OPINION OF THE COURT
GALL V. UNITED STATES
552 U. S. ____ (2007)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 06-7949
BRIAN MICHAEL GALL, PETITIONER
v. UNITED
STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eighth circuit
[December 10, 2007]
Justice Stevens delivered the
opinion of the Court.
In two cases argued on the same
day last Term we considered the standard that courts of appeals
should apply when reviewing the reasonableness of sentences imposed
by district judges. The first,
Rita v.
United
States, 551 U. S. ___ (2007), involved a sentence
within the range recommended by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines; we held that when a district judge’s discretionary
decision in a particular case accords with the sentence the United
States Sentencing Commission deems appropriate “in the mine run of
cases,” the court of appeals may presume that the sentence is
reasonable.
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11).
The second case,
Claiborne v.
United States, involved a sentence
below the
range recommended by the Guidelines, and raised the converse
question whether a court of appeals may apply a “proportionality
test,” and require that a sentence that constitutes a substantial
variance from the Guidelines be justified by extraordinary
circumstances. See
Claiborne v.
United States,
549 U. S. ___ (2006). We did not have the opportunity to answer
this question because the case was mooted by Claiborne’s untimely
death.
Claiborne v.
United States, 551 U. S. ___
(2007)
(per curiam). We granted certiorari in the case
before us today in order to reach that question, left unanswered
last Term. 551 U. S. ___ (2007). We now hold that, while the extent
of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended
Guidelines range is surely relevant, courts of appeals must review
all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly
outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard. We also hold that the sentence
imposed by the experienced District Judge in this case was
reasonable.
I
In February or March 2000,
petitioner Brian Gall, a second-year college student at the
University of Iowa, was invited by Luke Rinderknecht to join an
ongoing enterprise distributing a controlled substance popularly
known as “ecstasy.”[
Footnote 1]
Gall—who was then a user of ecstasy, cocaine, and
marijuana—accepted the invitation. During the ensuing seven months,
Gall delivered ecstasy pills, which he received from Rinderknecht,
to other conspirators, who then sold them to consumers. He netted
over $30,000.
A month or two after joining the
conspiracy, Gall stopped using ecstasy. A few months after that, in
September 2000, he advised Rinderknecht and other co-conspirators
that he was withdrawing from the conspiracy. He has not sold
illegal drugs of any kind since. He has, in the words of the
District Court, “self-rehabilitated.” App. 75. He graduated from
the University of Iowa in 2002, and moved first to Arizona, where
he obtained a job in the construction industry, and later to
Colorado, where he earned $18 per hour as a master carpenter. He
has not used any illegal drugs since graduating from college.
After Gall moved to Arizona, he was approached
by federal law enforcement agents who questioned him about his
involvement in the ecstasy distribution conspiracy. Gall admitted
his limited participation in the distribution of ecstasy, and the
agents took no further action at that time. On April 28,
2004—approximately a year and a half after this initial interview,
and three and a half years after Gall withdrew from the
conspiracy—an indictment was returned in the Southern District of
Iowa charging him and seven other defendants with participating in
a conspiracy to distribute ecstasy, cocaine, and marijuana, that
began in or about May 1996 and continued through October 30, 2002.
The Government has never questioned the truthfulness of any of
Gall’s earlier statements or contended that he played any role in,
or had any knowledge of, other aspects of the conspiracy described
in the indictment. When he received notice of the indictment, Gall
moved back to Iowa and surrendered to the authorities. While free
on his own recognizance, Gall started his own business in the
construction industry, primarily engaged in subcontracting for the
installation of windows and doors. In his first year, his profits
were over $2,000 per month.
Gall entered into a plea agreement with the
Government, stipulating that he was “responsible for, but did not
necessarily distribute himself, at least 2,500 grams of [ecstasy],
or the equivalent of at least 87.5 kilograms of marijuana.”
Id., at 25. In the agreement, the Government acknowledged
that by “on or about September of 2000,” Gall had communicated his
intent to stop distributing ecstasy to Rinderknecht and other
members of the conspiracy.
Ibid. The agreement further
provided that recent changes in the Guidelines that enhanced the
recommended punishment for distributing ecstasy were not applicable
to Gall because he had withdrawn from the conspiracy prior to the
effective date of those changes.
In her presentence report, the probation
officer concluded that Gall had no significant criminal history;
that he was not an organizer, leader, or manager; and that his
offense did not involve the use of any weapons. The report stated
that Gall had truthfully provided the Government with all of the
evidence he had concerning the alleged offenses, but that his
evidence was not useful because he provided no new information to
the agents. The report also described Gall’s substantial use of
drugs prior to his offense and the absence of any such use in
recent years. The report recommended a sentencing range of 30 to 37
months of imprisonment.
The record of the sentencing hearing held on
May 27, 2005, includes a “small flood” of letters from Gall’s
parents and other relatives, his fiancé, neighbors, and
representatives of firms doing business with him, uniformly
praising his character and work ethic. The transcript includes the
testimony of several witnesses and the District Judge’s colloquy
with the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) and with Gall. The
AUSA did not contest any of the evidence concerning Gall’s
law-abiding life during the preceding five years, but urged that
“the Guidelines are appropriate and should be followed,” and
requested that the court impose a prison sentence within the
Guidelines range.
Id., at 93. He mentioned that two of
Gall’s co-conspirators had been sentenced to 30 and 35 months,
respectively, but upon further questioning by the District Court,
he acknowledged that neither of them had voluntarily withdrawn from
the conspiracy.
The District Judge sentenced Gall to probation
for a term of 36 months. In addition to making a lengthy statement
on the record, the judge filed a detailed sentencing memorandum
explaining his decision, and provided the following statement of
reasons in his written judgment:
“The Court determined that,
considering all the factors under 18 U. S. C. 3553(a), the
Defendant’s explicit withdrawal from the conspiracy almost four
years before the filing of the Indictment, the Defendant’s
post-offense conduct, especially obtaining a college degree and the
start of his own successful business, the support of family and
friends, lack of criminal history, and his age at the time of the
offense conduct, all warrant the sentence imposed, which was
sufficient, but not greater than necessary to serve the purposes of
sentencing.”
Id., at 117.
At the end of both the sentencing
hearing and the sentencing memorandum, the District Judge reminded
Gall that probation, rather than “an act of leniency,” is a
“substantial restriction of freedom.”
Id., at 99, 125. In
the memorandum, he emphasized:
“[Gall] will have to comply with
strict reporting conditions along with a three-year regime of
alcohol and drug testing. He will not be able to change or make
decisions about significant circumstances in his life, such as
where to live or work, which are prized liberty interests, without
first seeking authorization from his Probation Officer or, perhaps,
even the Court. Of course, the Defendant always faces the harsh
consequences that await if he violates the conditions of his
probationary term.”
Id., at 125.
Finally, the District Judge
explained why he had concluded that the sentence of probation
reflected the seriousness of Gall’s offense and that no term of
imprisonment was necessary:
“Any term of imprisonment in this
case would be counter effective by depriving society of the
contributions of the Defendant who, the Court has found,
understands the consequences of his criminal conduct and is doing
everything in his power to forge a new life. The Defendant’s
post-offense conduct indicates neither that he will return to
criminal behavior nor that the Defendant is a danger to society. In
fact, the Defendant’s post-offense conduct was not motivated by a
desire to please the Court or any other governmental agency, but
was the pre-Indictment product of the Defendant’s own desire to
lead a better life.”
Id., at 125–126.
II
The Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded for resentencing. Relying on its earlier opinion in
United States v.
Claiborne, 439 F. 3d 479
(CA8 2006), it held that a sentence outside of the Guidelines range
must be supported by a justification that “ ‘ “is
proportional to the extent of the difference between the advisory
range and the sentence imposed.” ’ ” 446 F. 3d 884,
889 (CA8 2006) (quoting
Claiborne, 439 F. 3d, at 481,
in turn quoting
United States v.
Johnson, 427
F. 3d 423, 426–427 (CA7 2005)). Characterizing the difference
between a sentence of probation and the bottom of Gall’s advisory
Guidelines range of 30 months as “extraordinary” because it
amounted to “a 100% downward variance,” 446 F. 3d, at 889, the
Court of Appeals held that such a variance must be—and here was
not—supported by extraordinary circumstances.
Rather than making an attempt to
quantify the value of the justifications provided by the District
Judge, the Court of Appeals identified what it regarded as five
separate errors in the District Judge’s reasoning: (1) He gave “too
much weight to Gall’s withdrawal from the conspiracy”; (2) given
that Gall was 21 at the time of his offense, the District Judge
erroneously gave “significant weight” to studies showing impetuous
behavior by persons under the age of 18; (3) he did not “properly
weigh” the seriousness of Gall’s offense; (4) he failed to consider
whether a sentence of probation would result in “unwarranted”
disparities; and (5) he placed “too much emphasis on Gall’s
post-offense rehabilitation.”
Id., at 889–890. As we shall
explain, we are not persuaded that these factors, whether viewed
separately or in the aggregate, are sufficient to support the
conclusion that the District Judge abused his discretion. As a
preface to our discussion of these particulars, however, we shall
explain why the Court of Appeals’ rule requiring “proportional”
justifications for departures from the Guidelines range is not
consistent with our remedial opinion in
United States v.
Booker,
543
U. S. 220 (2005).
III
In
Booker we invalidated
both the statutory provision, 18 U. S. C. §3553(b)(1) (2000
ed., Supp. IV), which made the Sentencing Guidelines mandatory, and
§3742(e) (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), which directed appellate courts
to apply a
de novo standard of review to departures from
the Guidelines. As a result of our decision, the Guidelines are now
advisory, and appellate review of sentencing decisions is limited
to determining whether they are “reasonable.” Our explanation of
“reasonableness” review in the
Booker opinion made it
pellucidly clear that the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of
review now applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions. See
543 U. S., at 260–262; see also
Rita, 551 U. S., at ___
(Stevens, J., concurring).
It is also clear that a district
judge must give serious consideration to the extent of any
departure from the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion that
an unusually lenient or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate
in a particular case with sufficient justifications. For even
though the Guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory, they are,
as we pointed out in
Rita, the product of careful study
based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of
thousands of individual sentencing decisions.[
Footnote 2]
Id., at ___.
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence
outside the Guidelines range, appellate courts may therefore take
the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a
deviation from the Guidelines. We reject, however, an appellate
rule that requires “extraordinary” circumstances to justify a
sentence outside the Guidelines range. We also reject the use of a
rigid mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure
as the standard for determining the strength of the justifications
required for a specific sentence.
As an initial matter, the approaches we reject
come too close to creating an impermissible presumption of
unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range. See
id., at ___ (slip op., at 15) (“The fact that we permit
courts of appeals to adopt a presumption of reasonableness does not
mean that courts may adopt a presumption of
unreasonableness”).[
Footnote 3]
Even the Government has acknowledged that such a presumption would
not be consistent with
Booker. See Brief for United States
in
Rita v.
United States, O. T. 2006, No.
06–5754, pp. 34–35.
The mathematical approach also suffers from
infirmities of application. On one side of the equation, deviations
from the Guidelines range will always appear more extreme—in
percentage terms—when the range itself is low, and a sentence of
probation will always be a 100% departure regardless of whether the
Guidelines range is 1 month or 100 years. Moreover, quantifying the
variance as a certain percentage of the maximum, minimum, or median
prison sentence recommended by the Guidelines gives no weight to
the “substantial restriction of freedom” involved in a term of
supervised release or probation. App. 95.
We recognize that custodial
sentences are qualitatively more severe than probationary sentences
of equivalent terms. Offenders on probation are nonetheless subject
to several standard conditions that substantially restrict their
liberty. See
United States v.
Knights,
534 U. S. 112, 119
(2001) (“Inherent in the very nature of probation is that
probationers ‘do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every
citizen is entitled’ ” (quoting
Griffin v.
Wisconsin,
483 U. S. 868, 874
(1987))).[
Footnote 4]
Probationers may not leave the judicial district, move, or change
jobs without notifying, and in some cases receiving permission
from, their probation officer or the court. They must report
regularly to their probation officer, permit unannounced visits to
their homes, refrain from associating with any person convicted of
a felony, and refrain from excessive drinking. USSG §5B1.3. Most
probationers are also subject to individual “special conditions”
imposed by the court. Gall, for instance, may not patronize any
establishment that derives more than 50% of its revenue from the
sale of alcohol, and must submit to random drug tests as directed
by his probation officer. App. 109.
On the other side of the
equation, the mathematical approach assumes the existence of some
ascertainable method of assigning percentages to various
justifications. Does withdrawal from a conspiracy justify more or
less than, say, a 30% reduction? Does it matter that the withdrawal
occurred several years ago? Is it relevant that the withdrawal was
motivated by a decision to discontinue the use of drugs and to lead
a better life? What percentage, if any, should be assigned to
evidence that a defendant poses no future threat to society, or to
evidence that innocent third parties are dependent on him? The
formula is a classic example of attempting to measure an inventory
of apples by counting oranges.[
Footnote 5]
Most importantly, both the exceptional
circumstances requirement and the rigid mathematical formulation
reflect a practice—common among courts that have adopted
“proportional review”—of applying a heightened standard of review
to sentences outside the Guidelines range. This is inconsistent
with the rule that the abuse-of-discretion standard of review
applies to appellate review of all sentencing decisions—whether
inside or outside the Guidelines range.
As we explained in
Rita, a district
court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly
calculating the applicable Guidelines range. See 551 U. S., at ___.
As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency,
the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial
benchmark. The Guidelines are not the only consideration, however.
Accordingly, after giving both parties an opportunity to argue for
whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge should
then consider all of the §3553(a) factors to determine whether they
support the sentence requested by a party.[
Footnote 6] In so doing, he may not presume that the
Guidelines range is reasonable. See
id., at ___. He must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. If
he decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he
must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the
justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of
the variance. We find it uncontroversial that a major departure
should be supported by a more significant justification than a
minor one. After settling on the appropriate sentence, he must
adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful
appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.
Id., at ___.
Regardless of whether the sentence imposed is
inside or outside the Guidelines range, the appellate court must
review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. It must
first ensure that the district court committed no significant
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the §3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any
deviation from the Guidelines range. Assuming that the district
court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate
court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. When
conducting this review, the court will, of course, take into
account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of
any variance from the Guidelines range. If the sentence is within
the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not required
to, apply a presumption of reasonableness.
Id., at ___.
But if the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may
not apply a presumption of unreasonableness. It may consider the
extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the
district court’s decision that the §3553(a) factors, on a whole,
justify the extent of the variance. The fact that the appellate
court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was
appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district
court.
Practical considerations also underlie this
legal principle. “The sentencing judge is in a superior position to
find facts and judge their import under §3553(a) in the individual
case. The judge sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility
determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights
not conveyed by the record.” Brief for Federal Public and Community
Defenders et al. as
Amici Curiae 16. “The sentencing
judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual
case and the individual defendant before him than the Commission or
the appeals court.”
Rita, 551 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
18). Moreover, “[d]istrict courts have an institutional advantage
over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations,
especially as they see so many more Guidelines sentences than
appellate courts do.”
Koon v.
United States,
518 U. S. 81, 98
(1996).[
Footnote 7]
“It has been uniform and constant in the
federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider
every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique
study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes
magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.”
Id., at
113.[
Footnote 8] The uniqueness
of the individual case, however, does not change the deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard of review that applies to all
sentencing decisions. As we shall now explain, the opinion of the
Court of Appeals in this case does not reflect the requisite
deference and does not support the conclusion that the District
Court abused its discretion.
IV
As an initial matter, we note
that the District Judge committed no significant procedural error.
He correctly calculated the applicable Guidelines range, allowed
both parties to present arguments as to what they believed the
appropriate sentence should be, considered all of the §3553(a)
factors, and thoroughly documented his reasoning. The Court of
Appeals found that the District Judge erred in failing to give
proper weight to the seriousness of the offense, as required by
§3553(a)(2)(A), and failing to consider whether a sentence of
probation would create unwarranted disparities, as required by
§3553(a)(6). We disagree.
Section 3553(a)(2)(A) requires
judges to consider “the need for the sentence imposed … to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense.” The Court of Appeals
concluded that “the district court did not properly weigh the
seriousness of Gall’s offense” because it “ignored the serious
health risks ecstasy poses.” 446 F. 3d, at 890. Contrary to
the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, the District Judge plainly did
consider the seriousness of the offense. See,
e.g., App.
99 (“The Court, however, is bound to impose a sentence that
reflects the seriousness of joining a conspiracy to distribute MDMA
or ecstasy”);
id., at 122.
[Footnote 9] It is true that the District
Judge did not make specific reference to the (unquestionably
significant) health risks posed by ecstasy, but the prosecutor did
not raise ecstasy’s effects at the sentencing hearing. Had the
prosecutor raised the issue, specific discussion of the point might
have been in order, but it was not incumbent on the District Judge
to raise every conceivably relevant issue on his own
initiative.
The Government’s legitimate
concern that a lenient sentence for a serious offense threatens to
promote disrespect for the law is at least to some extent offset by
the fact that seven of the eight defendants in this case have been
sentenced to significant prison terms. Moreover, the unique facts
of Gall’s situation provide support for the District Judge’s
conclusion that, in Gall’s case, “a sentence of imprisonment may
work to promote not respect, but derision, of the law if the law is
viewed as merely a means to dispense harsh punishment without
taking into account the real conduct and circumstances involved in
sentencing.” Id., at 126.
Section 3553(a)(6) requires
judges to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct.” The Court of Appeals stated that
“the record does not show that the district court considered
whether a sentence of probation would result in unwarranted
disparities.” 446 F. 3d, at 890. As with the seriousness of
the offense conduct, avoidance of unwarranted disparities was
clearly considered by the Sentencing Commission when setting the
Guidelines ranges. Since the District Judge correctly calculated
and carefully reviewed the Guidelines range, he necessarily gave
significant weight and consideration to the need to avoid
unwarranted disparities.
Moreover, as we understand the
colloquy between the District Judge and the AUSA, it seems that the
judge gave specific attention to the issue of disparity when he
inquired about the sentences already imposed by a different judge
on two of Gall’s codefendants. The AUSA advised the District Judge
that defendant Harbison had received a 30-month sentence and that
Gooding had received 35 months. The following colloquy then
occurred:
“THE
COURT: … You probably know more about this than anybody. How
long did those two stay in the conspiracy, and did they voluntarily
withdraw?
“MR GRIESS: They did
not.
“THE COURT: They did
not?
“MR. GRIESS: They did not
voluntarily withdraw. And they were in the conspiracy, I think, for
a shorter period of time, but at the very end.
“THE COURT: Okay. Thank
you.
“MR. GRIESS: A significant
difference there, Your Honor, is that they were in the conspiracy
after the guidelines changed and, therefore, were sentenced at a
much higher level because of that.” App. 88.
A little later
Mr. Griess stated: “The last thing I want to talk about goes to
sentencing disparity… . Obviously, the Court is cognizant of
that and wants to avoid any unwarranted sentencing disparities.”
Id., at 89. He then discussed at some length the sentence
of 36 months imposed on another codefendant, Jarod Yoder, whose
participation in the conspiracy was roughly comparable to Gall’s.
Griess voluntarily acknowledged three differences between Yoder and
Gall: Yoder was in the conspiracy at its end and therefore was
sentenced under the more severe Guidelines, he had a more serious
criminal history, and he did not withdraw from the
conspiracy.
From these facts, it is
perfectly clear that the District Judge considered the need to
avoid unwarranted disparities, but also considered the need to
avoid unwarranted similarities among other co-conspirators
who were not similarly situated. The District Judge regarded Gall’s
voluntary withdrawal as a reasonable basis for giving him a less
severe sentence than the three codefendants discussed with the
AUSA, who neither withdrew from the conspiracy nor rehabilitated
themselves as Gall had done. We also note that neither the Court of
Appeals nor the Government has called our attention to a comparable
defendant who received a more severe sentence.
Since the District Court
committed no procedural error, the only question for the Court of
Appeals was whether the sentence was reasonable—i.e.,
whether the District Judge abused his discretion in determining
that the §3553(a) factors supported a sentence of probation and
justified a substantial deviation from the Guidelines range. As we
shall now explain, the sentence was reasonable. The Court of
Appeals’ decision to the contrary was incorrect and failed to
demonstrate the requisite deference to the District Judge’s
decision.
V
The Court of
Appeals gave virtually no deference to the District Court’s
decision that the §3553(a) factors justified a significant variance
in this case. Although the Court of Appeals correctly stated that
the appropriate standard of review was abuse of discretion, it
engaged in an analysis that more closely resembled de novo
review of the facts presented and determined that, in its view, the
degree of variance was not warranted.
The Court of
Appeals thought that the District Court “gave too much weight to
Gall’s withdrawal from the conspiracy because the court failed to
acknowledge the significant benefit Gall received from being
subject to the 1999 Guidelines.”[Footnote 10] 446 F. 3d, at 889. This criticism is
flawed in that it ignores the critical relevance of Gall’s
voluntary withdrawal, a circumstance that distinguished his conduct
not only from that of all his codefendants, but from the vast
majority of defendants convicted of conspiracy in federal court.
The District Court quite reasonably attached great weight to the
fact that Gall voluntarily withdrew from the conspiracy after
deciding, on his own initiative, to change his life. This lends
strong support to the District Court’s conclusion that Gall is not
going to return to criminal behavior and is not a danger to
society. See 18 U. S. C. §§3553(a)(2)(B), (C). Compared to a
case where the offender’s rehabilitation occurred after he was
charged with a crime, the District Court here had greater
justification for believing Gall’s turnaround was genuine, as
distinct from a transparent attempt to build a mitigation
case.
The Court of Appeals thought
the District Judge “gave significant weight to an improper factor”
when he compared Gall’s sale of ecstasy when he was a 21-year-old
adult to the “impetuous and ill-considered” actions of persons
under the age of 18. 446 F. 3d, at 890. The appellate court
correctly observed that the studies cited by the District Judge do
not explain how Gall’s “specific behavior in the instant case was
impetuous or ill-considered.” Ibid.
In that portion of his
sentencing memorandum, however, the judge was discussing the
“character of the defendant,” not the nature of his offense. App.
122. He noted that Gall’s criminal history included a ticket for
underage drinking when he was 18 years old and possession of
marijuana that was contemporaneous with his offense in this case.
In summary, the District Judge observed that all of Gall’s criminal
history “including the present offense, occurred when he was
twenty-one-years old or younger” and appeared “to stem from his
addictions to drugs and alcohol.” Id., at 123. The
District Judge appended a long footnote to his discussion of Gall’s
immaturity. The footnote includes an excerpt from our opinion in
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, 569
(2005), which quotes a study stating that a lack of maturity and an
undeveloped sense of responsibility are qualities that
“ ‘often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions.’ ” The District Judge clearly stated the relevance of
these studies in the opening and closing sentences of the
footnote:
“Immaturity at
the time of the offense conduct is not an inconsequential
consideration. Recent studies on the development of the human brain
conclude that human brain development may not become complete until
the age of twenty-five… . [T]he recent [National Institute of
Health] report confirms that there is no bold line demarcating at
what age a person reaches full maturity. While age does not excuse
behavior, a sentencing court should account for age when inquiring
into the conduct of a defendant.” App. 123, n. 2.
Given the
dramatic contrast between Gall’s behavior before he joined the
conspiracy and his conduct after withdrawing, it was not
unreasonable for the District Judge to view Gall’s immaturity at
the time of the offense as a mitigating factor, and his later
behavior as a sign that he had matured and would not engage in such
impetuous and ill-considered conduct in the future. Indeed, his
consideration of that factor finds support in our cases. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350, 367
(1993) (holding that a jury was free to consider a 19-year-old
defendant’s youth when determining whether there was a probability
that he would continue to commit violent acts in the future and
stating that “ ‘youth is more than a chronological fact. It is
a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible
to influence and to psychological damage’ ” (quoting
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 115
(1982))).
Finally, the Court of Appeals
thought that, even if Gall’s rehabilitation was dramatic and
permanent, a sentence of probation for participation as a middleman
in a conspiracy distributing 10,000 pills of ecstasy “lies outside
the range of choice dictated by the facts of the case.” 446
F. 3d, at 890. If the Guidelines were still mandatory, and
assuming the facts did not justify a Guidelines-based downward
departure, this would provide a sufficient basis for setting aside
Gall’s sentence because the Guidelines state that probation alone
is not an appropriate sentence for comparable offenses.[Footnote 11] But the Guidelines are
not mandatory, and thus the “range of choice dictated by the facts
of the case” is significantly broadened. Moreover, the Guidelines
are only one of the factors to consider when imposing sentence, and
§3553(a)(3) directs the judge to consider sentences other than
imprisonment.
We also note that the
Government did not argue below, and has not argued here, that a
sentence of probation could never be imposed for a crime identical
to Gall’s. Indeed, it acknowledged that probation could be
permissible if the record contained different—but in our view, no
more compelling—mitigating evidence. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37–38
(stating that probation could be an appropriate sentence, given the
exact same offense, if “there are compelling family circumstances
where individuals will be very badly hurt in the defendant’s family
if no one is available to take care of them”).
The District Court quite
reasonably attached great weight to Gall’s self-motivated
rehabilitation, which was undertaken not at the direction of, or
under supervision by, any court, but on his own initiative. This
also lends strong support to the conclusion that imprisonment was
not necessary to deter Gall from engaging in future criminal
conduct or to protect the public from his future criminal acts. See
18 U. S. C. §§3553(a)(2)(B), (C).
The Court of Appeals clearly
disagreed with the District Judge’s conclusion that consideration
of the §3553(a) factors justified a sentence of probation; it
believed that the circumstances presented here were insufficient to
sustain such a marked deviation from the Guidelines range. But it
is not for the Court of Appeals to decide de novo whether
the justification for a variance is sufficient or the sentence
reasonable. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Court of Appeals
should have given due deference to the District Court’s reasoned
and reasonable decision that the §3553(a) factors, on the whole,
justified the sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Footnote
1
Ecstasy is sometimes called
“MDMA” because its scientific name is
“methylenedioxymethamphetamine.” App. 24, 118.
Footnote
2
Notably, not all of the
Guidelines are tied to this empirical evidence. For example, the
Sentencing Commission departed from the empirical approach when
setting the Guidelines range for drug offenses, and chose instead
to key the Guidelines to the statutory mandatory minimum sentences
that Congress established for such crimes. See United States
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §1A1.1 (Nov. 2006) (USSG).
This decision, and its effect on a district judge’s authority to
deviate from the Guidelines range in a particular drug case, is
addressed in Kimbrough v. United States,
post, p. ___.
Footnote
3
Several Courts of Appeals had
rejected such a presumption of unreasonableness even prior to our
decision in Rita. See, e.g., United
States v. Howard, 454 F. 3d 700, 703 (CA7 2006)
(“Although a sentence outside the range does not enjoy the
presumption of reasonableness that one within the range does, it
does not warrant a presumption of unreasonableness”); United
States v. Matheny, 450 F. 3d 633, 642 (CA6 2006)
(“[T]his court’s holding that sentences within the advisory
guideline range are presumptively reasonable does not mean that
sentences outside of that range are presumptively unreasonable”);
United States v. Myers, 439 F. 3d 415, 417
(CA8 2006) (“We have determined that a sentence imposed within the
guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. While it does not
follow that a sentence outside the guidelines range is
unreasonable, we review a district court’s decision to depart from
the appropriate guidelines range for abuse of discretion” (citation
omitted)).
Footnote
4
See also Advisory Council of
Judges of National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Guides for
Sentencing 13–14 (1957) (“Probation is not granted out of a spirit
of leniency… . As the Wickersham Commission said, probation is
not merely ‘letting an offender off easily’ ”); 1 N. Cohen,
The Law of Probation and Parole §7:9 (2d ed. 1999) (“[T]he
probation or parole conditions imposed on an individual can have a
significant impact on both that person and society… . Often
these conditions comprehensively regulate significant facets of
their day-to-day lives … . They may become subject to
frequent searches by government officials, as well as to mandatory
counseling sessions with a caseworker or
psychotherapist”).
Footnote
5
Notably, when the Court of
Appeals explained its disagreement with the District Judge’s
decision in this case, it made no attempt to quantify the strength
of any of the mitigating circumstances.
Footnote
6
Section 3553(a) lists seven
factors that a sentencing court must consider. The first factor is
a broad command to consider “the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18
U. S. C. §3553(a)(1). The second factor requires the
consideration of the general purposes of sentencing,
including:
“the need for the sentence imposed—
“(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense;
“(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct;
“(C) to protect the public from further crimes
of the defendant; and
“(D) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”
§3553(a)(2).
The third factor pertains to
“the kinds of sentences available,” §3553(a)(3); the fourth to the
Sentencing Guidelines; the fifth to any relevant policy statement
issued by the Sentencing Commission; the sixth to “the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities,” §3553(a)(6); and the
seventh to “the need to provide restitution to any victim,”
§3553(a)(7). Preceding this list is a general directive to “impose
a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with the purposes” of sentencing described in the second factor.
§3553(a) (2000 ed., Supp. V). The fact that §3553(a) explicitly
directs sentencing courts to consider the Guidelines supports the
premise that district courts must begin their analysis with the
Guidelines and remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing
process.
Footnote
7
District judges sentence, on
average, 117 defendants every year. Administrative Office of United
States Courts, 2006 Federal Court Management Statistics 167. The
District Judge in this case, Judge Pratt, has sentenced over 990
offenders over the course of his career. United States v.
Likens, 464 F. 3d 823, 827, n. 1 (CA8 2006)
(Bright, J., dissenting). Only a relatively small fraction of these
defendants appeal their sentence on reasonableness grounds. See
Koon, 518 U. S., at 98 (“In 1994, for example, 93.9% of
Guidelines cases were not appealed”); Likens, 464
F. 3d, at 827, n. 1 (Bright, J., dissenting) (noting that
the District Judge had sentenced hundreds of defendants and that
“[w]e have reviewed only a miniscule number of those cases”);
cf. United States Sentencing Commission, 2006
Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics
135–152.
Footnote 8
It is
particularly revealing that when we adopted an abuse-of-discretion
standard in Koon, we explicitly rejected the Government’s
argument that “de novo review of departure decisions is
necessary ‘to protect against unwarranted disparities arising from
the differing sentencing approaches of individual district
judges.’ ” 518 U. S., at 97 (quoting Brief for United States
in O. T. 1995, No. 94–1664, p. 12). Even then we were
satisfied that a more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard
could successfully balance the need to “reduce unjustified
disparities” across the Nation and “consider every convicted person
as an individual.” 518 U. S., at 113.
Footnote 9
The District
Judge also gave specific consideration to the fact—not directly
taken into account by the Guidelines—that Gall netted $30,000 from
his participation in the conspiracy. He noted,
however:
“[T]his fact can be viewed from
different perspectives. On the one hand, [Gall] should be punished
for profiting from a criminal scheme… . On the other hand,
[Gall], who is from a working-class family and has few financial
resources, decided to turn his back on what, for him, was a highly
profitable venture… . The Court can not consider, for the
purposes of sentencing, one side of the financial aspect of the
offense conduct without considering the other.” App. 123–124,
n. 3.
Footnote 10
The Court of
Appeals explained that under the current Guidelines, which treat
ecstasy more harshly, Gall’s base offense level would have been 32,
eight levels higher than the base offense level imposed under the
1999 Guidelines.
Footnote 11
Specifically,
probation is not recommended under the Guidelines when the
applicable Guidelines range is outside Zone A of the sentencing
table as it is here. USSG §5B1.1.
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