OPINION OF THE COURT
JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA
545 U. S. ____ (2005)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 04-6964
JAY SHAWN JOHNSON, PETITIONER
v.
CALIFORNIA
on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal of
california, first appellate district
[June 13, 2005]
Justice Stevens delivered the
opinion of the Court.
The Supreme Court of California
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have
provided conflicting answers to the following question: “Whether to
establish a
prima facie case under
Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), the objector must
show that it is more likely than not that the other party’s
peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible
group bias?” Pet. for Cert. i. Because both of those courts
regularly review the validity of convictions obtained in California
criminal trials, respondent, the State of California, agreed to
petitioner’s request that we grant certiorari and resolve the
conflict. We agree with the Ninth Circuit that the question
presented must be answered in the negative, and accordingly reverse
the judgment of the California Supreme Court.
I
Petitioner Jay Shawn Johnson, a
black male, was convicted in a California trial court of
second-degree murder and assault on a white 19-month-old child,
resulting in death. During jury selection, a number of prospective
jurors were removed for cause until 43 eligible jurors remained, 3
of whom were black. The prosecutor used 3 of his 12 peremptory
challenges to remove the black prospective jurors. The resulting
jury, including alternates, was all white.
After the prosecutor exercised
the second of his three peremptory challenges against the
prospective black jurors, defense counsel objected on the ground
that the challenge was unconstitutionally based on race under both
the California and United States Constitutions.
People v.
Johnson, 30 Cal. 4th 1302, 1307, 71 P. 3d 270,
272–273 (2003).[
Footnote 1]
Defense counsel alleged that the prosecutor “had no apparent reason
to challenge this prospective juror ‘other than [her] racial
identity.’ ”
Ibid. (alteration in original). The
trial judge did not ask the prosecutor to explain the rationale for
his strikes. Instead, the judge simply found that petitioner had
failed to establish a prima facie case under the governing state
precedent,
People v.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583
P. 2d 748 (1978), reasoning “ ‘that there’s not been
shown a
strong likelihood that the exercise of the
peremptory challenges were based upon a group rather than an
individual basis,’ ” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1307, 71 P. 3d, at
272 (emphasis added). The judge did, however, warn the prosecutor
that “ ‘we are very close.’ ”
People v.
Johnson, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727, 729 (2001).
Defense counsel made an additional motion the
next day when the prosecutor struck the final remaining prospective
black juror. 30 Cal. 4th, at 1307, 71 P. 3d, at 272. Counsel
argued that the prosecutor’s decision to challenge all of the
prospective black jurors constituted a “systematic attempt to
exclude African-Americans from the jury panel.” 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d,
at 729. The trial judge still did not seek an explanation from the
prosecutor. Instead, he explained that his own examination of the
record had convinced him that the prosecutor’s strikes could be
justified by race-neutral reasons. Specifically, the judge opined
that the black venire members had offered equivocal or confused
answers in their written questionnaires. 30 Cal. 4th, at 1307–1308,
71 P. 3d, at 272–273. Despite the fact that “ ‘the Court
would not grant the challenges for cause, there were answers … at
least on the questionnaires themselves [such] that the Court felt
that there was sufficient basis’ ” for the strikes.
Id., at 1308, 71 P. 3d, at 273 (brackets added).
Therefore, even considering that all of the prospective black
jurors had been stricken from the pool, the judge determined that
petitioner had failed to establish a prima facie case.
The California Court of Appeal set aside the
conviction.
People v.
Johnson, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d
727 (2001). Over the dissent of one judge, the majority ruled that
the trial judge had erred by requiring petitioner to establish a
“strong likelihood” that the peremptory strikes had been
impermissibly based on race. Instead, the trial judge should have
only required petitioner to proffer enough evidence to support an
“inference” of discrimination.[
Footnote 2] The Court of Appeal’s holding relied on
decisions of this Court, prior California case law, and the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in
Wade v.
Terhune, 202 F. 3d 1190
(2000). Applying the proper “reasonable inference” standard, the
majority concluded that petitioner had produced sufficient evidence
to support a prima facie case.
Respondent appealed, and the California
Supreme Court reinstated petitioner’s conviction over the dissent
of two justices. The court stressed that
Batson v.
Kentucky,
476 U. S. 79 (1986), left to state
courts the task of establishing the standards used to evaluate the
sufficiency of defendants’ prima facie cases. 30 Cal. 4th, at 1314,
71 P. 3d, at 277. The court then reviewed
Batson,
Wheeler, and those decisions’ progeny, and concluded that
“
Wheeler’s terms ‘strong likelihood’ and ‘reasonable
inference’ state the same standard”—one that is entirely consistent
with
Batson. 30 Cal. 4th, at 1313, 71 P. 3d, at 277.
A prima facie case under
Batson establishes a
“ ‘legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption,’ ” it does
not merely constitute “enough evidence to
permit the
inference” that discrimination has occurred. 30 Cal. 4th, at
1315, 71 P. 3d, at 278.
Batson, the court held,
“permits a court to require the objector to present, not merely
‘some evidence’ permitting the inference, but ‘strong evidence’
that makes discriminatory intent
more likely than not if
the challenges are not explained.” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1316, 71
P. 3d, at 278. The court opined that while this burden is “not
onerous,” it remains “substantial.”
Ibid., 71 P. 3d,
at 279.
Applying that standard, the court acknowledged
that the case involved the “highly relevant” circumstance that a
black defendant was “charged with killing ‘his White girlfriend’s
child,’ ” and that “it certainly looks suspicious that all
three African-American prospective jurors were removed from the
jury.”
Id., at 1326, 71 P. 3d, at 286. Yet
petitioner’s
Batson showing, the court held, consisted
“primarily of the statistical disparity of peremptory challenges
between African-Americans and others.” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1327, 71
P. 3d, at 287. Although those statistics were indeed
“troubling and, as the trial court stated, the question was close,”
id., at 1328, 71 P. 3d, at 287, the court decided to
defer to the trial judge’s “carefully considered ruling.”
Ibid.[
Footnote 3] We
granted certiorari, but dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction
because the judgment was not yet final.
Johnson v.
California, 541 U. S. 428 (2004)
(per curiam). After the California Court of Appeal decided
the remaining issues, we again granted certiorari. 543 U. S. ___
(2005).
II
The issue in this case is narrow
but important. It concerns the scope of the first of three steps
this Court enumerated in
Batson, which together guide
trial courts’ constitutional review of peremptory strikes. Those
three
Batson steps should by now be familiar. First, the
defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose.” 476 U. S., at 93–94 (citing
Washington v.
Davis,
426 U. S. 229, 239–242
(1976)).[
Footnote 4] Second,
once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden
shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by
offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.
476 U. S., at 94; see also
Alexander v.
Louisiana,
405 U. S. 625, 632
(1972). Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the
trial court must then decide … whether the opponent of the strike
has proved purposeful racial discrimination.”
Purkett v.
Elem,
514
U. S. 765, 767 (1995)
(per curiam).
The question before us is
whether Batson permits California to require at step one that
“the objector must show that it is more likely than not the other
party’s peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on
impermissible group bias.” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1318, 71 P. 3d, at
280. Although we recognize that States do have flexibility in
formulating appropriate procedures to comply with
Batson,
we conclude that California’s “more likely than not” standard is an
inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a
prima facie case.
We begin with
Batson itself, which on
its own terms provides no support for California’s rule. There, we
held that a prima facie case of discrimination can be made out by
offering a wide variety of evidence,[
Footnote 5] so long as the sum of the proffered facts
gives “rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” 476 U. S.,
at 94. We explained that
“a defendant may establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on
evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory
challenges at the defendant’s trial. To establish such a case, the
defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable
racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory
challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s
race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to
which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits ‘those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.’ Finally, the
defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that
practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of
their race.”
Id., at 96 (citations omitted) (quoting
Avery v.
Georgia,
345 U. S. 559, 562
(1953)).
Indeed,
Batson held that
because the petitioner had timely objected to the prosecutor’s
decision to strike “all black persons on the venire,” the trial
court was in error when it “flatly rejected the objection without
requiring the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action.”
476 U. S., at 100. We did not hold that the petitioner had proved
discrimination
. Rather, we remanded the case for further
proceedings because the trial court failed to demand an explanation
from the prosecutor—
i.e., to proceed to
Batson’s
second step—despite the fact that the petitioner’s evidence
supported
an inference of discrimination.
Ibid.
Thus, in describing the burden-shifting
framework, we assumed in
Batson that the trial judge would
have the benefit of all relevant circumstances, including the
prosecutor’s explanation, before deciding whether it was more
likely than not that the challenge was improperly motivated. We did
not intend the first step to be so onerous that a defendant would
have to persuade the judge—on the basis of all the facts, some of
which are impossible for the defendant to know with certainty—that
the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful
discrimination. Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of
Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to
permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has
occurred.
Respondent, however, focuses on
Batson’s ultimate sentence: “If the trial court decides
that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination
and the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral explanation
for his action, our precedents require that petitioner’s conviction
be reversed.”
Ibid. For this to be true, respondent
contends, a
Batson claim must prove the ultimate facts by
a preponderance of the evidence in the prima facie case; otherwise,
the argument goes, a prosecutor’s failure to respond to a prima
facie case would inexplicably entitle a defendant to judgment as a
matter of law on the basis of nothing more than an inference that
discrimination may have occurred. Brief for Respondent 13–18.
Respondent’s argument is misguided.
Batson, of course, explicitly stated that the defendant
ultimately carries the “burden of persuasion” to “ ‘prove the
existence of purposeful discrimination.’ ” 476 U. S., at 93
(quoting
Whitus v.
Georgia,
385 U. S. 545, 550
(1967)). This burden of persuasion “rests with, and never shifts
from, the opponent of the strike.”
Purkett, 514 U. S., at
768. Thus, even if the State produces only a frivolous or utterly
nonsensical justification for its strike, the case does not end—it
merely proceeds to step three.
Ibid.[Footnote 6] The first two
Batson steps
govern the production of evidence that allows the trial court to
determine the persuasiveness of the defendant’s constitutional
claim. “It is not until the
third step that the
persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant—the step in
which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike
has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.”
Purkett, supra, at 768.[
Footnote 7]
Batson’s purposes further support our
conclusion. The constitutional interests
Batson sought to
vindicate are not limited to the rights possessed by the defendant
on trial, see 476 U. S., at 87, nor to those citizens who desire to
participate “in the administration of the law, as jurors,”
Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 308
(1880). Undoubtedly, the overriding interest in eradicating
discrimination from our civic institutions suffers whenever an
individual is excluded from making a significant contribution to
governance on account of his race. Yet the “harm from
discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the
defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community.
Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from
juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of
justice.”
Batson, 476 U. S., at 87; see also
Smith v.
Texas,
311 U. S. 128, 130
(1940) (“For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from
jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our
Constitution and the laws enacted under it but it is at war with
our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative
government” (footnote omitted)).
The
Batson framework is designed to
produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that
discrimination may have infected the jury selection process. See
476 U. S., at 97–98, and n. 20. The inherent uncertainty
present in inquiries of discriminatory purpose counsels against
engaging in needless and imperfect speculation when a direct answer
can be obtained by asking a simple question. See
Paulino
v.
Castro, 371 F. 3d 1083, 1090 (CA9 2004) (“[I]t
does not matter that the prosecutor might have had good reasons …
[w]hat matters is the real reason they were stricken” (emphasis
deleted));
Holloway v.
Horn, 355 F. 3d 707,
725 (CA3 2004) (speculation “does not aid our inquiry into the
reasons the prosecutor actually harbored” for a peremptory strike).
The three-step process thus simultaneously serves the public
purposes
Batson is designed to vindicate and encourages
“prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges without
substantial disruption of the jury selection process.”
Hernandez v.
New York,
500 U. S. 352, 358–359
(1991) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
The disagreements among the state-court judges
who reviewed the record in this case illustrate the imprecision of
relying on judicial speculation to resolve plausible claims of
discrimination. In this case the inference of discrimination was
sufficient to invoke a comment by the trial judge “that ‘we are
very close,’ ” and on review, the California Supreme
acknowledged that “it certainly looks suspicious that all three
African-American prospective jurors were removed from the jury.” 30
Cal. 4th, at 1307, 1326, 71 P. 3d, at 273, 286. Those
inferences that discrimination may have occurred were sufficient to
establish a prima facie case under
Batson.
The facts of this case well illustrate that
California’s “more likely than not” standard is at odds with the
prima facie inquiry mandated by
Batson. The judgment of
the California Supreme Court is therefore reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered
Footnote 1
Petitioner’s state objection was made under
People v.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d
748 (1978).
Footnote 2
In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeal
rejected the notion that a showing of a “ ‘strong
likelihood’ ” is equivalent to a “ ‘reasonable
inference.’ ” To conclude so would “be as novel a proposition
as the idea that ‘clear and convincing evidence’ has always meant a
‘preponderance of the evidence.’ ” 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at
733.
Footnote 3
In dissent, Justice Kennard argued that
“[r]equiring a defendant to persuade the trial court of the
prosecutor’s discriminatory purpose at the first
Wheeler-Batson stage short-circuits the process, and
provides inadequate protection for the defendant’s right to a fair
trial … .” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1333, 71 P. 3d, at 291.
The proper standard for measuring a prima facie case under
Batson is whether the defendant has identified actions by
the prosecutor that, “
if unexplained, permit a reasonable
inference of an improper purpose or motive.” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1339,
71 P. 3d, at 294. Trial judges, Justice Kennard argued, should
not speculate when it is not “apparent that the [neutral]
explanation was the true reason for the challenge.”
Id.,
at 1340, 71 P. 3d, at 295.
Footnote 4
An “inference” is generally understood to be
a “conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a
logical consequence from them.” Black’s Law Dictionary 781 (7th ed.
1999).
Footnote 5
In
Batson, we spoke of the methods
by which prima facie cases could be proved in permissive terms. A
defendant may satisfy his prima facie burden, we said, “by relying
solely on the facts concerning [the selection of the venire]
in
his case.” 476 U. S., at 95 (emphasis in original). We
declined to require proof of a pattern or practice because
“ ‘[a] single invidiously discriminatory governmental act’ is
not ‘immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making
of other comparable decisions.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting
Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.,
429 U.
S. 252, 266, n. 14 (1977)).
Footnote 6
In the unlikely hypothetical in which the
prosecutor declines to respond to a trial judge’s inquiry regarding
his justification for making a strike, the evidence before the
judge would consist not only of the original facts from which the
prima facie case was established, but also the prosecutor’s refusal
to justify his strike in light of the court’s request. Such a
refusal would provide additional support for the inference of
discrimination raised by a defendant’s prima facie case. Cf.
United States ex rel. Vajtauer v.
Commissioner of Immigration,
273 U. S. 103, 111
(1927).
Footnote 7
This explanation comports with our
interpretation of the burden-shifting framework in cases arising
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See,
e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters,
438 U. S. 567,
577 (1978) (noting that the
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,
411
U. S. 792 (1973), framework “is merely a sensible, orderly way
to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears
on the critical question of discrimination”); see also
St.
Mary’s Honor Center v.
Hicks,
509 U. S. 502, 509–510,
and n. 3 (1993) (holding that determinations at steps one and
two of the
McDonnell Douglas framework “can involve no
credibility assessment” because “the burden-of-production
determination necessarily
precedes the
credibility-assessment stage,” and that the burden-shifting
framework triggered by a defendant’s prima face case is essentially
just “a means of ‘arranging the presentation of evidence’ ”
(quoting
Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U. S. 977,
986 (1988)).
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