OCTOBER TERM, 1995
Syllabus
FELKER
v. TURPIN, WARDEN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-8836 (A-890). Argued June 3, 1996-Decided June 28,
1996
After he was convicted of murder and other crimes and sentenced
to death by a Georgia state court, petitioner was denied relief on
direct appeal, in two rounds of state collateral proceedings, and
in a first round of federal habeas corpus proceedings. While he was
awaiting execution, the President signed into law the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Act), Title I of which, as
here pertinent, requires dismissal of a claim presented in a state
prisoner's second or successive federal habeas application if the
claim was also presented in a prior application, 28 U. S. C. §
2244(b)(1); compels dismissal of a claim that was not presented in
a prior federal application, unless certain conditions apply, §
2244(b)(2); creates a "gatekeeping" mechanism, whereby the
prospective applicant files in the court of appeals a motion for
leave to file a second or successive habeas application in the
district court, and a three-judge panel determines whether the
application makes a prima facie showing that it satisfies §
2244(b)'s requirements, § 2244(b)(3); and declares that a panel's
grant or denial of authorization to file "shall not be appealable
and shall not be the subject of a petition for ... writ of
certiorari," § 2244(b)(3)(E). Petitioner filed a motion for leave
to file a second federal habeas petition, which the Eleventh
Circuit denied on the grounds,
inter alia, that the claims
to be raised therein had not been presented in his first petition
and did not meet § 2244(b)(2)'s conditions. Petitioner then filed
in this Court a pleading styled a "Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus [and] for Appellate or Certiorari Review .... " The Court
granted certiorari, ordering briefing on the extent to which Title
I's provisions apply to a habeas petition filed in this Court,
whether application of the Act suspended habeas in this case, and
whether Title I, especially the provision to be codified at §
2244(b)(3)(E), unconstitutionally restricts the Court's
jurisdiction.
Held:
1. The Act does not preclude this Court from entertaining an
application for habeas corpus relief, although it does affect the
standards governing the granting of such relief. Pp. 658-663.
(a) Title I does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to
entertain habeas petitions filed as original matters pursuant to 28
U. S. C. §§ 2241
652
Syllabus
and 2254. No Title I provision mentions the Court's authority to
entertain such original petitions; in contrast, § 103 amends the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to bar consideration of
original habeas petitions in the courts of appeals. Although §
2244(b)(3)(E) precludes the Court from reviewing, by appeal or
certiorari, the latter courts' decisions exercising the
"gatekeeping" function for second habeas petitions, it makes no
mention of the Court's original habeas jurisdiction. Thus, the
Court declines to find a repeal of § 2241 by implication. See
Ex
parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 105. This conclusion obviates any
claim by petitioner under the Constitution's Exceptions Clause,
Art. III, § 2, which provides,
inter alia, that, "[i]n all
... Cases ... the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions ... as the Congress
shall make." Since the Act does not repeal the Court's authority to
entertain a habeas petition, there can be no plausible argument
that it deprives the Court of appellate jurisdiction in violation
of that Clause. Pp. 658-662.
(b) Title I changes the standards governing this Court's
consideration of habeas petitions by imposing new requirements
under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a), which limits the Court's authority to
grant relief to state prisoners. Section 2244(b)(3)'s "gatekeeping"
system does not apply to the Court because it is limited to
applications "filed in the district court." There is no such
limitation, however, on the restrictions imposed by §§ 2244(b)(1)
and (2), and those restrictions inform the Court's authority to
grant relief on original habeas petitions, whether or not the Court
is bound by the restrictions. Pp. 662-663.
2. The Act does not violate the Constitution's Suspension
Clause, Art.
I, § 9, cl. 2, which provides that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended." The new restrictions on
successive habeas petitions constitute a modified res judicata
rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas practice "abuse of
the writ." The doctrine of abuse of the writ refers to a complex
and evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled
by historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial
decisions.
McCleskey v.
Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 489. The
new restrictions are well within the compass of this evolutionary
process and do not amount to a "suspension" of the writ. Pp.
663-664.
3. The petition for an original writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Petitioner's claims do not satisfy the § 2244(b)(2) requirements,
let alone this Court's Rule 20.4(a), which requires that the habeas
petitioner show "exceptional circumstances" justifying the issuance
of the writ and says that habeas relief is rarely granted.
Petitioner's claims here do not materially differ from numerous
other claims made by successive habeas petitioners that the Court
has had occasion to review on stay applications. Pp. 664-665.
Certiorari dismissed for want of jurisdiction; writ of habeas
corpus denied.
653
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOUTER and
BREYER, JJ., joined,
post, p. 665. SOUTER, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which STEVENS and BREYER, JJ., joined,
post, p. 666.
Henry P. Monaghan argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the brief were Stephen C. Bayliss, Mary Elizabeth
Wells, and Mark Evan Olive.
Susan v:
Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General
of Georgia, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the briefs
were
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General,
Mary Beth Westmoreland, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and
Paige Reese
Whitaker, Assistant Attorney General.
Solicitor General Days argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney
General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, James A. Feldman,
Malcolm L. Stewart, Robert J. Erickson, and David S. Kris.
*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the
Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Ronald D. Maines, Paul G.
Cassell, Daniel
J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar; and for
Senator Orrin G. Hatch, pro se, et al.
Briefs of
amici curiae were filed for the State of
Alabama et al. by
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of
Ohio,
Jeffrey S.
Sutton, State Solicitor, and
Stuart A. Cole, Stuart W Harris, and
Jon C.
Walden, Assistant Attorneys General,
Dan Morales,
Attorney General of Texas,
Jorge Vega, First Assistant
Attorney General,
Drew T. Durham, Deputy Attorney General,
and
Margaret Portman Griffey, John Jacks, and
Dana E.
Parker, Assistant Attorneys General,
Daniel E. Lungren,
Attorney General of California,
George Williamson, Chief
Assistant Attorney General,
Donald E. De Nicola, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and
Dane R. Gillette, Senior
Assistant Attorney General,
Jeff Sessions, Attorney General
of Alabama,
Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona,
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General of Colorado,
John M.
Bailey, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut,
M. Jane
Brady, Attorney General of Delaware,
Robert A.
Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida,
Margery S.
Bronster, Attorney General of Hawaii,
Allan G.
Lance, Attorney General of Idaho,
Jim Ryan, Attorney
General of Illinois,
A. B. Chandler III, Attorney General of
Kentucky,
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of
Massachusetts,
Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi,
Jeremiah W (Jay) Nixon,
654
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (Act) works substantial changes to chapter 153 of Title 28 of
the United States Code, which authorizes federal courts to grant
the writ of habeas corpus. Pub. L. 104132, 110 Stat. 1217. We hold
that the Act does not preclude this Court from entertaining an
application for habeas corpus relief, although it does affect the
standards governing the granting of such relief. We also conclude
that the availability of such relief in this Court obviates any
claim by petitioner under the Exceptions Clause of Article III, §
2, of the Constitution, and that the operative provisions of the
Act do not violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, Art.
I, §9.
I
On a night in 1976, petitioner approached Jane W. in his car as
she got out of hers. Claiming to be lost and looking for a party
nearby, he used a series of deceptions to induce Jane to accompany
him to his trailer home in town. Peti-
Attorney General of Missouri,
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney
General of Montana,
Don Stenberg, Attorney General of
Nebraska,
Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada,
Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey,
Dennis C.
Vacco, Attorney General of New York,
Michael F.
Easley, Attorney General of North
Carolina,
W A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma,
Theodore R. Kolongoski, Attorney General of Oregon,
Thomas W Corbett, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania,
Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney General of Rhode Island,
Mark W
Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota,
Charles W
Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee,
Jan Graham,
Attorney General of Utah,
Christine Q Gregoire, Attorney
General of Washington,
James E. Doyle, Attorney General of
Wisconsin, and
William U. Hill, Attorney General of Wyoming;
for the American Civil Liberties Union by
Steven R. Shapiro;
for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation et al. by
Kent S.
Scheidegger; and for the N ational District Attorneys
Association by
Lynn Abraham and
Ronald Eisenberg.
655
tioner forcibly subdued her, raped her, and sodomized her. Jane
pleaded with petitioner to let her go, but he said he could not
because she would notify the police. She escaped later, when
petitioner fell asleep. Jane notified the police, and petitioner
was eventually convicted of aggravated sodomy and sentenced to 12
years' imprisonment.
Petitioner was paroled four years later. On November 23, 1981,
he met Joy Ludlam, a cocktail waitress, at the lounge where she
worked. She was interested in changing jobs, and petitioner used a
series of deceptions involving offering her a job at "The Leather
Shoppe," a business he owned, to induce her to visit him the next
day. The last time Joy was seen alive was the evening of the next
day. Her dead body was discovered two weeks later in a creek.
Forensic analysis established that she had been beaten, raped, and
sodomized, and that she had been strangled to death before being
left in the creek. Investigators discovered hair resembling
petitioner's on Joy's body and clothes, hair resembling Joy's in
petitioner's bedroom, and clothing fibers like those in Joy's coat
in the hatchback of petitioner's car. One of petitioner's neighbors
reported seeing Joy's car at petitioner's house the day she
disappeared.
A jury convicted petitioner of murder, rape, aggravated sodomy,
and false imprisonment. Petitioner was sentenced to death on the
murder charge. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's
conviction and death sentence,
Felker v.
State, 252
Ga. 351, 314 S. E. 2d 621, and we denied certiorari, 469 U. S. 873
(1984). A state trial court denied collateral relief, the Georgia
Supreme Court declined to issue a certificate of probable cause to
appeal the denial, and we again denied certiorari.
Felker v.
Zant, 502 U. S. 1064 (1992).
Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia, alleging that (1) the State's evidence was insuffi-
656
cient to convict him; (2) the State withheld exculpatory
evidence, in violation of
Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963); (3)
petitioner's counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing;
(4) the State improperly used hypnosis to refresh a witness'
memory; and (5) the State violated double jeopardy and collateral
estoppel principles by using petitioner's crime against Jane W. as
evidence at petitioner's trial for crimes against Joy Ludlam. The
District Court denied the petition. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
52
F.3d 907, extended on denial of petition for rehearing,
62 F.3d
342 (1995), and we denied certiorari, 516 U. S. 1133
(1996).
The State scheduled petitioner's execution for the period May
2-9, 1996. On April 29, 1996, petitioner filed a second petition
for state collateral relief. The state trial court denied this
petition on May 1, and the Georgia Supreme Court denied certiorari
on May 2.
On April 24, 1996, the President signed the Act into law.
Title I of this Act contained a series of amendments to existing
federal habeas corpus law. The provisions of the Act pertinent to
this case concern second or successive habeas corpus applications
by state prisoners. Section 106(b) specifies the conditions under
which claims in second or successive applications must be
dismissed, amending 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b) to read:
"(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior
application shall be dismissed.
"(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior
application shall be dismissed unless-
"(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
657
"(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence;
and
"(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense."
Title 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. II) creates a
"gatekeeping" mechanism for the consideration of second or
successive applications in district court. The prospective
applicant must file in the court of appeals a motion for leave to
file a second or successive habeas application in the district
court. § 2244(b)(3)(A). A three-judge panel has 30 days to
determine whether "the application makes a prima facie showing that
the application satisfies the requirements of" § 2244(b). §
2244(b)(3)(C); see §§ 2244(b)(3)(B), (D). Section 2244(b)(3)(E)
specifies that "[t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a
court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall
not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for
rehearing or for a writ of certi orari."
On May 2,1996, petitioner filed in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit a motion for stay of execution and
a motion for leave to file a second or successive federal habeas
corpus petition under § 2254. Petitioner sought to raise two claims
in his second petition, the first being that the state trial court
violated due process by equating guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt"
with "moral certainty" of guilt in
voir dire and jury
instructions. See
Cage v.
Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39 (1990)
(per curiam). He also alleged that qualified experts,
reviewing the forensic evidence after his conviction, had
established that Joy must have died during a period when petitioner
was under police surveillance for Joy's disappearance and thus had
a valid
658
alibi. He claimed that the testimony of the State's forensic
expert at trial was suspect because he is not a licensed physician,
and that the new expert testimony so discredited the State's
testimony at trial that petitioner had a colorable claim of factual
innocence.
The Court of Appeals denied both motions the day they were
filed, concluding that petitioner's claims had not been presented
in his first habeas petition, that they did not meet the standards
of § 2244(b)(2), and that they would not have satisfied pre-Act
standards for obtaining review on the merits of second or
successive claims.
83 F.3d
1303 (CAll 1996). Petitioner filed in this Court a pleading
styled a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, for Appellate or
Certiorari Review of the Decision of the United States Circuit
Court for the Eleventh Circuit, and for Stay of Execution." On May
3, we granted petitioner's stay application and petition for
certiorari. We ordered briefing on the extent to which the
provisions of Title I of the Act apply to a petition for habeas
corpus filed in this Court, whether application of the Act
suspended the writ of habeas corpus in this case, and whether Title
I of the Act, especially the provision to be codified at §
2244(b)(3)(E), constitutes an unconstitutional restriction on the
jurisdiction of this Court. 517 U. S. 1182 (1996).
II
We first consider to what extent the provisions of Title I of
the Act apply to petitions for habeas corpus filed as original
matters in this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241 and 2254. We
conclude that although the Act does impose new conditions on our
authority to grant relief, it does not deprive this Court of
jurisdiction to entertain original habeas petitions.
A
Section 2244(b)(3)(E) prevents this Court from reviewing a court
of appeals order denying leave to file a second ha-
659
beas petition by appeal or by writ of certiorari. More than a
century ago, we considered whether a statute barring review by
appeal of the judgment of a circuit court in a habeas case also
deprived this Court of power to entertain an original habeas
petition.
Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85 (1869). We consider
the same question here with respect to § 2244(b)(3)(E).
Yerger's holding is best understood in the light of the
availability of habeas corpus review at that time. Section 14 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized all federal courts, including
this Court, to grant the writ of habeas corpus when prisoners were
"in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United
States, or [were] committed for trial before some court of the
same." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 82.1 Congress
greatly expanded the scope of federal habeas corpus in 1867,
authorizing federal courts to grant the writ, "in addition to the
authority already conferred by law," "in all cases where any person
may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States." Act of
Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.2 Before the Act of 1867, the
only instances in which a federal court could issue the writ to
produce a state prisoner were if the prisoner was "necessary to be
brought into court to testify," Act of Sept. 24,1789, ch. 20, §
14,1 Stat. 82, was "committed ... for any act done ... in pursuance
of a law of the United States," Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4
Stat. 634-635, or was a "subjec[t] or citize[n] of a foreign
1 Section 14 is the direct ancestor of 28 U. S. C. § 2241,
subsection (a) of which now states in pertinent part: ''Writs of
habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice
thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their
respective jurisdictions."
2 This language from the 1867 Act is the direct ancestor of §
2241(c)(3), which states: "The writ of habeas corpus shall not
extend to a prisoner unless ... [h]e is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
660
State, and domiciled therein," and held under state law, Act of
Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539-540.
The Act of 1867 also expanded our statutory appellate
jurisdiction to authorize appeals to this Court from the final
decision of any circuit court on a habeas petition. 14 Stat. 386.
This enactment changed the result of
Barry v.
Mercein, 5 How. 103 (1847), in which we had held that the
Judiciary Act of 1789 did not authorize this Court to conduct
appellate review of circuit court habeas decisions. However, in
1868, Congress revoked the appellate jurisdiction it had given in
1867, repealing "so much of the [Act of 1867] as authorizes an
appeal from the judgment of the circuit court to the Supreme Court
of the United States." Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat.
44.
In
Yerger, we considered whether the Act of 1868 deprived
us not only of power to hear an appeal from an inferior court's
decision on a habeas petition, but also of power to entertain a
habeas petition to this Court under § 14 of the Act of 1789. We
concluded that the 1868 Act did not affect our power to entertain
such habeas petitions. We explained that the 1868 Act's text
addressed only jurisdiction over appeals conferred under the Act of
1867, not habeas jurisdiction conferred under the Acts of 1789 and
1867. We rejected the suggestion that the Act of 1867 had repealed
our habeas power by implication.
Yerger, 8 Wall., at 105.
Repeals by implication are not favored, we said, and the continued
exercise of original habeas jurisdiction was not "repugnant" to a
prohibition on review by appeal of circuit court habeas judgments.
Ibid.
Turning to the present case, we conclude that Title I of the Act
has not repealed our authority to entertain original habeas
petitions, for reasons similar to those stated in
Yerger. No
provision of Title I mentions our authority to entertain original
habeas petitions; in contrast, § 103 amends the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure to bar consider-
661
ation of original habeas petitions in the courts of appeals.3
Although § 2244(b)(3)(E) precludes us from reviewing, by appeal or
petition for certiorari, a judgment on an application for leave to
file a second habeas petition in district court, it makes no
mention of our authority to hear habeas petitions filed as original
matters in this Court. As we declined to find a repeal of § 14 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 as applied to this Court by implication
then, we decline to find a similar repeal of § 2241 of Title 28-its
descendant, n. 1,
supra-by implication now.
This conclusion obviates one of the constitutional challenges
raised. The critical language of Article III, § 2, of the
Constitution provides that, apart from several classes of cases
specifically enumerated in this Court's original jurisdiction,
"[i]n all the other Cases ... the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
Previous decisions construing this clause have said that while our
appellate powers "are given by the constitution," "they are limited
and regulated by the [Judiciary Act of 1789], and by such other
acts as have been passed on the subject."
Durousseau v.
United States, 6 Cranch 307, 314 (1810); see also
United
States v.
More, 3 Cranch 159, 172-173 (1805). The Act
does remove our authority to entertain an appeal or a petition for
a writ of certiorari to review a decision of a court of appeals
exercising its "gatekeeping" function over a second petition. But
since it does not repeal our authority to entertain a petition
for
3 Section 103 of the Act amends Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 22(a) to read: "An application for a writ of habeas
corpus shall be made to the appropriate district court. If
application is made to a circuit judge, the application shall be
transferred to the appropriate district court. If an application is
made to or transferred to the district court and denied, renewal of
the application before a circuit judge shall not be permitted. The
applicant may, pursuant to section 2253 of title 28, United States
Code, appeal to the appropriate court of appeals from the order of
the district court denying the writ."
662
habeas corpus, there can be no plausible argument that the Act
has deprived this Court of appellate jurisdiction in violation of
Article III, § 2.
B
We consider next how Title I affects the requirements a state
prisoner must satisfy to show he is entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus from this Court. Title I of the Act has changed the
standards governing our consideration of habeas petitions by
imposing new requirements for the granting of relief to state
prisoners. Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners
is limited by § 2254, which specifies the conditions under which
such relief may be granted to "a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court."4 § 2254(a). Several sections of the Act
impose new requirements for the granting of relief under this
section, and they therefore inform our authority to grant such
relief as well.
Section 2244(b) addresses second or successive habeas petitions.
Section 2244(b)(3)'s "gatekeeping" system for second petitions does
not apply to our consideration of habeas petitions because it
applies to applications "filed in the district court." §
2244(b)(3)(A). There is no such limitation, however, on the
restrictions on repetitive and new claims imposed by §§ 2244(b)(1)
and (2). These restrictions apply without qualification to any
"second or successive habeas corpus application under section
2254." §§ 2244(b)(1), (2).
4 As originally enacted in 1948, 28 U. S. C. § 2254 specified
that "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U. S. C.
§2254 (1946 ed., Supp. III). The reviser's notes, citing
Ex
parte Hawk, 321
U. S. 114 (1944)
(per curiam), indicated that "[t]his
new section is declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the
Supreme Court." Reviser's Note following 28 U. S. C. §2254, p. 1109
(1946 ed., Supp. III).
Hawk was one of a series of opinions
in which we applied the exhaustion requirement first announced in
Ex parte Royall,
117 U. S. 241 (1886), to
deny relief to applicants seeking writs of habeas corpus from this
Court.
663
Whether or not we are bound by these restrictions, they
certainly inform our consideration of original habeas
petitions.
III
Next, we consider whether the Act suspends the writ of habeas
corpus in violation of Article I, § 9, clause 2, of the
Constitution. This Clause provides that "[t]he Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
The writ of habeas corpus known to the Framers was quite
different from that which exists today. As we explained previously,
the first Congress made the writ of habeas corpus available only to
prisoners confined under the authority of the United States, not
under state authority.
Supra, at 659660; see
Ex parte
Dorr, 3 How. 103 (1844). The class of judicial actions
reviewable by the writ was more restricted as well. In
Ex parte
Watkins, 3 Pet. 193 (1830), we denied a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus from a prisoner "detained in prison by virtue of the
judgment of a court, which court possesses general and final
jurisdiction in criminal cases."
Id., at 202. Reviewing the
English common law which informed American courts' understanding of
the scope of the writ, we held that "[t]he judgment of the circuit
court in a criminal case is of itself evidence of its own
legality," and that we could not "usurp that power by the
instrumentality of the writ of habeas corpus."
Id., at
207.
It was not until 1867 that Congress made the writ generally
available in "all cases where any person may be restrained of his
or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty
or law of the United States."
Supra, at 659. And it was not
until well into this century that this Court interpreted that
provision to allow a final judgment of conviction in a state court
to be collaterally attacked on habeas. See,
e. g., Waley v.
Johnston, 316
U. S. 101 (1942)
(per curiam); Brown v.
Allen,
344 U. S. 443
(1953). But we assume,
664
for purposes of decision here, that the Suspension Clause of the
Constitution refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than as
it existed in 1789. See
Swain v.
Pressley, 430 U. S. 372 (1977);
id., at 384 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
The Act requires a habeas petitioner to obtain leave from the
court of appeals before filing a second habeas petition in the
district court. But this requirement simply transfers from the
district court to the court of appeals a screening function which
would previously have been performed by the district court as
required by 28 U. S. C. § 2254 Rule 9(b). The Act also codifies
some of the pre-existing limits on successive petitions, and
further restricts the availability of relief to habeas petitioners.
But we have long recognized that "the power to award the writ by
any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written
law,"
Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 94 (1807), and we have
likewise recognized that judgments about the proper scope of the
writ are "normally for Congress to make."
Lonchar v.
Thomas, 517 U.
S. 314, 323 (1996).
The new restrictions on successive petitions constitute a
modified res judicata rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas
corpus practice "abuse of the writ." In
McCleskey v.
Zant, 499 U.
S. 467 (1991), we said that "the doctrine of abuse of the writ
refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable principles
informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory
developments, and judicial decisions."
Id., at 489. The
added restrictions which the Act places on second habeas petitions
are well within the compass of this evolutionary process, and we
hold that they do not amount to a "suspension" of the writ contrary
to Article I, § 9.
IV
We have answered the questions presented by the petition for
certiorari in this case, and we now dispose of the petition
665
for an original writ of habeas corpus. Our Rule 20.4(a)
delineates the standards under which we grant such writs:
"A petition seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
shall comply with the requirements of 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241 and 2242,
and in particular with the provision in the last paragraph of §
2242 requiring a statement of the 'reasons for not making
application to the district court of the district in which the
applicant is held.' If the relief sought is from the judgment of a
state court, the petition shall set forth specifically how and
wherein the petitioner has exhausted available remedies in the
state courts or otherwise comes within the provisions of 28 U. S.
C. § 2254(b). To justify the granting of a writ of habeas corpus,
the petitioner must show exceptional circumstances warranting the
exercise of the Court's discretionary powers and must show that
adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or from any
other court. These writs are rarely granted."
Reviewing petitioner's claims here, they do not materially
differ from numerous other claims made by successive habeas
petitioners which we have had occasion to review on stay
applications to this Court. Neither of them satisfies the
requirements of the relevant provisions of the Act, let alone the
requirement that there be "exceptional circumstances" justifying
the issuance of the writ.
***
The petition for writ of certiorari is dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. The petition for an original writ of habeas corpus is
denied.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE BREYER
join, concurring.
While I join the Court's opinion, I believe its response to the
argument that the Act has deprived this Court of appel-
666
late jurisdiction in violation of Article III, § 2, is
incomplete. I therefore add this brief comment.
As the Court correctly concludes, the Act does not divest this
Court of jurisdiction to grant petitioner relief by issuing a writ
of habeas corpus. It does, however, except the category of orders
entered by the courts of appeals pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §
2244(b)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. II) from this Court's statutory
jurisdiction to review cases in the courts of appeals pursuant to
28 U. S. C. § 1254(1). The Act does not purport to limit our
jurisdiction under that section to review interlocutory orders in
such cases, to limit our jurisdiction under § 1254(2), or to limit
our jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651.
Accordingly, there are at least three reasons for rejecting
petitioner's argument that the limited exception violates Article
III, § 2. First, if we retain jurisdiction to review the
gatekeeping orders pursuant to the All Writs Act-and petitioner has
not suggested otherwise-such orders are not immune from direct
review. Second, by entering an appropriate interlocutory order, a
court of appeals may provide this Court with an opportunity to
review its proposed disposition of a motion for leave to file a
second or successive habeas application. Third, in the exercise of
our habeas corpus jurisdiction, we may consider earlier gatekeeping
orders entered by the court of appeals to inform our judgments and
provide the parties with the functional equivalent of direct
review. In this case the Court correctly denies the writ of habeas
corpus because petitioner's claims do not satisfy the requirements
of our pre-Act jurisprudence or the requirements of the Act,
including the standards governing the court of appeals' gatekeeping
function.
JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE BREYER
join, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion. The Court holds today that the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1217, precludes our review, by "certio-
667
rari" or by "appeal," over the courts of appeals's "gatekeeper"
determinations. See 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (1994 ed., Supp.
II). The statute's text does not necessarily foreclose all of our
appellate jurisdiction, see,
e. g., 28 U. S. C. §
1254(2) (certified questions from courts of appeals); § 1651(a)
(authority to issue appropriate writs in aid of another exercise of
appellate jurisdiction); this Court's Rule 20.3 (procedure for
petitions for extraordinary writs), nor has Congress repealed our
authority to entertain original petitions for writs of habeas
corpus.1 Because petitioner sought only a writ of certiorari (which
Congress has foreclosed) and a writ of habeas corpus (which, even
applying the traditional criteria, we would choose to deny, see
ante, at 664-665), I have no difficulty with the conclusion
that the statute is not on its face, or as applied here,
unconstitutional. I write only to add that if it should later turn
out that statutory avenues other than certiorari for reviewing a
gatekeeping determination were closed, the question whether the
statute exceeded Congress's Exceptions Clause power would be open.2
The question could arise if the courts of appeals adopted divergent
interpretations of the gatekeeper standard.
1 Such a petition is commonly understood to be "original" in the
sense of being filed in the first instance in this Court, but
nonetheless for constitutional purposes an exercise of this Court's
appellate (rather than original) jurisdiction. See Oaks, The
"Original" Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 S. Ct.
Rev. 153.
2 See,
e. g., Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1364-1365 (1953) (articulating "essential
functions" limitation on the Exceptions Clause); Ratner,
Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157,160-167 (1960) (same); Gunther,
Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 895,
896-899 (1984) (taking a broad view of Congress's authority, but
noting ongoing scholarly debate); Caminker, Why Must Inferior
Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?,46 Stan. L. Rev. 817,
828-837 (1994) (noting that the "essential functions" argument may
find textual support, with respect to the lower federal courts, in
the requirement of Art. I, § 8, cl. 9, that such courts be
"inferior to the supreme Court").
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment