OCTOBER TERM, 1993
Syllabus
FLORENCE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT FOUR ET AL.
v. CARTER, A
MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, CARTER
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT
No. 91-1523. Argued October 6, 1993-Decided November 9,1993
After respondent Shannon Carter, a student in petitioner public
school district, was classified as learning disabled, school
officials met with her parents to formulate an individualized
education program (IEP), as required under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), 20 U. S. C. § 1400
et
seq. Shannon's parents requested a hearing to challenge the
proposed IEP's appropriateness. In the meantime, Shannon's parents
enrolled her in Trident Academy, a private school specializing in
educating children with disabilities. After the state and local
educational authorities concluded that the IEP was adequate,
Shannon's parents filed this suit, claiming that the school
district had breached its duty under IDEA to provide Shannon with a
"free appropriate public education," § 1401(a)(18), and seeking
reimbursement for tuition and other costs incurred at Trident. The
District Court ruled in the parents' favor, holding that the
proposed IEP violated IDEA, and that the education Shannon received
at Trident was "appropriate" and in substantial compliance with
IDEA's substantive requirements, even though the school did not
comply with all of the Act's procedures. In affirming, the Court of
Appeals rejected the school district's argument that reimbursement
is never proper when the parents choose a private school that is
not approved by the State or that does not comply with all of the
requirements of § 1401(a)(18).
Held: A court may order reimbursement for parents who
unilaterally withdraw their child from a public school that
provides an inappropriate education under IDEA and put the child in
a private school that provides an education that is otherwise
proper under IDEA, but does not meet all of § 1401(a)(18)'s
requirements. Pp. 12-16.
(a) In
School Comm. of Burlington v.
Department of Ed.
of Mass., 471 U.
S. 359, 369-370, the Court recognized the right of parents who
disagree with a proposed IEP to unilaterally withdraw their child
from public school and place the child in private school, and held
that IDEA's grant of equitable authority empowers a court to order
school authorities retroactively to reimburse the parents if the
court ultimately deter-
8
mines that the private placement, rather than the proposed IEP,
is proper under the Act. P. 12.
(b) Trident's failure to meet § 1401(a)(18)'s definition of a
"free appropriate public education" does not bar Shannon's parents
from reimbursement, because the section's requirements cannot be
read as applying to parental placements. The § 1401(a)(18)
requirements that the education be "provided ... under public
supervision and direction," and that the IEP be designed by "a
representative of the local educational agency" and
"establish[ed]," "revise[d]," and "review[ed]" by the agency, will
never be met in the context of a parental placement. Therefore to
read them as applying to parental placements would effectively
eliminate the right of unilateral withdrawal recognized in
Burlington, and would defeat IDEA's purpose of ensuring that
children with disabilities receive an education that is both
appropriate and free. Similarly, the § 1401(a)(18)(B) requirement
that the school meet the standards of the state educational agency
does not apply to private parental placements. It would be
inconsistent with the Act's goals to forbid parents to educate
their child at a school that provides an appropriate education
simply because that school lacks the stamp of approval of the same
public school system that failed to meet the child's needs in the
first place. Parents' failure to select a state-approved program in
favor of an unapproved option does not itself bar reimbursement.
Pp. 12-15.
(c) The school district's argument that allowing reimbursement
for parents such as Shannon's puts an unreasonable burden on
financially strapped local educational authorities is rejected.
Reimbursement claims need not worry school officials who conform to
IDEA's mandate to either give the child a free appropriate public
education in a public setting, or place the child in an appropriate
private setting of the State's choice. Moreover, parents who
unilaterally change their child's placement during the pendency of
IDEA review proceedings are entitled to reimbursement
only
if a federal court concludes both that the public placement
violated IDEA and that the private placement was proper under the
Act. Finally, total reimbursement will not be appropriate if a
court fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA
determines that the cost of the private education was unreasonable.
pp.15-16.
950 F.2d
156, affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Donald B. Ayer argued the cause for petitioners. With him
on the briefs were
Beth Heifetz and
Bruce E.
Davis.
9
Peter W D. Wright argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief was
Nancy C.
McCormick.
Amy L. Wax argued the cause for the United States as amicus
curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Solicitor
General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy
Solicitor General Wallace, William Kanter, and John P. Schnitker.
*
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), 84 Stat.
175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1400
et seq. (1988 ed. and
Supp. IV), requires States to provide disabled children with a
"free appropriate public education," § 1401(a)(18). This case
presents the question whether a court may order reimbursement for
parents who unilaterally withdraw their child from a public school
that provides an inappropriate education under IDEA and put the
child in a private school that provides an education that is
otherwise proper under IDEA, but does not meet all the requirements
of § 1401(a)(18). We
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of Arizona et al. by
J. Joseph Curran, Jr.,
Attorney General of Maryland, and
Andrew H. Baida and
Joann Goedert, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the
Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as
follows:
Grant Woods of Arizona, Michael
J. Bowers of Georgia,
Richard Ieyoub of Louisiana, Michael E. Carpenter of Maine, Joseph
P. Mazurek of Montana, Robert
J. Del Tufo of New Jersey, Tom
Udall of New Mexico, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi
Heitkamp of North Dakota, Theodore R. Kulongoski of Oregon, T.
Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota,
Charles Burson of Tennessee, R. Paul Van Dam of Utah, Stephen D.
Rosenthal of Virginia, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; for the
National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda; and for the
National School Boards Association et al. by August W Steinhilber,
Thomas A. Shannon, and Gwendolyn H. Gregory.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the National Head Injury Foundation, Inc., by
Craig Denmead
and
Kevin M. Maloney; for the Learning Disability
Association of America et al. by
Mark S.
Partin and
Reed Martin; and for the National Alliance for the Mentally
III et al. by
Steven Ney and
Andrew S.
Penn.
10
hold that the court may order such reimbursement, and therefore
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
Respondent Shannon Carter was classified as learning disabled in
1985, while a ninth grade student in a school operated by
petitioner Florence County School District Four. School officials
met with Shannon's parents to formulate an individualized education
program (IEP) for Shannon, as required under IDEA. 20 U. S. C. §§
1401(a)(18) and (20), 1414(a)(5) (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). The IEP
provided that Shannon would stay in regular classes except for
three periods of individualized instruction per week, and
established specific goals in reading and mathematics of four
months' progress for the entire school year. Shannon's parents were
dissatisfied, and requested a hearing to challenge the
appropriateness of the IEP. See § 1415(b)(2). Both the local
educational officer and the state educational agency hearing
officer rejected Shannon's parents' claim and concluded that the
IEP was adequate. In the meantime, Shannon's parents had placed her
in Trident Academy, a private school specializing in educating
children with disabilities. Shannon began at Trident in September
1985 and graduated in the spring of 1988.
Shannon's parents filed this suit in July 1986, claiming that
the school district had breached its duty under IDEA to provide
Shannon with a "free appropriate public education," § 1401(a)(18),
and seeking reimbursement for tuition and other costs incurred at
Trident. After a bench trial, the District Court ruled in the
parents' favor. The court held that the school district's proposed
educational program and the achievement goals of the IEP "were
wholly inadequate" and failed to satisfy the requirements of the
Act. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. The court further held that
"[a]lthough [Trident Academy] did not comply with all of the
procedures outlined in [IDEA]," the school "provided Shannon an
excel-
11
lent education in substantial compliance with all the
substantive requirements" of the statute.
Id., at 37a. The
court found that Trident "evaluated Shannon quarterly, not yearly
as mandated in [IDEA], it provided Shannon with low teacher-student
ratios, and it developed a plan which allowed Shannon to receive
passing marks and progress from grade to grade."
Ibid. The
court also credited the findings of its own expert, who determined
that Shannon had made "significant progress" at Trident and that
her reading comprehension had risen three grade levels in her three
years at the school.
Id., at 29a. The District Court
concluded that Shannon's education was "appropriate" under IDEA,
and that Shannon's parents were entitled to reimbursement of
tuition and other costs.
Id., at 37a.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
950 F.2d
156 (1991). The court agreed that the IEP proposed by the
school district was inappropriate under IDEA. It also rejected the
school district's argument that reimbursement is never proper when
the parents choose a private school that is not approved by the
State or that does not comply with all the terms of IDEA. According
to the Court of Appeals, neither the text of the Act nor its
legislative history imposes a "requirement that the private school
be approved by the state in parent-placement reimbursement cases."
Id., at 162. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals
concluded, IDEA's state-approval requirement applies only when a
child is placed in a private school by public school officials.
Accordingly, "when a public school system has defaulted on its
obligations under the Act, a private school placement is 'proper
under the Act' if the education provided by the private school is
'reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits.'"
Id., at 163, quoting
Board of Ed. of Hendrick
Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v.
Rowley,
458 U. S. 176,
207 (1982).
The court below recognized that its holding conflicted with
Tucker v.
Bay Shore Union Free School Dist.,
873 F.2d
563,
12
568 (1989), in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that parental placement in a private school cannot be proper
under the Act unless the private school in question meets the
standards of the state education agency. We granted certiorari, 507
U. S. 907 (1993), to resolve this conflict among the Courts of
Appeals.
II
In
School Comm. of Burlington v.
Department of Ed.
of Mass.,
471 U.
S. 359, 369 (1985), we held that IDEA's grant of equitable
authority empowers a court "to order school authorities to
reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special
education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such
placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act."
Congress intended that IDEA's promise of a "free appropriate public
education" for disabled children would normally be met by an IEP's
provision for education in the regular public schools or in private
schools chosen jointly by school officials and parents. In cases
where cooperation fails, however, "parents who disagree with the
proposed IEP are faced with a choice: go along with the IEP to the
detriment of their child if it turns out to be inappropriate or pay
for what they consider to be the appropriate placement."
Id., at 370. For parents willing and able to make the latter
choice, "it would be an empty victory to have a court tell them
several years later that they were right but that these
expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed by the school
officials."
Ibid. Because such a result would be contrary to
IDEA's guarantee of a "free appropriate public education," we held
that "Congress meant to include retroactive reimbursement to
parents as an available remedy in a proper case."
Ibid.
As this case comes to us, two issues are settled: (1) the school
district's proposed IEP was inappropriate under IDEA, and (2)
although Trident did not meet the § 1401(a)(18) requirements, it
provided an education other-
13
wise proper under IDEA. This case presents the narrow question
whether Shannon's parents are barred from reimbursement because the
private school in which Shannon enrolled did not meet the §
1401(a)(18) definition of a "free appropriate public education." *
We hold that they are not, because § 1401(a)(18)'s requirements
cannot be read as applying to parental placements.
Section 1401(a)(18)(A) requires that the education be "provided
at public expense, under public supervision and direction."
Similarly, § 1401(a)(18)(D) requires schools to provide an IEP,
which must be designed by "a representative of the local
educational agency," 20 U. S. C. § 1401(a)(20) (1988 ed., Supp.
IV), and must be "establish[ed]," "revise[d]," and "review[ed]" by
the agency, § 1414(a)(5). These requirements do not make sense in
the context of a parental placement. In this case, as in all
Burlington reimbursement cases, the parents' rejection of
the school district's proposed IEP is the very reason for the
parents' decision to put their child in a private school. In such
cases, where the private placement has necessarily been made over
the school district's objection, the private school education will
not be under "public supervision and direction." Accordingly, to
read the § 1401(a)(18) requirements as applying to parental
placements would effectively eliminate the right of unilateral
withdrawal recognized in
Burlington. Moreover, IDEA was
intended to ensure that children with disabilities receive an
education that is both appropriate and free.
Burlington,
supra, at 373. To read the provisions of § 1401(a)(18) to
bar
*Section 1401(a)(18) defines "free appropriate public education"
as "special education and related services that-
"(A) have been provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction, and without charge,
"(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
"(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or
secondary school education in the State involved, and
"(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized
education program .... "
14
reimbursement in the circumstances of this case would defeat
this statutory purpose.
Nor do we believe that reimbursement is necessarily barred by a
private school's failure to meet state education standards.
Trident's deficiencies, according to the school district, were that
it employed at least two faculty members who were not state
certified and that it did not develop IEP's. As we have noted,
however, the § 1401(a)(18) requirements-including the requirement
that the school meet the standards of the state educational agency,
§ 1401(a) (18)(B)-do not apply to private parental placements.
Indeed, the school district's emphasis on state standards is
somewhat ironic. As the Court of Appeals noted, "it hardly seems
consistent with the Act's goals to forbid parents from educating
their child at a school that provides an appropriate education
simply because that school lacks the stamp of approval of the same
public school system that failed to meet the child's needs in the
first place." 950 F. 2d, at 164. Accordingly, we disagree with the
Second Circuit's theory that "a parent may not obtain reimbursement
for a unilateral placement if that placement was in a school that
was not on [the State's] approved list of private" schools.
Tucker, 873 F. 2d, at 568 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Parents' failure to select a program known to be approved
by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar
to reimbursement.
Furthermore, although the absence of an approved list of private
schools is not essential to our holding, we note that parents in
the position of Shannon's have no way of knowing at the time they
select a private school whether the school meets state standards.
South Carolina keeps no publicly available list of approved private
schools, but instead approves private school placements on a
case-by-case basis. In fact, although public school officials had
previously placed three children with disabilities at Trident, see
App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a, Trident had not received blanket
approval from
15
the State. South Carolina's case-by-case approval system meant
that Shannon's parents needed the cooperation of state officials
before they could know whether Trident was state approved. As we
recognized in
Burlington, such cooperation is unlikely in
cases where the school officials disagree with the need for the
private placement. 471 U. S., at 372.
III
The school district also claims that allowing reimbursement for
parents such as Shannon's puts an unreasonable burden on
financially strapped local educational authorities. The school
district argues that requiring parents to choose a state-approved
private school if they want reimbursement is the only meaningful
way to allow States to control costs; otherwise States will have to
reimburse dissatisfied parents for any private school that provides
an education that is proper under the Act, no matter how expensive
it may be.
There is no doubt that Congress has imposed a significant
financial burden on States and school districts that participate in
IDEA. Yet public educational authorities who want to avoid
reimbursing parents for the private education of a disabled child
can do one of two things: give the child a free appropriate public
education in a public setting, or place the child in an appropriate
private setting of the State's choice. This is IDEA's mandate, and
school officials who conform to it need not worry about
reimbursement claims.
Moreover, parents who, like Shannon's, "unilaterally change
their child's placement during the pendency of review proceedings,
without the consent of state or local school officials, do so at
their own financial risk."
Burlington, supra, at 373-374.
They are entitled to reimbursement
only if a federal court
concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA and that the
private school placement was proper under the Act.
Finally, we note that once a court holds that the public
placement violated IDEA, it is authorized to "grant such
16
relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U. s. C. §
1415(e)(2). Under this provision, "equitable considerations are
relevant in fashioning relief,"
Burlington, 471 U. S., at
374, and the court enjoys "broad discretion" in so doing,
id., at 369. Courts fashioning discretionary equitable
relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the
appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be
required. Total reimbursement will not be appropriate if the court
determines that the cost of the private education was
unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
So ordered.
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