On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice O'CONNOR, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL
join, dissenting.
This petition raises important and unresolved issues concerning
the protection afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to applicants for general assistance. Because the
decision below relies on a questionable reading of this Court's
precedent to hold that such applicants are entitled to no
procedural safeguards whatsoever and, alternatively, that state law
remedies provide sufficient due process, I would grant
certiorari.
Petitioner Cindy Gregory and her husband on April 13, 1982,
filed an application with respondent town of Pittsfield, Maine,
seeking general assistance in order to pay their rent. The Town
Manager, respondent Gene Moyers, denied this request on the grounds
that Mrs. Gregory had quit her job and had spent an Aid to Families
with Dependent Children check to obtain her husband's release from
jail. Contrary to the requirements of state law, Moyers did not
provide a written notice of this decision
Page 470 U.S.
1018 , 1019
informing Mrs. Gregory of her right to an administrative
hearing. [
Footnote 1] Mrs.
Gregory unsuccessfully requested assistance again on April 16. On
the morning of April 23, she filed an action in the Superior Court
of Somerset County, State of Maine, requesting a temporary
restraining order against the town's denial of general assistance.
The court directed Mrs. Gregory to exhaust the administrative
hearing procedure established by Me.Rev.Stat. Ann., Tit. 22, 4507
(1980), and instructed the town's hearing authority to follow the
decision of the Maine Supreme Court in Page v. City of Auburn,
440 A.2d
363 (1982), which held that voluntary termination of employment
is not a valid ground for denying general assistance. On the
afternoon of April 23, Mrs. Gregory went to the Pittsfield
Municipal Office and filed written requests for general assistance
and for an administrative hearing on the denial of her April 13
application. The request for assistance was denied, and the town
again failed to provide Mrs. Gregory with written notice of the
decision. On April 29, 1983, the town's hearing authority upheld
the denial of benefits requested on April 13 and refused to review
the denial of the April 23 application.
Thwarted in her efforts to obtain assistance, Mrs. Gregory then
filed an action in Superior Court requesting review of the hearing
authority's decision pursuant to state law and also seeking relief
under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged constitutional deprivations. The
Superior Court held that Mrs. Gregory was entitled to an award of
assistance based on the April 13 application and that the town's
hearing authority had violated statutory requirements by refusing
to hold a hearing on her April 23 application. Moreover, the court
found that the town's policy was not to provide applicants with a
written decision unless the applicant went to the Municipal Office
and submitted a request. This policy, along with
Page 470 U.S.
1018 , 1020
the refusal to hold a hearing on the April 23 application,
"flagrantly violated the statutory procedures for the
administration of the general assistance program." App. 2 to Pet.
for Cert. 6 (footnote omitted). The Superior Court further found
that the town's failure to provide Mrs. Gregory written notice of
her right to a hearing to review the denial of benefits and the
subsequent refusal to conduct such a hearing constituted a denial
of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Before
damages were determined with respect to the due process claim, the
Superior Court amended its earlier decision in light of Jackson v.
Inhabitants of Town of Searsport,
456 A.2d
852 (Me.), cert. denied sub nom. Jackson v. Handley, 464 U.S.
825 (1983), to hold that petitioner did not have a cognizable claim
of a denial of due process. Consequently, the court dismissed with
prejudice Mrs. Gregory's 1983 claim.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of the
1983 claim on alternative grounds.
479 A.2d
1304 (1984). First, the state court noted that under state law,
general assistance grants are made on the basis of a specific
determination of need. Recipients are not eligible for continued
payments simply on the basis of prior benefits, but instead must
make a de novo showing of eligibility to obtain each particular
grant. Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 22, 4450(2) (1980). This fact, the
Supreme Judicial Court concluded, implies that an applicant for
general assistance does not have a property interest in benefits
until he or she is found eligible to receive such assistance.
"Without this determination, an applicant, no matter what his
financial status, has no more than an abstract expectancy of
benefits, which in no case can rise to the level of a
constitutionally protected property right." 479 A.2d, at 1308. In
the alternative, the Supreme Judicial Court held that even if Mrs.
Gregory was entitled to the protections of due process, Parratt v.
Taylor,
451 U.S.
527 (1981), indicated that state procedures afforded all the
process due. 479 A.2d, at 1308- 1309. Under state law, unsuccessful
applicants for assistance are entitled to an administrative hearing
and judicial review. Pursuant to those provisions, after the
Superior Court issued its first decision in February 1983, the town
awarded Mrs. Gregory the assistance that it had denied the previous
April. See id., at 1306, n. 2. Relying on its decision in Jackson
v. Town of Searsport, supra, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded
that state law remedies were adequate to compensate petitioner and
her
Page 470 U.S.
1018 , 1021
husband for any loss and thereby satisfied the requirements of
due process . 479 A.2d, at 1308.
The conclusion of the Supreme Judicial Court that an applicant
for general assistance does not have an interest protected by the
Due Process Clause is unsettling in its implication that less
fortunate persons in our society may arbitrarily be denied benefits
that a State has granted as a matter of right. There is no dispute
that Mrs. Gregory was entitled under Maine law to the general
assistance benefits denied to her in April 1982. We have held that
state statutes or regulations prescribing the substantive
predicates for state action may create liberty interests protected
by due process. Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460, 470-472,
103 S. Ct. 864, 871-872 (1983) (finding that prisoner had protected
liberty interest in remaining in general prison population). One
would think that where state law creates an entitlement to general
assistance based on certain substantive conditions, there similarly
results a property interest that warrants at least some procedural
safeguards. Cf. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates,
442 U.S.
1, 12, 2106 (1979) (finding parole applicant's expectancy of
release entitled to some measure of constitutional protection).
Although this Court has never addressed the issue whether
applicants for general assistance have a protected property
interest, see Peer v. Griffeth,
445 U.S. 970 (1980) (
Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), the weight of
authority among lower courts is contrary to the conclusion of the
Supreme Judicial Court. See, e.g., Daniels v. Woodbury County,
Iowa,
742 F.2d
1128, 1132-1133 (CA8 1984); Griffeth v. Detrich,
603 F.2d
118, 120-121 ( CA9 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Peer v.
Griffeth, supra; White v. Roughton,
530 F.2d
750, 755 (CA7 1976); Johnston v. Shaw,
556 F.
Supp. 406, 412-413 (ND Tex.1982). But see Zobriscky v. Los
Angeles County,
28 Cal. App. 3d
930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1972).
Assuming that applicants for general assistance are entitled to
some procedural safeguards, the Supreme Judicial Court further held
that the statutory procedures afforded by state law provide
sufficient process. This conclusion rests on a reading of Parratt
v. Taylor that is more expansive than this Court previously has
endorsed. Parratt held that a postdeprivation state tort action
afforded all the process that was due to remedy a "tortious loss of
. . . property as a result of a random and unauthorized act by a
state employee." 451 U.S., at 541. See also Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S.
517, 533, 3203 (1984) (applying Parratt to unau-
Page 470 U.S.
1018 , 1022
thorized, intentional deprivation of property by a state
employee). The present case is far removed from the facts of
Parratt, where prison employees negligently lost an inmate's
mail-order hobby kit. In contrast, here the town of Pittsfield had
a policy, contrary to the requirements of state law, not to provide
written notice to applicants denied general assistance. If we
assume, arguendo, that due process requires the provision of such
notice, it is questionable whether Parratt suggests that a
municipal policy denying those procedures comports with the
Constitution so long as state law makes some remedy available. Cf.
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422, 435-436,
1157-1158 (1982) (postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy due
process where deprivation is caused by established state
procedures).
Parratt reasoned that postdeprivation procedures may satisfy the
requirements of due process in circumstances in which
predeprivation process is impracticable. 451 U.S., at 539-541-1916.
In the context of unauthorized deprivations by individual state
employees, the State cannot possibly provide a meaningful
predeprivation hearing, and therefore adequate postdeprivation
state remedies may satisfy the procedural requirements of the Due
Process Clause. Id., at 541-542, 101 S. Ct., at 1916; see also
Hudson v. Palmer, supra, 468 U.S., at 533, 104 S. Ct., at 3204.
This reasoning cannot readily be extended to the facts of the
present case. First, the deprivation involved here did not result
from the unauthorized conduct of individual employees, but instead
reflected the town's policy. Second, the alleged denial of due
process was not the town's failure to provide a hearing prior to
denying the application for general assistance. Instead, petitioner
complains of the town's refusal to provide her with notice
explaining the decision and informing her of a statutory right to a
hearing. It does not seem impracticable to insist that the town
afford these minimal procedural protections. [
Footnote 2]
Even if the reasoning of Parratt applies in circumstances in
which a municipal policy causes deprivations of protected property
interests, it is by no means clear that the state law remedies
available in the instant case are adequate. The state procedures
did allow Mrs. Gregory to obtain grants of general assistance
nearly
Page 470 U.S.
1018 , 1023
one year after her application was improperly denied. Those
procedures, however, made no provision for the recovery of damages
resulting from the town's failure to provide her with notice or a
prompt hearing. Mrs. Gregory's complaint alleged that as a result
of the town's actions, she and her children were forced to leave
their home and to move to another town. Any state tort action
against the town or responsible employees apparently would be
barred by the immunity provisions of the Maine Tort Claims Act,
Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 14, 8103, 8111 (1980). Although Parratt
acknowledged that state remedies may be adequate even though they
may not provide a plaintiff with as large a recovery as he might
receive in a 1983 action, 451 U.S., at 544, it would be a novel
extension of that proposition to infer that eventual restoration of
a property interest, no matter how belated, constitutes an adequate
remedy for the intervening deprivation and any consequent damages.
Cf. ibid. ( noting that available state remedies could fully
compensate for property loss).
By suggesting that an applicant for general assistance may
arbitrarily be denied benefits, the holding below adopts a
proposition not endorsed previously by this Court and in conflict
with the decisions of several other courts. Moreover, our previous
decisions do not easily support the conclusion below that if
applicants are entitled to some procedural safeguards,
postdeprivation procedures are sufficient to remedy a municipal
policy of denying unsuccessful applicants a required written notice
explaining their right to an administrative hearing. The reasoning
of the Supreme Judicial Court is troubling in its general
implications as well as its application in this case. Consequently,
I respectfully dissent from the denial of certiorari.
Justice POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of
this petition.
Footnotes
Footnote 1 The general
assistance statute in effect at the time required that a decision
concerning an applicant's eligibility be made within 24 hours after
an application was submitted. Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 22, 4504(3)(
C) (1980). Furthermore, the statute required that an applicant be
provided written notice explaining the reasons for the decision and
the right to an administrative hearing. 4505. The administrative
hearing was to be held within seven days of receipt of a written
request for a hearing. 4507.
Maine has since replaced its previous general assistance
statute. 1983 Me. Acts, ch. 577, 1. See Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 22,
4301-4324 ( Supp.1984-1985). The new provisions also contain
requirements for written notice of a right to hearing. See 4321,
4322.
Footnote 2 Indeed, the
Superior Court noted that the town had previously entered into a
consent decree related to its refusal to follow the procedural
requirements of Maine's general assistance statute. Grass v.
Commissioner of Dept. of Human Services, Civ. Action No. 79-31-SD
(Me., Mar. 31, 1980), App. 2 to Pet. for Cert. 6-7, n. 3.
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