OCTOBER TERM, 1996
Syllabus
JOHNSON ET AL.
v. FANKELL
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO No. 96-292. Argued
February 26, 1997-Decided June 9, 1997
Respondent filed this 42 U. S. C. § 1983 damages action in Idaho
state court, alleging that the termination of her state employment
by petitioner officials deprived her of property without due
process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court
denied petitioners' motion to dismiss, which asserted that they
were entitled to qualified immunity. The Idaho Supreme Court
dismissed their appeal from that ruling, explaining that the denial
was neither an appealable final order under Idaho Appellate Rule
l1(a)(I) nor appealable as a matter of federal right under §
1983.
Held: Defendants in a state-court § 1983 action do not
have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of
qualified immunity. Pp. 914-923.
(a) State officials performing discretionary functions have a
"qualified immunity" defense that, in appropriate circumstances,
shields them both from liability for damages under § 1983 and from
the burdens of trial.
Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818. A
federal district court order rejecting such a defense on the ground
that the defendant's actions-if proved-would have violated clearly
established law may be appealed immediately as a "final decision"
under the general federal appellate jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S.
C. § 1291.
Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 524-530.
Relying on respondent's federal statutory claim and their own
federal defense, petitioners submit that the Idaho courts must
protect their right to avoid the burdens of trial by allowing the
same interlocutory appeal that would be available in a federal
court. Pp. 914-916.
(b) This Court rejects petitioners' argument that when the Idaho
courts construe their own Rule l1(a)(I), they must accept the
federal definition of a "final decision" in cases brought under §
1983. Even if the Idaho Rule and § 1291 contained identical
language-and they do not-the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Rule would be binding on federal courts, which have no
authority to place a different construction upon it. See,
e. g.,
New York v.
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 767. Idaho
could voluntarily place the same construction on the Rule as the
Mitchell Court placed on § 1291, but this Court cannot
command that choice. Pp. 916-918.
(c) Also unpersuasive is petitioners' contention that Rule
l1(a)(I) is pre-empted by § 1983 to the extent that it does not
allow an interlocu-
912
Syllabus
tory appeal. Petitioners' arguments are not strong enough to
overcome two considerable hurdles. First, the normal presumption
against preemption is buttressed here by the fact that the Idaho
Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal rested squarely on a
neutral state rule for administering state courts.
Howlett
v.
Rose, 496
U. S. 356, 372. Second, because the qualified immunity
defense's ultimate purpose is to protect the State and its
officials from overenforcement of federal rights, Rule l1(a)(I)'s
application in this context is less an interference with
federal interests, as petitioners claim, than a judgment
about how best to balance competing
state interests. In
arguing that pre-emption is necessary to avoid different "outcomes"
in § 1983 litigation based solely on whether the claim is asserted
in state or federal court, petitioners misplace their reliance on
Felder v.
Casey, 487 U. S. 131, 138.
"[O]utcom[e]," as used there, referred to the ultimate disposition
of the case, whereas the postponement of the appeal until after
final judgment will not affect the ultimate outcome of this case if
petitioners' qualified immunity claim is meritorious. Their
argument that Rule l1(a)(I) does not adequately protect their right
to prevail on the immunity question in advance of trial also fails,
given the precise source and scope of the federal right at issue.
In contrast to the right to have the trial court rule on the
immunity defense's merits, which presumably has its source in §
1983 and is fully protected by Idaho, the right to immediate
appellate review of such a ruling in a federal case has its source
in § 1291, not § 1983, see
Johnson v.
Jones, 515 U. S. 304, 317, and
is a federal procedural right that simply does not apply in a
nonfederal forum. pp. 918-923.
Affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Michael S.
Gilmore, Deputy Attorney General of
Idaho, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs
were
Alan G.
Lance, Attorney General,
David G.
High, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and
Margaret R.
Hughes, Deputy Attorney General.
W B. Latta, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief was
Eric Schnapper. *
* A brief of
amici curiae was filed for the Commonwealth
of Kentucky et al. by
A. B. Chandler III, Attorney General
of Kentucky,
Bill Pettus, Assistant Attorney General,
Scott White, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, and
Brent
Irvin, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys
913
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether defendants in an action
brought under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in state court
have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of
qualified immunity. We hold that they do not.
I
Petitioners are officials of the Idaho Liquor Dispensary.
Respondent, a former liquor store clerk, brought this action for
damages under § 1983 in the District Court for the County of
Bonner, Idaho. She alleged that petitioners deprived her of
property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution when they terminated her
employment. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity. They
contended that, at the time of respondent's dismissal, they
reasonably believed that she was a probationary employee who had no
property interest in her job. Accordingly, petitioners argued, her
termination did not violate clearly established law. The trial
court
General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bruce M.
Botelho of Alaska, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of
Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A. Norton of
Colorado, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Michael
J.
Bowers of Georgia, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, James E. Ryan of
Illinois, Tom Miller of Iowa, Carla
J. Stovall of Kansas,
Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana,
J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of
Maryland, Frank
J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey
III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W (Jay) Nixon
of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of
Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard of New
Hampshire, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North
Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of
Ohio, Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Thomas W Corbett, Jr., of
Pennsylvania, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Mark Barnett of
South Dakota, Dan Morales of Texas, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont,
Julio A. Brady of the Virgin Islands, Christine O. Gregoire of
Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and James E.
Doy le of Wisconsin.
914
denied the motion,l and petitioners filed a timely notice of
appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.
The State Supreme Court entered an order dismissing the appeal.
The court explained that an order denying a motion for summary
judgment is not appealable under Idaho Appellate Rule l1(a)(l) "for
the reason it is not from a final order or Judgment." App. 67. It
also rejected petitioners' arguments that the order was appealable
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and
Behrens v.
Pelletier,
516 U. S. 299
(1996). Petitioners sought rehearing, again arguing that the order
was final within the meaning of the Idaho Appellate Rule, and, in
the alternative, that they had a right to appeal as a matter of
federal law. The court denied rehearing and dismissed the
appeal.
Petitioners then filed a petition in this Court seeking either a
writ of certiorari or a writ of mandamus. They pointed out that
some state courts, unlike the Idaho Supreme Court, allow
interlocutory appeals of orders denying qualified immunity on the
theory that such review is necessary to protect a substantial
federal right, see
McLin v.
Trimble, 795 P. 2d 1035,
1037-1038 (Okla. 1990);
Lakewood v.
Brace, 919 P. 2d
231, 238-240 (Colo. 1996). We granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict, 519 U. S. 947 (1996), and now affirm.
II
We have recognized a qualified immunity defense for both federal
officials sued under the implied cause of action asserted in
Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.
S. 388 (1971), and state officials sued under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
In both situations, "officials performing discretionary function[s]
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a rea-
1 Because affidavits had been filed in support of the motion,
the court treated it as a motion for summary judgment.
915
sonable person would have known."
Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818
(1982).
This "qualified immunity" defense is valuable to officials
asserting it for two reasons. First, if it is found applicable at
any stage of the proceedings, it determines the outcome of the
litigation by shielding the official from damages liability.
Second, when the complaint fails to allege a violation of clearly
established law or when discovery fails to uncover evidence
sufficient to create a genuine issue whether the defendant
committed such a violation, it provides the defendant with an
immunity from the burdens of trial as well as a defense to
liability.2 Indeed, one reason for adopting the objective test
announced in
Harlow was to "permit the resolution of many
insubstantial claims on summary judgment."
Ibid.
Consistent with that purpose, we held in
Mitchell v.
Forsyth,
472
U. S. 511, 524-530 (1985), that a Federal District Court order
rejecting a qualified immunity defense on the ground that the
defendant's actions-if proved-would have violated clearly
established law may be appealed immediately as a "final decision"
within the meaning of the general federal appellate jurisdiction
statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1291.3 If this action had been brought in a
federal court, therefore, petitioners would have had a right to
take an appeal from the trial court's order denying their motion
for summary judgment.
Relying on the facts (a) that respondent has asserted a federal
claim under a federal statute, and (b) that they are
2 Of course, when a case can be dismissed on the pleadings or in
an early pretrial stage, qualified immunity also provides officials
with the valuable protection from "the burdens of broad-reaching
discovery,"
Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818
(1982).
3While
Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985),
involved a
Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971),
action against a federal official, we have also construed § 1291 to
authorize similar appeals in actions brought against state
officials under § 1983. See,
e. g., Johnson v.
Jones, 515 U.
S. 304 (1995).
916
asserting a defense provided by federal law, petitioners submit
that the Idaho courts must protect their right to avoid the burdens
of trial by allowing the same interlocutory appeal that would be
available in a federal court. They support this submission with two
different arguments: First, that when the Idaho courts construe
their own rules allowing appeals from final judgments, they must
accept the federal definition of finality in cases brought under §
1983; and second, that if those rules do not authorize the appeal,
they are pre-empted by federal law. We find neither argument
persuasive.
III
We can easily dispense with petitioners' first contention that
Idaho must follow the federal construction of a "final decision."
Even if the Idaho and federal statutes contained identical
language-and they do not 4-the interpretation of the Idaho statute
by the Idaho Supreme Court would be binding on federal courts.
Neither this Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority
to place a construction on a state statute different from the one
rendered by the highest court of the State. See,
e. g., New
York v.
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 767 (1982);
Exxon
Corp. v.
Department of Revenue of Wis., 447 U. S. 207, 226, n. 9
(1980);
Commissioner v.
Estate of Bosch, 387 U. S. 456, 465
(1967). This proposition, fundamental to our system of federalism,
is applicable to procedural as well as substantive rules. See
Wardius v.
Oregon, 412 U. S. 470, 477
(1973).
The definition of the term "final decision" that we adopted in
Mitchell was an application of the "collateral order"
doctrine first recognized in
Cohen v.
Beneficial
Industrial Loan
4 "Final decision" is the operative term of § 1291, whereas
"[j]udgments, orders and decrees which are final" is the language
of Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1).
917
Corp., 337
U. S. 541 (1949). In that case, as in all of our cases
following it, we were construing the federal statutory language of
28 U. S. C. § 1291.5 While some States have adopted a similar
"collateral order" exception when construing their jurisdictional
statutes,6 we have never suggested that federal law compelled them
to do so. Indeed, a number of States employ collateral order
doctrines that reject the limitations this Court has placed on §
1291.7 Idaho could, of
5 Thus, in
Mitchell we explained: "In holding these and
similar issues of absolute immunity to be appealable under the
collateral order doctrine, see
Abney v.
United
States, [
431 U.
S. 651 (1977)];
Helstoski v.
Meanor, 442 U. S. 500 (1979);
Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731 (1982), the
Court has recognized that a question of immunity is separate from
the merits of the underlying action for purposes of the
Cohen test even though a reviewing court must consider the
plaintiff's factual allegations in resolving the immunity issue.
Accordingly, we hold that a district court's denial of a claim of
qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law,
is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U. S. C.
§ 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." 472 U. S.,
at 528-530 (footnote omitted).
6 See,
e. g., Richardson v.
Chevrefils, 131 N. H.
227, 231, 552 A. 2d 89, 92 (1988) ("Although all of the court's
rulings ... would normally be treated as interlocutory, ... [w]e
have followed
Mitchell in accepting the State defendants'
appeal from the order denying their motion for summary judgment");
Murray v.
White, 155 Vt. 621, 626, 587 A. 2d 975,
977-978 (1991) ("In
[Mitchell], the Supreme Court held that
a trial court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity met these
[collateral order] requirements, and we agree with this
determination");
Park County v.
Cooney, 845 P. 2d
346, 349 (Wyo. 1992) ("We believe the state decisions which allow
appeal, for the reasons detailed in
Mitchell ... , are
better reasoned; and we therefore hold that an order denying
dismissal of a claim based on qualified immunity is an order
appealable to this court").
7See,
e. g., Goldston v.
American Motors Corp.,
326 N. C. 723, 727, 392 S. E. 2d 735, 737 (1990) (disqualification
of counsel is appealable under state collateral order doctrine
notwithstanding
Richardson-Merrell Inc. v.
Koller,
472 U. S. 424
(1985));
Hanson v.
Federal Signal Corp., 451 Pa.
Super. 260, 264-265, 679 A. 2d 785, 787-788 (1996) (same for class
certification denial notwithstanding
Coopers &
Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U. S. 463
(1978)).
918
course, place the same construction on its Appellate Rule
l1(a)(l) as we have placed on § 1291. But that is clearly a choice
for that court to make, not one that we have any authority to
command.
IV
Petitioners also contend that, to the extent that Idaho
Appellate Rule l1(a)(l) does not allow an interlocutory appeal, it
is pre-empted by § 1983. Relying heavily on
Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.
S. 131 (1988), petitioners first assert that preemption is
necessary to avoid "different outcomes in § 1983 litigation based
solely on whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court,"
id., at 138. Second, they argue that the state procedure
"impermissibly burden[sJ" the federal immunity from suit because it
does not adequately protect their right to prevail on the immunity
question in advance of trial.s
For two reasons, petitioners have a heavy burden of persuasion
in making this argument. First, our normal presumption against
pre-emption is buttressed by the fact that the Idaho Supreme
Court's dismissal of the appeal rested squarely on a neutral state
Rule regarding the administration of the state courts.9 As we
explained in
Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 372
(1990):
8 See Brief for Petitioners 22.
9Unlike the notice-of-claim rule at issue in
Felder v.
Casey, 487 U. S., at 140-145, Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1)
does not target civil rights claims against the State. See also
Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 380-381
(1990). Instead, it generally permits appeals only of "[j]udgments,
orders and decrees which are final," without regard to the identity
of the party seeking the appeal or the subject matter of the suit.
Petitioners claim that the rule is not neutral because it permits
interlocutory appeals in certain limited circumstances but denies
an appeal here. But we have never held that a rule must be
monolithic to be neutral. Absent evidence that Appellate Rule
11(a)(1) discriminates against interlocutory appeals of § 1983
qualified immunity determinations by defendants-as compared with
other types of appeals-we must deem the state procedure
neutral.
919
"When a state court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral
state rule regarding the administration of the courts, we must act
with utmost caution before deciding that it is obligated to
entertain the claim. See Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v.
Mayfield, 340 U.
S. 1 (1950); Georgia Rail Road & Banking Co.
v. Musgrove, 335 U. S. 900 (1949) (per curiam); Herb
v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 (1945);
Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Co., 279 U. S.
377 (1929). The requirement that a state court of competent
jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not
necessarily include within it a requirement that the State create a
court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim is
presented. The general rule, 'bottomed deeply in belief in the
importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that
federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.' Hart, [The
Relations Between State and Federal Law], 54 Colum. L. Rev. [489,
508 (1954)]; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U. S. 1, 33
(1984) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting); FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U. S. [742, 774 (1982)] (opinion of Powell,
J.). The States thus have great latitude to establish the structure
and jurisdiction of their own courts."
A second barrier to petitioners' argument arises from the nature
of the interest protected by the defense of qualified immunity.
Petitioners' argument for pre-emption is bottomed on their claims
that the Idaho rules are interfering with their federal rights.
While it is true that the defense has its source in a federal
statute (§ 1983), the ultimate purpose of qualified immunity is to
protect the State and its officials from overenforcement of federal
rights. The Idaho Supreme Court's application of the State's
procedural rules in this context is thus less an interference
withfederal interests than a judgment about how best to
balance the competing
state interests of limiting
interlocutory appeals and pro-
920
viding state officials with immediate review of the merits of
their defense.1o
Petitioners' arguments for pre-emption are not strong enough to
overcome these considerable hurdles. Contrary to petitioners'
assertions, Idaho's decision not to provide appellate review for
the vast majority of interlocutory ordersincluding denials of
qualified immunity in § 1983 cases-is not "outcome determinative"
in the sense that we used that term when we held that Wisconsin's
notice-of-claim statute could not be applied to defeat a federal
civil rights action brought in state courts under § 1983.
Felder, 487 U. S., at 153. The failure to comply with the
Wisconsin statute in
Felder resulted in a judgment
dismissing a complaint that would not have been dismissed-at least
not without a judicial determination of the merits of the claim-if
the case had been filed in a federal court. One of the primary
grounds for our decision was that, because the notice-of-claim
requirement would "frequently and predictably produce different
outcomes" depending on whether § 1983 claims were brought in state
or federal court, it was inconsistent with the federal interest in
uniformity.
Id., at 138.11
10 It does warrant observation that Rule 12(a) of the Idaho
Appellate Rules provides that the State Supreme Court may grant
permission "to appeal from an interlocutory order or decree ...
which is not otherwise appealable under these rules, but which
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an
immediate appeal ... may materially advance the orderly resolution
of the litigation." Presumably, petitioners could have sought
review under this permissive provision, and the Idaho Supreme Court
might have granted review if, in the view of that court, the
officials' claim to immunity was so substantial that the suit
should not proceed.
11 See also
Brown v.
Western R. Co. of Ala.,
338 U. S. 294,
296-299 (1949) (Federal Employers' Liability Act (FE LA) pre-empted
different state pleading requirements when effect was to defeat
plaintiff's cause of action);
Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack
Co., 317 U. S.
239, 243-244 (1942) (federal Jones Act pre-empted different
state burden of proof regarding releases when effect was to defeat
plaintiff's cause of action).
921
Petitioners' reliance on
Felder is misplaced because
"outcome," as we used the term there, referred to the ultimate
disposition of the case. If petitioners' claim to qualified
immunity is meritorious, there is no suggestion that the
application of the Idaho rules of procedure will produce a final
result different from what a federal ruling would produce.
Petitioners were able to argue their immunity from suit claim to
the trial court, just as they would to a federal court. And the
claim will be reviewable by the Idaho Supreme Court after the trial
court enters a final judgment, thus providing petitioners with a
further chance to urge their immunity. Consequently, the
postponement of the appeal until after final judgment will not
affect the ultimate outcome of the case.
Petitioners' second argument for pre-emption of the state
procedural Rule is that the Rule does not adequately protect their
right to prevail in advance of trial. In evaluating this
contention, it is important to focus on the precise source and
scope of the federal right at issue. The right to have the trial
court rule on the merits of the qualified immunity defense
presumably has its source in § 1983, but the right to immediate
appellate review of that ruling in a federal case has its source in
§ 1291. The former right is fully protected by Idaho. The latter
right, however, is a federal procedural right that simply does not
apply in a nonfederal forum.12
The locus of the right to interlocutory appeal in § 1291, rather
than in § 1983 itself, is demonstrated by our holding
12 Petitioners' reliance on
Dice v.
Akron, C.
& Y.
R. Co., 342 U. S. 359 (1952), is
therefore misplaced. In
Dice we held that the FELA preempted
a state rule denying a right to a jury trial. In that case,
however, we made clear that Congress had provided
in
FELA that the jury trial procedure was to be part of claims
brought under the Act.
Id., at 363 (citing
Bailey v.
Central Vermont R. Co., 319 U. S. 350, 354
(1943)). In this case, by contrast, Congress has mentioned nothing
about interlocutory appeals in § 1983; rather, the right to an
immediate appeal in the federal court system is found in § 1291,
which obviously has no application to state courts.
922
in
Johnson v.
Jones, 515 U. S. 304 (1995). In
that case, government officials asserting qualified immunity
claimed entitlement to an interlocutory appeal of a District Court
order denying their motion for summary judgment on the ground that
the record showed a genuine issue of material fact whether the
officials actually engaged in the conduct that constituted a clear
violation of constitutional law.
Id., at 307-308. We
concluded that this circumstance was different from that presented
in
Mitchell, 472 U. S., at 528, in which the subject of the
interlocutory appeal was whether a given set of facts showed a
violation of clearly established law, and held that although § 1291
did allow an interlocutory appeal in the latter circumstance, such
an appeal was not allowed in the former.
In so holding, we acknowledged that "whether a district court's
denial of summary judgment amounts to (a) a determination about
pre-existing 'clearly established' law, or (b) a determination
about 'genuine' issues of fact for trial, it still forces public
officials to trial." 515 U. S., at 317. But we concluded that the
strong "countervailing considerations" surrounding appropriate
interpretation of § 1291 were of sufficient importance to outweigh
the officials' interest in avoiding the burdens of litigation.
The "countervailing considerations" at issue here are even
stronger than those presented in
Johnson. When preemption of
state law is at issue, we must respect the "principles [that] are
fundamental to a system of federalism in which the state courts
share responsibility for the application and enforcement of federal
law."
Howlett, 496 U. S., at 372-373. This respect is at its
apex when we confront a claim that federal law requires a State to
undertake something as fundamental as restructuring the operation
of its courts. 13 We therefore cannot agree with petitioners
that
13 We have made it quite clear that it is a matter for each
State to decide how to structure its judicial system. See,
e. g., M. L. B. v. S.
L. J.,
519 U. S. 102, 111 (1996) (States under no obligation to
provide appellate re-
923
§ 1983's recognition of the defense of qualified immunity
preempts a State's consistent application of its neutral procedural
rules, even when those rules deny an interlocutory appeal in this
context.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
dismissing petitioners' appeal is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
view) (citing cases);
Kohl v.
Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293, 299 (1895)
("[T]he right of review in an appellate court is purely a matter of
state concern");
McKane v.
Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 688 (1894)
("[W]hether an appeal should be allowed, and if so, under what
circumstances or on what conditions, are matters for each State to
determine for itself").
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