OCTOBER TERM, 1991
Syllabus
FRANKLIN
v. GWINNETT COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 90-918. Argued December 11, 1991-Decided February
26,1992
Petitioner Franklin, a student in a high school operated by
respondent school district, filed an action for damages in Federal
District Court under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
alleging,
inter alia, that she had been subjected to
continual sexual harassment and abuse by a teacher, Andrew Hill.
After the complaint was filed, Hill resigned on the condition that
all matters pending against him be dropped, and the school
thereupon closed its investigation. The District Court subsequently
dismissed the complaint on the ground that Title IX does not
authorize an award of damages, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held: A damages remedy is available for an action brought
to enforce Title IX. Pp. 65-76.
(a) Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of action.
Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677. P. 65.
(b) The longstanding general rule is that absent clear direction
to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to
award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action
brought pursuant to a federal statute. See,
e. g., Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.
S. 678, 684;
Davis v.
Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 246-247.
Pp.65-68.
(c) This Court's adherence to the general rule has not eroded
since
Bell. See,
e. g., J. I. Case Co.
v.
Borak, 377
U. S. 426, 433-435. In declaring that "the question of who may
enforce a
statutory right is fundamentally different from
the question of who may enforce a [constitutionally protected]
right,"
Davis, 442 U. S., at 241, was not limiting the
traditional presumption in favor of all appropriate relief to
actions claiming constitutional violations. Rather it was merely
attempting to decide whether a litigant had a "cause of action," a
question that is analytically distinct from, and prior to, the one
at issue: what relief, if any a litigant is entitled to receive,
see
id., at 239. Nor did
Guardians Assn. v.
Civil
Service Comm'n of New York City, 463 U. S. 582, and
Consolidated Rail Corporation v.
Darrone, 465 U. S. 624, erode the
traditional presumption. In fact, those cases support it, since a
clear majority in
Guardians expressed the view that damages
were available in an action seeking remedies for an intentional
violation of a statute
61
closely analogous to Title IX, while a unanimous Court in
Darrone held that another such statute authorized the award
of backpay. Pp. 68-71.
(d) Congress did not intend to limit the remedies available in a
Title IX suit. Because the
Cannon Court inferred a cause of
action upon concluding that Title IX supported no express right of
action, the silence of the
pre-Cannon statutory text and
legislative history on the issue of available remedies is neither
surprising nor enlightening. Rather, the appropriate inquiry for
the
pre-Cannon period is the state of the law when Congress
passed Title IX. Since, at that time, the traditional presumption
in favor of all available remedies was firmly established, and this
Court had recently found implied rights of action in six cases and
approved a damages remedy in three of them, the lack of any
legislative intent to abandon the traditional presumption is amply
demonstrated. For the
post-Cannon period, when Congress was
legislating with full cognizance of that decision, analysis of the
text and history of the two statutes enacted to amend Title IX-the
Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment of 1986 and the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987-establishes that Congress validated
Cannon's holding and made no effort to alter the traditional
presumption. Pp.71-73.
(e) The argument that a damages award would unduly expand the
federal courts' power into a sphere properly reserved to the
Executive and Legislative Branches in violation of separation of
powers principles misconceives the difference between a cause of
action and a remedy. Unlike the finding of a cause of action, which
authorizes a court to hear a case or controversy, the discretion to
award appropriate relief involves no such increase in judicial
power and, in fact, historically has been thought necessary to
provide an important safeguard against legislative and executive
abuses and to insure an independent Judiciary. Moreover, selective
adjudication of the sort advocated here would harm separation of
powers by giving judges the power to render inutile causes of
action authorized by Congress through a decision that
no
remedy is available. Pp. 73-74.
(f) Also rejected is the contention that the normal presumption
in favor of all appropriate remedies should not apply because Title
IX was enacted pursuant to Congress' Spending Clause power. The
Court's observation in
Pennhurst State School and Hospital
v.
Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 28-29, that remedies are limited
under Spending Clause statutes when the alleged violation is
unintentional is based on the theory that an entity
receiving federal funds lacks notice that it will be liable for
damages for such a violation, see
id., at 17. This notice
problem does not arise in a case such as the present, where
intentional discrimination is alleged and is proscribed by the
statute in question. Moreover, the notion that Spending Clause
statutes do not authorize monetary awards
62
for intentional violations is belied by the unanimous holding in
Darrone, supra, at 628. Pp. 74-75.
(g) The assertion that Title IX remedies should nevertheless be
limited to backpay and prospective relief diverges from this
Court's traditional approach to deciding what remedies are
available for violation of a federal right. Both suggested remedies
are equitable in nature, and it is axiomatic that a court should
determine the adequacy of damages at law before resorting to
equitable relief. Moreover, both suggested remedies are clearly
inadequate in that they would provide Franklin no relief: backpay
because she was a student when the alleged discrimination occurred,
and prospective relief because she no longer attends school in
respondent system and Hill no longer teaches there. Pp. 75-76.
911 F.2d
617, reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined.
SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined,
post, p. 76.
Joel 1.
Klein argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were
Richard G.
Taranto and
Michael Weinstock.
Albert M. Pearson III argued the cause for
respondents.
With him on the brief were Frank C. Bedinger III and E. Victoria
Sweeny.
Stephen L. Nightingale argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy
Solicitor General Roberts, and John P. Schnitker.
*
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the implied right of
action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the National Women's Law Center et al. by
Marcia D.
Greenberger; and for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law by
William T. Lake, William H. Brown III, Herbert M.
Wachtell, Norman Redlich, and
Thomas J.
Henderson.
Peter J. Kadzik and
Arlene B.
Mayerson filed a brief for the American Council of the Blind et
al. as
amici curiae.
63
1972, 20 U. S. C. §§ 1681-1688 (Title IX),l which this Court
recognized in
Cannon v.
University of Chicago,
441 U. S. 677
(1979), supports a claim for monetary damages.
I
Petitioner Christine Franklin was a student at North Gwinnett
High School in Gwinnett County, Georgia, between September 1985 and
August 1989. Respondent Gwinnett County School District operates
the high school and receives federal funds. According to the
complaint filed on December 29, 1988, in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Franklin was subjected
to continual sexual harassment beginning in the autumn of her tenth
grade year (1986) from Andrew Hill, a sports coach and teacher
employed by the district. Among other allegations, Franklin avers
that Hill engaged her in sexually oriented conversations in which
he asked about her sexual experiences with her boyfriend and
whether she would consider having sexual intercourse with an older
man, Complaint' 10; First Amended Complaint, Exh. A, p. 3; 2 that
Hill forcibly kissed her on the mouth in the school parking lot,
Complaint , 17; that he telephoned her at her home and asked if she
would meet him socially, Complaint , 21; First Amended Complaint,
Exh. A, pp. 4-5; and that, on three occasions in her junior year,
Hill interrupted a class, requested that the teacher excuse
Franklin, and took her to a private office where he subjected her
to coercive intercourse, Complaint "25, 27, 32. The complaint
further alleges that though
IThis statute provides in pertinent part that "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 20
2 This exhibit is the report of the United States Department of
Education's Office for Civil Rights based on that office's
investigation of this case. Franklin incorporated this exhibit into
her amended complaint.
64
they became aware of and investigated Hill's sexual harassment
of Franklin and other female students, teachers and administrators
took no action to halt it and discouraged Franklin from pressing
charges against Hill. Complaint "23,24,35. On April 14, 1988, Hill
resigned on the condition that all matters pending against him be
dropped. Complaint "36, 37. The school thereupon closed its
investigation. Complaint' 37.
In this action,3 the District Court dismissed the complaint on
the ground that Title IX does not authorize an award of damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
911 F.2d
617 (CAll 1990). The court noted that analysis of Title IX and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d
et
seq. (Title VI), has developed along similar lines. Citing as
binding precedent
Drayden v.
Needville Independent School
Dist., 642 F.2d
129 (CA5 1981), a decision rendered prior to the division of
the Fifth Circuit, the court concluded that Title VI did not
support a claim for monetary damages. The court then analyzed this
Court's decision in
Guardians Assn. v.
Civil Service
Comm'n of New York City, 463 U. S. 582 (1983), to
determine whether it implicitly overruled
Drayden. The court
stated that the absence of a majority opinion left unresolved the
question whether a court could award such relief upon a showing of
intentional discrimination. As a second basis for its holding that
monetary damages were unavailable, the court reasoned that Title IX
was enacted under Congress' Spending Clause powers and that
3 Prior to bringing this lawsuit, Franklin filed a complaint
with the Office for Civil Rights of the United States Department of
Education (OCR) in August 1988. After investigating these charges
for several months, OCR concluded that the school district had
violated Franklin's rights by subjecting her to physical and verbal
sexual harassment and by interfering with her right to complain
about conduct proscribed by Title IX. OCR determined, however, that
because of the resignations of Hill and respondent William Prescott
and the implementation of a school grievance procedure, the
district had come into compliance with Title IX. It then terminated
its investigation. First Amended Complaint, Exh. A, pp. 7-9.
65
"[u]nder such statutes, relief may frequently be limited to that
which is equitable in nature, with the recipient of federal funds
thus retaining the option of terminating such receipt in order to
rid itself of an injunction." 911 F. 2d, at 621.4 The court closed
by observing it would "proceed with extreme care" to afford
compensatory relief absent express provision by Congress or clear
direction from this Court.
Id., at 622. Accordingly, it held
that an action for monetary damages could not be sustained for an
alleged intentional violation of Title IX, and affirmed the
District Court's ruling to that effect.
Ibid.5
Because this opinion conflicts with a decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, see
Pfeiffer v.
Marion
Center Area School Dist., 917 F.2d
779, 787-789 (1990), we granted certiorari, 501 U. S. 1204
(1991). We reverse.
II
In
Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979), the
Court held that Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of
action. We have no occasion here to reconsider that decision.
Rather, in this case we must decide what remedies are available in
a suit brought pursuant to this implied right. As we have often
stated, the question of what remedies are available under a statute
that provides a private right of action is "analytically distinct"
from the issue
4 The court also rejected an argument by Franklin that the terms
of outright prohibition of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17, apply by analogy to Title IX's antidiscrimination
provision, and that the remedies available under the two statutes
should also be the same. 911 F. 2d, at 622. Because Franklin does
not pursue this contention here, we need not address whether it has
merit.
5Judge Johnson concurred specially, writing that the result was
controlled by
Drayden v.
Needville Independent School
Dist., 642 F.2d
129 (CA5 1981), and that there was no need to address
whether Titles VI and IX are grounded solely in the Spending Clause
and whether Title VII analysis should apply to an action under
Titles VI or IX. See 911 F. 2d, at 622-623.
66
of whether such a right exists in the first place.
Davis
v.
Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 239
(1979). Thus, although we examine the text and history of a statute
to determine whether Congress intended to create a right of action,
Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington,
442 U. S. 560,
575-576 (1979), we presume the availability of all appropriate
remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.
Davis, supra, at 246247. This principle has deep roots in
our jurisprudence.
A
"[W]here legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute
provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done."
Bell v.
Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684
(1946). The Court explained this longstanding rule as
jurisdictional and upheld the exercise of the federal courts' power
to award appropriate relief so long as a cause of action existed
under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Ibid.
The
Bell Court's reliance on this rule was hardly
revolutionary. From the earliest years of the Republic, the Court
has recognized the power of the Judiciary to award appropriate
remedies to redress injuries actionable in federal court, although
it did not always distinguish clearly between a right to bring suit
and a remedy available under such a right. In
Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), for example, Chief
Justice Marshall observed that our Government "has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will
certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws
furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." This
principle originated in the English common law, and Blackstone
described it as "a general and indisputable rule, that where there
is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action
at law, whenever that right is invaded." 3 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries 23 (1783). See also
Ashby v.
White, 1
Salk. 19, 21, 87 Eng.
67
Rep. 808, 816 (Q. B. 1702) ("If a statute gives a right, the
common law will give a remedy to maintain that right ... ").
In
Kendall v.
United States ex rel. Stokes, 12
Pet. 524 (1838), the Court applied these principles to an Act of
Congress that accorded a right of action in mail carriers to sue
for adjustment and settlement of certain claims for extra services
but which did not specify the precise remedy available to the
carriers. After surveying possible remedies, which included an
action against the Postmaster General for monetary damages, the
Court held that the carriers were entitled to a writ of mandamus
compelling payment under the terms of the statute. "It cannot be
denied but that congress had the power to command that act to be
done," the Court stated; "and the power to enforce the performance
of the act must rest somewhere, or it will present a case which has
often been said to involve a monstrous absurdity in a well
organized government, that there should be no remedy, although a
clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist. And if the
remedy cannot be applied by the circuit court of this district, it
exists nowhere."
Id., at 624.
Dooley v.
United
States, 182 U. S.
222, 229 (1901), also restated "the principle that a liability
created by statute without a remedy may be enforced by a common-law
action."
The Court relied upon this traditional presumption again after
passage of the Federal Safety Appliance Act of 1893, ch. 196, 27
Stat. 531. In
Texas &
Pacific R. Co. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.
S. 33 (1916), the Court first had to determine whether the Act
supported an implied right of action. After answering that question
in the affirmative, the Court then upheld a claim for monetary
damages: "A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful
act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the
damages from the party in default is implied, according to a
doctrine of the common law .... "
Id., at 39. The foundation
upon which the
Bell v.
Hood Court articulated this
traditional pre sump-
68
tion, therefore, was well settled. See also
Texas &
New Orleans R. Co. v.
Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 569
(1930).
B
Respondents and the United States as
amicus curiae,
however, maintain that whatever the traditional presumption may
have been when the Court decided
Bell v.
Hood, it has
disappeared in succeeding decades. We do not agree. In
J. 1.
Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U. S. 426 (1964), the
Court adhered to the general rule that all appropriate relief is
available in an action brought to vindicate a federal right when
Congress has given no indication of its purpose with respect to
remedies. Relying on
Bell v.
Hood, the
Borak
Court specifically rejected an argument that a court's remedial
power to redress violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
was limited to a declaratory judgment. 377 U. S., at 433-434. The
Court concluded that the federal courts "have the power to grant
all necessary remedial relief" for violations of the Act.
Id., at 435. As Justice Clark's opinion for the Court
observed, this holding closely followed the reasoning of a similar
case brought under the Securities Act of 1933, in which the Court
had stated:
" 'The power to enforce implies the power to make
effective the right of recovery afforded by the Act. And the power
to make the right of recovery effective implies the power to
utilize any of the procedures or actions normally available to the
litigant according to the exigencies of the particular case.'"
Id., at 433-434 (quoting Deckert v. Independence
Shares Corp., 311
U. S. 282, 288 (1940)).
That a statute does not authorize the remedy at issue "in so
many words is no more significant than the fact that it does not in
terms authorize execution to issue on a judgment."
Id., at
288. Subsequent cases have been true to this posi-
69
tion. See,
e. g., Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 239 (1969), stating that the "existence of
a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and
appropriate remedies";
Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 255
(1978), upholding damages remedy under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S.
C. § 1983, even though the enacting Congress had not specifically
provided such relief.
The United States contends that the traditional presumption in
favor of all appropriate relief was abandoned by the Court in
Davis v.
Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), and
that the
Bell v.
Hood rule was limited to actions
claiming constitutional violations. The United States quotes
language in
Davis to the effect that "the question of who
may enforce a
statutory right is fundamentally different
from the question of who may enforce a right that is protected by
the Constitution."
Davis, 442 U. S., at 241. The
Government's position, however, mirrors the very misunderstanding
over the difference between a cause of action and the relief
afforded under it that sparked the confusion we attempted to
clarify in
Davis. Whether Congress may limit the class of
persons who have a right of action under Title IX is irrelevant to
the issue in this lawsuit. To reiterate, "the question whether a
litigant has a 'cause of action' is analytically distinct and prior
to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled
to receive."
Id., at 239.
Davis, therefore, did
nothing to interrupt the long line of cases in which the Court has
held that if a right of action exists to enforce a federal right
and Congress is silent on the question of remedies, a federal court
may order any appropriate relief. See
id., at 247, n. 26
(contrasting
Brown v.
GSA, 425 U. S. 820
(1976)).6
6 Cases cited by respondents and the United States since
Davis are inapposite, either because they involved holdings
that plaintiffs had no right of action, see,
e. g., Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, 501 U. S. 1083
(1991); Karahalios v.
Federal Employees, 489 U. S. 527 (1989);
Thompson
70
70 FRANKLIN
v. GWINNETT COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Contrary to arguments by respondents and the United States that
Guardians Assn. v.
Civil Service Comm'n of New York
City, 463 U. S.
582 (1983), and
Consolidated Rail Corporation v.
Darrone, 465
U. S. 624 (1984), eroded this traditional presumption, those
cases in fact support it. Though the multiple opinions in
Guardians suggest the difficulty of inferring the common
ground among the Justices in that case, a clear majority expressed
the view that damages were available under Title VI in an action
seeking remedies for an intentional violation, and no Justice
challenged the traditional presumption in favor of a federal
court's power to award appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of
action. See
Guardians, 463 U. S., at 595 (WHITE, J., joined
by REHNQUIST, J.);
id., at 607-611 (Powell, J., concurring
in judgment, joined by Burger, C. J.);
id., at 612, and n. 1
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment);
id., at 624-628
(Marshall, J., dissenting);
id., at 636 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting, joined by Brennan and BLACKMUN, JJ.). The correctness
of this inference was made clear the following Term when the Court
unanimously held that the 1978 amendment to § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973-which had expressly incorporated the
"remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI" (29 U. S.
C. § 794a(a)(2))-authorizes an award of backpay. In
Darrone,
the Court observed that a majority in
Guardians had "agreed
that retroactive relief is available to private plaintiffs for all
discrimination ... that is actionable under Title VI." 465 U. S.,
at 630, n. 9. The general rule, therefore, is that absent clear
direction to the contrary by
v.
Thompson, 484 U. S. 174 (1988);
Texas Industries, Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U. S. 630
(1981);
California v.
Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287 (1981);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77 (1981);
Touche Ross &
Co. v.
Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979);
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v.
Barbour,
421 U. S. 412
(1975); or because the Court rejected a claim for damages under a
statute that expressly enumerated the remedies available to
plaintiffs,
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473
U. S. 134 (1985).
71
Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any
appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant
to a federal statute.
III
We now address whether Congress intended to limit application of
this general principle in the enforcement of Title IX. See
Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 378
(1983);
Wyandotte Transportation Co. v.
United
States, 389 U. S.
191, 200 (1967). Because the cause of action was inferred by
the Court in
Cannon, the usual recourse to statutory text
and legislative history in the period prior to that decision
necessarily will not enlighten our analysis. Respondents and the
United States fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the
inquiry, therefore, by needlessly dedicating large portions of
their briefs to discussions of how the text and legislative intent
behind Title IX are "silent" on the issue of available remedies.
Since the Court in
Cannon concluded that this statute
supported no express right of action, it is hardly surprising that
Congress also said nothing about the applicable remedies for an
implied right of action.
During the period prior to the decision in
Cannon, the
inquiry in any event is
not" 'basically a matter of
statutory construction,'" as the United States asserts. Brief for
United States as
Amicus Curiae 8 (quoting
Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 15 (1979)).
Rather, in determining Congress' intent to limit application of the
traditional presumption in favor of all appropriate relief, we
evaluate the state of the law when the Legislature passed Title IX.
Cf.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v.
Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 378
(1982). In the years before and after Congress enacted this
statute, the Court "follow[ed] a common-law tradition [and]
regarded the denial of a remedy as the exception rather than the
rule."
Id., at 375 (footnote omitted). As we outlined in
Part II, this has been the prevailing presumption in our
federal
72
courts since at least the early 19th century. In
Cannon,
the majority upheld an implied right of action in part because in
the decade immediately preceding enactment of Title IX in 1972,
this Court had found implied rights of action in six cases.7 In
three of those cases, the Court had approved a damages remedy. See,
e. g., J. 1.
Case Co., 377 U. S., at 433;
Wyandotte Transportation Co., supra, at 207;
Sullivan
v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 (1969).
Wholly apart from the wisdom of the
Cannon holding,
therefore, the same contextual approach used to justify an implied
right of action more than amply demonstrates the lack of any
legislative intent to abandon the traditional presumption in favor
of all available remedies.
In the years
after the announcement of
Cannon, on
the other hand, a more traditional method of statutory analysis is
possible, because Congress was legislating with full cognizance of
that decision. Our reading of the two amendments to Title IX
enacted after
Cannon leads us to conclude that Congress did
not intend to limit the remedies available in a suit brought under
Title IX. In the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat.
1845, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-7, Congress abrogated the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX, Title VI, § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975.
This statute cannot be read except as a validation of
Cannon's holding. A subsection of the 1986 law provides that
in a suit against a State, "remedies (including remedies both at
law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same
extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in the
suit against any public or private entity other than a
7
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U. S. 426 (1964);
Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States,
389 U. S. 191 (1967);
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U. S. 409 (1968);
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U. S. 544 (1969);
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,
396 U. S. 229 (1969); and
Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co.,
404 U. S. 6
(1971).
73
State." 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-7(a)(2). While it is true that this
saving clause says nothing about the nature of those other
available remedies, cf.
Milwaukee v.
Illinois,
451 U. S. 304,
329, n. 22 (1981), absent any contrary indication in the text or
history of the statute, we presume Congress enacted this statute
with the prevailing traditional rule in mind.
In addition to the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986,
Congress also enacted the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28. Without in any way altering the
existing rights of action and the corresponding remedies
permissible under Title IX, Title VI, § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, and the Age Discrimination Act, Congress broadened the
coverage of these antidiscrimination provisions in this
legislation. In seeking to correct what it considered to be an
unacceptable decision on our part in
Grove City College v.
Bell, 465 U.
S. 555 (1984), Congress made no effort to restrict the right of
action recognized in
Cannon and ratified in the 1986 Act or
to alter the traditional presumption in favor of any appropriate
relief for violation of a federal right. We cannot say, therefore,
that Congress has limited the remedies available to a complainant
in a suit brought under Title IX.
IV
Respondents and the United States nevertheless suggest three
reasons why we should not apply the traditional presumption in
favor of appropriate relief in this case.
A
First, respondents argue that an award of damages violates
separation of powers principles because it unduly expands the
federal courts' power into a sphere properly reserved to the
Executive and Legislative Branches. Brief for Respondents 22-25. In
making this argument, respondents misconceive the difference
between a cause of action and a remedy. Unlike the finding of a
cause of action, which authorizes a court to hear a case or
controversy, the discre-
74
tion to award appropriate relief involves no such increase in
judicial power. See generally Note, Federal Jurisdiction in Suits
for Damages Under Statutes Not Affording Such Remedy, 48 Colum. L.
Rev. 1090, 1094-1095 (1948). Federal courts cannot reach out to
award remedies when the Constitution or laws of the United States
do not support a cause of action. Indeed, properly understood,
respondents' position invites us to
abdicate our historic
judicial authority to award appropriate relief in cases brought in
our court system. It is well to recall that such authority
historically has been thought necessary to provide an important
safeguard against abuses of legislative and executive power, see
Kendall v.
United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524
(1838), as well as to ensure an independent Judiciary. See
generally Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional
Legality and the Law of Torts in
Bell v. Hood, 117 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1, 16-17 (1968). Moreover, selective abdication of the sort
advocated here would harm separation of powers principles in
another way, by giving judges the power to render inutile causes of
action authorized by Congress through a decision that
no
remedy is available.
B
Next, consistent with the Court of Appeals' reasoning,
respondents and the United States contend that the normal
presumption in favor of all appropriate remedies should not apply
because Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress' Spending Clause
power. In
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 451
U. S. 1, 28-29 (1981), the Court observed that remedies were
limited under such Spending Clause statutes when the alleged
violation was
unintentional. Respondents and the United
States maintain that this presumption should apply equally to
intentional violations. We disagree. The point of not
permitting monetary damages for an unintentional violation is that
the receiving entity of federal funds lacks notice that it will be
liable for a monetary award. See
id., at 17. This notice
problem does
75
not arise in a case such as this, in which intentional
discrimination is alleged. Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the
Gwinnett County Public Schools the duty not to discriminate on the
basis of sex, and "when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate[sJ' on the basis of sex."
Meritor Sav. Bank,
FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 64 (1986).
We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually
harasses and abuses a student. Congress surely did not intend for
federal moneys to be expended to support the intentional actions it
sought by statute to proscribe. Moreover, the notion that Spending
Clause statutes do not authorize monetary awards for intentional
violations is belied by our unanimous holding in
Darrone.
See 465 U. S., at 628. Respondents and the United States
characterize the backpay remedy in
Darrone as equitable
relief, but this description is irrelevant to their underlying
objection: that application of the traditional rule in this case
will require state entities to pay monetary awards out of their
treasuries for intentional violations of federal statutes.8
C
Finally, the United States asserts that the remedies permissible
under Title IX should nevertheless be limited to backpay and
prospective relief. In addition to diverging from our traditional
approach to deciding what remedies are available for violation of a
federal right, this position conflicts with sound logic. First,
both remedies are equitable in nature, and it is axiomatic that a
court should determine
8 Franklin argues that, in any event, Title IX should not be
viewed solely as having been enacted under Congress' Spending
Clause powers and that it also rests on powers derived from § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brief for Petitioner 19, n. 10.
Because we conclude that a money damages remedy is available under
Title IX for an intentional violation irrespective of the
constitutional source of Congress' power to enact the statute, we
need not decide which power Congress utilized in enacting Title
IX.
76
76 FRANKLIN
v. GWINNETT COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
the adequacy of a remedy in law before resorting to equitable
relief. Under the ordinary convention, the proper inquiry would be
whether monetary damages provided an adequate remedy, and if not,
whether equitable relief would be appropriate.
Whitehead v.
Shattuck, 138
U. S. 146, 150 (1891). See generally C. McCormick, Damages 1
(1935). Moreover, in this case the equitable remedies suggested by
respondent and the Federal Government are clearly inadequate.
Backpay does nothing for petitioner, because she was a student when
the alleged discrimination occurred. Similarly, because Hill-the
person she claims subjected her to sexual harassment-no longer
teaches at the school and she herself no longer attends a school in
the Gwinnett system, prospective relief accords her no remedy at
all. The Government's answer that administrative action helps other
similarly situated students in effect acknowledges that its
approach would leave petitioner remediless.
v
In sum, we conclude that a damages remedy is available for an
action brought to enforce Title IX. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals, therefore, is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE THOMAS
join, concurring in the judgment.
The substantive right at issue here is one that Congress did not
expressly create, but that this Court found to be "implied." See
Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979).
Quite obviously, the search for what was Congress'
remedial
intent as to a right whose very existence Congress did not
expressly acknowledge is unlikely to succeed, see
ante, at
71; it is "hardly surprising," as the Court says,
ibid.,
that the usual sources yield no explicit answer.
77
The Court finds an implicit answer, however, in the legislators'
presumptive awareness of our practice of using "any available
remedy" to redress violations of legal rights.
Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.
S. 678, 684 (1946); see
ante, at 72-73. This strikes me
as question begging. We can plausibly assume acquiescence in our
Bell v.
Hood presumption when the Legislature says
nothing about remedy in expressly creating a private right of
action; perhaps even when it says nothing about remedy in creating
a private right of action by clear textual implication; but not, I
think, when it says nothing about remedy in a statute in which the
courts divine a private right of action on the basis of
"contextual" evidence such as that in
Cannon, which charged
Congress with knowledge of a court of appeals' creation of a cause
of action under a similarly worded statute. See
Cannon,
supra, at 696-698. Whatever one thinks of the validity of the
last approach, it surely rests on attributed rather than actual
congressional knowledge. It does not demonstrate an explicit
legislative decision to create a cause of action, and so could not
be expected to be accompanied by a legislative decision to alter
the application of
Bell v.
Hood. Given the nature of
Cannon and some of our earlier "implied right of action"
cases, what the Court's analytical construct comes down to is this:
Unless Congress expressly legislates a more limited remedial policy
with respect to rights of action it does not know it is creating,
it intends the full gamut of remedies to be applied.
In my view, when rights of action are judicially "implied,"
categorical limitations upon their remedial scope may be judicially
implied as well. Cf.
Cort v.
Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 84-85
(1975). Although we have abandoned the expansive rights-creating
approach exemplified by
Cannon, see
Touche Ross &
Co. v.
Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 575-576
(1979);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.
S. 11, 18, 23-24 (1979)-and perhaps ought to abandon the notion
of implied causes of action entirely, see
Thompson v.
Thompson, 484
U. S. 174, 191 (1988) (SCALIA, J., concurring
78
in judgment)-causes of action that came into existence under the
ancien regime should be limited by the same logic that gave
them birth. To require, with respect to a right that is not
consciously and intentionally created, that any limitation of
remedies must be express, is to provide, in effect, that the most
questionable of private rights will also be the most expansively
remediable. As the United States puts it, "[w]hatever the merits of
'implying' rights of action may be, there is no justification for
treating [congressional] silence as the equivalent of the broadest
imaginable grant of remedial authority." Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 12-13.
I nonetheless agree with the Court's disposition of this case.
Because of legislation enacted subsequent to
Cannon, it is
too late in the day to address whether a judicially implied
exclusion of damages under Title IX would be appropriate. The
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-7(a)(2),
must be read, in my view, not only "as a validation of
Cannon's holding,"
ante, at 72, but also as an
implicit acknowledgment that damages are available. See 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000d-7(a)(1) (withdrawing the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity); § 2000d-7(a)(2) (providing that, in suits against
States, "remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity)
are available for [violations of Title IX] to the same extent as
such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit
against any public or private entity other than a State"). I
therefore concur in the judgment.
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