OCTOBER TERM, 1992
Syllabus
GODINEZ, WARDEN
v. MORAN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
No. 92-725. Argued April 21, 1993-Decided June 24, 1993
After respondent Moran pleaded not guilty to three counts of
first-degree murder and two psychiatrists concluded that he was
competent to stand trial, he informed the Nevada trial court that
he wished to discharge his attorneys and change his pleas to
guilty. The court found that Moran understood "the nature of the
criminal charges against him" and was "able to assist in his
defense"; that he was "knowingly and intelligently" waiving his
right to the assistance of counsel; and that his guilty pleas were
"freely and voluntarily" given. He was ultimately sentenced to
death. When Moran subsequently sought state postconviction relief,
the trial court held an evidentiary hearing before rejecting his
claim that he was mentally incompetent to represent himself, and
the State Supreme Court dismissed his appeal. A Federal District
Court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but the
Court of Appeals reversed. It concluded that due process required
the trial court to hold a hearing to evaluate and determine Moran's
competency before it accepted his decisions to waive counsel and
plead guilty. It also found that the postconviction hearing did not
cure the error, holding that the trial court's ruling was premised
on the wrong legal standard because competency to waive
constitutional rights requires a higher level of mental functioning
than that required to stand trial. The court reasoned that, while a
defendant is competent to stand trial if he has a rational and
factual understanding of the proceedings and is capable of
assisting his counsel, he is competent to waive counselor plead
guilty only if he has the capacity for reasoned choice among the
available alternatives.
Held: The competency standard for pleading guilty or
waiving the right to counsel is the same as the competency standard
for standing trial: whether the defendant has "sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding" and a "rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him,"
Dusky v.
United States, 362 U. S. 402 (per
curiam). There is no reason for the competency standard for
either of those decisions to be higher than that for standing
trial. The decision to plead guilty, though profound, is no more
complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may
have to make during the course of a trial, such as
390
Syllabus
whether to testify, whether to waive a jury trial, and whether
to crossexamine witnesses for the prosecution. Nor does the
decision to waive counsel require an appreciably higher level of
mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional
rights. A higher standard is not necessary in order to ensure that
a defendant is competent to represent himself, because the ability
to do so has no bearing upon his competence to
choose
self-representation,
Faretta v.
California, 422 U. S. 806, 836. When,
in
Westbrook v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 150 (per
curiam), this Court vacated a lower court ruling because there
had been no "hearing or inquiry into the issue of [the
petitioner's] competence to waive his constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel," it did not mean to suggest that the
Dusky formulation is not a high enough standard in cases in
which the defendant seeks to waive counsel. Rather, the "competence
to waive" language was simply a shorthand for the "intelligent and
competent waiver" requirement of
Johnson v.
Zerbst,
304 U. S. 458,
468. Thus,
Westbrook stands only for the unremarkable
proposition that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to
counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not
enough; the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it
can be accepted. While States are free to adopt competency
standards that are more elaborate than the
Dusky
formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose them. Pp.
396-402.
972 F.2d
263, reversed and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and SOUTER, JJ., joined, and
in Parts I, II-B, and III of which SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.
KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment, in which SCALIA, J., joined,
post, p. 402.
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J.,
joined,
post, p. 409.
David F. Sarnowski, Chief Deputy Attorney General of
Nevada, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were
Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General, and
Brooke A.
Nielsen, Assistant Attorney General.
Amy L. Wax argued the cause for the United States as amicus
curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor
General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Joel
M. Gershowitz.
391
Gal J. Potter III, by appointment of the
Court, 506 U. S. 1046, argued the cause for respondent. With him on
the brief was
Edward M. Ghikofsky. *
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the competency standard
for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher than
the competency standard for standing trial. We hold that it is
not.
I
On August 2, 1984, in the early hours of the morning, respondent
entered the Red Pearl Saloon in Las Vegas, Nevada, and shot the
bartender and a patron four times each with an automatic pistol. He
then walked behind the bar and removed the cash register. Nine days
later, respondent arrived at the apartment of his former wife and
opened fire on her; five of his seven shots hit their target.
Respondent then shot himself in the abdomen and attempted, without
success, to slit his wrists. Of the four victims of respondent's
gunshots, only respondent himself survived. On August 13,
respondent summoned police to his hospital bed and confessed to the
killings.
After respondent pleaded not guilty to three counts of
first-degree murder, the trial court ordered that he be examined by
a pair of psychiatrists, both of whom concluded that he was
competent to stand triaU The State thereafter an-
* Kent S.
Scheidegger and
Charles L.
Hobson filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation
as
amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by
Steven R. Shapiro,
Diann Y.
Rust-Tierney, John A. Powell, and
Bruce
J. Winick; for the American Psychiatric Association
et al. by
James W Ellis and
Barbara E. Bergman; and
for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by
Jon
May.
lOne of the psychiatrists stated that there was "not the
slightest doubt" that respondent was "in full control of his
faculties" insofar as he had the "ability to aid counsel, assist in
his own defense, recall evidence and ...
392
nounced its intention to seek the death penalty. On November 28,
1984, 21/2 months after the psychiatric evaluations, respondent
again appeared before the trial court. At this time respondent
informed the court that he wished to discharge his attorneys and
change his pleas to guilty. The reason for the request, according
to respondent, was to prevent the presentation of mitigating
evidence at his sentencing.
On the basis of the psychiatric reports, the trial court
found that respondent
"is competent in that he knew the nature and quality of his
acts, had the capacity to determine right from wrong; that he
understands the nature of the criminal charges against him and is
able to assist in his defense of such charges, or against the
pronouncement of the judgment thereafter; that he knows the
consequences of entering a plea of guilty to the charges; and that
he can intelligently and knowingly waive his constitutional right
to assistance of an attorney." App. 21.
The court advised respondent that he had a right both to the
assistance of counsel and to self-representation, warned him of the
"dangers and disadvantages" of self-representation,
id., at
22, inquired into his understanding of the proceedings and his
awareness of his rights, and asked why he had chosen to represent
himself. It then accepted respondent's waiver of counsel. The court
also accepted respondent's guilty pleas, but not before it had
determined that respondent was not pleading guilty in response to
threats or promises, that he understood the nature of the charges
against him and the consequences of pleading guilty, that he was
aware of the
give testimony if called upon to do so." App. 8. The other
psychiatrist believed that respondent was "knowledgeable of the
charges being made against him"; that he had the ability to "assist
his attorney, in his own defense, if he so desire[d]"; and that he
was "fully cognizant of the penalties if convicted."
Id., at
17.
393
rights he was giving up, and that there was a factual basis for
the pleas. The trial court explicitly found that respondent was
"knowingly and intelligently" waiving his right to the assistance
of counsel,
ibid., and that his guilty pleas were "freely
and voluntarily" given,
id., at 64.2
On January 21, 1985, a three-judge court sentenced respondent to
death for each of the murders. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed
respondent's sentences for the Red Pearl Saloon murders, but
reversed his sentence for the murder of his ex-wife and remanded
for imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of
parole.
Moran v.
State, 103 Nev. 138, 734 P. 2d 712
(1987).
On July 30, 1987, respondent filed a petition for postconviction
relief in state court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court rejected respondent's claim that he was "mentally incompetent
to represent himself," concluding that "the record clearly shows
that he was examined by two psychiatrists both of whom declared
[him] competent." App. to Pet. for Cert. D-8. The Supreme Court of
Nevada dismissed respondent's appeal,
Moran v.
Warden, 105 Nev. 1041, 810 P. 2d 335, and we denied
certiorari, 493 U. S. 874 (1989).
Respondent then filed a habeas petition in the United States
District Court for the District of Nevada. The District Court
denied the petition, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.
972 F.2d
263 (1992). The Court of Appeals concluded that the "record in
this case" should have led the trial court to "entertai[n] a good
faith doubt about [respondent's] competency to make a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent
2 During the course of this lengthy exchange, the trial court
asked respondent whether he was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol, and respondent answered as follows: "Just what they give
me in, you know, medications."
Id., at 33. The court made no
further inquiry. The "medications" to which respondent referred had
been prescribed to control his seizures, which were a byproduct of
his cocaine use. See App. to Pet. for Cert. D-4.
394
waiver of constitutional rights,"
id., at 265,3 and that
the Due Process Clause therefore "required the court to hold a
hearing to evaluate and determine [respondent's] competency ...
before it accepted his decision to discharge counsel and change his
pleas,"
ibid. Rejecting petitioner's argument that the trial
court's error was "cured by the postconviction hearing,"
ibid., and that the competency determination that followed
the hearing was entitled to deference under 28 U. s. C. § 2254(d),
the Court of Appeals held that "the state court's postconviction
ruling was premised on the wrong legal standard of competency," 972
F. 2d, at 266. "Competency to waive constitutional rights,"
according to the Court of Appeals, "requires a higher level of
mental functioning than that required to stand trial"; while a
defendant is competent to stand trial if he has "a rational and
factual understanding of the proceedings and is capable of
assisting his counsel," a defendant is competent to waive counselor
plead guilty only if he has "the capacity for 'reasoned choice'
among the alternatives available to him."
Ibid. The Court of
Appeals determined that the trial court had "erroneously applied
the standard for evaluating competency to stand trial, instead of
the correct 'reasoned choice' standard,"
id., at 266-267,
and further concluded that when examined "in light of the correct
legal standard," the record did not support a finding that
respondent was "mentally capable of the reasoned choice required
for a valid waiver of constitutional rights,"
id., at 267.4
The Court of Appeals accordingly in-
3 The specific features of the record upon which the Court of
Appeals relied were respondent's suicide attempt; his desire to
discharge his attorneys so as to prevent the presentation of
mitigating evidence at sentencing; his "monosyllabic" responses to
the trial court's questions; and the fact that he was on medication
at the time he sought to waive his right to counsel and plead
guilty. 972 F. 2d, at 265.
4 In holding that respondent was not competent to waive his
constitutional rights, the court placed heavy emphasis on the fact
that respondent was on medication at the time he sought to
discharge his attorneys and plead guilty. See
id., at
268.
395
structed the District Court to issue the writ of habeas corpus
within 60 days, "unless the state court allows [respondent] to
withdraw his guilty pleas, enter new pleas, and proceed to trial
with the assistance of counsel."
Id., at 268.
Whether the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving
the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for
standing trial is a question that has divided the Federal Courts of
Appeals 5 and state courts of last re-
5 While the Ninth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit,
see
United States v.
Masthers, 176 U. S. App. D. C.
242,247,
539 F.2d
721, 726 (1976), have employed the "reasoned choice" standard
for guilty pleas, every other Circuit that has considered the issue
has determined that the competency standard for pleading guilty is
identical to the competency standard for standing trial. See
Allard v.
Helgemoe, 572 F.2d
1, 3-6
(CA1), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 858 (1978);
United States v.
Valentino, 283 F. 2d 634, 635
(CA2 1960)
(per curiam); United States ex rel.
McGough v.
Hewitt, 528 F.2d
339, 342, n. 2
(CA3 1975);
Shaw v.
Martin,
733 F.2d
304,
314 (CA4), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 873 (1984);
Malinauskas v.
United States, 505
F.2d 649, 654
(CA5 1974);
United States v.
Harlan, 480 F.2d
515, 517
(CA6), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1006 (1973);
United States ex rel. Heral v.
Franzen, 667 F.2d
633, 638
(CA7 1981);
White Hawk v.
Solem,
693 F.2d
825, 829-830, n. 7
(CA8 1982), cert. denied, 460 U. S.
1054 (1983);
Wolf v.
United States, 430 F.2d
443, 444 (CAlO 1970);
United States v.
Simmons,
961 F.2d
183, 187
(CA111992), cert. denied, 507 U. S. 989 (1993).
Three of those same Circuits, however, have indicated that the
competency standard for waiving the right to counsel is "vaguely
higher" than the competency standard for standing trial, see
United States ex rel. Konigsberg v.
Vincent,
526 F.2d
131, 133
(CA2 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 937
(1976); United States v.
McDowell, 814 F.2d
245, 250
(CA6), cert. denied,
484 U. S. 980 (1987);
Blackmon v.
Armontrout, 875 F.2d
164, 166
(CA8), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 939 (1989), and
one of them has stated that the two standards "may not always be
coterminous,"
United States v.
Campbell, 874 F.2d
838, 846
(CA1 1989). Only the Ninth Circuit applies the
"reasoned choice" standard to waivers of counsel, and only the
Seventh Circuit, see
United States v.
Clark,
943 F.2d
775, 782 (1991), cert. pending, No. 92-6439, has held that the
competency standard for waiving counsel is identical to the
competency standard for standing trial. The Fourth Circuit has
expressed the view that the two standards are "closely linked."
United States v.
McGinnis, 384
F.2d 875, 877 (1967)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 390 U.
S. 990 (1968).
396
sort.6 We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 506 U. S.
1033 (1992).
II
A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent,
Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 378
(1966), and he may not waive his right to counselor plead guilty
unless he does so "competently and intelligently,"
Johnson
v.
Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 468 (1938); accord,
Brady
v.
United States, 397 U. S. 742, 758
(1970). In
Dusky v.
United States, 362 U. S. 402
(1960) (per curiam), we held that the standard for
competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has "sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding" and has "a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him."
Ibid.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accord,
Drope v.
Missouri, 420
U. S. 162, 171 (1975) ("[A] person whose mental condition is
such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object
of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to
assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial").
While we have described the standard for competence to stand trial,
however, we have never expressly articulated a standard for
competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to the assistance
of counsel.
Relying in large part upon our decision in
Westbrook
v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 150 (1966)
(per curiam), the Ninth Circuit adheres to the view that the
competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to
counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial.
See
Sieling v.
Eyman, 478 F.2d
211, 214-215 (1973) (first Ninth Circuit
6 Compare,
e. g., State v.
Sims, 118 Ariz. 210,
215, 575 P. 2d 1236, 1241 (1978) (heightened standard for guilty
plea); and
Pickens v.
State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 567-568,
292 N. W. 2d 601, 610-611 (1980) (heightened standard for waiver of
counsel), with
People v.
Heral, 62 Ill. 2d 329, 334,
342 N. E. 2d 34, 37 (1976) (identical standard for pleading guilty
and standing trial); and
People v.
Reason, 37 N. Y.
2d 351, 353-354, 334 N. E. 2d 572, 574 (1975) (identical standard
for waiving counsel and standing trial).
397
decision applying heightened standard). In
Westbrook, a
two-paragraph
per curiam opinion, we vacated the lower
court's judgment affirming the petitioner's conviction, because
there had been "a hearing on the issue of [the petitioner's]
competence to stand trial," but "no hearing or inquiry into the
issue of his competence to waive his constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel." 384 U. S., at 150. The Ninth Circuit has
reasoned that the "clear implication" of
Westbrook is that
the
Dusky formulation is not "a high enough standard" for
determining whether a defendant is competent to waive a
constitutional right.
Sieling, supra, at 214.7 We think the
Ninth Circuit has read too much into
Westbrook, and we think
it errs in applying two different competency standards.8
A
The standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit is whether a defendant
who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel has the capacity for
"reasoned choice" among the alternatives available to him. How this
standard is different from (much less higher than) the
Dusky
standard-whether the defendant has a "rational understanding" of
the proceedings-is not readily apparent to us. In fact, respondent
himself opposed certiorari on the ground that the difference
between the two standards is merely one of "terminology," Brief in
Opposition 4, and he devotes little space in his brief on the
merits to a defense of the Ninth Circuit's standard, see,
e.
g., Brief for
7 A criminal defendant waives three constitutional rights when
he pleads guilty: the privilege against self-incrimination, the
right to a jury trial, and the right to confront one's accusers.
Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243
(1969).
8 Although this case comes to us by way of federal habeas
corpus, we do not dispose of it on the ground that the heightened
competency standard is a "new rule" for purposes of
Teague
v.
Lane, 489
U. S. 288 (1989), because petitioner did not raise a
Teague defense in the lower courts or in his petition for
certiorari. See
Parke v.
Raley, 506 U. S. 20, 26 (1992);
Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 41
(1990).
398
Respondent 17-18, 27, 32; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 33 ("Due
process does not require [a] higher standard, [it] requires a
separate inquiry").9 But even assuming that there is some
meaningful distinction between the capacity for "reasoned choice"
and a "rational understanding" of the proceedings, we reject the
notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to
counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even
different from) the
Dusky standard.
We begin with the guilty plea. A defendant who stands trial is
likely to be presented with choices that entail relinquishment of
the same rights that are relinquished by a defendant who pleads
guilty: He will ordinarily have to decide whether to waive his
"privilege against compulsory selfincrimination,"
Boykin v.
Alabama, 395
U. S. 238, 243 (1969), by taking the witness stand; if the
option is available, he may have to decide whether to waive his
"right to trial by jury,"
ibid.; and, in consultation with
counsel, he may have to decide whether to waive his "right to
confront [his] accusers,"
ibid., by declining to
cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution. A defendant who pleads
not guilty, moreover, faces still other strategic choices: In
consultation with his attorney, he may be called upon to decide,
among other things, whether (and how) to put on a defense and
whether to raise one or more affirmative defenses. In sum,
all criminal defendants-not merely those who plead
guilty-may be required to make important decisions once criminal
proceedings have been initiated. And while the decision to plead
guilty is undeniably a profound one, it is no more complicated than
the sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to
make during the course of a trial. (The decision to plead guilty is
also made over a shorter period of
9We have used the phrase "rational choice" in describing the
competence necessary to withdraw a certiorari petition,
Rees
v.
Peyton, 384
U. S. 312,314 (1966)
(per curiam), but there is no
indication in that opinion that the phrase means something
different from "rational understanding."
399
time, without the distraction and burden of a trial.) This being
so, we can conceive of no basis for demanding a higher level of
competence for those defendants who choose to plead guilty. If the
Dusky standard is adequate for defendants who plead not
guilty, it is necessarily adequate for those who plead guilty.
Nor do we think that a defendant who waives his right to the
assistance of counsel must be more competent than a defendant who
does not, since there is no reason to believe that the decision to
waive counsel requires an appreciably higher level of mental
functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights.
Respondent suggests that a higher competency standard is necessary
because a defendant who represents himself" 'must have greater
powers of comprehension, judgment, and reason than would be
necessary to stand trial with the aid of an attorney.'" Brief for
Respondent 26 (quoting Silten & Tullis, Mental Competency in
Criminal Proceedings, 28 Hastings L. J. 1053, 1068 (1977)). Accord,
Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
Amicus Curiae 10-12. But this argument has a flawed premise;
the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his
right to counsel is the competence to
waive the right, not
the competence to represent himself.lO In
Faretta v.
California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975),
we
10 It is for this reason that the dissent's reliance on
Massey v.
Moore, 348 U. S. 105 (1954), is
misplaced. When we said in
Massey that "[o]ne might not be
insane in the sense of being incapable of standing trial and yet
lack the capacity to stand trial without benefit of counsel,"
id., at 108, we were answering a question that is quite
different from the question presented in this case. Prior to our
decision in
Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), the
appointment of counsel was required only in those state
prosecutions in which "special circumstances" were present, see
id., at 350-351 (Harlan, J., concurring), and the question
in
Massey was whether a finding that a defendant is
competent to stand trial compels a conclusion that there are no
"special circumstances" justifying the appointment of counsel. The
question here is not whether a defendant who is competent to stand
trial has no right to have counsel appointed; it is
400
held that a defendant choosing self-representation must do so
"competently and intelligently,"
id., at 835, but we made it
clear that the defendant's "technical legal knowledge" is "not
relevant" to the determination whether he is competent to waive his
right to counsel,
id., at 836, and we emphasized that
although the defendant "may conduct his own defense ultimately to
his own detriment, his choice must be honored,"
id., at 834.
Thus, while "[i]t is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions
defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by
their own unskilled efforts,"
ibid., a criminal defendant's
ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to
choose selfrepresentation.ll
B
A finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial, however,
is not all that is necessary before he may be permitted to plead
guilty or waive his right to counsel. In addition to determining
that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is
competent, a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his
constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.
Parke v.
Raley, 506 U.
S. 20, 28-29 (1992) (guilty plea);
Faretta, supra, at
835 (waiver of counsel). In this
whether such a defendant is competent to waive the right to
counsel that (after
Gideon) he under all circumstances
has.
H We note also that the prohibition against the trial of
incompetent defendants dates back at least to the time of
Blackstone, see
Medina v.
California, 505 U. S. 437,446 (1992);
Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U. S. 162,171-172
(1975); Youtsey v.
United States, 97 F.9d
7,940
(CA6 1899) (collecting "common law authorities"),
and that "[b]y the common law of that time, it was not
representation by counsel but self-representation that was the
practice in prosecutions for serious crime,"
Faretta v.
California, 422 U. S., at 823; accord,
id., at 850
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) ("selfrepresentation was common, if not
required, in 18th century English and American prosecutions"). It
would therefore be "difficult to say that a standard which was
designed to determine whether a defendant was capable of defending
himself" is "inadequate when he chooses to conduct his own
defense."
People v.
Reason, 37 N. Y. 2d, at 354, 334
N. E. 2d, at 574.
401
sense there
is a "heightened" standard for pleading
guilty and for waiving the right to counsel, but it is not a
heightened standard of
competence.12
This two-part inquiry 13 is what we had in mind in
Westbrook. When we distinguished between "competence to
stand trial" and "competence to waive [the] constitutional right to
the assistance of counsel," 384 U. S., at 150, we were using
"competence to waive" as a shorthand for the "intelligent and
competent waiver" requirement of
Johnson v.
Zerbst.
This much is clear from the fact that we quoted that very language
from
Zerbst immediately after noting that the trial court
had not determined whether the petitioner was competent to waive
his right to counsel. See 384 U. S., at 150 (" 'This protecting
duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial
judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent
waiver by the accused''') (quoting
Johnson v.
Zerbst,
304 U. S., at 465). Thus,
Westbrook stands only for the
unremarkable proposi-
12 The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant's mental
capacity; the question is whether he has the
ability to
understand the proceedings. See
Drope v.
Missouri,
supra, at 171 (defendant is incompetent if he "lacks the
capacity to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him") (emphasis added). The purpose of the
"knowing and voluntary" inquiry, by contrast, is to determine
whether the defendant actually
does understand the
significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether
the decision is uncoerced. See
Faretta v.
California,
supra, at 835 (defendant waiving counsel must be "made aware of
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open''') (quoting
Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269,279
(1942));
Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U. S., at 244
(defendant pleading guilty must have "a full understanding of what
the plea connotes and of its consequence").
13We do not mean to suggest, of course, that a court is required
to make a competency determination in every case in which a
defendant seeks to plead guilty or to waive his right to counsel.
As in any criminal case, a competency determination is necessary
only when a court has reason to doubt the defendant's competence.
See
Drope v.
Missouri, supra, at 180
181; Pate
v.
Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 385
(1966).
402
Opinion of KENNEDY, J.
tion that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel,
a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough;
the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be
accepted.14
III
Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest
aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the
proceedings and to assist counsel. While psychiatrists and scholars
may find it useful to classify the various kinds and degrees of
competence, and while States are free to adopt competency standards
that are more elaborate than the
Dusky formulation, the Due
Process Clause does not impose these additional requirements. Cf.
Medina v.
California, 505 U. S. 437, 446-453
(1992). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment.
I am in full agreement with the Court's decision that the
competency standard for pleading guilty and waiving the right to
counsel is the same as the test of competency to stand trial. As I
have some reservations about one part of the Court's opinion and
take a somewhat different path to reach my conclusion, it is
appropriate to make some further observations.
The Court compares the types of decisions made by one who goes
to trial with the decisions required to plead guilty and waive the
right to counsel. This comparison seems to suggest that there may
have been a heightened standard of
14 In this case the trial court explicitly found both that
respondent was competent and that his waivers were knowing and
voluntary. See
supra, at 392-393.
403
competency required by the Due Process Clause if the decisions
were not equivalent. I have serious doubts about that proposition.
In discussing the standard for a criminal defendant's competency to
make decisions affecting his case, we should not confuse the
content of the standard with the occasions for its application.
We must leave aside in this case any question whether a
defendant is absolved of criminal responsibility due to his mental
state at the time he committed criminal acts and any later question
about whether the defendant has the minimum competence necessary to
undergo his sentence. What is at issue here is whether the
defendant has sufficient competence to take part in a criminal
proceeding and to make the decisions throughout its course. This is
not to imply that mental competence is the only aspect of a
defendant's state of mind that is relevant during criminal
proceedings. Whether the defendant has made a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary decision to make certain fundamental choices during
the course of criminal proceedings is another subject of judicial
inquiry. That both questions might be implicated at any given
point, however, does not mean that the inquiries cease to be
discrete. And as it comes to us, this case involves only the
standard for determining competency.
This Court set forth the standard for competency to stand trial
in
Dusky v.
United States, 362 U. S. 402 (1960)
(per curiam): "[T]he 'test must be whether [the defendant]
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.'"
Ibid. In my view, both the Court of Appeals
and respondent read "competency to stand trial" in too narrow a
fashion. We have not suggested that the
Dusky competency
standard applies during the course of, but not before, trial.
Instead, that standard is applicable from the time of arraignment
through the return of a verdict. Although the
Dusky standard
refers to "ability to consult
404
Opinion of KENNEDY, J.
with [a] lawyer," the crucial component of the inquiry is the
defendant's possession of "a reasonable degree of rational
understanding." In other words, the focus of the
Dusky
formulation is on a particular level of mental functioning, which
the ability to consult counsel helps identify. The possibility that
consultation will occur is not required for the standard to serve
its purpose. If a defendant elects to stand trial and to take the
foolish course of acting as his own counsel, the law does not for
that reason require any added degree of competence. See
ante, at 399-400, n. 10.
The Due Process Clause does not mandate different standards of
competency at various stages of or for different decisions made
during the criminal proceedings. That was never the rule at common
law, and it would take some extraordinary showing of the inadequacy
of a single standard of competency for us to require States to
employ heightened standards. See
Medina v.
California, 505 U. S. 437, 446447
(1992). Indeed, we should only overturn Nevada's use of a single
standard if it "'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.'"
Ibid. (quoting
Patterson v.
New
York, 432 U. S.
197, 202 (1977)).
The historical treatment of competency that supports Nevada's
single standard has its roots in English common law. Writing in the
18th century, Blackstone described the effect of a defendant's
incompetence on criminal proceedings:
"[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and
before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be
arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that
advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the
prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make
his defence?" 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *24.
Accord, 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown *34-*35.
405
Blackstone drew no distinction between madness for purposes of
pleading and madness for purposes of going to trial. An English
case arising in the Crown Court in 1865 indicates that a single
standard was applied to assess competency at the time of
arraignment, the time of pleading, and throughout the course of
trial. See
Regina v.
Southey, 4 Fos. & Fin. 864,
872, n. a, 176 Eng. Rep. 825, 828, n. a (N. P. 1865) ("Assuming the
prisoner to be insane at the time of arraignment, he cannot be
tried
at all, with or without counsel, for, even assuming
that he has appointed counsel at a time when he was sane, it is not
fit that he should be tried, as he cannot understand the evidence,
nor the proceedings, and so is unable to instruct counsel, or to
withdraw his authority if he acts improperly, as a prisoner may
always do");
id., at 877, n. a, 176 Eng. Rep., at 831, n. a
("[I]f [the defendant] be so insane as not to understand the nature
of the proceedings, he cannot plead").
A number of 19th-century American cases also referred to
insanity in a manner that suggested there was a single standard by
which competency was to be assessed throughout legal proceedings.
See,
e. g., Underwood v.
People, 32 Mich. 1, 3 (1875)
("[I]nsanity, when discovered, was held at common law to bar any
further steps against a prisoner, at whatever stage of the
proceedings");
Crocker v.
State, 60 Wis. 553, 556, 19
N. W. 435, 436 (1884) ("At common law, if a person, after
committing a crime, became insane, he was not arraigned during his
insanity, but was remitted to prison until such incapacity was
removed. The same was true where he became insane after his plea of
not guilty and before trial");
State v.
Reed, 41 La.
Ann. 581, 582, 7 So. 132 (1889) ("It is elementary that a man
cannot plead, or be tried, or convicted, or sentenced, while in a
state of insanity"). See also 2 J. Bishop, Commentaries on Law of
Criminal Procedure §§ 664, 667 (2d ed. 1872) ("[A] prisoner cannot
be tried, sentenced, or punished" unless he is "mentally competent
to make a rational defense").
406
Opinion of KENNEDY, J.
Other American cases describe the standard by which competency
is to be measured in a way that supports the idea that a single
standard, parallel to that articulated in
Dusky, is applied
no matter at what point during legal proceedings a competency
question should arise. For example, in
Freeman v.
People, 4 Denio 2 (N. Y. 1847), it was held: "If ... a
person arraigned for a crime, is capable of understanding the
nature and object of the proceedings going on against him; if he
rightly comprehends his own condition in reference to such
proceedings, and can conduct his defence in a rational manner, he
is, for the purpose of being tried, to be deemed sane."
Id.,
at 24-25. Because the competency question was posed in
Freeman at the time the defendant was to be arraigned,
id., at 19, the
Freeman court's conception of
competency to stand trial was that of a single standard to be
applied throughout.
An even more explicit recitation of this common-law principle is
found in
Hunt v.
State, 27 So. 2d 186 (Ala. 1946). In
the course of the opinion in that case, there was a discussion of
the common-law rule regarding a defendant's competency to take part
in legal proceedings:
"The rule at common law ... is that if at any time while
criminal proceedings are pending against a person accused of a
crime, the trial court either from observation or upon suggestion
of counsel has facts brought to his attention which raise a doubt
of the sanity of defendant, the question should be settled before
further steps are taken .... The broad question to be determined
then is whether the defendant is capable of understanding the
proceedings and of making his defense, and whether he may have a
full, fair and impartial trial." Id., at 191 (citation
omitted).
At common law, therefore, no attempt was made to apply different
competency standards to different stages of criminal proceedings or
to the variety of decisions that a defend-
407
ant must make during the course of those proceedings. See
Commonwealth v.
Woelfel, 88 S. W. 1061, 1062 (Ky.
1905);
Jordan v.
State, 135 S. W. 327, 328-329 (Tenn.
1911);
State v.
Seminary, 115 So. 370, 371-372 (La.
1927);
State ex rel. Townsend v.
Bushong, 146 Ohio
St. 271, 272, 65 N. E. 2d 407,408 (1946)
(per curiam); Moss
v.
Hunter, 167 F.2d 683, 684-685 (CAlO 1948). Commentators
have agreed that the common-law standard of competency to stand
trial, which parallels the
Dusky standard, has been applied
throughout criminal proceedings, not just to the formal trial. See
H. Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 428429, 431
(1954) ("It has long been the rule of the common law that a person
cannot be required to plead to an indictment or be tried for a
crime while he is so mentally disordered as to be incapable of
making a rational defense"); S. Brakel, J. Parry, and A. Weiner,
The Mentally Disabled and the Law 695-696 (3d ed. 1985) ("It has
traditionally been presumed that competency to stand trial means
competency to participate in all phases of the trial process,
including such pretrial activities as deciding how to plead,
participating in plea bargaining, and deciding whether to assert or
waive the right to counsel").
That the common law did not adopt heightened competency
standards is readily understood when one considers the difficulties
that would be associated with more than one standard. The standard
applicable at a given point in a trial could be difficult to
ascertain. For instance, if a defendant decides to change his plea
to guilty after a trial has commenced, one court might apply the
competency standard for undergoing trial while another court might
use the standard for pleading guilty. In addition, the subtle
nuances among different standards are likely to be difficult to
differentiate, as evidenced by the lack of any clear distinction
between a "rational understanding" and a "reasoned choice" in this
case. See
ante, at 398.
408
Opinion of KENNEDY, J.
It is true, of course, that if a defendant stands trial instead
of pleading guilty, there will be more occasions for the trial
court to observe the condition of the defendant to determine his
mental competence. Trial courts have the obligation of conducting a
hearing whenever there is sufficient doubt concerning a defendant's
competence. See
Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U. S. 162, 180-181
(1975). The standard by which competency is assessed, however, does
not change. Respondent's counsel conceded as much during oral
argument, making no attempt to defend the contrary position of the
Court of Appeals. See,
e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 22
("This is not a case of heightened standards");
id., at 31
("We didn't argue a heightened standard. We did not argue a
heightened standard to the Ninth Circuit, nor did we necessarily
argue a heightened standard at any juncture in this case");
id., at 33 ("Due process does not require this higher
standard, but requires a separate inquiry").
A single standard of competency to be applied throughout
criminal proceedings does not offend any "'principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.'"
Medina, 505 U. S., at 446. Nothing
in our case law compels a contrary conclusion, and adoption of a
rule setting out varying competency standards for each decision and
stage of a criminal proceeding would disrupt the orderly course of
trial and, from the standpoint of all parties, prove unworkable
both at trial and on appellate review.
I would avoid the difficult comparisons engaged in by the Court.
In my view, due process does not preclude Nevada's use of a single
competency standard for all aspects of the criminal proceeding.
Respondent's decision to plead guilty and his decision to waive
counsel were grave choices for him to make, but as the Court
demonstrates in Part II-B, there is a heightened standard, albeit
not one concerned with competence, that must be met before a
defendant is allowed to make those decisions.
409
With these observations, I concur in the judgment and in Parts
I, II-B, and III of the Court's opinion.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,
dissenting.
Today, the majority holds that a standard of competence designed
to measure a defendant's ability to consult with counsel and to
assist in preparing his defense is constitutionally adequate to
assess a defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel and
represent himself. In so doing, the majority upholds the death
sentence for a person whose decision to discharge counsel, plead
guilty, and present no defense well may have been the product of
medication or mental illness. I believe the majority's analysis is
contrary to both common sense and longstanding case law. Therefore,
I dissent.
I
As a preliminary matter, the circumstances under which
respondent Richard Allan Moran waived his right to an attorney and
pleaded guilty to capital murder bear elaboration. For, although
the majority's exposition of the events is accurate, the most
significant facts are omitted or relegated to footnotes.
In August 1984, after killing three people and wounding himself
in an attempt to commit suicide, Moran was charged in a Nevada
state court with three counts of capital murder. He pleaded not
guilty to all charges, and the trial court ordered a psychiatric
evaluation. At this stage, Moran's competence to represent himself
was not at issue.
The two psychiatrists who examined him therefore focused solely
upon his capacity to stand trial with the assistance of counsel.
Dr. Jack A. Jurasky found Moran to be "in full control of his
faculties insofar as his ability to aid counsel, assist in his own
defense, recall evidence and to give testimony if called upon to do
so." App. 8. Dr. Jurasky, however, did express some reservations,
observing: "Psy-
410
chologically, and perhaps legally speaking, this man, because he
is expressing and feeling considerable remorse and guilt, may be
inclined to exert less effort towards his own defense."
Ibid. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, Dr. Jurasky
felt that Moran's depressed state of mind was not "necessarily a
major consideration."
Ibid. Dr. William D. O'Gorman also
characterized Moran as "very depressed," remarking that he "showed
much tearing in talking about the episodes that led up to his
present incarceration, particularly in talking about his ex-wife."
Id., at 15-16. But Dr. O'Gorman ultimately concluded that
Moran "is knowledgeable of the charges being made against him" and
"can assist his attorney, in his own defense, if he so desires."
Id., at 17.
In November 1984, just three months after his suicide attempt,
Moran appeared in court seeking to discharge his public defender,
waive his right to counsel, and plead guilty to all three charges
of capital murder. When asked to explain the dramatic change in his
chosen course of action, Moran responded that he wished to
represent himself because he opposed all efforts to mount a
defense. His purpose, specifically, was to prevent the presentation
of any mitigating evidence on his behalf at the sentencing phase of
the proceeding. The trial judge inquired whether Moran was
"presently under the influence of any drug or alcohol," and Moran
replied: "Just what they give me in, you know, medications."
Id., at 33. Despite Moran's affirmative answer, the trial
judge failed to question him further regarding the type, dosage, or
effect of the "medications" to which he referred. Had the trial
judge done so, he would have discovered that Moran was being
administered simultaneously four different prescription
drugs-phenobarbital, dilantin, inderal, and vistaril. Moran later
testified to the numbing effect of these drugs, stating: "I guess I
really didn't care about anything .... I wasn't very concerned
about anything that
411
was going on ... as far as the proceedings and everything were
going."
Id., at 92.1
Disregarding the mounting evidence of Moran's disturbed mental
state, the trial judge accepted Moran's waiver of counsel and
guilty pleas after posing a series of routine questions regarding
his understanding of his legal rights and the offenses, to which
Moran gave largely monosyllabic answers. In a string of affirmative
responses, Moran purported to acknowledge that he knew the import
of waiving his constitutional rights, that he understood the
charges against him, and that he was, in fact, guilty of those
charges. One part of this exchange, however, highlights the
mechanical character of Moran's answers to the questions. When the
trial judge asked him whether he killed his ex-wife "deliberately,
with premeditation and malice aforethought," Moran unexpectedly
responded: "No. I didn't do it-I mean, I wasn't looking to kill
her, but she ended up dead."
Id., at 58. Instead of probing
further, the trial judge simply repeated the question, inquiring
again whether Moran had acted deliberately. Once again, Moran
replied: "I don't know. I mean, I don't know what you mean by
deliberately. I mean, I pulled the trigger on purpose, but I didn't
plan on doing it; you know what I mean?"
Id., at 59.
Ignoring the ambiguity of Moran's responses, the trial judge
reframed the question to elicit an affirmative answer, stating:
"Well, I've previously explained to you what is meant by
deliberation and premeditation. Deliberate means that you arrived
at or determined as a result of careful thought and weighing the
consideration
1 Moran's medical records, read in conjunction with the
Physician's Desk Reference (46 ed. 1992), corroborate his testimony
concerning the medications he received and their impact upon him.
The records show that Moran was administered dilantin, an
antiepileptic medication that may cause confusion; inderal, a
beta-blocker antiarrhythmic that may cause light-headedness, mental
depression, hallucinations, disorientation, and short-term memory
loss; and vistaril, a depressant that may cause drowsiness,
tremors, and convulsions. App. 97-98.
412
for and against the proposed action. Did you do that?" This
time, Moran responded: "Yes."
Ibid.
It was only after prodding Moran through the plea colloquy in
this manner that the trial judge concluded that he was competent to
stand trial and that he voluntarily and intelligently had waived
his right to counsel. Accordingly, Moran was allowed to plead
guilty and appear without counsel at his sentencing hearing. Moran
presented no defense, called no witness, and offered no mitigating
evidence on his own behalf. Not surprisingly, he was sentenced to
death.
II
It is axiomatic by now that criminal prosecution of an
incompetent defendant offends the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See
Medina v.
California, 505
U. S. 437 (1992);
Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U. S. 127, 138 (1992)
(KENNEDY, J., concurring);
Drope v.
Missouri,
420 U. S. 162,
171 (1975);
Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 378
(1966). The majority does not deny this principle, nor does it
dispute the standard that has been set for competence to stand
trial with the assistance of counsel: whether the accused possesses
"the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in
preparing his defense."
Drope, 420 U. S., at 171. Accord,
Dusky v.
United States, 362 U. S. 402 (1960). My
disagreement with the majority turns, then, upon another
standardthe one for assessing a defendant's competence to waive
counsel and represent himself.
The majority "reject[s] the notion that competence to plead
guilty or to waive the right to counsel must be measured by a
standard that is higher than (or even different from)" the standard
for competence to stand trial articulated in
Dusky and
Drope. Ante, at 398. But the standard for competence to
stand trial is specifically designed to measure a defendant's
ability to "consult with counsel" and to "assist in preparing his
defense." A finding that a defendant is
413
competent to stand trial establishes only that he is capable of
aiding his attorney in making the critical decisions required at
trial or in plea negotiations. The reliability or even relevance of
such a finding vanishes when its basic premise-that counsel will be
present-ceases to exist. The question is no longer whether the
defendant can proceed with an attorney, but whether he can proceed
alone and uncounseled. I do not believe we place an excessive
burden upon a trial court by requiring it to conduct a specific
inquiry into that question at the juncture when a defendant whose
competency already has been questioned seeks to waive counsel and
represent himself.
The majority concludes that there is no need for such a hearing
because a defendant who is found competent to stand trial with the
assistance of counsel is,
ipso facto, competent to discharge
counsel and represent himself. But the majority cannot isolate the
term "competent" and apply it in a vacuum, divorced from its
specific context. A person who is "competent" to play basketball is
not thereby "competent" to play the violin. The majority's
monolithic approach to competency is true to neither life nor the
law. Competency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to
competency for another purpose. See Bonnie, The Competence of
Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 Behav. Sci.
& L. 291, 299 (1992); R. Roesch & S. Golding, Competency to
Stand Trial 10-13 (1980). Consistent with this commonsense notion,
our cases always have recognized that "a defendant's mental
condition may be relevant to more than one legal issue, each
governed by distinct rules reflecting quite different policies."
Drope, 420 U. S., at 176. See
Jackson v.
Indiana, 406
U. S. 715, 739 (1972). To this end, this Court has required
competency evaluations to be specifically tailored to the context
and purpose of a proceeding. See
Rees v.
Peyton,
384 U. S. 312,
314 (1966) (directing court "to determine [petitioner's] mental
competence in the present posture of things").
414
In
Massey v.
Moore, 348 U. S. 105, 108
(1954), for example, the Court ruled that a defendant who had been
found competent to stand trial with the assistance of counsel
should have been given a hearing as to his competency to represent
himself because "[o]ne might not be insane in the sense of being
incapable of standing trial and yet lack the capacity to stand
trial without benefit of counsel." 2 And in
Westbrook v.
Arizona, 384
U. S. 150 (1966), the Court reiterated the requirement that the
determination of a defendant's competency be tailored to the
particular capacity in question, observing:
"Although petitioner received a hearing on the issue of his
competence to stand trial, there appears to have been no hearing or
inquiry into the issue of his competence to waive his
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel and proceed, as
he did, to conduct his own defense." See also
Medina, 505 U.
S., at 446-448 (distinguishing between a claim of incompetence and
a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity);
Riggins, 504 U.
S., at 140-144 (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (distinguishing between
functional competence and competence to stand trial).
Although the Court never has articulated explicitly the standard
for determining competency to represent oneself, it has hinted at
its contours. In
Rees v.
Peyton, supra, it required
an evaluation of competence that was designed to measure the
abilities necessary for a defendant to make a decision under
analogous circumstances. In that case, a capital defendant who had
filed a petition for certiorari ordered his attorney to withdraw
the petition and forgo further legal proceedings. The petitioner's
counsel advised the Court that he could not conscientiously do so
without a psychiatric examination of his client because there was
some doubt as to
2 The majority's attempt to distinguish
Massey as a
pre-Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963),
case,
ante, at 399-400, n. 10, is simply irrelevant. For, as
the majority itself concedes,
Massey stands only for the
proposition that the two inquiries are different-competency to
stand trial with the assistance of counsel is not equivalent to
competency to proceed alone.
415
his client's mental competency. Under those circumstances, this
Court directed the lower court to conduct an inquiry as to whether
the defendant possessed the "capacity to appreciate his position
and make a
rational choice with respect to continuing or
abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is
suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may
substantially affect his capacity in the premises." 384 U. S., at
314 (emphasis added). Certainly the competency required for a
capital defendant to proceed
without the advice of counsel
at trial or in plea negotiations should be no less than the
competency required for a capital defendant to proceed
against
the advice of counsel to withdraw a petition for certiorari.
The standard applied by the Ninth Circuit in this case-the
"reasoned choice" standardclosely approximates the "rational
choice" standard set forth in
Rees.3
Disregarding the plain language of
Westbrook and
Massey, the majority in effect overrules those cases
sub
silentio.4 From the constitutional right of
self-representation established in
Faretta v.
California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975), the
majority extrapolates that "a criminal defendant's ability to
represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to
choose
3 According to the majority, "there is no indication ... that
the phrase ['rational choice'] means something different from
'rational understanding.'''
Ante, at 398, n. 9. What the
majority fails to recognize is that, in the distinction between a
defendant who possesses a "rational understanding" of the
proceedings and one who is able to make a "rational choice," lies
the difference between the capacity for passive and active
involvement in the proceedings.
4 According to the majority,
"Westbrook stands only for
the unremarkable proposition" that a determination of competence to
stand trial is not sufficient to waive the right to counsel; "the
waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be
accepted."
Ante, at 401-402. But the majority's attempt to
transform a case about the competency to waive counsel into a case
about the voluntariness of a waiver needlessly complicates this
area of the law. Perhaps competence to waive rights is incorporated
into a voluntariness inquiry, but there is no necessary link
between the two concepts.
416
self-representation."
Ante, at 400. But
Faretta
does not confer upon an
incompetent defendant a
constitutional right to conduct his own defense. Indeed, Faretta
himself was "literate, competent, and understanding," and the
record showed that "he was voluntarily exercising his informed free
will." 422 U. S., at 835. "Although a defendant need not himself
have the skill and experience of a lawyer,"
Faretta's right
of self-representation is confined to those who are able to choose
it "competently and intelligently."
Ibid. The
Faretta
Court was careful to emphasize that the record must establish that
the defendant "'knows what he is doing and his choice is made with
eyes open.'''
Ibid., quoting
Adams v.
United
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 279
(1942).
The majority asserts that "the competence that is required of a
defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence
to
waive the right, not the competence to represent
himself."
Ante, at 399. But this assertion is simply
incorrect. The majority's attempt to extricate the competence to
waive the right to counsel from the competence to represent oneself
is unavailing, because the former decision necessarily entails the
latter. It is obvious that a defendant who waives counsel must
represent himself. Even Moran, who pleaded guilty, was required to
defend himself during the penalty phase of the proceedings. And a
defendant who is utterly incapable of conducting his own defense
cannot be considered "competent" to make such a decision, any more
than a person who chooses to leap out of a window in the belief
that he can fly can be considered "competent" to make such a
choice.
The record in this case gives rise to grave doubts regarding
respondent Moran's ability to discharge counsel and represent
himself. Just a few months after he attempted to commit suicide,
Moran essentially volunteered himself for execution: He sought to
waive the right to counsel, to plead guilty to capital murder, and
to prevent the presentation of any mitigating evidence on his
behalf. The psychiatrists' re-
417
ports supplied one explanation for Moran's self-destructive
behavior: his deep depression. And Moran's own testimony suggested
another: the fact that he was being administered simultaneously
four different prescription medications. It has been recognized
that such drugs often possess side effects that may "compromise the
right of a medicated criminal defendant to receive a fair trial ...
by rendering him unable or unwilling to assist counsel."
Riggins, 504 U. S., at 142 (KENNEDY, J., concurring).
Moran's plea colloquy only augments the manifold causes for concern
by suggesting that his waivers and his assent to the charges
against him were not rendered in a truly voluntary and intelligent
fashion. Upon this evidence, there can be no doubt that the trial
judge should have conducted another competency evaluation to
determine Moran's capacity to waive the right to counsel and
represent himself, instead of relying upon the psychiatrists'
reports that he was able to stand trial with the assistance of
counsel. 5
To try, convict, and punish one so helpless to defend himself
contravenes fundamental principles of fairness and impugns the
integrity of our criminal justice system. I cannot condone the
decision to accept, without further inquiry, the self-destructive
"choice" of a person who was so deeply medicated and who might well
have been severely mentally ill. I dissent.
5 Whether this same evidence implies that Moran's waiver of
counsel and guilty pleas were also involuntary remains to be seen.
Cf.
Miller v.
Fenton,
474 U. S. 104 (1985)
(voluntariness is a mixed question of law and fact entitled to
independent federal review).
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