the limit on its pre-Compact pumping is the
maximum amount that Colorado law permitted or the maximum amount of
pumping possible using wells existing prior to the Compact.
Id., at 69-70. In support of its position, Colorado argues
that the Special Master failed to consider the subsequent practice
of the parties, i.
e., Kansas' failure to object to
replacement of centrifugal pumps with turbine pumps or increased
pumping by pre-Compact wells, and that Article VI-A(2) of the
Compact supports its position.4
We conclude that the clear language of Article IV-D refutes
Colorado's legal challenge. Article IV -D permits "future
beneficial development of the Arkansas River basin ... which may
involve construction of dams, reservoir, and other works for the
purposes of water utilization and control,
as well as the
improved or prolonged functioning of existing works: Provided,
that the waters of the Arkansas River ... shall not be materially
depleted in usable quantity or availability .... " App. to Report 5
(emphasis added). Regardless of subsequent practice by the parties,
improved and increased pumping by existing wells clearly falls
within Article IV-D's prohibition against "improved or prolonged
functioning of existing works," if such action results in
"materia[l] deplet[ions] in usable" river flows.
Ibid.; see
Texas v.
New Mexico, 462 U. S. 554, 564 (1983)
("[U]nless the compact to which Congress has consented is somehow
unconstitutional, no court may order relief inconsistent with its
express terms"). Article VI-A(2) of the Compact, which begins with
the phrase, "Except as otherwise provided," App. to
4 Article VI-A(2) provides:
"Except as otherwise
provided, nothing in this Compact shall be construed as
supplanting the administration by Colorado of the rights of
appropriators of waters of the Arkansas River in said State as
decreed to said appropriators by the courts of Colorado, nor as
interfering with the distribution among said appropriators by
Colorado, nor as curtailing the diversion and use for irrigation
and other beneficial purposes in Colorado of the waters of the
Arkansas River." App. to Report 10 (emphasis added).
691
Report 10, must be read in conjunction with and as limited by
Article IV-D. We agree with the Special Master that "new wells, the
replacement of centrifugal with turbine pumps, and increased
pumping from [pre-Compact] wells all come within [Article IV -D]."
Report 194.
Second, Colorado argues as a factual matter that the Special
Master unreasonably relied upon faulty reports by the United States
Geological Survey (USGS) and the Colorado Legislature to conclude
that the greatest amount of annual pre-Compact pumping in Colorado
was 15,000 acre-feet. Colorado's Exceptions 73-74. The Special
Master concluded:
"There is no precise answer to the amount of [preCompact]
pumping .... That amount must simply remain as an estimate of water
use that affected the general allocation of water between the
states when the [C]ompact was being negotiated. Two responsible
reports, one published by the USGS and one prepared for the
Colorado legislature, reached similar conclusions as to the amounts
of Colorado pumping during the 1940s .... They have since been used
by the Colorado State Engineer. I have relied on these reports and
recommend that the highest annual amount shown to have been pumped
during the negotiations, namely 15,000 acre-feet, should be allowed
under the [C]ompact." Report 199-200.
Although the ultimate responsibility for deciding what are
correct findings of fact remains with the Court,
Colorado v.
New Mexico, 467 U. S. 310, 317
(1984), in this instance, we are in full agreement with the Special
Master. Accordingly, we overrule Colorado's exception.
C
In April 1980, the Administration adopted a resolution
concerning the method for operating John Martin Reservoir (1980
Operating Plan). Report 47. The 1980 Operating
692
Plan divides the water conserved in John Martin Reservoir into
separate accounts. Kansas is allocated 40% of the conservation
storage, with the remaining 60% being divided in specified
percentages among the nine canal companies in Colorado Water
District 67.
Id., at 173. The Special Master concluded that
the 1980 Operating Plan for the John Martin Reservoir was
"separately bargained for" and therefore should not offset
depletions caused by post-Compact well pumping in Colorado.
Id., at 180-181. Colorado takes exception to this
ruling.
Colorado argues that increases in usable stateline flows
resulting from the 1980 Operating Plan should offset depletions to
usable stateline flows. Colorado's Exceptions 85. Colorado
maintains that the Administration adopted the 1980 Operating Plan
"for more efficient utilization of water under its control because
of changes in the regime of the Arkansas River,"
id., at 91,
"including [post-Compact] well pumping in Colorado and Kansas,"
ibid.; see also App. to Report 107 (Resolution Concerning an
Operating Plan for John Martin Reservoir) ("WHEREAS, the Arkansas
River Compact Administration ... recognizes that, because of
changes in the regime of the Arkansas River, the present operation
of the conservation features of John Martin Reservoir does not
result in the most efficient utilization possible of the water
under its control"). We disagree.
As Colorado acknowledges, the resolution adopting the 1980
Operating Plan "does not state that [post-Compact] well pumping in
Colorado or Kansas was a cause of changes in the regime of the
Arkansas River." Colorado's Exceptions 88. In fact, Colorado argues
in a separate part of its brief that "Kansas had made no complaint
about well pumping in Colorado to the Compact Administration ...
before 1984."
Id., at 32. The 1980 Operating Plan expressly
reserves the parties' rights under the Compact, stating that
"[a]doption of this resolution does not prejudice the ability of
Kansas or of any Colorado ditch to object or to otherwise represent
its
693
interest in present or future cases or controversies before the
Administration or in a court of competent jurisdiction." App. to
Report 116. The Special Master concluded:
"The 1980 Operating Plan provided benefits to both Kansas and
Colorado which were separately bargained for. There is no evidence
to support the claim that benefits to Kansas were in settlement of
its well claims. Colorado received ample consideration under the
agreement for the 1980 plan without a waiver of Kansas' well
claims. The benefits received by Kansas under the plan should not
be offset against compact violations, and should not be a bar to
any of the Kansas claims in this case." Report 180-181.
We agree with the Special Master's resolution of Colorado's
claim. Accordingly, we overrule Colorado's exception.
D
Finally, Colorado argues that Kansas is required to prove its
well-pumping claim by clear and convincing evidence. Colorado's
Exceptions 91. The Special Master, relying upon
Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 507
U. S. 584 (1993), concluded that the proper burden of proof for
enforcing an interstate compact is the preponderance of the
evidence standard. Report 70. The Special Master noted that the
Nebraska Court had drawn a distinction between actions
seeking to "modify" a judicial decree and actions seeking to
"enforce" a judicial decree. See
Nebraska, supra, at 592
("[WJe find merit in [the] contention that, to the extent that
Nebraska seeks modification of the decree rather than enforcement,
a higher standard of proof applies"). The Special Master concluded
that an action seeking to enforce an interstate compact stood on
the same footing as an action enforcing a judicial decree, and
therefore was subject to the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard. Report 70.
We need not, however, resolve this issue. The Special Master
concluded that "regardless of which burden of proof
694
applies" he had "no difficulty in concluding that [postCompact]
pumping in Colorado ha[d] caused material depletions of the usable
Stateline flows of the Arkansas River, in violation of the Arkansas
River Compact."
Id., at 263. We agree with this
determination, and thus overrule Colorado's exception.
IV
For these reasons, we overrule the exceptions filed by the
States of Kansas and Colorado. We remand the case to the Special
Master for determination of the unresolved issues in a manner not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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