BREYER, J., DISSENTING
HEMI GROUP, LLC V. CITY OF NEW YORK
559 U. S. ____ (2010)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 08-969
HEMI GROUP, LLC and KAI GACHUPIN, PETITIONERS
v. CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the second circuit
[January 25, 2010]
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice
Stevens and Justice Kennedy join, dissenting.
In my view, the Hemi Group’s
failure to provide New York State with the names and addresses of
its New York City cigarette customers proximately caused New York
City to lose tobacco tax revenue. I dissent from the Court’s
contrary holding.
I
A
Although the ultimate legal issue
is a simple one, the statutory framework within which it arises is
complex. As the majority points out,
ante, at 3, the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.
S. C. §§1961–1968, provides a private cause of action (and
treble damages) to “[a]ny person injured in” that person’s
“business or property
by reason of” conduct that involves
a “pattern of racketeering activity.” §§1964(c) (emphasis added),
1962. RICO defines “racketeering activity” to include violations of
various predicate criminal statutes including mail and wire fraud.
§1961(1). The “pattern of racketeering” at issue here consists of
repeated instances of mail fraud, which in turn consist largely of
violations of the federal Jenkins Act, 15 U. S. C.
§§375–378
. That Act seeks to help States collect tobacco
taxes by requiring out-of-state cigarette sellers, such as Hemi, to
file reports with state tobacco tax administrators identifying the
names and addresses of in-state customers and the amounts they
purchased. The violations consist of Hemi’s intentional failure to
do so.
As the majority points out, we
must assume for present purposes that an intentional failure to
file Jenkins Act reports counts as mail fraud (at least where the
failure is part of a scheme that includes use of the mails).
Ante, at 4. Lower courts have sometimes so held. See
United States v.
Melvin, 544 F. 2d 767,
773–777 (CA5 1977);
United States v.
Brewer, 528
F. 2d 492, 497–498 (CA4 1975). The Court of Appeals here so
held.
City of New York v.
Smokes-Spirits.com,
Inc., 541 F. 3d 425, 446 (CA2 2008). And no one has
challenged that holding.
We must also assume that Hemi’s “intentiona[l]
conceal[ment]” of the name/address/purchase information, Second Am.
Compl. ¶¶103, 104, is the legal equivalent of an affirmative
representation that Hemi had no New York City customers. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts §551, p. 119 (1976) (a person “who
fails to disclose … a fact” may be “subject to … liability” as if
“he had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has
failed to disclose”); cf.
Stewart v.
Wyoming Cattle
Ranche Co.,
128
U. S. 383, 388 (1888) (concealment or suppression of material
fact equivalent to a false representation). On these assumptions,
the question before us is whether New York City’s loss of tax
revenues constitutes an injury to its “business or property by
reason of” Hemi’s Jenkins Act misrepresentations.
B
The case arises as a result of
the District Court’s dismissal of New York City’s RICO complaint.
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Hence we must answer the question in
light of the facts alleged, taking as true the facts pleaded in the
complaint (along with the “RICO statement” submitted pursuant to
the District Court’s rule).
Bridge v.
Phoenix Bond
& Indemnity Co., 553 U. S. ___, ___, n. 1 (2008)
(slip op., at 1, n. 1). Those facts (as I interpret them) include
the following:
1. New York State (or State) and New York City (or
City) both impose tobacco taxes on New York cigarette buyers.
Second Am. Compl. ¶37.
2. Both City and State normally collect the taxes from in-state
cigarette sellers, who, in turn, charge retail customers.
Id., ¶¶4, 6.
3. Hemi, an out-of-state company, sells cigarettes over the
Internet to in-state buyers at prices that are lower than in-state
cigarette prices. The difference in price is almost entirely
attributable to the fact that Hemi’s prices do not include any
charge for New York taxes. Hemi advertises its cigarettes as “tax
free” and often adds that it “does not report any sales activity to
any State taxing authority.”
Id., ¶¶2, 6, 108b (internal
quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted).
4. New York State normally receives Jenkins Act reports from
out-of-state sellers. It is contractually obliged to pass the
information on to New York City (and I assume it normally does so).
Id., ¶¶8–9, 11, 54–57.
5. When it receives Jenkins-Act-type information, New York City
writes letters to resident customers asking them to pay the tobacco
tax they owe. As a result, New York City collects about 40% of the
tax due. (By doing so, in 2005 the City obtained $400,000 out of $1
million owed.)
Id., ¶¶58–59.
6. Hemi has consistently and intentionally failed to file
Jenkins Act reports in order to prevent both State and City from
collecting the tobacco taxes that Hemi’s in-state customers owe and
which otherwise many of those customers would pay.
Id.,
¶¶13, 24, 58.
II
A
The majority asks whether New
York City stated a valid cause of action in alleging that it lost
tobacco tax revenue “by reason of” Hemi’s unlawful
misrepresentations. The facts just set forth make clear that we
must answer that question affirmatively. For one thing, no one
denies that Hemi’s misrepresentation was a “but-for” condition of
New York City’s loss. In the absence of the misrepresentation,
i.e., had Hemi told New York State the truth about its New
York City customers, New York City would have written letters to
the purchasers and obtained a significant share of the tobacco
taxes buyers owed.
For another thing, New York
City’s losses are “reasonably foreseeable” results of the
misrepresentation. It is foreseeable that, without the
name/address/purchase information, New York City would not be able
to write successful dunning letters, and it is foreseeable that,
with that information, it would be able to write successful dunning
letters. Indeed, that is a natural inference from, among other
things, the complaint’s assertion that Hemi advertised that it did
not “report” sales information to “State taxing authorit[ies].”
See,
e.g., Smith v.
Bolles,
132 U. S. 125, 130
(1889) (for causation purposes, “ ‘those results are proximate
which the wrong-doer from his position must have contemplated as
the probable consequence of his fraud or breach of contract’ ”
(quoting
Crater v.
Binninger, 33
N. J. L. 513, 518 (Ct. Errors and Appeals 1869)); see
also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and
Keeton on Law of Torts §110, p. 767 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter
Prosser and Keeton); 3 S. Speiser, C. Krause, & A. Gans,
The American Law of Torts §11:3, p. 68 (2003) (“By far the
most treated and most discussed aspect of the law of proximate or
legal cause is the so-called doctrine of foreseeability”). But cf.
ante, at 9 (“The dissent would have RICO’s proximate cause
requirement turn on foreseeability …”).
Further, Hemi misrepresented the relevant
facts
in order to bring about New York City’s relevant
loss. It knew the loss would occur; it
intended the loss
to occur; one might even say it
desired the loss to occur.
It is difficult to find common-law cases denying liability for a
wrongdoer’s intended consequences, particularly where those
consequences are also foreseeable. Cf.
Bridge, supra, at
___–___ (slip op., at 9–10) (“[S]uppose an enterprise that wants to
get rid of rival businesses mails representations about them to
their customers and suppliers, but not to the rivals themselves. If
the rival businesses lose money as a result of the
misrepresentations, it would certainly seem that they were injured
in their business ‘by reason of’ a pattern of mail fraud …”);
N. M. ex rel. Caleb v.
Daniel E., 2008 UT 1,
¶7, n. 3, 175 P. 3d 566, 569, n. 3 (“[I]f an unskilled
marksman were to shoot a single bullet at a distant individual with
the intent of killing her, that individual’s injury or death may
not be the natural and probable consequence of the [shooter’s]
act[,] … [but] the harm would not be an accident because the
shooter intended the harm, even though the likelihood of success
was improbable”); 1 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts,
§7.13, p. 584 (1956) (explaining that, ordinarily, “all intended
consequences” of an intentional act “are proximate”).
In addition, New York City’s revenue loss
falls squarely within the bounds of the kinds of harms that the
Jenkins Act (essentially the predicate statute) seeks to prevent.
The statute is entitled “An Act To assist States in collecting
sales and use taxes on cigarettes.” 63 Stat. 884. I have no reason
to believe the Act intends any different result with respect to
collection of a city’s tobacco tax assessed under the authority of
state law. See N. Y. Unconsol. Law Ann. §9436(1) (West Supp.
2009) (authorizing cities with over one million inhabitants to
impose their own cigarette taxes). The Restatement (Second) of
Torts explains that where
“a statute requires information to be furnished …
for the protection of a particular class of persons, one who makes
a fraudulent misrepresentation … is subject to liability to the
persons for pecuniary loss … in a transaction of the kind in which
the statute is intended to protect them.” §536, at 77 (1976).
See also §536, Appendix (citing supporting cases in
the Reporter’s Note).
Finally, we have acknowledged that “Congress
modeled §1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the federal
antitrust laws,” and we have therefore looked to those laws as an
interpretive aid in RICO cases.
Holmes v.
Securities
Investor Protection Corporation,
503 U. S. 258, 267, 268
(1992). I can find no antitrust analogy that suggests any lack of
causation here, nor has the majority referred to any such
analogical antitrust circumstance.
The upshot is that the harm is foreseeable; it
is a consequence that Hemi intended, indeed desired; and it falls
well within the set of risks that Congress sought to prevent.
Neither antitrust analogy nor any statutory policy of which I am
aware precludes a finding of “proximate cause.” I recognize that
some of our opinions may be read to suggest that the words “by
reason of” in RICO do not perfectly track common-law notions of
proximate cause. See,
e.g.,
Bridge, 553 U. S., at
___–___ (slip op., at 14–16). But where so much basic common law
argues in favor of such a finding, how can the Court avoid that
conclusion here?
B
The majority bases its contrary
conclusion upon three special circumstances and its reading of two
of this Court’s prior cases. In my view, none of the three
circumstances precludes finding causation (indeed two are not even
relevant to the causation issue). Nor can I find the two prior
cases controlling.
The three circumstances are the
following: First, the majority seems to argue that the intervening
voluntary acts of third parties, namely, the customers’ own
independent failures to pay the tax, cuts the causal chain.
Ante, at 8 (“[T]he City’s harm was directly caused by the
customers, not Hemi”); see
Saugerties Bank v.
Delaware
& Hudson Co., 236 N. Y. 425, 430, 141 N. E. 904,
905 (1923) (third party’s forgery of a bill of lading an
intervening cause); Prosser and Keeton §44, at 313–314 (collecting
cases on intervening intentional or criminal acts). But an
intervening third-party act, even if criminal, does not cut a
causal chain where the intervening act is foreseeable and the
defendant’s conduct
increases the risk of its occurrence.
See
Lillie v.
Thompson,
332 U. S. 459, 462
(1947)
(per curiam); Horan v.
Watertown,
217 Mass. 185, 186, 104 N. E. 464, 465 (1914); see also
Restatement (Second) of Torts §435A, at 454 (1963–1964)
(intentional tortfeasor liable for intended harm “except where the
harm results from an outside force the risk of which is not
increased by the defendant’s act”). Hemi’s act here did increase
the risk that New York City would not be paid; and not only was the
risk foreseeable, but Hemi’s advertising strongly suggests that
Hemi actually knew nonreporting would likely bring about this very
harm.
The majority claims that “directness,” rather
than foreseeability, should be our guide in assessing proximate
cause, and that the lack of a “direct” relationship in this case
precludes a finding of proximate causation.
Ante, at 9–10.
But courts used this concept of directness in tort law to expand
liability (for direct consequences)
beyond what was
foreseeable, not to eliminate liability for what was foreseeable.
Thus, under the “directness” theory of proximate causation, there
is liability for both “all ‘direct’ (or ‘directly traceable’)
consequences
and those indirect consequences that are
foreseeable.” Prosser and Keeton §42, at 273 (emphasis added);
see also
id., §43, at 294, and n. 17 (citing
Nunan v.
Bennett, 184 Ky. 591, 212 S. W. 570
(1919)). I do not read this Court’s opinions in
Holmes or
Anza v.
Ideal Steel Supply Corp.,
547 U. S. 451 (2006), to
invoke anything other than this traditional understanding.
Second, the majority correctly points out that
Hemi misrepresented the situation to the State, not to the City—a
circumstance which, the majority believes, significantly separates
misrepresentation from harm.
Ante, at 8. But how could
that be so? New York State signed a contract promising to relay
relevant information to the City. In respect to that relevant
information, the State is a conduit, indeed roughly analogous to a
postal employee. This Court has recognized specifically that “under
the common law a fraud may be established when the defendant has
made use of a third party to reach the target of the fraud.”
Tanner v.
United States,
483 U. S. 107, 129
(1987). The treatises say the same. See,
e.g., Prosser and
Keeton §107, at 743–745; 26 C. J. S., Fraud §47, p. 1121
(1921) (collecting cases); see also Prosser, Misrepresentation and
Third Parties, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 231, 240–241, and nn. 56–59,
62–64 (1966) (collecting cases). This Court has never suggested the
contrary, namely, that a defendant is
not liable for
(foreseeable) harm (intentionally) caused to the target of a scheme
to defraud
simply because the misrepresentation was
transmitted via a third (or even a fourth or fifth) party. Cf.
Terry, Intent to Defraud, 25 Yale L. J. 87, 93 (1915) (“When a
representation is communicated through one person to another in
such circumstances that it can be deemed to be directed to the
latter, it makes no difference through how many persons or by how
circuitous a route it reaches the latter …”).
Third, the majority places great weight upon
its view that Hemi tried to defraud the State, not the City.
Ante, at 8–9. Hemi, however, sought to defraud both. Third
Amended RICO Statement ¶d (explaining that “[e]very other State or
local government that imposes a use tax on cigarettes and whose
residents purchase cigarettes” from Hemi is a victim of its scheme
to defraud). Hemi sought to prevent the State from collecting state
taxes; and it sought to prevent the City from collecting city
taxes. Here we are concerned only with the latter. In respect to
the latter, the State was an information conduit. The fact that
state taxes were also involved is beside the point.
The two Supreme Court cases to which the
majority refers involve significantly different causal
circumstances.
Ante, at 5–8. The predicate acts in
Holmes—the defendant’s acts that led to the plaintiff’s
harm—consisted of securities frauds. The defendant misrepresented
the prospects of one company and misled the investing public into
falsely believing that it could readily buy and sell the stock of
another. When the truth came out, stock prices fell, investors
(specifically, stockbrokers) lost money, and since the stockbrokers
could not pay certain creditors, those creditors also lost money.
503 U. S., at 262–263. Claiming subrogation to stand in the shoes
of the creditors, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
sued.
Id., at 270–271.
Since the creditors had not bought the
securities, there was little reason to believe the defendant
intended their harm. And the securities statutes seek, first and
foremost, to protect investors, not creditors of those who sell
stock to those investors. The latter harm (a broker’s creditor’s
loss) differs in kind from the harm that the “predicate act”
statute primarily seeks to avoid and that its violation would
ordinarily cause (namely, investors’ stock-related monetary
losses). As Part II–A,
supra, points out, neither of these
circumstances is present here.
In
Anza, the plaintiff was a business
competitor of the defendants. The plaintiff claimed that the
defendants falsely told state officials that they did not owe sales
tax. The plaintiff added that, had the defendants paid the tax they
owed, the defendants would have had less money available to run
their business, and the plaintiff consequently would have been able
to compete against them more effectively. 547 U. S., at 454,
457–458.
Again, in
Anza the
kind of
harm that the plaintiff alleged is not the
kind of
harm that the tax statutes primarily seek to prevent. Rather,
it alleged a kind of harm (competitive injury) that tax violations
do not ordinarily cause and which ordinarily flows from the regular
operation of a competitive marketplace. Thus, in both
Holmes and
Anza, unlike the present case,
plaintiffs alleged special harm, neither squarely within the class
of harms at which the relevant statutes were directed, nor of a
kind that typical violators would intend or even foresee.
Bridge, which the majority seeks to
distinguish,
ante, at 11–12, is a more closely analogous
case. The defendants in that case directed agents to misrepresent
to a county that they qualified as independent bidders at a
county-run property auction. They consequently participated in the
auction. And the plaintiffs, facing additional bidders, lost some
of the property that they otherwise would have won—all to their
financial disadvantage. 553 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4).
The harm was foreseeable; it was intended; and it was precisely the
kind of harm that the county’s bidding rules sought to prevent.
Thus this Court held that the harm was “a foreseeable and natural
consequence of [the defendants’] scheme.”
Id., at ___
(slip op., at 18).
In sum, the majority recognizes that
“[p]roximate cause for RICO purposes … should be evaluated in light
of its common law foundations,”
ante, at 6, but those
foundations do not support the majority’s view. Moreover, the
majority’s rationale would free from RICO liability defendants who
would appear to fall within its intended scope. Consider, for
example, a group of defendants who use a marketing firm (in RICO
terms, an “enterprise”) to perpetrate a variation on a “pump and
dump” scheme. See,
e.g., United States v.
Salmonese, 352 F. 3d 608, 612 (CA2 2003). They
deliberately and repeatedly make egregiously fraudulent
misrepresentations to inflate the price of securities that,
unbeknownst to investors, they own. After the stock price rises,
the defendants sell at an artificial profit. When the fraud is
revealed, the price crashes, to the investors’ detriment. Suppose
the defendants have intentionally spoken directly only to
intermediaries who simply
repeated the information to
potential investors, and have not had any contact with the
investors themselves. Under the majority’s reasoning, these
defendants apparently did not proximately cause the investors’
losses and are not liable under RICO.
III
If there is causation, we must
decide whether, for RICO purposes, the City’s loss of tax revenue
is “ ‘business or property’ under 18 U. S. C. §1964(c).”
Ante, at 5 (acknowledging, but not reaching, this second
issue). The question has led to concern among the lower courts.
Some fear that an affirmative answer would turn RICO into a tax
collection statute, permitting States to bring RICO actions and
recover treble damages for behavior that amounts to no more than a
failure to pay taxes due. See,
e.g., Michigan, Dept.
of Treasury, Revenue Div. v.
Fawaz, No. 86–1809, 1988
WL 44736, *2 (CA6 1988) (holding that tax revenue is not RICO
“property” lest district courts become “collection agencies for
unpaid state taxes”);
Illinois Dept. of Revenue v.
Phillips, 771 F. 2d 312, 316, 312 (CA7 1985)
(holding, “reluctantly,” that “a state’s Department of Revenue may
file suit in federal court for treble damages under [RICO] against
a retailer who files fraudulent state sales tax returns”).
In a related context, however,
the Department of Justice has taken steps to avoid the “tax
collection agency” problem without reading all tax-related frauds
out of similar federal criminal statutes. The Department’s
prosecution guidelines require prosecutors considering a
tax-related mail fraud or wire fraud or bank fraud prosecution (or
a related RICO prosecution) to obtain approval from high-level
Department officials. And those guidelines specify that the
Department will grant that approval only where there is at issue “a
large fraud loss or a substantial pattern of conduct” and will not
do so, absent “unusual circumstances,” in cases involving simply
“one person’s tax liability.” Dept. of Justice, United States
Attorneys’ Manual §6–4.210(A) (2007), online at http://www.justice.
gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title6/4mtax.htm (as visited
Jan. 20, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); see
also §6–4.210(B) (explaining that the Department “will not
authorize the use of mail, wire or bank fraud charges to convert
routine tax prosecutions into RICO … cases”).
This case involves an extensive pattern of
fraudulent conduct, large revenue losses, and many different
unrelated potential taxpayers. The Department’s guidelines would
appear to authorize prosecution in these circumstances. And
limiting my consideration to these circumstances, I would find that
this RICO complaint asserts a valid harm to “business or property.”
I need not and do not express a view as to how or whether RICO’s
civil action provisions apply to simpler instances of individual
tax liability.
This conclusion is virtually compelled by
Pasquantino v.
United States,
544 U. S. 349
(2005)
, a case that we decided only five years ago. We
there pointed out that the right to uncollected taxes is an
“entitlement to collect money . . . , the possession of which is
‘something of value.’ ”
Id., at 355 (quoting
McNally v.
United States,
483 U. S. 350, 358
(1987)). Such an entitlement “has long been thought to be a species
of property.” 544 U. S., at 356 (citing 3 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 153–155 (1768)). And “fraud at
common law included a scheme to deprive a victim of his entitlement
to money.” 544 U. S., at 356. We observed that tax evasion
“inflict[s] an economic injury no less than” the “embezzle[ment]
[of] funds from the … treasury.”
Ibid. And we consequently
held that “Canada’s right to uncollected excise taxes on the liquor
petitioners imported into Canada” is “ ‘property’ ”
within the terms of the mail fraud statute.
Id., at
355.
Hemi points in reply to our decision in
Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal.,
405 U. S. 251 (1972).
But that case involved not a loss of tax revenues, but “injury to
the general economy of a State”—insofar as it was threatened by
violations of antitrust law.
Id., at 260. Hawaii’s
interest, both more general and derivative of harm to individual
businesses, differs significantly from the particular tax loss at
issue in
Pasquantino and directly at issue here.
We have previously made clear that the
compensable injury for RICO purposes is the harm caused by the
predicate acts. See generally
Sedima,
S. P. R. L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 495–496
(1985); cf.
Cleveland v.
United States,
531 U. S. 12, 25 (2000).
I can find no convincing reason in the context of this case to
distinguish in the circumstances present here between “property” as
used in the mail fraud statute and “property” as used in RICO.
Hence, I would postpone for another day the question whether RICO
covers instances where little more than the liability of an
individual taxpayer is at issue. And I would find in the
respondent’s favor here.
With respect, I dissent.
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