OPINION OF THE COURT
HARDT V. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INS. CO.
560 U. S. ____ (2010)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 09-448
BRIDGET HARDT, PETITIONER
v. RELIANCE
STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit
[May 24, 2010]
Justice Thomas delivered the
opinion of the Court.
In most lawsuits seeking relief
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §1001
et seq.,
“a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs” are available “to either
party” at the court’s “discretion.” §1132(g)(1). The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has interpreted §1132(g)(1) to
require that a fee claimant be a “prevailing party” before he may
seek a fees award. We reject this interpretation as contrary to
§1132(g)(1)’s plain text. We hold instead that a court “in its
discretion” may award fees and costs “to either party,”
ibid., as long as the fee claimant has achieved “some
degree of success on the merits,”
Ruckels- haus v.
Sierra Club,
463 U. S. 680, 694 (1983).
I
In 2000, while working as an
executive assistant to the president of textile manufacturer Dan
River, Inc., petitioner Bridget Hardt began experiencing neck and
shoulder pain. Her doctors eventually diagnosed her with carpal
tunnel syndrome. Because surgeries on both her wrists failed to
alleviate her pain, Hardt stopped working in January 2003.
In August 2003, Hardt sought
long-term disability benefits from Dan River’s Group Long-Term
Disability Insurance Program Plan (Plan). Dan River administers the
Plan, which is subject to ERISA, but respondent Reliance Standard
Life Insurance Company decides whether a claimant qualifies for
benefits under the Plan and underwrites any benefits awarded.
Reliance provisionally approved Hardt’s claim, telling her that
final approval hinged on her performance in a functional capacities
evaluation intended to assess the impact of her carpal tunnel
syndrome and neck pain on her ability to work.
Hardt completed the functional capacities
evaluation in October 2003. The evaluator summarized Hardt’s
medical history, observed her resulting physical limitations, and
ultimately found that Hardt could perform some amount of sedentary
work. Based on this finding, Reliance concluded that Hardt was not
totally disabled within the meaning of the Plan and denied her
claim for disability benefits. Hardt filed an administrative
appeal. Reliance reversed itself in part, finding that Hardt was
totally disabled from her regular occupation, and was therefore
entitled to temporary disability benefits for 24 months.
While her administrative appeal was pending,
Hardt began experiencing new symptoms in her feet and calves,
including tingling, pain, and numbness. One of her physicians
diagnosed her with small-fiber neuropathy, a condition that
increased her pain and decreased her physical capabilities over the
ensuing months.
Hardt eventually applied to the Social
Security Administration for disability benefits under the Social
Security Act. Her application included questionnaires completed by
two of her treating physicians, which described Hardt’s symptoms
and stated the doctors’ conclusion that Hardt could not return to
full gainful employment because of her neuropathy and other
ailments. In February 2005, the Social Security Administration
granted Hardt’s application and awarded her disability
benefits.
About two months later, Reliance told Hardt
that her Plan benefits would expire at the end of the 24-month
period. Reliance explained that under the Plan’s terms, only
individuals who are “totally disabled from all occupations” were
eligible for benefits beyond that period, App. to Pet. for Cert.
36a, and adhered to its conclusion that, based on its review of
Hardt’s records, Hardt was not “totally disabled” as defined by the
Plan. Reliance also demanded that Hardt pay Reliance $14,913.23 to
offset the disability benefits she had received from the Social
Security Administration. (The Plan contains a provision
coordinating benefits with Social Security payments.) Hardt paid
Reliance the offset.
Hardt then filed another administrative
appeal. She gave Reliance all of her medical records, the
questionnaires she had submitted to the Social Security
Administration, and an updated questionnaire from one of her
physicians. Reliance asked Hardt to supplement this material with
another functional capacities evaluation. When Reliance referred
Hardt for the updated evaluation, it did not ask the evaluator to
review Hardt for neuropathic pain, even though it knew that Hardt
had been diagnosed with neuropathy after her first evaluation.
Hardt appeared for the updated evaluation in
December 2005, and appeared for another evaluation in January 2006.
The evaluators deemed both evaluations invalid because Hardt’s
efforts were “submaximal.”
Id., at 37a. One evaluator
recorded that Hardt “refused multiple tests … for fear of
nausea/illness/further pain complaints.”
Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Lacking an updated functional capacities
evaluation, Reliance hired a physician and a vocation
rehabilitation counselor to help it resolve Hardt’s administrative
appeal. The physician did not examine Hardt; instead, he reviewed
some, but not all, of Hardt’s medical records. Based on that
review, the physician produced a report in which he opined that
Hardt’s health was expected to improve. His report, however, did
not mention Hardt’s pain medications or the questionnaires that
Hardt’s attending physicians had completed as part of her
application for Social Security benefits. The vocational
rehabilitation counselor, in turn, performed a labor market study
(based on Hardt’s health in 2003) that identified eight employment
opportunities suitable for Hardt. After reviewing the physician’s
report, the labor market study, and the results of the 2003
functional capacities evaluation, Reliance concluded that its
decision to terminate Hardt’s benefits was correct. It advised
Hardt of this decision in March 2006.
After exhausting her administrative remedies,
Hardt sued Reliance in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. She alleged that Reliance violated
ERISA by wrongfully denying her claim for long-term disability
benefits. See §1132(a)(1)(B). The parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, both of which the District Court denied.
The court first rejected Reliance’s request
for summary judgment affirming the denial of benefits, finding that
“Reliance’s decision to deny benefits was based on incomplete
information.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a. Most prominently, none of
the functional capacities evaluations to which Hardt had submitted
had “assessed the impact of neuropathy and neuropathic pain on Ms.
Hardt.”
Ibid. In addition, the reviewing physician’s
report “was itself incomplete”; the basis for the physician’s
“medical conclusions [wa]s extremely vague and conclusory,”
ibid., and the physician had “failed to cite any medical
evidence to support his conclusions,”
id., at 43a, or “to
address the treating physicians’ contradictory medical findings,”
id., at 44a. The court also found that Reliance had
“improperly rejected much of the evidence that Ms. Hardt
submitted,”
id., at 45a, and had “further ignored the
substantial amount of pain medication Ms. Hardt’s treating
physicians had prescribed to her,”
id., at 46a.
Accordingly, the court thought it “clear that Reliance’s decision
to deny Ms. Hardt long-term disability benefits was not based on
substantial evidence.”
Id., at 47a.
The District Court then denied Hardt’s motion
for summary judgment, which contended that Reliance’s decision to
deny benefits was unreasonable as a matter of law. In so doing,
however, the court found “compelling evidence” in the record that
“Ms. Hardt [wa]s totally disabled due to her neuropathy.”
Id., at 48a. Although it was “inclined to rule in Ms.
Hardt’s favor,” the court concluded that “it would be unwise to
take this step without first giving Reliance the chance to address
the deficiencies in its approach.”
Ibid. In the District
Court’s view, a remand to Reliance was warranted because “[t]his
case presents one of those scenarios where the plan administrator
has failed to comply with the ERISA guidelines,” meaning “Ms. Hardt
did not get the kind of review to which she was entitled under
applicable law.”
Ibid. Accordingly, the court instructed
“Reliance to act on Ms. Hardt’s application by adequately
considering all the evidence” within 30 days; “[o]therwise,” it
warned, “judgment will be issued in favor of Ms. Hardt.”
Id., at 49a.
Reliance did as instructed. After conducting
that review, Reliance found Hardt eligible for long-term disability
benefits and paid her $55,250 in accrued, past-due benefits.
Hardt then moved for attorney’s fees and costs
under §1132(g)(1). The District Court assessed her motion under the
three-step framework that governed fee requests in ERISA cases
under Circuit precedent. At step one of that framework, a district
court asks whether the fee claimant is a “ ‘prevailing
party.’ ”
Id., at 15a–16a (quoting
Martin v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, Inc., 115
F. 3d 1201, 1210 (CA4 1997), and citing
Buckhannon Board
& Care Home, Inc. v.
West Virginia Dept. of Health and
Human Resources,
532 U. S. 598, 603 (2001)). If the fee
claimant qualifies as a prevailing party, the court proceeds to
step two and “determin[es] whether an award of attorneys’ fees is
appropriate” by examining “five factors.”[
Footnote 1] App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a. Finally, if
those five factors suggest that a fees award is appropriate, the
court “must review the attorneys’ fees and costs requested and
limit them to a reasonable amount.”
Id., at 17a (citing
Hensley v.
Eckerhart,
461 U. S. 424, 433
(1983)).
Applying that framework, the District Court
granted Hardt’s motion. It first concluded that Hardt was a
prevailing party because the court’s remand order “sanctioned a
material change in the legal relationship of the parties by
ordering [Reliance] to conduct the type of review to which [Hardt]
was entitled.”
Id., at 22a. The court recognized that the
order did not “sanctio[n] a certain result on remand,” but found
that it “quite clearly expressed the consequences to [Reliance]
were it to fail to complete its reconsideration in an expeditious
manner.”
Id., at 19a. Accordingly, the remand order
“signif[ied] that the court was displeased with the cursory review
that [Reliance] had initially given to [Hardt’s] claim, but was
inclined to reserve judgment and permit [Reliance] to conduct a
proper review of all of the medical evidence.”
Ibid. The
court next concluded that a fees award was appropriate under the
five-factor test, see
id., at 22a–25a, and awarded $39,149
in fees and costs,
id., at 25a–30a.
Reliance appealed the fees award, and the
Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s order. According to
the Court of Appeals, Hardt failed to satisfy the step-one
inquiry—
i.e., she failed to establish that she was a
“prevailing party.” In reaching that conclusion, the Court of
Appeals relied on this Court’s decision in
Buckhannon,
under which a fee claimant qualifies as a “prevailing party” only
if he has obtained an “ ‘enforceable judgmen[t] on the
merits’ ” or a “ ‘court-ordered consent decre[e].’ ”
336 Fed. Appx. 332, 335 (CA4 2009)
(per curiam) (quoting
532 U. S., at 604). The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the
remand order “did not require Reliance to award benefits to Hardt,”
it did “not constitute an ‘enforceable judgment on the merits’ as
Buckhannon requires,” thus precluding Hardt from
establishing prevailing party status. 336 Fed. Appx., at 336
(brackets omitted).
Hardt filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari seeking review of two aspects of the Court of Appeals’
judgment. First, did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that
§1132(g)(1) permits courts to award attorney’s fees only to a
“prevailing party”?[
Footnote 2]
Second, did the Court of Appeals correctly identify the
circumstances under which a fee claimant is entitled to attorney’s
fees under §1132(g)(1)? We granted certiorari. 558 U. S. ___
(2010).
II
Whether §1132(g)(1) limits the
availability of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party” is a
question of statutory construction. As in all such cases, we begin
by analyzing the statutory language, “assum[ing] that the ordinary
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative
purpose.”
Gross v.
FBL Financial Services, Inc.,
557 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 7) (internal quotation
marks omitted). We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory
language according to its terms.
Carcieri v.
Salazar, 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 7);
Jimenez v.
Quarterman, 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009)
(slip op., at 5).
Section 1132(g)(1) provides:
“In any action under this subchapter (other than an
action described in paragraph (2)) by a participant, beneficiary,
or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable
attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.”
The words “prevailing party” do not appear in this
provision. Nor does anything else in §1132(g)(1)’s text purport to
limit the availability of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party.”
Instead, §1132(g)(1) expressly grants district courts “discretion”
to award attorney’s fees “to
either party.” (Emphasis
added.)
That language contrasts sharply with
§1132(g)(2), which governs the availability of attorney’s fees in
ERISA actions under §1145 (actions to recover delinquent employer
contributions to a multiemployer plan). In such cases, only
plaintiffs who obtain “a judgment in favor of the plan” may seek
attorney’s fees. §1132(g)(2)(D). The contrast between these two
paragraphs makes clear that Congress knows how to impose express
limits on the availability of attorney’s fees in ERISA cases.
Because Congress failed to include in §1132(g)(1) an express
“prevailing party” limit on the availability of attorney’s fees,
the Court of Appeals’ decision adding that term of art to a
fee-shifting statute from which it is conspicuously absent more
closely resembles “invent[ing] a statute rather than interpret[ing]
one.”
Pasquantino v.
United States,
544 U. S. 349, 359
(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We see no reason to dwell any longer on this
question, particularly given Reliance’s concessions. See Brief for
Respondent 9–10 (“On its face,” §1132(g)(1) “does not expressly
demand, like so many statutes, that a claimant be a ‘prevailing
party’ before receiving attorney’s fees”). We therefore hold that a
fee claimant need not be a “prevailing party” to be eligible for an
attorney’s fees award under §1132(g)(1).
III
We next consider the
circumstances under which a court may award attorney’s fees
pursuant to §1132(g)(1). “Our basic point of reference” when
considering the award of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle
known as the “ ‘American Rule’ ”: Each litigant pays his
own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract
provides otherwise.
Ruckelshaus, 463 U. S., at 683; see
id., at 683–686;
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society,
421 U. S. 240, 247
(1975);
Buckhannon,
supra, at 602–603; see also
Perdue v.
Kenny A., 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010)
(slip op., at 5). Statutory changes to this rule take various
forms. Most fee-shifting provisions permit a court to award
attorney’s fees only to a “prevailing party.” [
Footnote 3] Others permit a “substantially
prevailing” party [
Footnote
4] or a “successful” litigant [
Footnote 5] to obtain fees. Still others authorize
district courts to award attorney’s fees where
“appropriate,” [
Footnote
6] or simply vest district courts with “discretion” to award
fees.[
Footnote 7]
Of those statutory deviations
from the American Rule, we have most often considered statutes
containing an express “prevailing party” requirement. See,
e.g., Texas State Teachers Assn. v.
Garland
Independent School Dist.,
489 U. S. 782, 792–793
(1989);
Farrar v.
Hobby,
506 U. S. 103, 109–114
(1992);
Buckhannon,
supra, at 602–606;
Sole v.
Wyner,
551 U. S. 74, 82–86
(2007). Our “prevailing party” precedents, however, do not govern
the availability of fees awards under §1132(g)(1), because this
provision does not limit the availability of attorney’s fees to the
“prevailing party.”
Supra, at 8–9; see also
Gross,
supra, at ___, (slip op., at 6)
(cautioning courts “conducting statutory interpretation … ‘not to
apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute
without careful and critical examination’ ” (quoting
Federal Express Corp. v.
Holowecki,
552 U. S. 389, 393
(2008))).
Instead, we interpret §1132(g)(1) in light of
our precedents addressing statutory deviations from the American
Rule that do not limit attorney’s fees awards to the “prevailing
party.” In that line of precedents,
Ruckelshaus is the
principal case. There, the Court interpreted §307(f) of the Clean
Air Act, which authorizes a court to award fees “whenever it
determines that such an award is appropriate.” 42 U. S. C.
§7607(f). We began by noting that because nothing in §307(f)’s text
“clear[ly] show[ed]” that Congress meant to abandon the American
Rule, 463 U. S., at 685, fee claimants must have achieved some
litigating success to be eligible for a fees award under that
section,
id., at 686. We then concluded that by using the
less stringent “whenever … appropriate” standard instead of the
traditional “prevailing party” standard, Congress had “expand[ed]
the class of parties eligible for fees awards from prevailing
parties to
partially prevailing parties—parties achieving
some success, even if not major success.”
Id., at
688. We thus held “that, absent some degree of success on the
merits by the claimant, it is not ‘appropriate’ for a federal court
to award attorney’s fees under §307(f).”
Id., at 694.
Applying the interpretive approach we employed
in
Ruckelshaus to §1132(g)(1), we first look to “the
language of the section,”
id., at 682, which unambiguously
allows a court to award attorney’s fees “in its discretion … to
either party,” §1132(g)(1). Statutes vesting judges with such broad
discretion are well known in the law, particularly in the
attorney’s fees context. See,
e.g., n. 7,
supra;
see also
Perdue, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14).
Equally well known, however, is the fact that
a “judge’s discretion is not unlimited.”
Ibid.
Consistent with Circuit precedent, the District
Court applied five factors to guide its discretion in deciding
whether to award attorney’s fees under §1132(g)(1). See
supra, at 6, and n. 1. Because these five factors
bear no obvious relation to §1132(g)(1)’s text or to our
fee-shifting jurisprudence, they are not required for channeling a
court’s discretion when awarding fees under this section.
Instead,
Ruckelshaus lays down the
proper markers to guide a court in exercising the discretion that
§1132(g)(1) grants. As in the statute at issue in
Ruckelshaus, Congress failed to indicate clearly in
§1132(g)(1) that it “meant to abandon historic fee-shifting
principles and intuitive notions of fairness.” 463 U. S., at 686.
Accordingly, a fees claimant must show “some degree of success on
the merits” before a court may award attorney’s fees under
§1132(g)(1),
id., at 694. A claimant does not satisfy that
requirement by achieving “trivial success on the merits” or a
“purely procedural victor[y],” but does satisfy it if the court can
fairly call the outcome of the litigation some success on the
merits without conducting a “lengthy inquir[y] into the question
whether a particular party’s success was ‘substantial’ or occurred
on a ‘central issue.’ ”
Id., at 688,
n. 9.[
Footnote 8]
Reliance essentially agrees that this standard
should govern fee requests under §1132(g)(1), see Brief for
Respondent 13–31, but argues that Hardt has not satisfied it.
Specifically, Reliance contends that a court order remanding an
ERISA claim for further consideration can never constitute “some
success on the merits,” even if such a remand results in an award
of benefits. See
id., at 34–50.
Reliance’s argument misses the point, given
the facts of this case. Hardt persuaded the District Court to find
that “the plan administrator has failed to comply with the ERISA
guidelines” and “that Ms. Hardt did not get the kind of review to
which she was entitled under applicable law.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 48a; see 29 U. S. C. §1133(2), 29 CFR §2560.503–1(h)
(2009). Although Hardt failed to win summary judgment on her
benefits claim, the District Court nevertheless found “compelling
evidence that Ms. Hardt is totally disabled due to her neuropathy,”
and stated that it was “inclined to rule in Ms. Hardt’s favor” on
her benefits claim, but declined to do so before “first giving
Reliance the chance to address the deficiencies in its” statutorily
mandated “full and fair review” of that claim. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 48a; 29 U. S. C. §1133(2). Hardt thus obtained a
judicial order instructing Reliance “to act on Ms. Hardt’s
application by adequately considering all the evidence” within 30
days; “[o]therwise, judgment will be issued in favor of Ms. Hardt.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a. After Reliance conducted that
court-ordered review, and consistent with the District Court’s
appraisal, Reliance reversed its decision and awarded Hardt the
benefits she sought. App. 120a–123a.
These facts establish that Hardt has achieved
far more than “trivial success on the merits” or a “purely
procedural victory.” Accordingly, she has achieved “some success on
the merits,” and the District Court properly exercised its
discretion to award Hardt attorney’s fees in this case. Because
these conclusions resolve this case, we need not decide today
whether a remand order, without more, constitutes “some success on
the merits” sufficient to make a party eligible for attorney’s fees
under §1132(g)(1).[
Footnote
9]
* * *
We reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and remand this case for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Footnote 1
These factors are: “ ‘(1) the degree of
opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) ability of opposing
parties to satisfy an award of attorneys’ fees; (3) whether an
award of attorneys’ fees against the opposing parties would deter
other persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the
parties requesting attorneys’ fees sought to benefit all
participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a
significant legal question regarding ERISA itself; and (5) the
relative merits of the parties’ positions.’ ” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 16a (quoting
Quesinberry v.
Life Ins. Co. of
North Am., 987 F. 2d 1017, 1029 (CA4 1993)).
Footnote 2
The Courts of Appeals are divided on this
issue. Some (a few only tentatively) agree with the Court of
Appeals’ conclusion here that only prevailing parties are entitled
to fees under §1132(g)(1). See,
e.g., Cottrill v.
Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100 F. 3d 220,
225 (CA1 1996) (“Congress declared that, in any ERISA claim
advanced by a ‘participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in
its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee’
to the
prevailing party” (emphasis added));
Tate v.
Long
Term Disability Plan for Salaried Employees of Champion Int’l Corp.
#506, 545 F. 3d 555, 564 (CA7 2008) (“In analyzing
whether attorney’s fees should be awarded to a ‘prevailing party’
in an ERISA case, a court should consider whether the losing
party’s position was justified an taken in good faith. However, we
have held that a claimant who is awarded a remand in an ERISA case
generally is not a prevailing party in the truest sense of the
term” (some internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
Graham v.
Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co.,
501 F. 3d 1153, 1162 (CA10 2007) (“We also afford certain
weight to prevailing party status, even though we acknowledge that
the ERISA attorney’s fees provision is not expressly directed at
prevailing parties”). Other Courts of Appeals have rejected or
disavowed that position. See,
e.g., Miller v.
United Welfare Fund, 72 F. 3d 1066, 1074 (CA2 1995);
Gibbs v.
Gibbs, 210 F. 3d 491, 503 (CA5
2000);
Freeman v.
Continental Ins. Co., 996
F. 2d 1116, 1119 (CA11 1993).
Footnote 3
See,
e.g., Buckhannon Board
& Care Home, Inc. v.
West Virginia Dept. of Health and
Human Resources,
532 U. S. 598, 601–603 (2001) (citing
examples);
Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club,
463 U. S. 680, 684, n. 3 (1983)
(same).
Footnote 4
See
ibid., n. 4 (citing
examples).
Footnote 5
See,
e.g., 18 U. S. C.
§2707(c);
Ruckelshaus,
supra, at 684, n. 5
(citing examples).
Footnote 6
See
Ruckelshaus,
supra, at
682, n. 1 (citing examples).
Footnote 7
See,
e.g., 15 U. S. C.
§§77k(e), 77www(a), 78i(e), 78r(a), 7706(g)(4); 20 U. S. C.
§1415(i)(3)(B)(i); 42 U. S. C. §2000aa–6(f).
Footnote 8
We do not foreclose the possibility that once
a claimant has satisfied this requirement, and thus becomes
eligible for a fees award under §1132(g)(1), a court may consider
the five factors adopted by the Court of Appeals, see n. 1,
supra, in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees.
Footnote 9
Reliance has not preserved any separate
objection to the reasonableness of the amount of fees awarded. See
Perdue v.
Kenny A., 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010)
(slip op., at 7–8, 14).
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