OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INSURANCE
CO.
ET AL. v. KNUDSON ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
No. 99-1786. Argued October 1, 200l-Decided January 8, 2002
When respondent Janette Knudson was injured in a car accident,
the health plan (Plan) of petitioner Earth Systems, Inc., the
employer of Janette's then-husband, respondent Eric Knudson,
covered $411,157.11 of her medical expenses, most of which was paid
by petitioner GreatWest Life & Annuity Insurance Co. The Plan's
reimbursement provision gives it the right to recover from a
beneficiary any payment for benefits paid by the Plan that the
beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third party. A separate
agreement assigns Great-West the Plan's rights to any reimbursement
provision claim. After the Knudsons filed a state-court tort action
to recover from the manufacturer of their car and others, they
negotiated a settlement which allocated the bulk of the recovery to
attorney's fees and to a trust for Janette's medical care, and
earmarked $13,828.70 (the portion of the settlement attributable to
past medical expenses) to satisfy Great-West's reimbursement claim.
Approving the settlement, the state court ordered the defendants to
pay the trust amount directly and the remainder to respondents'
attorney, who, in turn, would tender checks to Great-West and other
creditors. Instead of cashing its check, Great-West filed this
federal action under § 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to enforce the Plan's reimbursement
provision by requiring the Knudsons to pay the Plan $411,157.11 of
any proceeds recovered from third parties. The District Court
granted the Knudsons summary judgment, holding that the terms of
the Plan limited its right of reimbursement to the $13,828.70
determined by the state court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on
different grounds, holding that judicially decreed reimbursement
for payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a third
party is not "equitable relief" authorized by § 502(a)(3).
Held: Because petitioners are seeking legal relief-the
imposition of personal liability on respondents for a contractual
obligation to pay money-§ 502(a)(3) does not authorize this action.
Pp. 209-221.
(a) Under § 502(a)(3)-which authorizes a civil action "to enjoin
any act or practice which violates ... the terms of the plan, or
... to obtain other appropriate equitable relief" -the term
"equitable relief" refers to those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity.
205
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,
508 U. S. 248, 256. Here,
petitioners seek, in essence, to impose personal contractual
liability on respondents-relief that was not typically available in
equity, but is the classic form of legal relief. Id., at 255.
Petitioners' and the Government's efforts to characterize the
relief sought as "equitable" are not persuasive. Pp.209-21O.
(b) The Court rejects petitioners' argument that they are
entitled to relief under § 502(a)(3)(A) because they seek "to
enjoin a[n] act or practice"-respondents' failure to reimburse the
Plan-"which violates ... the [plan's] terms." An injunction to
compel the payment of money past due under a contract, or specific
performance of a past due monetary obligation, was not typically
available in equity. Those rare cases in which an equity court
would decree specific performance of a contract to transfer funds
were suits that, unlike the present case, sought to prevent future
losses that were either incalculable or would be greater than the
sum awarded. Bowen v. Massachusetts,
487 U. S. 879,
distinguished. Pp. 210-212.
(c) Also rejected is petitioners' argument that their suit is
authorized by § 502(a)(3)(B) because they seek restitution, which
they characterize as a form of equitable relief. Restitution is a
legal remedy when ordered in a case at law and an equitable remedy
when ordered in an equity case, and whether it is legal or
equitable depends on the basis for the plaintiff's claim and the
nature of the underlying remedies sought. For restitution to lie in
equity, the action generally must seek not to impose personal
liability on the defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff
particular funds or property in the defendant's possession. Here,
the basis for petitioners' claim is not that respondents hold
particular funds that, in good conscience, belong to petitioners,
but that petitioners are contractually entitled to some funds for
benefits that they conferred. The kind of restitution that
petitioners seek, therefore, is not equitable, but legal. Mertens,
supra, at 256, and Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith
Barney Inc.,
530 U.
S. 238, 253, distinguished. Pp. 212-218.
(d) Finally, the Court rejects the Government's argument that
the common law of trusts provides petitioners with equitable
remedies that allow them to bring this action under § 502(a)(3).
Such trust remedies are simply inapposite, see Mertens, supra, at
256, and, in any event, do not give a trustee a separate equitable
cause of action for payment from moneys other than the
beneficiary's interest in the trust. Pp. 219-220.
208 F.3d
221, affirmed.
206
206 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 221. GINSBURG,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, SOUTER, and
BREYER, JJ., joined, post, p.224.
James F. Jorden argued the cause for petitioners. With him on
the briefs were Waldemar
J. Pflepsen, Jr., Stephen H.
Goldberg, David C. Aspinwall, Thomas H. Lawrence, and John M.
Russell.
Paul R.
Q. Wolfson argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae in support of petitioners. On the brief were
Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, Beth S. Brinkmann, Judith E. Kramer, Allen H. Feldman,
Nathaniel L. Spiller, and Gary K. Stearman.
Richard G. Taranto, by invitation of the Court, 532 U. S. 917,
argued the cause as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Jeffrey S. Pop
filed a brief for respondent Janette Knudson. *
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether § 502(a)(3) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 891, 29 U.
S. C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994 ed.), authorizes this action by
petitioners to enforce a reimbursement provision of an ERISA
plan.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the
American Association of Health Plans et al. by Stephanie W Kanwit,
Louis Saccoccio, Robin S. Conrad, and Jeffrey Gabardi; for AARP et
al. by Paula Brantner, Mary Ellen Signorille, and Melvin Radowitz;
for the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and
Welfare Fund by John A. Kukankos, James L. Coghlan, Francis E.
Stepnowski, Debra M. Cyranoski, and William
J. Nellis; for
the National Association of Subrogation Professionals, Inc., by
Mark D. Spencer; and for the Self-Insurance Institute of America,
Inc., by George
J. Pantos.
Arthur H. Bryant, F. Paul Bland, Jr., and Leslie Brueckner filed
a brief for the Maryland HMO Subrogation Plaintiffs as amici
curiae.
207
I
Respondent Janette Knudson was rendered quadriplegic by a car
accident in June 1992. Because her then-husband, respondent Eric
Knudson, was employed by petitioner Earth Systems, Inc., Janette
was covered by the Health and Welfare Plan for Employees and
Dependents of Earth Systems, Inc. (Plan). The Plan covered
$411,157.11 of Janette's medical expenses, of which all except
$75,000 was paid by petitioner Great-West Life & Annuity
Insurance Co. pursuant to a "stop-loss" insurance agreement with
the Plan.
The Plan includes a reimbursement provision that is the basis
for the present lawsuit. This provides that the Plan shall have
"the right to recover from the [beneficiary] any payment for
benefits" paid by the Plan that the beneficiary is entitled to
recover from a third party. App. 58. Specifically, the Plan has "a
first lien upon any recovery, whether by settlement, judgment or
otherwise," that the beneficiary receives from the third party, not
to exceed "the amount of benefits paid [by the Plan] ... [or] the
amount received by the [beneficiary] for such medical treatment
.... " Id., at 58-59. If the beneficiary recovers from a third
party and fails to reimburse the Plan, "then he will be personally
liable to [the Plan] ... up to the amount of the first lien." Id.,
at 59. Pursuant to an agreement between the Plan and Great-West,
the Plan "assign[ed] to Great-West all of its rights to make,
litigate, negotiate, settle, compromise, release or waive" any
claim under the reimbursement provision. Id., at 45.
In late 1993, the Knudsons filed a tort action in California
state court seeking to recover from Hyundai Motor Company, the
manufacturer of the car they were riding in at the time of the
accident, and other alleged tortfeasors. The parties to that action
negotiated a $650,000 settlement, a notice of which was mailed to
Great-West. This allocated $256,745.30 to a Special Needs Trust
under Cal. Prob. Code Ann. § 3611 (West 1991 and Supp. 1993) to
provide for
208
208 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
Janette's medical care; $373,426 to attorney's fees and costs;
$5,000 to reimburse the California Medicaid program (MediCal); and
$13,828.70 (the portion of the settlement attributable to past
medical expenses) to satisfy Great-West's claim under the
reimbursement provision of the Plan.
The day before the hearing scheduled for judicial approval of
the settlement, Great-West, calling itself a defendant and
asserting that the state-court action involved federal claims
related to ERISA, filed in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California a notice of removal pursuant to 28
U. S. C. § 1441 (1994 ed.). That court concluded that Great-West
was not a defendant and could not remove the case, and therefore
remanded to the state court, which approved the settlement. The
state court's order provided that the defendants would pay the
settlement amount allocated to the Special Needs Trust directly to
the trust, and the remaining amounts to respondents' attorney, who,
in turn, would tender checks to Medi-Cal and Great-West.
Great-West, however, never cashed the check it received from
respondents' attorney. Instead, at the same time that Great-West
sought to remove the state-law tort action, it filed this action in
the same federal court (the United States District Court for the
Central District of California), seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief under § 502(a)(3) to enforce the reimbursement provision of
the Plan by requiring the Knudsons to pay the Plan $411,157.11 of
any proceeds recovered from third parties. Great-West subsequently
filed an amended complaint adding Earth Systems and the Plan as
plaintiffs and seeking a temporary restraining order against
continuation of the state-court proceedings for approval of the
settlement. The District Court denied the temporary restraining
order, a ruling that petitioners did not appeal. After the state
court approved the settlement and the money was disbursed, the
District Court granted summary judgment to the Knudsons. It held
that the language of the Plan limited its right of reimbursement to
the amount received by
209
respondents from third parties for past medical treatment, an
amount that the state court determined was $13,828.70. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed on different
grounds. Judgt. order reported at
208 F.3d
221 (2000). Citing FMC Medical Plan v. Owens,
122 F.3d
1258 (CA9 1997), it held that judicially decreed
reimbursement for payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance
plan by a third party is not equitable relief and is therefore not
authorized by § 502(a)(3). We granted certiorari. 531 U. S. 1124
(2001).
II
We have observed repeatedly that ERISA is a "'comprehensive and
reticulated statute,' the product of a decade of congressional
study of the Nation's private employee benefit system." Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates,
508 U. S. 248, 251 (1993)
(quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,
446 U. S. 359,
361 (1980)). We have therefore been especially "reluctant to tamper
with [the] enforcement scheme" embodied in the statute by extending
remedies not specifically authorized by its text. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U. S. 134, 147
(1985). Indeed, we have noted that ERISA's "carefully crafted and
detailed enforcement scheme provides 'strong evidence that Congress
did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to
incorporate expressly.''' Mertens, supra, at 254 (quoting Russell,
supra, at 146-147).
Section 502(a)(3) authorizes a civil action:
"by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any
act or practice which violates ... the terms of the plan, or (B) to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of ... the terms of
the plan." 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994 ed.).
As we explained in Mertens, "'[e]quitable' relief must mean
something less than all relief." 508 U. S., at 258, n. 8.
210
210 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
Thus, in Mertens we rejected a reading of the statute that would
extend the relief obtainable under § 502(a)(3) to whatever relief a
court of equity is empowered to provide in the particular case at
issue (which could include legal remedies that would otherwise be
beyond the scope of the equity court's authority). Such a reading,
we said, would "limit the relief not at all" and "render the
modifier ['equitable'] superfluous." Id., at 257-258. Instead, we
held that the term "equitable relief" in § 502(a)(3) must refer to
"those categories of relief that were typically available in equity
.... " Id., at 256.
Here, petitioners seek, in essence, to impose personal liability
on respondents for a contractual obligation to pay money-relief
that was not typically available in equity. "A claim for money due
and owing under a contract is 'quintessentially an action at law.'"
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wells,
213 F.3d
398, 401 (CA7 2000) (Posner, J.). "Almost invariably ... suits
seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel
the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for
'money damages,' as that phrase has traditionally been applied,
since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from
the defendant's breach of legal duty." Bowen v. Massachusetts,
487 U. S. 879,
918-919 (1988) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). And "[m]oney damages are,
of course, the classic form of legal relief." Mertens, supra, at
255.
Nevertheless, petitioners, along with their amicus the United
States, struggle to characterize the relief sought as "equitable"
under the standard set by Mertens. We are not persuaded.
A
First, petitioners argue that they are entitled to relief under
§ 502(a)(3)(A) because they seek "to enjoin a[n] act or
practice"-respondents' failure to reimburse the Plan"which violates
... the terms of the plan." But an injunction to compel the payment
of money past due under a con-
211
tract, or specific performance of a past due monetary
obligation, was not typically available in equity. 1 See, e.
g., 3 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359 (1979); 3
Dobbs § 12.8(2), at 199; 5A A. Corbin, Contracts § 1142, p. 119
(1964) (hereinafter Corbin). Those rare cases in which a court of
equity would decree specific performance of a contract to transfer
funds were suits that, unlike the present case, sought to prevent
future losses that either were incalculable or would be greater
than the sum awarded. For example, specific performance might be
available to enforce an agreement to lend money "when the
unavailability of alternative financing would leave the plaintiff
with injuries that are difficult to value; or to enforce an
obligor's duty to make future monthly payments, after the obligor
had consistently refused to make past payments concededly due, and
thus threatened the obligee with the burden of bringing multiple
damages actions." Bowen, supra, at 918 (SCALIA, J., dissenting).
See also 3 Dobbs § 12.8(2), at 200; 5A Corbin § 1142, at 117118.
Typically, however, specific performance of a contract to pay money
was not available in equity.
1 At oral argument, petitioners' counsel argued that the
injunction specifically authorized by § 502(a)(3)(A) need not be a
form of equitable relief. Petitioners' brief, however, conceded
that the reference in § 502(a)(3)(B) to "other appropriate
equitable relief" suggests that the relief authorized in §
502(a)(3)(A) "to enjoin any act or practice which violates ... the
terms of [a] plan" is, itself, "appropriate equitable relief." See
Brief for Petitioners 15, n. 6 (emphasis added). In any event,
injunction is inherently an equitable remedy, see, e. g., Reich v.
Continental Casualty Co., 33 F. 3d
754,756 (CA7 1994); 1 D.
Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 1.2, p. 11 (2d ed. 1993) (hereinafter
Dobbs), and statutory reference to that remedy must, absent other
indication, be deemed to contain the limitations upon its
availability that equity typically imposes. Without this rule of
construction, a statutory limitation to injunctive relief would be
meaningless, since any claim for legal relief can, with lawyerly
inventiveness, be phrased in terms of an injunction. Here, of
course, there is not only no contrary indication, but the positive
indication in paragraph (B) that the injunction referred to in
paragraph (A) is an equitable injunction.
212
212 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
Bowen v. Massachusetts, supra, upon which petitioners rely, is
not to the contrary. We held in Bowen that the provision of the
Administrative Procedure Act that precludes actions seeking "money
damages" against federal agencies, 5 U. S. C. § 702, does not bar a
State from seeking specific relief to obtain money to which it
claims entitlement under the federal Medicaid statute, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1396b(d) (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Bowen "did not turn on
distinctions between 'equitable' actions and other actions ... but
rather [on] what Congress meant by 'other than money damages'" in
the Administrative Procedure Act. Department of Army v. Blue Fox,
Inc.,
525 U. S.
255, 261 (1999). Furthermore, Bowen, unlike petitioners' claim,
did not deal with specific performance of a contractual obligation
to pay past due sums. Rather, Massachusetts claimed not only that
the Federal Government failed to reimburse it for past expenses
pursuant to a statutory obligation, but that the method the Federal
Government used to calculate reimbursements would lead to
underpayments in the future. Thus, the suit was not merely for past
due sums, but for an injunction to correct the method of
calculating payments going forward. Bowen, supra, at 889. Bowen has
no bearing on the unavailability of an injunction to enforce a
contractual obligation to pay money past due.
B
Second, petitioners argue that their suit is authorized by §
502(a)(3)(B) because they seek restitution, which they characterize
as a form of equitable relief. However, not all relief falling
under the rubric of restitution is available in equity. In the days
of the divided bench, restitution was available in certain cases at
law, and in certain others in equity. See, e.
g., 1 Dobbs §
1.2, at 11;
id., § 4.1(1), at 556;
id., § 4.1(3), at
564-565; id., §§ 4.2-4.3, at 570-624; 5 Corbin § 1102, at
550; Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81
Iowa L. Rev. 1, 36-37 (1995); Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to
Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality
213
of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. Rev. 486, 528 (1975).
Thus, "restitution is a legal remedy when ordered in a case at law
and an equitable remedy ... when ordered in an equity case," and
whether it is legal or equitable depends on "the basis for [the
plaintiff's] claim" and the nature of the underlying remedies
sought. Reich v. Continental Casualty Co.,
33
F.3d 754, 756 (CA7 1994) (Posner, J.).
In cases in which the plaintiff "could not assert title or right
to possession of particular property, but in which nevertheless he
might be able to show just grounds for recovering money to pay for
some benefit the defendant had received from him," the plaintiff
had a right to restitution
at law through an action derived
from the common-law writ of assumpsit. 1 Dobbs § 4.2(1), at 571.
See also Muir, supra, at 37. In such cases, the plaintiff's claim
was considered legal because he sought "to obtain a judgment
imposing a merely personal liability upon the defendant to pay a
sum of money." Restatement of Restitution § 160, Comment a, pp.
641-642 (1936). Such claims were viewed essentially as actions at
law for breach of contract (whether the contract was actual or
implied).
In contrast, a plaintiff could seek restitution in equity,
ordinarily in the form of a constructive trust or an equitable
lien, where money or property identified as belonging in good
conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular
funds or property in the defendant's possession. See 1 Dobbs §
4.3(1), at 587-588; Restatement of Restitution, supra, § 160,
Comment a, at 641-642; 1 G. Palmer, Law of Restitution § 1.4, p.
17; § 3.7, p. 262 (1978). A court of equity could then order a
defendant to transfer title (in the case of the constructive trust)
or to give a security interest (in the case of the equitable lien)
to a plaintiff who was, in the eyes of equity, the true owner. But
where "the property [sought to be recovered] or its proceeds have
been dissipated so that no product remains, [the plaintiff's] claim
is only that of a general creditor," and the plaintiff "cannot
enforce a con-
214
214 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
structive trust of or an equitable lien upon other property of
the [defendant]." Restatement of Restitution, supra, § 215, Comment
a, at 867. Thus, for restitution to lie in equity, the action
generally must seek not to impose personal liability on the
defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or
property in the defendant's possession.2
Here, the funds to which petitioners claim an entitlement under
the Plan's reimbursement provision-the proceeds from the settlement
of respondents' tort action-are not in respondents' possession. As
the order of the state court approving the settlement makes clear,
the disbursements from the settlement were paid by two checks, one
made payable to the Special Needs Trust and the other to
respondents' attorney (who, after deducting his own fees and costs,
placed the remaining funds in a client trust account from which he
tendered checks to respondents' other creditors, Great-West and
Medi-Cal). The basis for petitioners' claim is not that respondents
hold particular funds that, in good conscience, belong to
petitioners, but that petitioners are contractually entitled to
some funds for benefits that they conferred. The kind of
restitution that petitioners seek, therefore, is not equitable-the
imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien on particular
property-but legal-the imposition of personal liability for the
benefits that they conferred upon respondents.
Admittedly, our cases have not previously drawn this fine
distinction between restitution at law and restitution in equity,
but neither have they involved an issue to which the
2 There is a limited exception for an accounting for profits, a
form of equitable restitution that is not at issue in this case.
If, for example, a plaintiff is entitled to a constructive trust on
particular property held by the defendant, he may also recover
profits produced by the defendant's use of that property, even if
he cannot identify a particular res containing the profits sought
to be recovered. See 1 Dobbs § 4.3(1), at 588;
id., §
4.3(5), at 608. Petitioners do not claim the profits (if any)
produced by the proceeds from the state-court settlement, and are
not entitled to the constructive trust in those proceeds that would
support such a claim.
215
distinction was relevant. In Mertens, we mentioned in dicta that
"injunction, mandamus, and restitution" are categories of relief
that were typically available in equity. 508 U. S., at 256
(emphasis added). Mertens, however, did not involve a claim for
restitution at all; rather, we addressed the question whether a
nonfiduciary who knowingly participates in the breach of a
fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA is liable to the plan for
compensatory damages. Id., at 249-250. Thus, as courts and
commentators have noted, "all the [Supreme] Court meant [in Mertens
and other cases] was that restitution, in contrast to damages, is a
remedy commonly ordered in equity cases and therefore an equitable
remedy in a sense in which damages, though occasionally awarded in
equity cases, are not." Reich v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.
3d, at 756. Mertens did not purport to change the well-settled
principle that restitution is "not an exclusively equitable
remedy," and whether it is legal or equitable in a particular case
(and hence whether it is authorized by § 502(a)(3)) remains
dependent on the nature of the relief sought. 33 F. 3d, at 756. See
also Muir, 81 Iowa L. Rev., at 36 (analyzing Mertens and explaining
that "only equitable restitution will be available under Section
502(a)(3)").
Likewise, in Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney
Inc.,
530 U. S.
238 (2000), we noted that "an action for restitution against a
transferee of tainted plan assets" is "appropriate equitable
relief" within the meaning of § 502(a)(3). Id., at 253. While we
did not expressly distinguish between legal and equitable
restitution, the nature of the relief we described in Harris
Trust-a claim to specific property (or its proceeds) held by the
defendant-accords with the restitution we describe as equitable
today. Id., at 250 ("The trustee or beneficiaries may then maintain
an action for restitution of the property (if not already disposed
of) or disgorgement of proceeds (if already disposed of) ... "
(emphasis added));
id., at 250-251 ("Whenever the legal
title to property is obtained through means or under
216
216 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
circumstances 'which render it unconscientiousfor the holder of
the legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest, equity
impresses a constructive trust on the property thus acquired in
favor of the one who is truly and equitably entitled to the same
... " (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
JUSTICE GINSBURG'S dissent finds it dispositive that some
restitutionary remedies were typically available in equity. In her
view, the touchstone for distinguishing legal from equitable relief
is the "substance of the relief requested," post, at 228-and since
the "substantive" relief of restitution is typically available in
equity, it is, she concludes, available under § 502(a)(3). It is
doubtful, to begin with, that "restitution"-or at least restitution
defined broadly enough to embrace those forms of restitution
available at law-pertains to the substance of the relief rather
than to the legal theory under which it is awarded. The "substance"
of a money judgment is a compelled transfer of money; a money
judgment for restitution could be thought to identify a particular
type of relief (rather than merely the theory on which relief is
awarded) only if one were to limit restitution to the return of
identifiable funds (or property) belonging to the plaintiff and
held by the defendant-that is, to limit restitution to the form of
restitution traditionally available in equity.
In any event, JUSTICE GINSBURG'S approach, which looks only to
the nature of the relief and not to the conditions that equity
attached to its provision, logically leads to the same untenable
conclusion reached by JUSTICE STEVENS'S dissent-which is that §
502(a)(3)(A)'s explicit authorization of injunction, which it
identifies as a form of equitable relief, permits (what equity
would never permit) an injunction against failure to pay a simple
indebtedness-or, for that matter, an injunction against failure to
pay punitive damages. The problem with that conclusion, of course,
is that it renders the statute's limitation of relief to
"[injunction] ... or other appropriate equitable relief" utterly
pointless. It
217
is easy to disparage the law-equity dichotomy as "an ancient
classification," post, at 224 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.), and an
"obsolete distinctio[n]," post, at 222 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).
Like it or not, however, that classification and distinction has
been specified by the statute; and there is no way to give the
specification meaning-indeed, there is no way to render the
unmistakable limitation of the statute a limitation at allexcept by
adverting to the differences between law and equity to which the
statute refers. The dissents greatly exaggerate, moreover, the
difficulty of that task. Congress felt comfortable referring to
equitable relief in this statute-as it has in many others
3-precisely because the basic contours of the term are well known.
Rarely will there be need for any more "antiquarian inquiry," post,
at 233-234 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.), than consulting, as we have
done, standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the
Restatements, which make the answer clear. It is an inquiry,
moreover, that we are accustomed to pursuing, and will always have
to pursue, in other contexts. See, e. g., Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,
527 U. S. 308, 318 (1999)
(powers of federal courts under the Judiciary Act's grant of
jurisdiction over "all ... suits in equity"); Curtis v. Loether,
415 U. S. 189,
192 (1974) (scope of the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial
"[i]n suits at common law"). What will introduce a high degree of
confusion into congressional use (and lawyers' understanding) of
the statutory term "equity" is the rolling revision of its content
contemplated by the dissents.
JUSTICE STEVENS finds it "difficult ... to understand why
Congress would not have wanted to provide recourse in federal court
for the plan violation disclosed by the record in this case," post,
at 223. It is, however, not our job to find reasons for what
Congress has plainly done; and it is our job to avoid rendering
what Congress has plainly done (here,
3 A Westlaw search discloses that the term "equitable relief"
appears in 77 provisions of the United States Code.
218
218 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
limit the available relief) devoid of reason and effect. If, as
JUSTICE GINSBURG surmises, post, at 234, Congress meant to rule out
nothing more than "compensatory and punitive damages," it could
simply have said that. That Congress sought to achieve this result
by subtle reliance upon the dissenters' novel and expansive view of
equity is most implausible.
Respecting Congress's choice to limit the relief available under
§ 502(a)(3) to "equitable relief" requires us to recognize the
difference between legal and equitable forms of restitution.4
Because petitioners seek only the former, their suit is not
authorized by § 502(a)(3).
4 In support of its argument that Congress intended all
restitution to be "equitable relief" under § 502(a)(3), JUSTICE
GINSBURG'S dissent asserts that Congress has treated backpay, "a
type of restitution," post, at 230, as equitable for purposes of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The authorities of this
Court cited for the proposition that backpay is a type of
restitution are Curtis v. Loether,
415 U. S. 189, 197
(1974), and Teamsters v. Terry,
494 U. S. 558, 572
(1990). It is notable, however, that these cases do not say that
since it is restitutionary, it is therefore equitable. Curtis, in
fact, explicitly refuses to do so. 415 U. S., at 197 ("Whatever may
be the merit of the 'equitable' characterization [of backpay] in
Title VII cases ... " (footnote omitted)). And in Terry, while we
noted that "we have characterized damages as equitable where they
are restitutionary," 494 U. S., at 570, we did not (and could not)
say that all forms of restitution are equitable.
Congress "treated [backpay] as equitable" in Title VII, post, at
230 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.), only in the narrow sense that it
allowed backpay to be awarded together with equitable relief:
"[T]he court may ... order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ...
, or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994 ed.) (emphasis added).
If the referent of "other equitable relief" were "back pay," it
could be said, in a sense relevant here, that Congress "treated"
backpay as equitable relief. In fact, however, the referent is
"reinstatement or hiring of employees," which is modified by the
phrase "with or without back pay." Curtis recognized that courts of
appeals had treated Title VII backpay as
219
C
Third, the United States, as petitioners' amicus, argues that
the common law of trusts provides petitioners with equitable
remedies that allow them to bring this action under § 502(a)(3).
Analogizing respondents to beneficiaries of a trust, the United
States argues that a trustee could bring a suit to enforce an
agreement by a beneficiary to pay money into a trust or to repay an
advance made from the trust. See Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 17-19 (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 252, 255
(1959) (hereinafter Restatement of Trusts)). These trust remedies
are simply inapposite. In Mertens, we rejected the claim that the
special equity-court powers applicable to trusts define the reach
of § 502(a)(3). Instead, we held that the term "equitable relief"
in § 502(a)(3) must refer to "those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity .... " 508 U. S., at 256. In any
event, the cited sections of the Restatement, by their terms,
merely allow a trustee to charge the beneficiary's interest in the
trust in order to capture money owed. See Restatement of Trusts §
252 ("If one of the bene-
equitable because § 2000e-5(g)(1) had made backpay "an integral
part of an equitable remedy," 415 U. S., at 197. See Grayson v.
Wickes Corp.,
607 F.2d
1194, 1196 (CA7 1979) (Title VII backpay is "an integral part
of the equitable remedy of reinstatement"); Harmon v. May
Broadcasting Co.,
583 F.2d
410, 411 (CA8 1978) (same); Slack v. Havens,
522 F.2d
1091, 1094 (CA9 1975) (same); Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 417
The statement in Terry on which JUSTICE GINSBURG relies-that
"Congress specifically characterized backpay under Title VII as a
form of 'equitable relief,'" 494 U. S., at 572-is plainly
inaccurate unless it is understood to mean that Title VII backpay
was "specifically" made part of an equitable remedy. That is the
only sense which the Terry discussion requires, and is reinforced
by the immediately following citation of the portion of Curtis that
called Title VII backpay "an integral part of an equitable remedy,"
Curtis, supra, at 197. See Terry, supra, at 572. The restitution
sought here by Great-West is not that, but a freestanding claim for
money damages. Title VII has nothing to do with this case.
220
220 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
ficiaries of a trust contracts to pay money to the trustee to be
held as part of the trust estate and he fails to make the payment,
his beneficial interest is subject to a charge for the amount of
his liability");
id., § 255 ("If the trustee makes an
advance or loan of trust money to a beneficiary, the beneficiary's
interest is subject to a charge for the repayment of the amount
advanced or lent"). These setoff remedies do not give the trustee a
separate equitable cause of action for payment from other
moneys.
III
In the end, petitioners ask us to interpret § 502(a)(3) so as to
prevent them "from being deprived of any remedy under circumstances
where such a result clearly would be inconsistent with a primary
purpose of ERISA," namely, the enforcement of the terms of a plan.
See Brief for Petitioners 30-31. We note, though it is not
necessary to our decision, that there may have been other means for
petitioners to obtain the essentially legal relief that they seek.
We express no opinion as to whether petitioners could have
intervened in the state-court tort action brought by respondents or
whether a direct action by petitioners against respondents
asserting state-law claims such as breach of contract would have
been pre-empted by ERISA. Nor do we decide whether petitioners
could have obtained equitable relief against respondents' attorney
and the trustee of the Special Needs Trust, since petitioners did
not appeal the District Court's denial of their motion to amend
their complaint to add these individuals as codefendants.
We need not decide these issues because, as we explained in
Mertens, "[e]ven assuming ... that petitioners are correct about
the pre-emption of previously available state-court actions" or the
lack of other means to obtain relief, "vague notions of a statute's
'basic purpose' are nonetheless inadequate to overcome the words of
its text regarding the specific issue under consideration." 508 U.
S., at 261. In the
221
very same section of ERISA as § 502(a)(3), Congress authorized
"a participant or beneficiary" to bring a civil action "to enforce
his rights under the terms of the plan," without reference to
whether the relief sought is legal or equitable. 29 U. S. C. §
1132(a)(1)(B) (1994 ed.). But Congress did not extend the same
authorization to fiduciaries. Rather, § 502(a)(3), by its terms,
only allows for equitable relief. We will not attempt to adjust the
"carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme" embodied in the
text that Congress has adopted.5 Mertens, supra, at 254. Because
petitioners are seeking legal relief-the imposition of personal
liability on respondents for a contractual obligation to pay money§
502(a)(3) does not authorize this action. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
In her lucid dissent, which I join, JUSTICE GINSBURG has
explained why it is fanciful to assume that in 1974 Congress
5 Varity Corp. v. Howe,
516 U. S. 489 (1996),
upon which petitioners rely, is not to the contrary. In Varity
Corp., we explained that § 502(a)(3) is a "'catchall' provisio[n]"
that "act[s] as a safety net, offering appropriate equitable relief
for injuries caused by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere
adequately remedy." Id., at 512. Thus, we concluded that §
502(a)(3) authorizes lawsuits by beneficiaries for individualized
equitable relief for breach of fiduciary obligations,
notwithstanding the petitioner's argument that such relief is not
"appropriate" because § § 502(a)(2) and 409 of ERISA specifically
address liability for breach of fiduciary duty and preclude
individualized relief. Id., at 507-515. In Varity Corp., however,
it was undisputed that respondents were seeking equitable relief,
and the question was whether such relief was "appropriate" in light
of the apparent lack of alternative remedies. Id., at 508. Varity
Corp. did not hold, as petitioners urge us to conclude today, that
§ 502(a)(3) is a catchall provision that authorizes all relief that
is consistent with ERISA's purposes and is not explicitly provided
elsewhere. To accept petitioners' argument is to ignore the plain
language of the statute, which provides fiduciaries with only
equitable relief.
222
222 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
STEVENS, J., dissenting
intended to revive the obsolete distinctions between law and
equity as a basis for defining the remedies available in federal
court for violations of the terms of a plan under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). She has also
convincingly argued that the relief sought in the present case is
permissible even under the Court's favored test for determining
what qualifies as "equitable relief" under § 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA.
I add this postscript because I am persuaded that Congress intended
the word "enjoin," as used in § 502(a)(3)(A), to authorize any
appropriate order that prohibits or terminates a violation of an
ERISA plan, regardless of whether a precedent for such an order can
be found in English Chancery cases.
I read the word "other" in § 502(a)(3)(B) as having been
intended to enlarge, not contract, a federal judge's remedial
authority. Consequently, and contrary to the Court's view in
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,
508 U. S. 248, 256
(1993), I would neither read § 502(a)(3)(B) as placing a limitation
on a judge's authority under § 502(a)(3)(A), nor shackle an
analysis of what constitutes "equitable relief" under §
502(a)(3)(B) to the sort of historical analysis that the Court has
chosen.
Nevertheless, Mertens is the law, and an inquiry under §
502(a)(3)(B) now entails an analysis of what relief would have been
"typically available in equity." 508 U. S., at 256. This does not
mean, however, that all inquiries under § 502(a)(3) must involve
historical analysis, as the Court seems to believe, e. g., ante, at
209-210. In Mertens, our task was to interpret "other appropriate
equitable relief" under § 502(a)(3)(B), and our holding thus did
not extend to the meaning of "to enjoin" in § 502(a)(3)(A). As a
result, an analysis of tradition is unnecessary with respect to §
502(a)(3)(A). Moreover, that section provides a proper basis for
federal jurisdiction in the present case, as petitioners brought
suit "to enjoin any act or practice which violates ... the terms of
[a] plan." § 502(a)(3)(A).
223
Not only is an inclusive reading of § 502(a)(3) consonant with
the text of the statute, but it accomplishes Congress' goal of
providing a federal remedy for violations of the terms of plans
governed by ERISA. Contrary to the Court's current reluctance to
conclude that wrongs should be remedied,l I believe that the
historic presumption favoring the provision of remedies for
violations of federal rights 2 should inform our construction of
the remedial provisions of federal statutes. It is difficult for me
to understand why Congress would not have wanted to provide
recourse in federal court for the plan violation disclosed by the
record in this case. Cf., e. g., Varity Corp. v. Howe,
516 U. S. 489, 512-513,
515 (1996) ("We are not aware of any ERISA-related purpose that
denial of a remedy would serve"). It is thus unsurprising that the
Court's opinion contains no discussion of why Congress would have
intended its reading of § 502(a)(3) and the resulting denial of a
federal remedy in this case. Absent such discussion, the Court's
opinion is remarkably unpersuasive.3
I respectfully dissent.
1 See, e. g., Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, ante, p.
75 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U. S. 275, 294-297
(2001) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
2 See, e. g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U. S. 388,
392 (1971) (" '[W]here federally protected rights have been
invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will
be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief'" (quoting Bell v. Hood,
327 U. S. 678, 684
(1946))); 403 u. S., at 397 (" 'The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury'" (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803))).
3 In a response to this dissent that echoes Tennyson's poem
about the Light Brigade-"Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do
and die" -the Court states that it is "not our job to find reasons
for what Congress has plainly done," ante, at 217. Congress, of
course, has the power to enact unreasonable laws. Nevertheless,
instead of blind obedience to what at first blush appears to be
such a law, I think it both prudent and respectful to pause to ask
why Congress would do so.
224
224 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JusTICE SOUTER, and
JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.
Today's holding, the majority declares, is compelled by
"Congress's choice to limit the relief available under §
502(a)(3)." Ante, at 218. In the Court's view, Congress' placement
of the word "equitable" in that provision signaled an intent to
exhume the "fine distinction[s]" borne of the "days of the divided
bench," ante, at 212, 214; to treat as dispositive an ancient
classification unrelated to the substance of the relief sought; and
to obstruct the general goals of ERISA by relegating to state court
(or to no court at all) an array of suits involving the
interpretation of employee health plan provisions. Because it is
plain that Congress made no such "choice," I dissent.
I
The Court purports to resolve this case by determining the
"nature of the relief" Great-West seeks. Ante, at 215. The
opinion's analysis, however, trains on the question, deemed
subsidiary, whether the disputed claim could have been brought in
an equity court "[i]n the days of the divided bench." Ante, at
212-216 (inquiring whether the claim is akin to "an action derived
from the common-law writ of assumpsit" that would have been brought
at law, or instead resembles a claim for return of particular
assets that would "lie in equity"). To answer that question, the
Court scrutinizes the form of the claim and contrasts its features
with the technical requirements that once governed the
jurisdictional divide between the premerger courts. Finding no
clear match on the equitable side of the line, the Court concludes
that Great-West's claim is beyond the scope of § 502(a)(3) and
therefore outside federal jurisdiction.
The rarified rules underlying this rigid and time-bound
conception of the term "equity" were hardly at the fingertips of
those who enacted § 502(a)(3). By 1974, when ERISA became law, the
"days of the divided bench" were a fading memory, for that era had
ended nearly 40 years earlier with
225
the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Those rules
instruct: "There shall be one form of action" cognizable in the
federal courts. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 2. Except where reference to
historical practice might be necessary to preserve a right
established before the merger, see, e.
g., Curtis v.
Loether,
415 U. S.
189, 195 (1974) (Seventh Amendment jury trial), the doctrinal
rules delineating the boundaries of the divided courts had receded.
See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
1041, p. 135 (1987); C. Wright, Handbook on Law of Federal Courts §
67, p. 282 (2d ed. 1970) ("[I]nstances in which the old
distinctions continue to rule from their graves are quite
rare.").
It is thus fanciful to attribute to Members of the 93d Congress
familiarity with those "needless and obsolete distinctions," 4
Wright & Miller, supra, § 1041, at 131, much less a deliberate
"choice" to resurrect and import them wholesale into the modern
regulatory scheme laid out in ERISA. "[T]here is nothing to suggest
that ERISA's drafters wanted to embed their work in a time warp."
Health Cost Controls of Ill. v. Washington,
187
F.3d 703, 711 (CA7 1999) (Posner, J.); cf. Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates,
508 U. S.
248, 257, n. 7 (1993) (meaning of "equitable relief" in §
502(a)(3) must be determined based on "the state of the law when
ERISA was enacted").
That Congress did not intend to strap § 502(a)(3) with the
anachronistic rules on which the majority relies is corroborated by
the anomalous results to which the supposed legislative "choice"
leads. Although the Court recognizes that it need not decide the
issue, see ante, at 220, its opinion surely contemplates that a
constructive trust claim would lie; hence, the outcome of this case
would be different if Great-West had sued the trustee of the
Special Needs Trust, who has "possession" of the requested funds,
instead of the Knudsons, who do not. See ante, at 214 (constructive
trust unavailable because "the funds to which petitioners claim an
entitlement ... are not in respondents' possession"). Under
226
226 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
that view, whether relief is "equitable" would turn entirely on
the designation of the defendant, even though the substance of the
relief Great-West could have obtained in a suit against the
trustee-a judgment ordering the return of wrongfully withheld
funds-is identical to the relief GreatWest in fact sought from the
Knudsons. Unlike today's majority, I resist this "rule unjustified
in reason, which produces different results for breaches of duty in
situations that cannot be differentiated in policy." Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U. S. 375, 405
(1970).
The procedural history of this case highlights the anomaly of
upholding a judgment neither party supports,1 one that will at
least protract and perhaps preclude judicial resolution of the nub
of the controversy-i. e., what recoupment does the Plan's
reimbursement provision call for. Great-West named the Knudsons as
defendants before Janet Knudson's Special Needs Trust had been
approved. There was no other defendant then in the picture. Seeking
at that time to preserve the status quo, Great-West requested from
the District Court preliminary injunctive relief to stop the
Knudsons from disposing of the funds Hyundai paid to settle the
state-court action. Only after the District Court denied that
relief did the state court approve of, and order that the
settlement funds be paid into, the Special Needs Trust. Great-West
then moved for leave to amend its complaint to add the trustee as a
defendant, but the District Court denied
1 In the District Court, both parties sought decision on the
amount Great-West was entitled to recoup under the Plan's provision
for recovery of benefits paid, and the court resolved that issue in
the Knudsons' favor. The Ninth Circuit, however, refused to review
the District Court's resolution of that question, holding instead
that federal courts are without authority to grant any relief to
parties in Great-West's situation. Because neither party defended
that ruling in this Court, Motion to Dismiss as Improvidently
Granted 1, we appointed an amicus curiae to argue in support of the
Ninth Circuit's judgment. See 532 U. S. 917 (2001). Both on brief
and at oral argument, appointed counsel commendably developed the
position the majority now adopts.
227
that motion without consideration in light of its judgment for
the Knudsons on the merits. Had the District Court ruled
differently on this peripheral issue, the majority would presumably
reverse rather than affirm a disposition of this case that left in
limbo the meaning of the Plan's reimbursement provision. If that is
so, then the Court's decision rests on Great-West's failure to
appeal an interlocutory issue made moot by the District Court's
final judgment, an issue that, to all involved, must have seemed
utterly inconsequential post judgment day.
The majority's avowed obedience to Congress' "choice" is further
belied by the conflict between the Court's holding and Congress'
stated goals in enacting ERISA. After today, ERISA plans and
fiduciaries unable to fit their suits within the confines the
Court's opinion constructs are barred from a federal forum; they
may seek enforcement of reimbursement provisions like the one here
at issue only in state court. Many such suits may be precluded by
antisubrogation laws, see Brief for Maryland HMO Subrogation
Plaintiffs as Amici Curiae 4-5, n. 2, others may be preempted by
ERISA itself, and those that survive may produce diverse and
potentially contradictory interpretations of the disputed plan
terms.
We have recognized that Congress sought through ERISA "to
establish a uniform administrative scheme" and to ensure that plan
provisions would be enforced in federal court, free of "the threat
of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation." Fort
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
482 U. S. 1, 9 (1987)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 120 Congo Rec. 29933
(1974)). The majority's construction frustrates those goals by
ascribing to Congress the paradoxical intent to enact a specific
provision, § 502(a)(3), that thwarts the purposes of the general
scheme of which it is part. The Court is no doubt correct that
"vague notions of a statute's 'basic purpose' are ... inadequate to
overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under
consideration."
228
228 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
GINSBURG, J., dissenting
Ante, at 220 (quoting Mertens, 508 U. S., at 261) (emphasis
deleted). But when Congress' clearly stated purpose so starkly
conflicts with questionable inferences drawn from a single word in
the statute, it is the latter, and not the former, that must give
way.
It is particularly ironic that the majority acts in the name of
equity as it sacrifices congressional intent and statutory purpose
to archaic and unyielding doctrine. "Equity eschews mechanical
rules; it depends on flexibility." Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
327 U. S. 392, 396
(1946). And "[a]s this Court long ago recognized, 'there is
inherent in the Courts of Equity a jurisdiction to ... give effect
to the policy of the legislature.''' Mitchell v. Robert DeMario
Jewelry, Inc.,
361 U.
S. 288, 291-292 (1960) (quoting Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195,
203 (1839)); see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U. S. 405, 417 (1975)
("[W]hen Congress invokes the Chancellor's conscience to further
transcendent legislative purposes, what is required is the
principled application of standards consistent with those
purposes."); cf. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance
Bond Fund, Inc.,
527
U. S. 308, 336 (1999) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (Court
similarly "relie[d] on an unjustifiably static conception of equity
jurisdiction").
II
Unprepared to agree that Congress chose to infuse § 502(a)(3)
with the recondite distinctions on which the majority relies, I
would accord a different meaning to the term "equitable."
Consistent with what Congress likely intended and with our decision
in Mertens, I would look to the substance of the relief requested
and ask whether relief of that character was "typically available
in equity." Mertens, 508 U. S., at 256. Great-West seeks
restitution, a category of relief fully meeting that measure even
if the remedy was also available in cases brought at law.
Accordingly, I would not oust this case from the federal
courts.
229
That Great-West requests restitution is beyond dispute.
The relief would operate to transfer from the Knudsons funds
over which Great-West claims to be the rightful owner. See Curtis,
415 U. S., at 197 (describing an award as restitutionary if it
would "requir[e] the defendant to disgorge funds wrongfully
withheld from the plaintiff"); Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
328 U. S. 395,
402 (1946) (restitution encompasses a decree "ordering the return
of that which rightfully belongs to" the plaintiff). Great-West
alleges that the Knudsons would be unjustly enriched if permitted
to retain the funds. See 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.1(2), p.
557 (2d ed. 1993) ("The fundamental substantive basis for
restitution is that the defendant has been unjustly enriched by
receiving something, tangible or intangible, that properly belongs
to the plaintiff."). And Great-West sued to recover an amount
representing the Knudsons' unjust gain, rather than Great-West's
loss. See 3
id., § 12.1(1), at 9 ("Restitutionary recoveries
are based on the defendant's gain, not on the plaintiff's
loss.").
As the majority appears to admit, see ante, at 214, our cases
have invariably described restitutionary relief as "equitable"
without even mentioning, much less dwelling upon, the ancient
classifications on which today's holding rests. See, e. g., Tull v.
United States,
481 U.
S. 412, 424 (1987) (restitution "traditionally considered an
equitable remedy"); Mertens, 508 U. S., at 255 (restitution is a
"remedy traditionally viewed as 'equitable' "); Teamsters v. Terry,
494 U. S. 558,
570 (1990) ("[W]e have characterized [money] damages as equitable
where they are restitutionary."); Mitchell, 361 U. S., at 291-293
(District Court could exercise equitable authority under Fair Labor
Standards Act to order restitution); cf. Moses v. Macferlan, 2
Burr. 1005, 1012,97 Eng. Rep. 676, 681 (K. B. 1760) ("In one word,
the gist of this kind of action is that the defendant, upon the
circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural
justice and equity to refund the money."). These cases establish
what the Court does not
230
230 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
and cannot dispute: Restitution was "within the recognized power
and within the highest tradition of a court of equity." Porter, 328
U. S., at 402.
More important, if one's concern is to follow the Legislature's
will, Congress itself has treated as equitable a type of
restitution substantially similar to the relief Great-West seeks
here. Congress placed in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
the instruction that, to redress violations of the Act, courts may
award, inter alia, "appropriate ... equitable relief," including
"reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay."
42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994 ed.). Interpreting this
provision, we have recognized that backpay is "a form of
restitution," Curtis, 415 U. S., at 197; see Terry, 494 U. S., at
572, and that "Congress specifically characterized backpay under
Title VII as a form of 'equitable relief,'" ibid. The Mertens
majority used Title VII's "equitable relief" provision as the
touchstone for its interpretation of § 502(a)(3), see 508 U. S., at
255; today's majority declares, with remarkable inconsistency, that
"Title VII has nothing to do with this case," ante, at 219, n. 4.
The Court inexplicably fails to offer any reason why Congress did
not intend "equitable relief" in § 502(a)(3) to include a
plaintiff's "recover[y of] money to pay for some benefit the
defendant had received from him," ante, at 213 (internal quotation
marks omitted), but did intend those words to encompass such relief
in a measure (Title VII) enacted years earlier.2
2 The Courts of Appeals have not aligned behind the Court's
theory that Congress treated Title VII backpay as equitable "only
in the narrow sense that" such relief is an "integral part" of the
statutory remedy of reinstatement. Ante, at 218, n. 4. While some
courts have employed the majority's rationale, others have adopted
the position the Court denies: that Title VII backpay is
restitutionary and "therefore equitable," ibid. See, e. g., EEOC v.
Detroit Edison Co.,
515 F.2d
301, 308 (CA6 1975) ("Back pay in Title VII cases is considered
a form of restitution, not an award of damages. Since restitution
is an equitable remedy a jury is not required for the award of back
pay."), vacated on other grounds, 431 U. S. 951 (1977); Rogers v.
Loether,
467 F.2d
1110, 1121 (CA7 1972) ("It is not unreasonable
231
I agree that "not all relief falling under the rubric of
restitution [was] available in equity," ante, at 212 (emphasis
added); restitution was also available in claims brought at law,
and the majority may be correct that in such cases restitution
would have been termed "legal," ante, at 213. But that in no way
affects the answer to the question at the core of this case.
Section 502(a)(3) as interpreted in Mertens encompasses those
"categories of relief that were typically available in equity," 508
U. S., at 256 (emphasis in original), not those that were
exclusively so. Restitution plainly fits that bill. By insisting
that § 502(a)(3) embraces only those claims that, in the
circumstances of the particular case, could be brought in chancery
in times of yore, the majority labors against the holding of that
case. Indeed, Mertens explicitly
to regard an award of back pay [under Title VII] as an
appropriate exercise of a chancellor's power to require
restitution. Restitution is clearly an equitable remedy." (footnote
omitted)), aff'd,
415
U. S. 189 (1974). See also Hubbard v. EPA,
949 F.2d
453,462 (CADC 1991) ("Courts have recognized the equitable
nature of back pay awards in a number of different contexts.
Generally, these decisions hold that back pay constitutes the very
thing that the plaintiff would have received but for the
defendant's illegal action; back pay is thus seen to reflect
equitable restitution."), aff'd on other grounds,
982 F.2d
531 (CADC 1992) (en bane).
Such a reading of § 2000e-5(g)(1) accords with our recognition
in Teamsters v. Terry,
494 U. S. 558, 572
(1990), that "Congress specifically characterized backpay under
Title VII as a form of 'equitable relief.' " (Emphasis added.) We
were somewhat ambiguous in Curtis v. Loether,
415 U. S. 189, 197
(1974), about the rationale of the Courts of Appeals, reasoning
that they had treated Title VII backpay as equitable because
Congress had made backpay "an integral part of an equitable remedy,
a form of restitution." But we spoke with greater clarity in Terry,
494 U. S., at 570-571, explaining that we could find an "exception
to the general rule" that monetary relief is legal, rather than
equitable, in two situations: either "where thEe relief is]
restitutionary," a category into which we suggested Title VII
backpay might fall, see
id., at 572 ("backpay sought from an
employer under Title VII would generally be restitutionary in
nature"); or where "a monetary award [is] 'incidental to or
intertwined with injunctive relief,'" id., at 571 (quoting Tull v.
United States,
481 U.
S. 412, 424 (1987)).
232
232 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
rejected a position close to the one embraced by the Court
today; Mertens recognized that "[a]s memories of the divided bench,
and familiarity with its technical refinements, recede further into
the past, [an interpretation of § 502(a)(3) keyed to the relief a
court of equity could award in a particular case] becomes, perhaps,
increasingly unlikely." 508 U. S., at 256-257.
My objection to the inquiry the Court today adopts in spite of
Mertens does not turn on "the difficulty of thee] task," ante, at
217. To be sure, I question the Court's confidence in the ability
of "the standard works" to "make the answer clear"; the Court does
not indicate what rule prevails, for example, when those works
conflict, as they do on key points, compare Restatement of
Restitution § 160, Comment e, p. 645 (1936) (constructive trust
over money available only where transfer procured by abuse of
fiduciary relation or where legal remedy inadequate), with 1 Dobbs,
Law of Remedies § 4.3(2), at 595, 597 (limitation of constructive
trust to "misdealings by fiduciaries" a "misconception"; adequacy
of legal remedy "seems irrelevant"). And courts have recognized
that this Court's preferred method is indeed "difficult to apply,"
Ross v. Bernhard,
396
U. S. 531, 538, n. 10 (1970), calling for analysis that "may
seem to reek unduly of the study," Damsky v. Zavatt,
289 F.2d
46, 48 (CA2 1961) (Friendly, J.), "'if not of the museum,'"
id., at 59 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Even if the Court's chosen texts always yielded a quick and
plain answer, however, I would think it no less implausible that
Congress intended to make controlling the doctrine those texts
describe. See supra, at 224-228. Our reliance on that doctrine in
the context of the Seventh Amendment and Judiciary Act of 1789, see
ante, at 217, underscores the incongruity of applying it here. It
may be arguable that "preserving" the meaning of those founding-era
provisions requires courts to determine which tribunal would have
entertained a particular claim in 18th-century England. See
233
Grupo Mexicano, 527 U. S., at 318-319; Terry, 494 U. S., at 593
(KENNEDY, J., dissenting) ("We cannot preserve a right existing in
1791 unless we look to history to identify it."). But no such
rationale conceivably justifies asking that question in cases
arising under § 502(a)(3)(B), a provision of a distinctly modern
statute Congress passed in 1974.
That the import of the term "equity" might depend on context
does not signify a "rolling revision of its content," ante, at 217,
but rather a recognition that equity, characteristically, was and
should remain an evolving and dynamic jurisprudence, see Grupo
Mexicano, 527 U. S., at 336-337 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). Cf.
Mertens, 508 U. S., at 257 ("[I]t remains a question of
interpretation in each case which meaning [Congress] intended" to
impart to the term "equitable relief."). As courts in the
common-law realm have reaffirmed: "Principles of equity, we were
all taught, were introduced by Lord Chancellors and their deputies
... in order to provide relief from the inflexibility of common law
rules." Medforth v. Blake, [1999] 3 All E. R. 97, 110 (C. A.); see
Boulting v. Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied
Technicians, [1963] 2 Q. B. 606, 636 (C. A.) ("[A]ll rules of
equity [are] flexible, in the sense that [they] develo[p] to meet
the changing situations and conditions of the time."); Pettkus v.
Becker, [1980] 2 S. C. R. 834, 847, 117 D. L. R. (3d) 257, 273
("The great advantage of ancient principles of equity is their
flexibility: the judiciary is thus able to shape these malleable
principles so as to accommodate the changing needs and mores of
society."). This Court's equation of "equity" with the rigid
application of rules frozen in a bygone era, I maintain, is thus
"unjustifiabl[e]" even as applied to a law grounded in that era.
Grupo Mexicano, 527 U. S., at 336 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). As
applied to a statute like ERISA, however, such insistence is
senseless.
Thus, there is no reason to ask what court would have
entertained Great-West's claim "[i]n the days of the divided
bench," ante, at 212, and no need to engage in the antiquar-
234
234 GREAT-WEST LIFE & ANNUITY INS.
CO. v. KNUDSON
ian inquiry through which the majority attempts to answer that
question. Nor would reading § 502(a)(3) to encompass restitution
render the modifier "equitable" "utterly pointless," as the Court
fears, ante, at 216. Such a construction would confine the scope of
that provision to significantly "less than all relief," ante, at
209 (quoting Mertens, 508 U. S., at 258, n. 8). Most notably, it
would exclude compensatory and punitive damages, see id., at 255,
which, "though occasionally awarded in equity" under the "clean up
doctrine," Reich v. Continental Casualty Co.,
33
F.3d 754, 756 (CA7 1994), were not typically available in such
courts. See 1 S. Symons, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 181, p.
257 (5th ed. 1941). That large limitation is indeed "unmistakable."
But cf. ante, at 217. In sum, the reading I would adopt is entirely
faithful to the core holding of Mertens: "[E]quitable relief" in §
502(a)(3) "refer[s] to those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and
restitution, but not compensatory damages)." 508 U. S., at 256.
***
Today's decision needlessly obscures the meaning and complicates
the application of § 502(a)(3). The Court's interpretation of that
provision embroils federal courts in "recondite controversies
better left to legal historians," Terry, 494 U. S., at 576
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and
yields results that are demonstrably at odds with Congress' goals
in enacting ERISA. Because in my view Congress cannot plausibly be
said to have "carefully crafted" such confusion, ante, at 221, I
dissent.
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