OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
ILLINOIS
v. WARDLOW
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
No. 98-1036. Argued November 2, 1999-Decided January 12,2000
Respondent Wardlow fled upon seeing a caravan of police vehicles
converge on an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics
trafficking. When Officers Nolan and Harvey caught up with him on
the street, Nolan stopped him and conducted a protective patdown
search for weapons because in his experience there were usually
weapons in the vicinity of narcotics transactions. Discovering a
handgun, the officers arrested Wardlow. The Illinois trial court
denied his motion to suppress, finding the gun was recovered during
a lawful stop and frisk. He was convicted of unlawful use of a
weapon by a felon. In reversing, the State Appellate Court found
that Nolan did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop under
Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1. The State
Supreme Court affirmed, determining that sudden flight in a high
crime area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a
Terry stop because flight may simply be an exercise of the
right to "go on one's way," see
Florida v.
Royer,
460 U. S.
491.
Held: The officers' actions did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. This case, involving a brief encounter between a citizen
and a police officer on a public street, is governed by
Terry, under which an officer who has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot may conduct a
brief, investigatory stop. While "reasonable suspicion" is a less
demanding standard than probable cause, there must be at least a
minimal level of objective justification for the stop. An
individual's presence in a "high crime area," standing alone, is
not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion of
criminal activity, but a location's characteristics are relevant in
determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious
to warrant further investigation,
Adams v.
Williams,
407 U. S.
143,144,147-148. In this case, moreover, it was also Wardlow's
unprovoked flight that aroused the officers' suspicion. Nervous,
evasive behavior is another pertinent factor in determining
reasonable suspicion,
e. g., United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 885, and headlong flight is
the consummate act of evasion. In reviewing the propriety of an
officer's conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies
dealing with inferences from suspicious behavior, and this Court
cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty when none exists.
Thus, the reasonable suspicion determination must be based on
commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. See
120
Syllabus
United States v.
Cortez, 449 U. S. 411,418.
Officer Nolan was justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved
in criminal activity, and, therefore, in investigating further.
Such a holding is consistent with the decision in
Florida v.
Royer, supra, at 498, that an individual, when approached,
has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.
Unprovoked flight is the exact opposite of "going about one's
business." While flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing
criminal activity,
Terry recognized that officers can detain
individuals to resolve ambiguities in their conduct, 392 U. S., at
30, and thus accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent
people. If they do not learn facts rising to the level of probable
cause, an individual must be allowed to go on his way. But in this
case the officers found that Wardlow possessed a handgun and
arrested him for violating a state law. The propriety of that
arrest is not before the Court. pp. 123-126.
183 Ill. 2d 306, 701 N. E. 2d 484, reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined,
post, p.
126.
Richard A. Devine argued the cause for petitioner. With him on
the briefs were James E. Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, Joel
D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, Renee G. Goldfarb, Theodore Fotios
Burtzos, and Veronica Ximena Calderon.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, Deputy
Solicitor General Dreeben, and Deborah Watson.
James B. Koch argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were
Lynn N.
Weisberg and
Thomas
G.
Gardiner. *
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of Ohio et al. by
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney
General of Ohio,
Edward B. Foley, State Solicitor,
Robert C.
Maier and
Alejandro Almaguer,
Assistant Solicitors, and
Thomas R. Keller, Acting Attorney
General of Hawaii, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective States as follows:
Bill Pryor of Alabama,
Ken
Salazar of Colorado,
M. Jane Brady of Delaware,
121
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Wardlow fled upon seeing police officers patrolling
an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Two of the officers
caught up with him, stopped him, and conducted a protective patdown
search for weapons. Discovering a .38-caliber handgun, the officers
arrested Wardlow. We hold that the officers' stop did not violate
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
On September 9, 1995, Officers Nolan and Harvey were working as
uniformed officers in the special operations section of the Chicago
Police Department. The officers were driving the last car of a
four-car caravan converging on an area known for heavy narcotics
trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions. The officers
were traveling together because they expected to find a crowd of
people in the area, including lookouts and customers.
As the caravan passed 4035 West Van Buren, Officer Nolan
observed respondent Wardlow standing next to the building
Alan G.
Lance of Idaho,
Carla J.
Stovall of Kansas,
Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana,
Mike Hatch of Minnesota,
Michael C.
Moore of
Mississippi,
Don Stenberg of Nebraska,
Frankie Sue Del
Papa of Nevada,
Michael P. Easley of North Carolina,
W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma,
Charles M. Condon of
South Carolina,
Mark L. Barnett of South Dakota, and
Mark
L. Earley of Virginia; for the Wayne County Prosecuting
Attorney by
John D. O'Hair, pro se, Timothy A. Baughman, and
Jeffrey Caminsky; for Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement, Inc., et al. by
Wayne W Schmidt, James P.
Manak, and
Richard Weintraub; for the Criminal Justice
Legal Foundation by
Kent S.
Scheidegger and
Charles L. Hobson; and for the National Association of
Police Organizations et al. by
Stephen R. McSpadden.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the
American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Tracey Maclin, Steven R.
Shapiro, Harvey Grossman, and Barbara E. Bergman; for the NAACP
Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., by Elaine R. Jones,
Theodore M. Shaw, George H. Kendall, and Laura E. Hankins; and for
the Rutherford Institute by John W Whitehead and Steven H.
Aden.
122
holding an opaque bag. Respondent looked in the direction of the
officers and fled. Nolan and Harvey turned their car southbound,
watched him as he ran through the gangway and an alley, and
eventually cornered him on the street. Nolan then exited his car
and stopped respondent. He immediately conducted a protective
patdown search for weapons because in his experience it was common
for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics
transactions. During the frisk, Officer Nolan squeezed the bag
respondent was carrying and felt a heavy, hard object similar to
the shape of a gun. The officer then opened the bag and discovered
a .38-caliber handgun with five live rounds of ammunition. The
officers arrested Wardlow.
The Illinois trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress,
finding the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. App.
14. Following a stipulated bench trial, Wardlow was convicted of
unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. The Illinois Appellate Court
reversed Wardlow's conviction, concluding that the gun should have
been suppressed because Officer Nolan did not have reasonable
suspicion sufficient to justify an investigative stop pursuant to
Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). 287
Ill. App. 3d 367, 678 N. E. 2d 65 (1997).
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. 183 Ill. 2d 306, 701 N. E. 2d
484 (1998). While rejecting the Appellate Court's conclusion that
Wardlow was not in a high crime area, the Illinois Supreme Court
determined that sudden flight in such an area does not create a
reasonable suspicion justifying a
Terry stop. 183 Ill. 2d,
at 310, 701 N. E. 2d, at 486. Relying on
Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.
S. 491 (1983), the court explained that although police have
the right to approach individuals and ask questions, the individual
has no obligation to respond. The person may decline to answer and
simply go on his or her way, and the refusal to respond, alone,
does not provide a legitimate basis for an investigative stop. 183
Ill.
123
2d, at 311-312, 701 N. E. 2d, at 486-487. The court then
determined that flight may simply be an exercise of this right to
"go on one's way," and, thus, could not constitute reasonable
suspicion justifying a
Terry stop. 183 Ill. 2d, at 312, 701
N. E. 2d, at 487.
The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected the argument that
flight combined with the fact that it occurred in a high crime area
supported a finding of reasonable suspicion because the "high crime
area" factor was not sufficient standing alone to justify a
Terry stop. Finding no independently suspicious
circumstances to support an investigatory detention, the court held
that the stop and subsequent arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.
We granted certiorari, 526 U. S. 1097 (1999), and now reverse.1
This case, involving a brief encounter between a citizen and a
police officer on a public street, is governed by the analysis we
first applied in
Terry. In
Terry, we held that an
officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief,
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 392 U. S., at 30. While
"reasonable suspicion" is a less demanding standard than probable
cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance
of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal
level of objective justification for making the stop.
United
States v.
Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989). The
officer must be able
1 The state courts have differed on whether unprovoked flight is
sufficient grounds to constitute reasonable suspicion. See,
e.
g., State v.
Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 454 N. W. 2d 763
(1990) (flight alone is sufficient);
Platt v.
State,
589 N. E. 2d 222 (Ind. 1992) (same);
Harris v.
State,
205 Ga. App. 813,423 S. E. 2d 723 (1992) (flight in high crime area
sufficient);
State v.
Hicks, 241 Neb. 357, 488 N. W.
2d 359 (1992) (flight is not enough);
State v.
Tucker, 136 N. J. 158, 642 A. 2d 401 (1994) (same);
People v.
Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 378 N. W. 2d 451
(1985) (same);
People v.
Wilson, 784 P. 2d 325 (Colo.
1989) (same).
124
to articulate more than an "inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or 'hunch'" of criminal activity.
Terry, supra, at
27.2
Nolan and Harvey were among eight officers in a four-car caravan
that was converging on an area known for heavy narcotics
trafficking, and the officers anticipated encountering a large
number of people in the area, including drug customers and
individuals serving as lookouts. App.8. It was in this context that
Officer Nolan decided to investigate Wardlow after observing him
flee. An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal
activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable,
particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.
Brown v.
Texas, 443 U. S. 47 (1979). But
officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of
a location in determining whether the circumstances are
sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.
Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop
occurred in a "high crime area" among the relevant contextual
considerations in a
Terry analysis.
Adams v.
Williams, 407
U. S. 143, 144, 147-148 (1972).
In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent's presence
in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the
officers' suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the
police. Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive
behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.
United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 885
(1975);
Florida v.
Rodriguez, 469 U. S. 1, 6
(1984) (per curiam); United States v.
Sokolow,
supra, at 8-9. Headlong flight-wherever it occurs-is the
consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of
wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such. In reviewing
the propriety of an officer's conduct, courts do not have available
empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious
2We granted certiorari solely on the question whether the
initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Therefore, we
express no opinion as to the lawfulness of the frisk independently
of the stop.
125
behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty
from judges or law enforcement officers where none exists. Thus,
the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on
commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. See
United States v.
Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981).
We conclude Officer Nolan was justified in suspecting that Wardlow
was involved in criminal activity, and, therefore, in investigating
further.
Such a holding is entirely consistent with our decision in
Florida v.
Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983),
where we held that when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a
right to ignore the police and go about his business.
Id.,
at 498. And any "refusal to cooperate, without more, does not
furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a
detention or seizure."
Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 437
(1991). But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to
cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not "going about one's
business"; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing officers
confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate
further is quite consistent with the individual's right to go about
his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police
questioning.
Respondent and
amici also argue that there are innocent
reasons for flight from police and that, therefore, flight is not
necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity. This fact is
undoubtedly true, but does not establish a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Even in
Terry, the conduct justifying the stop
was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation. The
officer observed two individuals pacing back and forth in front of
a store, peering into the window and periodically conferring. 392
U. S., at 5-6. All of this conduct was by itself lawful, but it
also suggested that the individuals were casing the store for a
planned robbery.
Terry recognized that the officers could
detain the individuals to resolve the ambiguity.
Id., at
30.
126
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
In allowing such detentions,
Terry accepts the risk that
officers may stop innocent people. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment
accepts that risk in connection with more drastic police action;
persons arrested and detained on probable cause to believe they
have committed a crime may turn out to be innocent. The
Terry stop is a far more minimal intrusion, simply allowing
the officer to briefly investigate further. If the officer does not
learn facts rising to the level of probable cause, the individual
must be allowed to go on his way. But in this case the officers
found respondent in possession of a handgun, and arrested him for
violation of an Illinois firearms statute. No question of the
propriety of the arrest itself is before us.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed, and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and
JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The State of Illinois asks this Court to announce a "bright-line
rule" authorizing the temporary detention of anyone who flees at
the mere sight of a police officer. Brief for Petitioner 7-36.
Respondent counters by asking us to adopt the opposite
per
se rule-that the fact that a person flees upon seeing the
police can never, by itself, be sufficient to justify a temporary
investigative stop of the kind authorized by
Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 (1968). Brief for Respondent 6-31.
The Court today wisely endorses neither
per se rule.
Instead, it rejects the proposition that "flight is ... necessarily
indicative of ongoing criminal activity,"
ante, at 125,
adhering to the view that "[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion
... is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules," but must be determined by looking to "the
127
totality of the circumstances-the whole picture,"
United
States v.
Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1989)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Abiding by this
framework, the Court concludes that "Officer Nolan was justified in
suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity."
Ante, at 125.
Although I agree with the Court's rejection of the
per se
rules proffered by the parties, unlike the Court, I am persuaded
that in this case the brief testimony of the officer who seized
respondent does not justify the conclusion that he had reasonable
suspicion to make the stop. Before discussing the specific facts of
this case, I shall comment on the parties' requests for a
per
se rule.
I
In
Terry v.
Ohio, we first recognized "that a
police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating
possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause
to make an arrest," 392 U. S., at 22, an authority permitting the
officer to "stop and briefly detain a person for investigative
purposes,"
Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 7. We approved as well "a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has
probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime."
Terry,
392 U. S., at 27. Cognizant that such police intrusion had never
before received constitutional imprimatur on less than probable
cause,
id., at 11-12, 20, we reflected upon the magnitude of
the departure we were endorsing. "Even a limited search," we said,
"constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished
personal security, and it must be an annoying, frightening, and
perhaps humiliating experience."
Id., at 24-25.1
1 We added that a
Terry frisk "is a serious intrusion
upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity
and arouse strong resentment, and is not to be undertaken lightly."
392 U. S., at 17. The resent-
128
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
Accordingly, we recognized only a "narrowly drawn authority"
that is "limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of
weapons."
Id., at 27, 26. An officer conducting an
investigatory stop, we further explained, must articulate "a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity."
United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.
S. 411, 417-418 (1981). That determination, we admonished,
"becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the
conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected
to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate
the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of
the particular circumstances."
Terry, 392 U. S., at 21. In
undertaking that neutral scrutiny "based on all of the
circumstances," a court relies on "certain commonsense conclusions
about human behavior."
Cortez, 449 U. S., at 418; see also
ante, at 125. "[T]he relevant inquiry" concerning the
inferences and conclusions a court draws "is not whether particular
conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that
attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts."
Sokolow,
490 U. S., at 10.
The question in this case concerns "the degree of suspicion that
attaches to" a person's flight-or, more precisely, what
"commonsense conclusions" can be drawn respecting the motives
behind that flight. A pedestrian may break into a run for a variety
of reasons-to catch up with a friend a block or two away, to seek
shelter from an impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the
bus leaves, to get home in time for
ment engendered by that intrusion is aggravated, not mitigated,
if the officer's entire justification for the stop is the belief
that the individual is simply trying to avoid contact with the
police or move from one place to another-as he or she has a right
to do (and do rapidly). See
Chicago v.
Morales,
527 U. S. 41, 53
(1999) (plurality opinion) ("We have expressly identified this
'right to remove from one place to another according to
inclination' as 'an attribute of personal liberty' protected by the
Constitution" (citation omitted));
Florida v.
Bostick, 501
U. S. 429, 437 (1991);
Florida v.
Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 497-498
(1983) (plurality opinion);
Terry, 392 U. S., at 32-33
(Harlan, J., concurring); see also
ante, at 125.
129
dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for rest, to avoid
contact with a bore or a bully, or simply to answer the call of
nature-any of which might coincide with the arrival of an officer
in the vicinity. A pedestrian might also run because he or she has
just sighted one or more police officers. In the latter instance,
the State properly points out "that the fleeing person may be,
inter alia, (1) an escapee from jail; (2) wanted on a
warrant; (3) in possession of contraband, (i. e. drugs, weapons,
stolen goods, etc.); or (4) someone who has just committed another
type of crime." Brief for Petitioner 9, n. 4.2 In short, there are
unquestionably circumstances in which a person's flight is
suspicious, and undeniably instances in which a person runs for
entirely innocent reasons.3
Given the diversity and frequency of possible motivations for
flight, it would be profoundly unwise to endorse either
per
se rule. The inference we can reasonably draw about the
motivation for a person's flight, rather, will depend on a number
of different circumstances. Factors such as the time of day, the
number of people in the area, the character of the neighborhood,
whether the officer was in uniform, the way the runner was dressed,
the direction and speed of the
2 If the fleeing person exercises his or her right to remain
silent after being stopped, only in the third of the State's four
hypothetical categories is the stop likely to lead to probable
cause to make an arrest. And even in the third category, flight
does not necessarily indicate that the officer is "dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual."
Terry v.
Ohio,
392
3 Compare,
e. g., Proverbs 28:1 ("The wicked flee
when no man pursueth: but the righteous are as bold as a lion")
with Proverbs 22:3 ("A shrewd man sees trouble coming and lies low;
the simple walk into it and pay the penalty").
I have rejected reliance on the former proverb in the past,
because its "ivory-towered analysis of the real world" fails to
account for the experiences of many citizens of this country,
particularly those who are minorities. See
California v.
Hodari D., 499
U. S. 621, 630, n. 4 (1991) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). That
this pithy expression fails to capture the total reality of our
world, however, does not mean it is inaccurate in all
instances.
130
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
flight, and whether the person's behavior was otherwise unusual
might be relevant in specific cases. This number of variables is
surely sufficient to preclude either a bright-line rule that always
justifies, or that never justifies, an investigative stop based on
the sole fact that flight began after a police officer appeared
nearby.4
Still, Illinois presses for a
per se rule regarding
"unprovoked flight upon seeing a clearly identifiable police
officer."
Id., at 7. The phrase "upon seeing," as used by
Illinois, apparently assumes that the flight is motivated by the
presence of the police officer. 5 Illinois contends that unprovoked
flight is "an extreme reaction,"
id., at 8, because innocent
people simply do not "flee at the mere sight of the police,"
id., at 24. To be sure, Illinois concedes, an innocent
person-even one distrustful of the police-might "avoid eye contact
or even sneer at the sight of an officer," and that
4 Of course,
Terry itself recognized that sometimes
behavior giving rise to reasonable suspicion is entirely innocent,
but it accepted the risk that officers may stop innocent people.
392 U. S., at 30. And as the Court correctly observes, it is
"undoubtedly true" that innocent explanations for flight exist, but
they do not "establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment."
Ante, at 125. It is equally true, however, that the innocent
explanations make the single act of flight sufficiently ambiguous
to preclude the adoption of a
per se rule.
In
Terry, furthermore, reasonable suspicion was supported
by a concatenation of acts, each innocent when viewed in isolation,
that when considered collectively amounted to extremely suspicious
behavior. See 392 U. S., at 5-7, 22-23. Flight alone, however, is
not at all like a "series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in
itself, but which taken together warran[t] further investigation."
Id., at 22. Nor is flight similar to evidence which in the
aggregate provides "fact on fact and clue on clue afford[ing] a
basis for the deductions and inferences," supporting reasonable
suspicion.
United States v.
Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 419
(1981).
5 Nowhere in Illinois' briefs does it specify what it means by
"unprovoked." At oral argument, Illinois explained that if officers
precipitate a flight by threats of violence, that flight is
"provoked." But if police officers in a patrol car-with lights
flashing and siren sounding-descend upon an individual for the sole
purpose of seeing if he or she will run, the ensuing flight is
"unprovoked." Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18,20.
131
would not justify a
Terry stop or any sort of
per
se inference.
Id., at 8-9. But, Illinois insists,
unprovoked flight is altogether different. Such behavior is so
"aberrant" and "abnormal" that a
per se inference is
justified.
Id., at 8-9, and n.4.
Even assuming we know that a person runs because he sees the
police, the inference to be drawn may still vary from case to case.
Flight to escape police detection, we have said, may have an
entirely innocent motivation:
"[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely
innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of
being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness
to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of
criminal law that 'the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the
righteous are as bold as a lion.' Innocent men sometimes hesitate
to confront a jury-not necessarily because they fear that the jury
will not protect them, but because they do not wish their names to
appear in connection with criminal acts, are humiliated at being
obliged to incur the popular odium of an arrest and trial, or
because they do not wish to be put to the annoyance or expense of
defending themselves." Alberty v. United States,
162 U. S. 499,
511 (1896).
In addition to these concerns, a reasonable person may conclude
that an officer's sudden appearance indicates nearby criminal
activity. And where there is criminal activity there is also a
substantial element of danger-either from the criminal or from a
confrontation between the criminal and the police. These
considerations can lead to an innocent and understandable desire to
quit the vicinity with all speed.6
6 Statistical studies of bystander victimization are rare. One
study attributes this to incomplete recordkeeping and a lack of
officially compiled data. See Sherman, Steele, Laufersweiler,
Hooper, & Julian, Stray Bul-
132
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing
in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing
person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification,
believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous,
apart from any criminal activity associated with the officer's
sudden presence.7 For such a person,
lets and "Mushrooms": Random Shootings of Bystanders in Four
Cities, 1977-1988,5 J. of Quantitative Criminology 297,303 (1989).
Nonetheless, that study, culling data from newspaper reports in
four large cities over an 11-year period, found "substantial
increases in reported bystander killings and woundings in all four
cities."
Id., at 306. From 1986 to 1988, for example, the
study identified 250 people who were killed or wounded in bystander
shootings in the four survey cities.
Id., at 306-311. Most
significantly for the purposes of the present case, the study found
that such incidents "rank at the top of public outrage."
Id., at 299. The saliency of this phenomenon, in turn,
"violate[s] the routine assumptions" of day-to-day affairs, and,
"[w]ith enough frequency ... it shapes the conduct of daily life."
Ibid.
7 See Johnson, Americans' Views on Crime and Law Enforcement:
Survey Findings, Nat. Institute of Justice J. 13 (Sept. 1997)
(reporting study by the Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies in April 1996, which found that 43% of African-Americans
consider "police brutality and harassment of African-Americans a
serious problem" in their own community); President's Comm'n on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The
Police 183-184 (1967) (documenting the belief, held by many
minorities, that field interrogations are conducted
"indiscriminately" and "in an abusive ... manner," and labeling
this phenomenon a "principal problem" causing "friction" between
minorities and the police) (cited in
Terry, 392 U. S., at
14, n. 11); see also Casimir, Minority Men: We Are Frisk Targets,
N. Y. Daily News, Mar. 26,1999, p. 34 (informal survey of 100 young
black and Hispanic men living in New York City; 81 reported having
been stopped and frisked by police at least once; none of the 81
stops resulted in arrests); Brief for NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund as
Amicus Curiae 17-19 (reporting figures
on disproportionate street stops of minority residents in
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and St. Petersburg,
Florida); U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, S.
Smith, Criminal Victimization and Perceptions of Community Safety
in 12 Cities 25 (June 1998) (African-American residents in 12
cities are more than twice as likely to be dissatisfied with police
practices than white residents in same community).
133
unprovoked flight is neither "aberrant" nor "abnormal." 8
Moreover, these concerns and fears are known to the police officers
themselves,9 and are validated by law enforcement investigations
into their own practices.10 Accordingly, the
8 See,
e. g., Kotlowitz, Hidden Casualties: Drug
War's Emphasis on Law Enforcement Takes a Toll on Police, Wall
Street Journal, Jan. 11, 1991, p. A2, col. 1 ("Black leaders
complained that innocent people were picked up in the drug sweeps
.... Some teen-agers were so scared of the task force they ran even
if they weren't selling drugs").
Many stops never lead to an arrest, which further exacerbates
the perceptions of discrimination felt by racial minorities and
people living in high crime areas. See Goldberg, The Color of
Suspicion, N. Y. Times Magazine, June 20, 1999, p. 85 (reporting
that in 2-year period, New York City Police Department Street
Crimes Unit made 45,000 stops, only 9,500, or 20%, of which
resulted in arrest); Casimir,
supra n. 7 (reporting that in
1997, New York City's Street Crimes Unit conducted 27,061
stop-andfrisks, only 4,647 of which, 17%, resulted in arrest). Even
if these data were race neutral, they would still indicate that
society as a whole is paying a significant cost in infringement on
liberty by these virtually random stops. See also n. 1,
supra.
9 The Chief of the Washington, D.
C., Metropolitan Police
Department, for example, confirmed that "sizeable percentages of
Americans todayespecially Americans of color-still view policing in
the United States to be discriminatory, if not by policy and
definition, certainly in its day-to-day application." P. Verniero,
Attorney General of New Jersey, Interim Report of the State Police
Review Team Regarding Allegations of Racial Profiling 46 (Apr. 20,
1999) (hereinafter Interim Report). And a recent survey of 650 Los
Angeles Police Department officers found that 25% felt that"
'racial bias (prejudice) on the part of officers toward minority
citizens currently exists and contributes to a negative interaction
between police and the community.''' Report of the Independent
Comm'n on the Los Angeles Police Department 69 (1991); see also 5
United States Comm'n on Civil Rights, Racial and Ethnic Tensions in
American Communities: Poverty, Inequality and Discrimination, The
Los Angeles Report 26 (June 1999).
10 New Jersey's Attorney General, in a recent investigation into
allegations of racial profiling on the New Jersey Turnpike,
concluded that "minority motorists have been treated differently
[by New Jersey State Troopers] than non-minority motorists during
the course of traffic stops on the New Jersey Turnpike." "[T]he
problem of disparate treatment is real-not imagined," declared the
Attorney General. Not surprisingly,
134
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
evidence supporting the reasonableness of these beliefs is too
pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and too persuasive to
be disparaged as inconclusive or insufficientY In
the report concluded that this disparate treatment "engender[s]
feelings of fear, resentment, hostility, and mistrust by minority
citizens." See Interim Report 4, 7. Recently, the United States
Department of Justice, citing this very evidence, announced that it
would appoint an outside monitor to oversee the actions of the New
Jersey State Police and ensure that it enacts policy changes
advocated by the Interim Report, and keeps records on racial
statistics and traffic stops. See Kocieniewski, U. S. Will Monitor
New Jersey Police on Race Profiling, N. Y. Times, Dec. 23,
1999,
Likewise, the Massachusetts Attorney General investigated
similar allegations of egregious police conduct toward minorities.
The report stated:
"We conclude that Boston police officers engaged in improper,
and unconstitutional, conduct in the 1989-90 period with respect to
stops and searches of minority individuals .... Although we cannot
say with precision how widespread this illegal conduct was, we
believe that it was sufficiently common to justify changes in
certain Department practices.
"Perhaps the most disturbing evidence was that the
scope
of a number of
Terry searches went far beyond anything
authorized by that case and indeed, beyond anything that we believe
would be acceptable under the federal and state constitutions even
where probable cause existed to conduct a full search incident to
an arrest. Forcing young men to lower their trousers, or otherwise
searching inside their underwear, on public streets or in public
hallways, is so demeaning and invasive of fundamental precepts of
privacy that it can only be condemned in the strongest terms. The
fact that not only the young men themselves, but independent
witnesses complained of strip searches, should be deeply alarming
to all members of this community." J. Shannon, Attorney General of
Massachusetts, Report of the Attorney General's Civil Rights
Division on Boston Police Department Practices 60-61 (Dec. 18,
1990).
11 Taking into account these and other innocent motivations for
unprovoked flight leads me to reject Illinois' requested
per
se rule in favor of adhering to a totality-of-the-circumstances
test. This conclusion does not, as Illinois suggests, "establish a
separate
Terry analysis based on the individual
characteristics of the person seized." Reply Brief for Petitioner
14. My rejection of a
per se rule, of course, applies to
members of all races.
It is true, as Illinois points out, that
Terry approved
of the stop and frisk procedure notwithstanding "[t]he wholesale
harassment by certain
135
any event, just as we do not require "scientific certainty" for
our commonsense conclusion that unprovoked flight can sometimes
indicate suspicious motives, see
ante, at 124-125, neither
do we require scientific certainty to conclude that unprovoked
flight can occur for other, innocent reasons.12
The probative force of the inferences to be drawn from flight is
a function of the varied circumstances in which it occurs.
Sometimes those inferences are entirely consistent with the
presumption of innocence, sometimes they justify further
investigation, and sometimes they justify an immediate stop and
search for weapons. These considerations have led us to avoid
categorical rules concerning a person's flight and the presumptions
to be drawn therefrom:
"Few things ... distinguish an enlightened system of judicature
from a rude and barbarous one more than the manner in which they
deal with evidence. The former weighs testimony, whilst the latter,
conscious perhaps of its inability to do so or careless of the
consequences of error, at times rejects whole portions en
masse, and at others converts pieces of evidence into rules of
law by investing with conclusive effect some whose probative force
has been found to be in general considerable .... Our ancestors,
observing that guilty persons usually fled from justice, adopted
the hasty conclusion that it was only the guilty who did so ... so
that under the old law, a man who fled to avoid being tried for
felony forfeited
elements of the police community, of which minority groups,
particularly Negroes, frequently complain." 392 U. S., at 14. But
in this passage,
Terry simply held that such concerns would
not preclude the use of the stop and frisk procedure altogether.
See
id., at 17, n. 14. Nowhere did
Terry suggest that
such concerns cannot inform a court's assessment of whether
reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a particular stop
existed.
12 As a general matter, local courts often have a keener and
more informed sense of local police practices and events that may
heighten these concerns at particular times or locations. Thus, a
reviewing court may accord substantial deference to a local court's
determination that fear of the police is especially acute in a
specific location or at a particular time.
136
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
all his goods even though he were acquitted . In modern times
more correct views have prevailed, and the evasion of or flight
from justice seems now nearly reduced to its true place in the
administration of the criminal law, namely, that of a
circumstance-a fact which it is always of importance to take into
consideration, and combined with others may afford strong evidence
of guilt, but which, like any other piece of presumptive evidence,
it is equally absurd and dangerous to invest with infallibility."
Hickory v. United States, 160 U. S. 408, 419-420
(1896) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Unprovoked flight," in short, describes a category of activity
too broad and varied to permit a
per se reasonable inference
regarding the motivation for the activity. While the innocent
explanations surely do not establish that the Fourth Amendment is
always violated whenever someone is stopped solely on the basis of
an unprovoked flight, neither do the suspicious motivations
establish that the Fourth Amendment is never violated when a
Terry stop is predicated on that fact alone. For these
reasons, the Court is surely correct in refusing to embrace either
per se rule advocated by the parties. The totality of the
circumstances, as always, must dictate the result.13
13 Illinois' reliance on the common law as a conclusive answer
to the issue at hand is mistaken. The sources from which it gleans
guidance focus either on flightfollowing an accusation of criminal
activity, see 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *387 ("For
flight
... on an accusation of treason, felony, or even petit larceny
... is an offence carrying with it a strong presumption of guilt"
(emphasis added in part)), or are less dogmatic than Illinois
contends, compare Brief for Petitioner 15 ("[A] person's flight was
considered ... conclusive proof of guilt") with A. Burrill,
Circumstantial Evidence 472 (1856) ("So impressed was the old
common law with considerations of this kind, that it laid down the
rule, which passed into a maxim,-that flight from justice was
equivalent to confession of guilt .... But this maxim ... was
undoubtedly expressed in too general and sweeping terms").
137
II
Guided by that totality-of-the-circumstances test, the Court
concludes that Officer Nolan had reasonable suspicion to stop
respondent.
Ante, at 125. In this respect, my view differs
from the Court's. The entire justification for the stop is
articulated in the brief testimony of Officer Nolan. Some facts are
perfectly clear; others are not. This factual insufficiency leads
me to conclude that the Court's judgment is mistaken.
Respondent Wardlow was arrested a few minutes after noon on
September 9, 1995. 183 Ill. 2d 306, 308, n. 1, 701 N. E. 2d 484,
485, n. 1 (1998).14 Nolan was part of an eightofficer, four-car
caravan patrol team. The officers were headed for "one of the areas
in the 11th District [of Chicago] that's high [in] narcotics
traffic." App. 8.15 The reason why four cars were in the caravan
was that "[n]ormally in these different areas there's an enormous
amount of people, sometimes lookouts, customers."
Ibid.
Officer Nolan testified that he was in uniform on that day, but he
did not recall whether he was driving a marked or an unmarked car.
Id., at 4.
Officer Nolan and his partner were in the last of the four
patrol cars that "were all caravaning eastbound down Van Buren."
Id., at 8. Nolan first observed respondent "in front of 4035
West Van Buren."
Id., at 7. Wardlow "looked in our direction
and began fleeing."
Id., at 9. Nolan then "began driving
southbound down the street observing [respondent] running through
the gangway and the alley southbound," and observed that Wardlow
was carrying a white,
14 At the suppression hearing, the State failed to present
testimony as to the time of respondent's arrest. The Illinois
Supreme Court, however, took notice of the time recorded in Officer
Nolan's arrest report. See 183 Ill. 2d, at 308, n. 1, 701 N. E. 2d,
at 485, n. 1.
15 The population of the 11th district is over 98,000 people.
See Brief for the National Association of Police Organizations et
al. as
Amici Curiae App. II.
138
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
opaque bag under his arm.
Id., at 6, 9. After the car
turned south and intercepted respondent as he "ran right towards
us," Officer Nolan stopped him and conducted a "protective search,"
which revealed that the bag under respondent's arm contained a
loaded handgun.
Id., at 9-11.
This terse testimony is most noticeable for what it fails to
reveal. Though asked whether he was in a marked or unmarked car,
Officer Nolan could not recall the answer.
Id., at 4. He was
not asked whether any of the other three cars in the caravan were
marked, or whether any of the other seven officers were in uniform.
Though he explained that the size of the caravan was because
"[n]ormally in these different areas there's an enormous amount of
people, sometimes lookouts, customers," Officer Nolan did not
testify as to whether
anyone besides Wardlow was nearby 4035
West Van Buren. Nor is it clear that that address was the intended
destination of the caravan. As the Appellate Court of Illinois
interpreted the record, "it appears that the officers were simply
driving by, on their way to some unidentified location, when they
noticed defendant standing at 4035 West Van Buren." 287 Ill. App.
3d 367, 370-371, 678 N. E. 2d 65, 67 (1997).16 Officer Nolan's
testimony also does not reveal how fast the officers were driving.
It does not indicate whether he saw respondent notice the other
patrol cars. And it does not say whether the caravan, or any part
of it, had already passed Wardlow by before he began to run.
Indeed, the Appellate Court thought the record was even "too
vague to support the inference that ... defendant's flight was
related to his expectation of police focus on him."
Id., at
371, 678 N. E. 2d, at 67. Presumably, respondent did not react to
the first three cars, and we cannot even be sure that he recognized
the occupants of the fourth as police officers. The adverse
inference is based entirely on the officer's
16 Of course, it would be a different case if the officers had
credible information respecting that specific street address which
reasonably led them to believe that criminal activity was afoot in
that narrowly defined area.
139
statement: "He looked in our direction and began fleeing."
App.9.17
No other factors sufficiently support a finding of reasonable
suspicion. Though respondent was carrying a white, opaque bag under
his arm, there is nothing at all suspicious about that. Certainly
the time of day-shortly after noondoes not support Illinois'
argument. Nor were the officers "responding to any call or report
of suspicious activity in the area." 183 Ill. 2d, at 315, 701 N. E.
2d, at 488. Officer Nolan did testify that he expected to find "an
enormous amount of people," including drug customers or lookouts,
App. 8, and the Court points out that "[i]t was in this context
that Officer Nolan decided to investigate Wardlow after observing
him flee,"
ante, at 124. This observation, in my view, lends
insufficient weight to the reasonable suspicion analysis; indeed,
in light of the absence of testimony that anyone else was nearby
when respondent began to run, this observation points in the
opposite direction.
The State, along with the majority of the Court, relies as well
on the assumption that this flight occurred in a high crime area.
Even if that assumption is accurate, it is insufficient because
even in a high crime neighborhood unprovoked flight does not
invariably lead to reasonable suspicion. On the contrary, because
many factors providing innocent motivations for unprovoked flight
are concentrated in high crime areas, the character of the
neighborhood arguably makes an inference of guilt less appropriate,
rather than more so. Like unprovoked flight itself, presence in a
high crime neighborhood is a fact too generic and susceptible to
innocent explanation to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry.
See
Brown v.
Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979);
see also n. 15,
supra.
17 Officer Nolan also testified that respondent "was looking
at us," App. 5 (emphasis added), though this minor
clarification hardly seems sufficient to support the adverse
inference.
140
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
It is the State's burden to articulate facts sufficient to
support reasonable suspicion.
Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.
S., at 52; see also
Florida v.
Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983)
(plurality opinion). In my judgment, Illinois has failed to
discharge that burden. I am not persuaded that the mere fact that
someone standing on a sidewalk looked in the direction of a passing
car before starting to run is sufficient to justify a forcible stop
and frisk.
I therefore respectfully dissent from the Court's judgment to
reverse the court below.
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