OCTOBER TERM, 1992
Syllabus
GROWE, SECRETARY OF STATE OF MINNESOTA, ET AL.
v. EMISON
ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
MINNESOTA
No. 91-1420. Argued November 2, 1992-Decided February
23,1993
Shortly after a group of Minnesota voters filed a state-court
action against the Minnesota Secretary of State and other election
officials, appellee voters filed a similar action against
essentially the same officials in the Federal District Court. Both
suits alleged that, in light of the 1990 census results, the
State's congressional and legislative districts were
malapportioned, in violation of the Federal and State
Constitutions; the federal suit contained the additional claim that
the current districts diluted the vote of minority groups in
Minneapolis, in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Both suits sought declaration that the current districts were
unlawful, and judicial construction of new districts if the state
legislature failed to act. After the state legislature adopted a
new legislative districting plan, which contained numerous drafting
errors, a second federal action was filed raising constitutional
challenges to the new legislative districts; the two federal suits
were consolidated. The District Court set a deadline for the
legislature to act on redistricting plans, but refused to abstain
or defer to the statecourt proceedings. The state court, having
found the new legislative districts defective because of the
drafting errors, issued a preliminary legislative redistricting
plan correcting most of those errors, to be held in abeyance
pending further action by the legislature. Before the state court
could take additional action, the District Court stayed the
statecourt proceedings; this Court vacated that stay. When the
Governor vetoed the legislature's effort to correct the defective
legislative redistricting plan, and to adopt new congressional
districts, the state court issued a final order adopting its
legislative plan, and held hearings on the congressional plans
submitted by the parties. Before the state court could issue a
congressional plan, however, the District Court adopted its own
redistricting plans, both legislative and congressional, and
permanently enjoined interference with state implementation of
those plans. The District Court found, in effect, that the state
court's legislative plan violated the Voting Rights Act because it
did not contain a "super-majority minority" Senate district; its
own plan contained such a district, designed to create a majority
composed of at least three separately identifiable minority
groups.
26
Syllabus
Held:
1. The District Court erred in not deferring to the state
court's timely efforts to redraw the legislative and congressional
districts. States have the primary duty and responsibility to
perform that task, and federal courts must defer their action when
a State, through its legislative
or judicial branch, has
begun in timely fashion to address the issue.
Scott v.
Germano, 381
U. S. 407. Absent evidence that these branches cannot timely
perform their duty, a federal court cannot affirmatively obstruct,
or permit federal litigation to impede, state reapportionment.
Judged by these principles, the District Court erred in several
respects:
It set a deadline for reapportionment directed only to the state
legislature, instead of to the legislature and courts; it issued an
injunction that treated the state court's provisional legislative
plan as "interfering" in the reapportionment process; it failed to
give the state court's final order adopting a legislative plan
legal effect under the principles of federalism and comity
embodied in the full faith and credit statute; and it actively
prevented the state court from issuing its own congressional plan,
although it appears that the state court was prepared to do so.
pp.32-37.
2. The District Court erred in its conclusion that the state
court's legislative plan violated §2 of the Voting Rights Act. The
three prerequisites that were identified in
Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.
S. 30, as necessary to establish a vote-dilution claim with
respect to a multimember districting plan-a minority group that is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district, minority political cohesion,
and majority bloc voting that enables defeat of the minority's
preferred candidate-are also necessary to establish a
vote-fragmentation claim with respect to a single-member district.
In the present case, even making the dubious assumption that the
minority voters were geographically compact, the record contains no
statistical or anecdotal evidence of majority bloc voting or
minority political cohesion among the distinct ethnic and language
minority groups the District Court combined in the new district.
The
Gingles preconditions were not only ignored but were on
this record unattainable. Pp. 37-42.
782 F. Supp. 427, reversed and remanded.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
John R. Tunheim, Chief Deputy Attorney General of
Minnesota, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs
were
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General,
Jocelyn F. Olson, Assistant Attorney General,
27
John D. French, Michael L. Cheever, Peter S. Wattson, and Alan W
Weinblatt.
Solicitor General Starr argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were
Assistant Attorney General Dunne, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts,
Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Simon, and Jessica Dunsay
Silver.
Bruce D. Willis argued the cause for appellees. With him
on the brief was
Mark B. Peterson. *
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises important issues regarding the propriety of the
District Court's pursuing reapportionment of Minnesota's state
legislative and federal congressional districts in the face of
Minnesota state-court litigation seeking similar relief, and
regarding the District Court's conclusion that the state court's
legislative plan violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79
Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973.
I
In January 1991, a group of Minnesota voters filed a statecourt
action against the Minnesota Secretary of State and other officials
responsible for administering elections, claiming that the State's
congressional and legislative districts were malapportioned, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
and Article 4, § 2, of the Minnesota Constitution.
Cotlow v.
Growe, No. C8-91-985. The plaintiffs asserted that the 1990
federal census results revealed a significant change in the
distribution of the state population, and requested that the court
declare the current districts unlawful and draw new districts if
the legislature failed to do so. In February, the parties
stipulated that, in light of the new census, the challenged
districting plans were
*
Robert B. Wallace and
Jeffrey M. Wice filed a
brief for Congressman Martin Frost et al. as
amici curiae
urging reversal.
28
unconstitutional. The Minnesota Supreme Court appointed a
Special Redistricting Panel (composed of one appellate judge and
two district judges) to preside over the case.
In March, a second group of plaintiffs filed an action in
federal court against essentially the same defendants, raising
similar challenges to the congressional and legislative districts.
Emison v.
Growe, Civ. No. 4-91-202. The
Emison
plaintiffs (who include members of various racial minorities) in
addition raised objections to the legislative districts under § 2
of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, alleging that those
districts needlessly fragmented two Indian reservations and divided
the minority population of Minneapolis. The suit sought declaratory
relief and continuing federal jurisdiction over any legislative
efforts to develop new districts. A three-judge panel was appointed
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2284(a).
While the federal and state actions were getting underway, the
Minnesota Legislature was holding public hearings on, and
designing, new legislative districts. In May, it adopted a new
legislative districting plan, Chapter 246, Minn. Stat. §§
2.403-2.703 (Supp. 1991), and repealed the prior 1983
apportionment. It was soon recognized that Chapter 246 contained
many technical errors-mistaken compass directions, incorrect street
names, noncontiguous districts, and a few instances of double
representation. By August, committees of the legislature had
prepared curative legislation, Senate File 1596 and House File 1726
(collectively, Senate File 1596), but the legislature, which had
adjourned in late May, was not due to reconvene until January
6,1992.
Later in August, another group of plaintiffs filed a second
action in federal court, again against the Minnesota Secretary of
State.
Benson v.
Growe, No. 4-91-603. The
Benson plaintiffs, who include the Republican minority
leaders of the Minnesota Senate and House, raised federal and state
constitutional challenges to Chapter 246, but no Voting
29
Rights Act allegations. The
Benson action was
consolidated with the
Emison suit; the
Cotlow
plaintiffs, as well as the Minnesota House of Representatives and
State Senate, intervened.
With the legislature out of session, the committees' proposed
curative measures for Chapter 246 pending, and the state court in
Cotlow considering many of the same issues, the District
Court granted the defendants' motion to defer further proceedings
pending action by the Minnesota Legislature. It denied, however,
defendants' motion to abstain in light of the
Cotlow suit,
or to allow the state court first to review any legislative action
or, if the legislature failed to act, to allow the state court
first to issue a court-ordered redistricting plan. The District
Court set a January 20, 1992, deadline for the state legislature's
action on both redistricting plans, and appointed special masters
to develop contingent plans in the event the legislature failed to
correct Chapter 246 or to reapportion Minnesota's eight
congressional districts.
Meanwhile, the
Cotlow panel concluded (in October) that
Chapter 246, applied as written (i.
e., with its drafting
errors), violated both the State and Federal Constitutions, and
invited the parties to submit alternative legislative plans based
on Chapter 246. It also directed the parties to submit by
mid-October written arguments on any Chapter 246 violations of the
Voting Rights Act. In late November, the state court issued an
order containing its preliminary legislative redistricting
plan-essentially Chapter 246 with the technical corrections (though
not the stylistic corrections) contained in Senate File 1596.
(Since no party had responded to its order concerning Voting Rights
Act violations, the court concluded that Chapter 246 did not run
afoul of that Act.) It proposed putting its plan into effect on
January 21, 1992, if the legislature had not acted by then. Two
weeks later, after further argument, the
Cotlow panel
indicated it
30
would release a revised and final version of its legislative
redistricting plan in a few days.
In early December, before the state court issued its final plan,
the District Court stayed all proceedings in the
Cotlow
case, and enjoined parties to that action from "attempting to
enforce or implement any order of the ... Minnesota Special
Redistricting Panel which has proposed adoption of a
reapportionment plan relating to state redistricting or
Congressional redistricting." App. to Juris. Statement 154. The
court explained its action as necessary to prevent the state court
from interfering with the legislature's efforts to redistrict and
with the District Court's jurisdiction. It mentioned the
Emison Voting Rights Act allegations as grounds for issuing
the injunction, which it found necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, see 28 U. S. C. § 1651. One judge dissented.
Four days later the state court issued an order containing its
final legislative plan, subject to the District Court's injunction
and still conditioned on the legislature's failure to adopt a
lawful plan. The same order provided, again subject to the District
Court's injunction, that congressional redistricting plans be
submitted by mid-January. The obstacle of the District Court
injunction was removed on January 10, 1992, when, upon application
of the
Cotlow plaintiffs, we vacated the injunction. 502 U.
S. 1022.
When the legislature reconvened in January, both Houses approved
the corrections to Chapter 246 contained in Senate File 1596 and
also adopted a congressional redistricting plan that legislative
committees had drafted the previous October. The Governor, however,
vetoed the legislation. On January 30, the state court issued a
final order adopting its legislative plan and requiring that plan
to be used for the 1992 primary and general elections. By February
6, pursuant to an order issued shortly after this Court vacated the
injunction, the parties had submitted their proposals for
congressional redistricting, and on February 17 the state court
held hearings on the competing plans.
31
Two days later, the District Court issued an order adopting its
own legislative and congressional districting plans and permanently
enjoining interference with state implementation of those plans.
782 F. Supp. 427, 448-449 (Minn. 1992). The
Emison panel
found that the state court's modified version of Chapter 246 "fails
to provide the equitable relief necessary to cure the violation of
the Voting Rights Act," id., at 440, which in its view required at
least one "super-majority minority" Senate district, a district in
which the minority constitutes a clear majority. The District Court
rejected Chapter 246 as a basis for its plan, and instead referred
to state policy as expressed in the Minnesota Constitution and in a
resolution adopted by both Houses of the legislature. See Minn.
Const., Art. 4, § 2; H. R. Con. Res. No.2, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(1991). Judge MacLaughlin dissented in part. The District Court was
unanimous, however, in its adoption of a congressional
redistricting plan, after concluding that the pre-existing 1982
plan violated Art. I, § 2, of the Federal Constitution. Although it
had received the same proposed plans submitted to the state court
earlier that month, it used instead a congressional plan prepared
by its special masters. Finally, the District Court retained
jurisdiction to ensure adoption of its reapportionment plans and to
enforce the permanent injunction.
In early March, the state court indicated that it was "fully
prepared to release a congressional plan" but that the federal
injunction prevented it from doing so. In its view, the federal
plan reached population equality "without sufficient regard for the
preservation of municipal and county boundaries." App. to Juris.
Statement 445-446.
Appellants sought a stay of the District Court's February order
pending this appeal. JUSTICE BLACKMUN granted the stay with respect
to the legislative redistricting plan. No. 91-1420 (Mar. 11, 1992)
(in chambers). We noted probable jurisdiction. 503 U. S. 958
(1992).
32
II
In their challenge to both of the District Court's redistricting
plans, appellants contend that, under the principles of
Scott v.
Germano, 381 U. S. 407 (1965)
(per curiam), the court erred in not deferring to the
Minnesota Special Redistricting Panel's proceedings. We agree.
The parties do not dispute that both courts had jurisdiction to
consider the complaints before them. Of course federal courts and
state courts often find themselves exercising concurrent
jurisdiction over the same subject matter, and when that happens a
federal court generally need neither abstain (i.
e., dismiss
the case before it) nor defer to the state proceedings (i.
e., withhold action until the state proceedings have
concluded). See
McClellan v.
Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 282
(1910). In rare circumstances, however, principles of federalism
and comity dictate otherwise. We have found abstention necessary,
for example, when the federal action raises difficult questions of
state law bearing on important matters of state policy, or when
federal jurisdiction has been invoked to restrain ongoing state
criminal proceedings. See
Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v.
United States, 424 U. S. 800, 814-817
(1976) (collecting examples). We have required deferral, causing a
federal court to "sta[y] its hands," when a constitutional issue in
the federal action will be mooted or presented in a different
posture following conclusion of the state-court case.
Railroad
Comm'n of Texas v.
Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 501
(1941).1
1 We have referred to the Pullman doctrine as a form of
"abstention," see 312 U. S., at 501-502. To bring out more clearly,
however, the distinction between those circumstances that require
dismissal of a suit and those that require postponing consideration
of its merits, it would be preferable to speak of Pullman
"deferral." Pullman deferral recognizes that federal courts should
not prematurely resolve the constitutionality of a state statute,
just as Germano deferral recognizes that federal courts should not
prematurely involve themselves in redistricting.
33
In the reapportionment context, the Court has required federal
judges to defer consideration of disputes involving redistricting
where the State, through its legislative
or judicial branch,
has begun to address that highly political task itself. In
Germano, a Federal District Court invalidated Illinois'
Senate districts and entered an order requiring the State to submit
to the court any revised Senate districting scheme it might adopt.
An action had previously been filed in state court attacking the
same districting scheme. In that case the Illinois Supreme Court
held (subsequent to the federal court's order) that the Senate
districting scheme was invalid, but expressed confidence that the
General Assembly would enact a lawful plan during its then current
session, scheduled to end in July 1965. The Illinois Supreme Court
retained jurisdiction to ensure that the upcoming 1966 general
elections would be conducted pursuant to a constitutionally valid
plan.
This Court disapproved the District Court's action. The District
Court "should have stayed its hand," we said, and in failing to do
so overlooked this Court's teaching that state courts have a
significant role in redistricting. 381 U. S., at 409.
"The power of the judiciary of a State to require valid
reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not
only been recognized by this Court but appropriate action by the
States in such cases has been specifically encouraged.
" ... The case is remanded with directions that the District
Court enter an order fixing a reasonable time within which the
appropriate agencies of the State of Illinois, including its
Supreme Court, may validly redistrict the Illinois State Senate;
provided that the same be accomplished within ample time to permit
such plan to be utilized in the 1966 election .... " Ibid.
(citations omitted).
34
Today we renew our adherence to the principles expressed in
Germano, which derive from the recognition that the
Constitution leaves with the States primary responsibility for
apportionment of their federal congressional and state legislative
districts. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2. "We say once again what
has been said on many occasions: reapportionment is primarily the
duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or
other body, rather than of a federal court."
Chapman v.
Meier, 420 U. S.
1, 27 (1975). Absent evidence that these state branches will
fail timely to perform that duty, a federal court must neither
affirmatively obstruct state reapportionment nor permit federal
litigation to be used to impede it.
Judged by these principles, the District Court's December
injunction of state-court proceedings, vacated by this Court in
January, was clear error. It seems to have been based upon the
mistaken view that federal judges need defer only to the Minnesota
Legislature and not at all to the State's courts. Thus, the January
20 deadline the District Court established was described as a
deadline for the legislature, ignoring the possibility and
legitimacy of state
judicial redistricting. And the
injunction itself treated the state court's provisional legislative
redistricting plan as "interfering" in the reapportionment process.
But the doctrine of
Germano prefers
both state
branches to federal courts as agents of apportionment. The
Minnesota Special Redistricting Panel's issuance of its plan
(conditioned on the legislature's failure to enact a
constitutionally acceptable plan in January), far from being a
federally enjoinable "interference," was precisely the sort of
state judicial supervision of redistricting we have encouraged. See
Germano, 381 U. S., at 409 (citing cases).
Nor do the reasons offered by the District Court for its actions
in December and February support departure from the
Germano
principles. It is true that the
Emison plaintiffs alleged
that the 1983 legislative districting scheme vio-
35
lated the Voting Rights Act, while the
Cotlow complaint
never invoked that statute.
Germano, however, does not
require that the federal and state-court complaints be identical;
it instead focuses on the nature of the relief requested:
reapportionment of election districts. Minnesota can have only one
set of legislative districts, and the primacy of the State in
designing those districts compels a federal court to defer.
The District Court also expressed concern over the lack of time
for orderly appeal, prior to the State's primaries, of any judgment
that might issue from the state court, noting that Minnesota allows
the losing party 90 days to appeal. See Minn. Rule Civ. App. Proc.
104.01. We fail to see the relevance of the speed of appellate
review.
Germano requires only that the state agencies adopt
a constitutional plan "within ample time ... to be utilized in the
[upcoming] election," 381 U. S., at 409. It does not require
appellate review of the plan prior to the election, and such a
requirement would ignore the reality that States must often
redistrict in the most exigent circumstances-during the brief
interval between completion of the decennial federal census and the
primary season for the general elections in the next evennumbered
year. Our consideration of this appeal, long after the Minnesota
primary and final elections have been held, itself reflects the
improbability of completing judicial review before the necessary
deadline for a new redistricting scheme.
It may be useful to describe what ought to have happened with
respect to each redistricting plan. The state court entered its
judgment adopting its modified version of Chapter 246 in late
January (nearly three weeks before the federal court issued its
opinion). That final order, by declaring the legislature's version
of Chapter 246 unconstitutional and adopting a legislative plan to
replace it, altered the status quo: The state court's plan became
the law of Minnesota. At the very least, the elementary principles
of federalism and comity embodied in the full faith and credit
statute, 28
36
u. S. C. § 1738, obligated the federal court to give that
judgment
legal effect, rather than treating it as simply one
of several competing legislative redistricting proposals available
for the District Court's choosing. See
Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. v.
Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 286, 296
(1970). In other words, after January 30 the federal court was
empowered to entertain the
Emison plaintiffs' claims
relating to legislative redistricting only to the extent those
claims challenged the
state court's plan. Cf.
Wise v.
Lipscomb, 437
U. S. 535, 540 (1978) (opinion of WHITE, J.).
With respect to the congressional plan, the District Court did
not ignore any state-court judgment, but only because it had
actively prevented such a judgment from issuing. The wrongfully
entered December injunction prevented the Special Redistricting
Panel from developing a contingent plan for congressional
redistricting, as it had for legislative redistricting prior to the
injunction. The state court's December order to the parties for
mid-January submission of congressional plans was rendered a
nullity by the injunction, which was not vacated until January 10.
The net effect was a delay of at least a few weeks in the
submissions to the state court, and in hearings on those
submissions. A court may not acknowledge
Germano in one
breath and impede a state court's timely development of a plan in
the next. It would have been appropriate for the District Court to
establish a deadline by which, if the Special Redistricting Panel
had not acted, the federal court would proceed. But the January 20
deadline that the District Court established here was explicitly
directed
solely at the legislature. The state court was
never given a time by which it should decide on reapportionment,
legislative
or congressional, if it wished to avoid federal
intervention.
Of course the District Court would have been justified in
adopting its own plan if it had been apparent that the state court,
through no fault of the District Court itself, would not develop a
redistricting plan in time for the primaries.
37
Germano requires deferral, not abstention. But in this
case, in addition to the fact that the federal court itself had
been (through its injunction) a cause of the state court's delay,
it nonetheless appeared that the state court was fully prepared to
adopt a congressional plan in as timely a manner as the District
Court. The Special Redistricting Panel received the same plans
submitted to the federal court, and held hearings on those plans
two days before the federal court issued its opinion. The record
simply does not support a conclusion that the state court was
either unwilling or unable to adopt a congressional plan in time
for the elections.2 What occurred here was not a last-minute
federalcourt rescue of the Minnesota electoral process, but a race
to beat the Minnesota Special Redistricting Panel to the finish
line. That would have been wrong, even if the Panel had not been
tripped earlier in the course. The District Court erred in not
deferring to the state court's timely consideration of
congressional reapportionment.
III
The District Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence
to prove minority vote dilution in a portion of the city of
Minneapolis, in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965,42 U. S. C. § 1973.3 782 F. Supp., at 439. Choosing not
2 Although under Minnesota law legislative districts must be
drawn before precinct boundaries can be established, see Minn.
Stat. § 204B.14, subd. 3 (Supp. 1991), congressional districts were
not needed in advance of the March 3 precinct caucuses.
Congressional district conventions did not take place until late
April and early May.
3 That section provides:
"(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of
the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as
provided in subsection (b) of this section.
"(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is
established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown
that the political processes
38
to apply the preconditions for a vote-dilution violation set out
by this Court for challenges to multimember districts, see
Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986), the
court instead proceeded directly to the "totality of circumstances"
test in § 2(b) and found unlawful dilution. It rejected, as a basis
for its redistricting plan, Chapter 246, Chapter 246 as modified by
Senate File 1596, and the state court's version of Chapter 246, and
adopted instead its special masters' legislative plan, which
includes a Senate district stretching from south Minneapolis,
around the downtown area, and then into the northern part of the
city in order to link minority populations. This oddly shaped
creation, Senate District 59, is 43 percent black and 60 percent
minority, including at least three separately identifiable minority
groupS.4 In the District Court's view, based on "[j]udicial
experience, as well as the results of past elections," a
super-majority minority Senate district in Minneapolis was required
in order for a districting scheme to comply with the Voting Rights
Act.
leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office in the State or
political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered:
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population."
4 These percentages refer to total population. To establish
whether a § 2 violation has occurred (which presumably requires
application of the same standard that measures whether a § 2
violation has been remedied) other courts have looked to, not the
district's total minority population, but the district's minority
population
of voting age. See,
e. g., Romero v.
Pomona, 883 F.2d
1418, 1425-1426, and n. 13
(CA9 1989) (citing cases).
Gingles itself repeatedly refers to the voting population,
see,
e. g., 478 U. S., at 48, 50. We have no need to pass
upon this aspect of the District Court's opinion.
39
782 F. Supp., at 440. We must review this analysis because, if
it is correct, the District Court was right to deny effect to the
state-court legislative redistricting plan.
As an initial matter, it is not clear precisely which
legislative districting plan produced the vote dilution that
necessitated the super-majority remedy. For almost a decade prior
to the 1992 election season, the only legislative districting plan
that had been in use in Minnesota was the 1983 plan, which all
parties agreed was unconstitutional in light of the 1990 census.
More importantly, the state court had
declared the 1983 plan
to be unconstitutional in its final order of J anuary 30. Once that
order issued, the
Emison plaintiffs' claims that the 1983
plan violated the Voting Rights Act became moot, unless those
claims also related to the superseding plan. But no party to this
litigation has ever alleged that either Chapter 246, or the
modified version of Chapter 246 adopted by the state court,
resulted in vote dilution. The District Court did not hold a
hearing or request written argument from the parties on the § 2
validity of any particular plan; nor does the District Court's
discussion focus on any particular plan.
Although the legislative plan that in the court's view produced
the § 2 "dilution" violation is unclear, the District Court did
clearly conclude that the state court's plan could not remedy that
unspecified violation because it "fail[ed] to provide the
affirmative relief necessary to adequately protect minority voting
rights."
Id., at 448. The District Court was of the view, in
other words, as the dissenting judge perceived, see id., at 452,
and n. 6 (MacLaughlin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), that any legislative plan lacking a super-majority minority
Senate district in Minneapolis violated § 2. We turn to the merits
of this position.
Our precedent requires that, to establish a vote-dilution claim
with respect to a multimember districting plan (and
40
hence to justify a super-majority districting remedy), a
plaintiff must prove three threshold conditions: first, "that [the
minority group] is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district"; second, "that
it is politically cohesive"; and third, "that the white majority
votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate."
Gingles, 478 U. S., at
50-51. We have not previously considered whether these
Gingles threshold factors apply to a § 2 dilution challenge
to a single-member districting scheme, a socalled "vote
fragmentation" claim. See id., at 46-47, n. 12. We have, however,
stated on many occasions that multimember districting plans, as
well as at-large plans, generally pose greater threats to
minority-voter participation in the political process than do
single-member districts, see,
e. g., id., at 47, and n. 13;
id., at 87 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment);
Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.
S. 613, 616-617 (1982); see also
Burns v.
Richardson, 384
U. S. 73, 88 (1966)-which is why we have strongly preferred
single-member districts for federal-court-ordered reapportionment,
see,
e. g., Connor v.
Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 415
(1977). It would be peculiar to conclude that a vote-dilution
challenge to the (more dangerous) multimember district requires a
higher threshold showing than a vote-fragmentation challenge to a
single-member district. Certainly the reasons for the three
Gingles prerequisites continue to apply: The "geographically
compact majority" and "minority political cohesion" showings are
needed to establish that the minority has the potential to elect a
representative of its own choice in some single-member district,
see
Gingles, supra, at 50, n. 17. And the "minority
political cohesion" and "majority bloc voting" showings are needed
to establish that the challenged districting thwarts a distinctive
minority vote by submerging it in a larger white voting population,
see
Gingles, supra, at 51. Unless these
41
points are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can
be a remedy.5
In the present case, even if we make the dubious assumption that
the minority voters were "geographically compact," there was quite
obviously a higher-than-usual need for the second of the
Gingles showings. Assuming (without deciding) that it was
permissible for the District Court to combine distinct ethnic and
language minority groups for purposes of assessing compliance with
§ 2, when dilution of the power of such an agglomerated political
bloc is the basis for an alleged violation, proof of minority
political cohesion is all the more essential. See
Badillo v.
Stockton, 956 F.2d
884, 891 (CA9
1992); Concerned Citizens of Hardee County
v.
Hardee County Bd. of Comm'rs, 906 F.2d
524 (CAll 1990);
Campos v.
Baytown, 840 F.2d
1240, 1244 (CA5 1988), cert. denied, 492 U. S. 905 (1989).
Since a court may not presume bloc voting within even a single
minority group, see
Gingles, supra, at 46, it made no sense
for the District Court to (in effect) indulge that presumption as
to bloc voting within an agglomeration of distinct minority
groups.
We are satisfied that in the present case the
Gingles
preconditions were not only ignored but were unattainable. As the
District Court acknowledged, the record simply "contains no
statistical evidence" of minority political cohesion (whether of
one or several minority groups) or of majority bloc voting in
Minneapolis. 782 F. Supp., at 436, n. 30. And even anecdotal
evidence is lacking. Recognizing this void, the court relied on an
article identifying bloc voting as a
5
Gingles expressly declined to resolve whether, when a
plaintiff alleges that a voting practice or procedure impairs a
minority's ability to influence, rather than alter, election
results, a showing of geographical compactness of a minority group
not sufficiently large to constitute a majority will suffice. 478
U. S., at 46-47, n. 12. We do not reach that question in the
present case either: Although the
Emison plaintiffs alleged
both vote dilution and minimization of vote influence (in the 1983
plan), the District Court considered only the former issue in
reviewing the state court's plan.
42
national phenomenon that is "'all but inevitable.'"
Ibid., quoting Howard & Howard, The Dilemma of the
Voting Rights Act-Recognizing the Emerging Political Equality Norm,
83 Colum. L. Rev. 1615, 1625 (1983). A law review article on
national voting patterns is no substitute for proof that bloc
voting occurred in Minneapolis. Cf.
Gingles, 478 U. S., at
58-61 (summarizing statistical and anecdotal evidence in that
case). Section 2 "does not assume the existence of racial bloc
voting; plaintiffs must prove it."
Id., at 46.
***
The District Court erred in not deferring to the state court's
efforts to redraw Minnesota's state legislative and federal
congressional districts. Its conclusion that the state court's
legislative districting plan (which it treated as merely one
available option) violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act was also
erroneous. Having found these defects, we need not consider the
other points of error raised by appellants.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with
instructions to dismiss.
So ordered.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment