OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
FLORIDA
v. THOMAS
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA No.00-391. Argued
April 25, 200l-Decided June 4, 2001
While officers were investigating marijuana sales and making
arrests at a Florida home, respondent Thomas drove up, parked in
the home's driveway, and walked toward the back of his car. An
officer met him there and asked his name and whether he had a
driver's license. After a check of Thomas' license revealed an
outstanding warrant, the officer arrested him, handcuffed him, and
took him inside the home. The officer then went back outside,
alone, and searched Thomas' car, finding several bags containing
methamphetamine. Thomas was charged with possession of that drug
and related offenses. The trial court granted his motion to
suppress the evidence of narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia. The
Second District Court of Appeal reversed, finding the search valid
under
New York v.
Belton, 453 U. S. 454, in which
this Court established a "bright-line" rule permitting an officer
who has made a lawful custodial arrest of a car's occupant to
search the car's passenger compartment as a contemporaneous
incident of the arrest. Holding that
Belton did not apply,
the Florida Supreme Court reversed, but remanded for the trial
court to determine whether the vehicle search was justified under
Chimel v.
California, 395 U. S. 752. This Court
granted certiorari to consider whether, as the State Supreme Court
had held,
Belton's bright-line rule is limited to situations
where the officer initiates contact with a vehicle's occupant while
that person remains in the vehicle.
Held: The Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the question
on which certiorari was granted. Although the parties did not raise
the issue in their briefs on the merits, this Court must first
consider whether it has jurisdiction to decide this case. See
Duquesne Light Co. v.
Barasch, 488 U. S. 299, 306. Title
28 U. S. C. § 1257(a) authorizes this Court to review "[f]inal
judgments ... by the highest court of a State ... where any ...
right ... is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution."
In a criminal prosecution, finality generally is defined by a
judgment of conviction and the imposition of a sentence.
Fort
Wayne Books, Inc. v.
Indiana, 489 U. S. 46, 54. However,
in certain circumstances, the Court has treated state-court
judgments as final for jurisdictional purposes even though further
proceedings were to take place in the state court.
Flynt v.
Ohio, 451 U.
S. 619, 620-621. In
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.
S. 469, 479-483, the Court divided cases of this
775
kind into four categories: (1) cases in which there are further
proceedings, even entire trials, yet to occur in the state courts,
but where the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further
proceedings preordained; (2) cases in which the federal issue,
finally decided by a State's highest court, will survive and
require decision regardless of the outcome of future state-court
proceedings; (3) cases in which the federal claim has been finally
decided, with further proceedings on the merits in the state courts
to come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be
had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case; and (4) cases in
which the state courts have finally decided the federal issue with
further proceedings pending in which the party seeking review in
this Court might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus
rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court,
and where reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be
preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of
action rather than merely controlling the nature and character of,
or determining the admissibility of evidence in, the state
proceedings still to come. Because none of those categories fits
the Florida Supreme Court's judgment in this case, the judgment is
not final. Pp. 777-781.
Certiorari dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Reported below:
761 So. 2d 1010.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court.
Robert J.
Krauss, Senior Assistant Attorney
General of Florida, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on
the briefs were
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General,
Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant Deputy Attorney General,
and
John M. Klawikofsky, Assistant Attorney General.
Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting
Solicitor General Underwood, Acting Assistant Attorney General
Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.
Cynthia J.
Dodge argued the cause for respondent.
With her on the brief was
James Marion Moorman.*
*Tracey Maclin and
Lisa B. Kemler filed a brieffor
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
amicus
curiae urging affirmance.
776
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
New York v.
Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), we
established a "bright-line" rule permitting a law enforcement
officer who has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of a
car to search the passenger compartment of that car as a
contemporaneous incident of the arrest. We granted certiorari to
consider whether that rule is limited to situations in which the
officer initiates contact with the occupant of a vehicle while that
person remains inside the vehicle. 531 U. S. 1069 (2001). We find,
however, that we lack jurisdiction to decide the question.
On the evening at issue, officers were present at a home in Polk
County, Florida, investigating the sale of marijuana and making
arrests. Respondent Robert Thomas drove up to the residence, parked
in the driveway, and walked toward the back of his vehicle. Officer
J. D. Maney met Thomas at the rear of Thomas' vehicle, and asked
him his name and whether he had a driver's license. After a check
of Thomas' license revealed an outstanding warrant for his arrest,
Officer Maney arrested him, handcuffed him, and took him inside the
residence. The officer then went back outside, alone, and searched
Thomas' car. The search revealed several small bags containing a
white substance that tested positive for methamphetamine.
Respondent was charged with possession of methamphetamine and
related narcotics offenses. The trial court granted his motion to
suppress the evidence of narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia. The
Second District Court of Appeal reversed, 711 So. 2d 1241 (1998),
finding the search valid under
New York v.
Belton,
supra. The Supreme Court of Florida in turn reversed, holding
that
Belton did not apply.
The court held that
"Belton's bright-line rule is limited
to situations where the law enforcement officer initiates contact
with the defendant" while the defendant remains in the car. 761 So.
2d 1010, 1014 (2000). The court concluded
777
that
Belton was inapplicable, and directed that the trial
court determine "whether the factors in
Chimel [v.
California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969),]
justify the search of Thomas' vehicle." 761 So. 2d, at 1014. The
court explained that "[b]ased on the record ... we are unable to
ascertain whether [the officer's] safety was endangered or whether
the preservation of the evidence was in jeopardy," as necessary to
justify the search under
Chimel v.
California,
395 U. S. 752
(1969), and remanded for further proceedings.
Although the parties did not raise the issue in their briefs on
the merits, we must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to
decide this case. See
Duquesne Light Co. v.
Barasch,
488 U. S. 299,
306 (1989). Title 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a) authorizes this Court to
review "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court
of a State in which a decision could be had ... where any title,
right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under
the Constitution." In a criminal prosecution, finality generally
"is defined by a judgment of conviction and the imposition of a
sentence."
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v.
Indiana,
489 U. S. 46, 54
(1989). But we have not, in practice, interpreted the finality rule
so strictly. In certain circumstances, we have "treated statecourt
judgments as final for jurisdictional purposes although there were
further proceedings to take place in the state court."
Flynt
v.
Ohio, 451
U. S. 619, 620-621 (1981)
(per curiam). In
Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975), we
divided cases of this kind into four categories. None fits the
judgment of the Florida Supreme Court, however, and we therefore
conclude that its judgment is not final.
The first
Cox category includes those cases in which
"there are further proceedings-even entire trials-yet to occur in
the state courts but where for one reason or another the federal
issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings
preordained."
Id., at 479. The prototypical example of this
category is
Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U. S. 214 (1966).
There the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a statute
778
which prohibited the publication of an editorial endorsement on
election day did not violate the First Amendment, and remanded the
case for trial.
Id., at 216-217. Mills conceded that his
only defense to the state charge was his constitutional claim; he
admitted that he did publish the editorial. We held that this was a
"final judgment" and took jurisdiction, saying that a trial "would
be no more than a few formal gestures leading inexorably towards a
conviction, and then another appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court
for it formally to repeat its rejection of Mills' constitutional
contentions whereupon the case could then once more wind its weary
way back to us as a judgment unquestionably final and appealable.
Such a roundabout process would not only be an inexcusable delay of
the benefits Congress intended to grant by providing for appeal to
this Court, but it would also result in a completely unnecessary
waste of time and energy in judicial systems already troubled by
delays due to congested dockets."
Id., at 217-218.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Florida here differs
considerably from that of the state court in
Mills. The
Florida Supreme Court remanded the case not only for application of
Chimel, but for further factfinding, and the State has not
conceded that the search is invalid under
Chimel.
In
Cox's second category are those cases in which "the
federal issue, finally decided by the highest court in the State,
will survive and require decision regardless of the outcome of
future state-court proceedings." 420 U. S., at 480. In
Cox
we used our decision in
Radio Station WOW; Inc. v.
Johnson, 326
U. S. 120 (1945), to illustrate the second category. We
said:
"In Radio Station WOW; the Nebraska Supreme Court
directed the transfer of the properties of a federally licensed
radio station and ordered an accounting, rejecting the claim that
the transfer order would interfere with the federal license ....
Nothing that could happen
779
in the course of the accounting, short of settlement of the
case, would foreclose or make unnecessary decision on the federal
question." Cox, supra, at 480.
In this case, however, were the Florida courts to find that
Chimel allows the search, a decision on the
Belton
issue would no longer be necessary. We have also noted that we
treat state-court judgments in this category as final on the
assumption that" 'the federal questions that could come here have
been adjudicated by the State court,'" and the state proceedings to
take place on remand "'could not remotely give rise to a federal
question ... that may later come here.'"
Cox, 420 U. S., at
480. We cannot make that assumption in this case.
Cases where "the federal claim has been finally decided, with
further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to come, but
in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever
the ultimate outcome of the case," fall into
Cox's third
category.
Id., at 481.
New York v.
Quarles,
467 U. S. 649 (1984), is such a case. Respondent was charged in
state court with criminal possession of a weapon, and certain
evidence was suppressed on federal constitutional grounds. We
granted the petition for certiorari and reversed, explaining that
the suppression ruling was a "final judgment" although respondent
had yet to be tried.
Id., at 651. We said that this case
fell within
Cox's third category because "should the State
convict respondent at trial, its claim that certain evidence was
wrongfully suppressed will be moot. Should respondent be acquitted
at trial, the State will be precluded from pressing its federal
claim again on appeal." 467 U. S., at 651, and n. 1.
To deny review here would not necessarily cause Florida to go to
trial without the suppressed evidence, with further appeal barred
in the event of an acquittal or the federal claim mooted in the
event of a conviction. The state court has
780
yet to decide whether the evidence should be suppressed; that
will be resolved on remand. If the State prevails on remand and the
evidence is admitted under
Chimel, then the
Belton
issue will be moot, and the State cannot seek review of it. But if
the State loses, and the evidence is suppressed, Florida law allows
the State to appeal, as long as it does so prior to trial. Fla.
Stat. § 924.071(1) (1996) ("The state may appeal from a pretrial
order ... suppressing evidence"); Fla. Rule App. Proc.
9.140(c)(1)(B) (2001) ("The state may appeal an order ...
suppressing before trial ... evidence obtained by search and
seizure"). Should the Supreme Court of Florida rule against the
State on the
Chimel issue, the question of suppression would
be finally decided by the Florida courts, and the State could then
seek certiorari in this Court. At that time it could obtain review
of both the
Belton issue and the
Chimel issue. See
Jefferson
The fourth
Cox category includes those cases where "the
federal issue has been finally decided in the state courts with
further proceedings pending in which the party seeking review here
might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering
unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court, and where
reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be
preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of
action rather than merely controlling the nature and character of,
or determining the admissibility of evidence in, the state
proceedings still to come. In these circumstances, if a refusal
immediately to review the statecourt decision might seriously erode
federal policy, the Court has entertained and decided the federal
issue, which itself has been finally determined by the state courts
for purposes of the state litigation." 420 U. S., at 482-483.
Here the State can make no claim of serious erosion of federal
policy that is not common to all run-of-the-mine decisions
suppressing evidence in criminal trials. The fourth
Cox
exception does not apply here.
781
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the writ of certiorari for
want of jurisdiction.
It is so ordered.
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