OCTOBER TERM, 1992
Syllabus
FARRAR ET AL., COADMINISTRATORS OF ESTATE OF FARRAR, DECEASED
v. HOBBY
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT
No. 91-990. Argued October 7, 1992-Decided December 14,1992
Petitioners, coadministrators of decedent Farrar's estate,
sought $17 million in compensatory damages, pursuant to 42 U. S. C.
§§ 1983 and 1985, from respondent Hobby and other Texas public
officials for the alleged illegal closure of the school that Farrar
and his son operated. However, the Federal District Court awarded
them only nominal damages and, subsequently, awarded them $280,000
in attorney's fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988. The Court of Appeals
reversed the fee award on the ground that petitioners were not
prevailing parties eligible for fees under § 1988.
Held:
1. A plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party
under § 1988. A plaintiff "prevails" when actual relief on the
merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship
between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way
that directly benefits the plaintiff.
Hewitt v.
Helms, 482 U.
S. 755;
Rhodes v.
Stewart, 488 U. S.
1; Texas
State Teachers Assn. v.
Garland Independent School Dist.,
489 U. S. 782. Here, petitioners were entitled to nominal
damages under
Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 266,
because they were able to establish Hobby's liability for denial of
procedural due process, but could not prove the actual injury
necessary for a compensatory damages award. Judgment for nominal
damages entitled petitioners to demand payment and modified Hobby's
behavior for petitioners' benefit by forcing him to pay an amount
of money he otherwise would not have paid. The prevailing party
inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained, and
whether a nominal damages award is a "technical," "insignificant"
victory does not affect the plaintiff's prevailing party status.
Cf.
Garland, supra, at 792. Pp. 109-114.
2. Petitioners are not entitled to a fee award. While the
"technical" nature of a nominal damages award does not affect the
prevailing party inquiry, it does bear on the propriety of fees
awarded under § 1988. The most critical factor in determining a fee
award's reasonableness is the degree of success obtained, since a
fee based on the hours expended on the litigation as a whole may be
excessive if a plaintiff achieves only partial or limited success.
Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 436.
104
Syllabus
When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his
failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary
relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all. In light
of "the relationship between" the extent of petitioners' success on
the merits and the award's amount, id., at 438, the reasonable fee
was not the District Court's $280,000 award but no fee at all. Pp.
114-116.
941 F.2d
1311, affirmed.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.
O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p. 116.
WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and SOUTER, JJ., joined,
post, p. 122.
Gerald M. Birnberg argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the brief were Michael A. Maness and Waggoner
Carr.
Finis E. Cowan argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were
Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas,
Will Pryor, First Assistant Attorney General, and
Thomas
Gibbs Gee. *
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the State of Alabama et al. by
Warren Price III, Attorney
General of Hawaii, and
Steven S.
Michaels, Deputy
Attorney General,
Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of
Nevada, and
Brooke Nielsen, Assistant Attorney General,
Jimmy Evans, Attorney General of Alabama,
Charles E.
Cole, Attorney General of Alaska,
Winston Bryant,
Attorney General of Arkansas,
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney
General of California,
Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General
of Connecticut,
Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of
Delaware,
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of
Florida,
Michael J.
Bowers, Attorney General of
Georgia,
Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho,
Roland W Burris, Attorney General of Illinois,
Linley E.
Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana,
Bonnie J.
Campbell, Attorney General of Iowa,
Robert T.
Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas,
Chris Gorman,
Attorney General of Kentucky,
Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney
General of Louisiana,
Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General
of Maine, J.
Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of
Maryland,
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of
Massachusetts,
Frank J.
Kelley, Attorney General of
Michigan,
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of
Minnesota,
Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi,
William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri,
Don
Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska,
John P.
Arnold,
105
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
We decide today whether a civil rights plaintiff who receives a
nominal damages award is a "prevailing party" eligible to receive
attorney's fees under 42 U. s. C. § 1988. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed an award of attorney's fees on the
ground that a plaintiff receiving only nominal damages is not a
prevailing party. Although we hold that such a plaintiff is a
prevailing party, we affirm the denial of fees in this case.
I
Joseph Davis Farrar and Dale Lawson Farrar owned and operated
Artesia Hall, a school in Liberty County, Texas, for delinquent,
disabled, and disturbed teens. After an Artesia Hall student died
in 1973, a Liberty County grand jury returned a murder indictment
charging Joseph Farrar with willful failure to administer proper
medical treatment and
Attorney General of New Hampshire,
Robert J.
Del
Tufo, Attorney General of New Jersey,
Lacy H. Thornburg,
Attorney General of North Carolina,
Nicholas J.
Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota,
Lee Fisher,
Attorney General of Ohio,
Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney
General of Pennsylvania,
James E. O'Neil, Attorney General
of Rhode Island,
T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of
South Carolina,
Mark Barnett, Attorney General of South
Dakota,
Charles W Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee,
Paul Van Dam, Attorney General of Utah,
Jeffrey L.
Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont,
Mary Sue Terry,
Attorney General of Virginia,
Ken Eikenberry, Attorney
General of Washington,
Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of
Wyoming,
Jorge Perez-Diaz, Attorney General of Puerto Rico,
Elizabeth Barrett-Anderson, Attorney General of Guam, and
John Payton, Corporation Counsel of the District of
Columbia; for the County of Los Angeles by
Richard P. Towne, De
Witt W Clinton, and
Patrick T. Meyers; for Americans for
Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by
George J.
Franscell and
Wayne W Schmidt; for the Equal
Employment Advisory Council by
Ann Elizabeth Reesman, Robert E.
Williams, and
Douglas S.
McDowell; for the
National League of Cities et al. by
Richard Ruda, Michael G.
Dzialo, and
Glen D. Nager; and for the Washington
Legal Foundation et al. by
Daniel J.
Popeo and
Richard A. Samp.
Talbot S. D'Alemberte, Eric B. Schnurer, and Carter G. Phillips
filed a brief for the American Bar Association as amicus
curiae.
106
failure to provide timely hospitalization. The State of Texas
also obtained a temporary injunction that closed Artesia Hall.
Respondent William P. Hobby, Jr., then Lieutenant Governor of
Texas, participated in the events leading to the closing of Artesia
Hall. After Joseph Farrar was indicted, Hobby issued a press
release criticizing the Texas Department of Public Welfare and its
licensing procedures. He urged the department's director to
investigate Artesia Hall and accompanied Governor Dolph Briscoe on
an inspection of the school. Finally, he attended the temporary
injunction hearing with Briscoe and spoke to reporters after the
hearing.
Joseph Farrar sued Hobby, Judge Clarence D. Cain, County
Attorney Arthur J. Hartell III, and the director and two employees
of the Department of Public Welfare for monetary and injunctive
relief under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The complaint alleged
deprivation of liberty and property without due process by means of
conspiracy and malicious prosecution aimed at closing Artesia Hall.
Later amendments to the complaint added Dale Farrar as a plaintiff,
dropped the claim for injunctive relief, and increased the request
for damages to $17 million. After Joseph Farrar died on February
20, 1983, petitioners Dale Farrar and Pat Smith, coadministrators
of his estate, were substituted as plaintiffs.
The case was tried before a jury in the Southern District of
Texas on August 15, 1983. Through special interrogatories, the jury
found that all of the defendants except Hobby had conspired against
the plaintiffs but that this conspiracy was not a proximate cause
of any injury suffered by the plaintiffs. The jury also found that
Hobby had "committed an act or acts under color of state law that
deprived Plaintiff Joseph Davis Farrar of a civil right," but it
found that Hobby's conduct was not "a proximate cause of any
damages" suffered by Joseph Farrar. App. to Brief in Opposition
A-3. The jury made no findings in favor of Dale Farrar. In
accordance with the jury's answers to the special interrogato-
107
ries, the District Court ordered that "Plaintiffs take nothing,
that the action be dismissed on the merits, and that the parties
bear their own costs."
Id., at A-6.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
Farrar v.
Cain, 756 F.2d
1148 (1985). The court affirmed the failure to award
compensatory or nominal damages against the conspirators because
the plaintiffs had not proved an actual deprivation of a
constitutional right.
Id., at 1151-1152. Because the jury
found that Hobby had deprived Joseph Farrar of a civil right,
however, the Fifth Circuit remanded for entry of judgment against
Hobby for nominal damages.
Id., at 1152.
The plaintiffs then sought attorney's fees under 42 U. s. C. §
1988. On January 30, 1987, the District Court entered an order
awarding the plaintiffs $280,000 in fees, $27,932 in expenses, and
$9,730 in prejudgment interest against Hobby. The court denied
Hobby's motion to reconsider the fee award on August 31, 1990.
A divided Fifth Circuit panel reversed the fee award.
Estate of Farrar v.
Cain, 941 F.2d
1311 (1991). After reviewing our decisions in
Hewitt v.
Helms, 482 U.
S. 755 (1987),
Rhodes v.
Stewart, 488 U. S. 1 (1988)
(per
curiam), and
Texas State Teachers Assn. v.
Garland
Independent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782 (1989), the
majority held that the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties and
were therefore ineligible for fees under § 1988:
"The Farrars sued for $17 million in money damages; the jury
gave them nothing. No money damages. No declaratory relief. No
injunctive relief. Nothing .... [T]he Farrars did succeed in
securing a jury-finding that Hobby violated their civil rights and
a nominal award of one dollar. However, this finding did not in any
meaningful sense 'change the legal relationship' between the
Farrars and Hobby. Nor was the result a success for the Farrars on
a 'significant issue that achieve[d] some of the benefit the
[Farrars] sought in bringing suit.'
108
When the sole relief sought is money damages, we fail to see how
a party 'prevails' by winning one dollar out of the $17 million
requested." 941 F. 2d, at 1315 (citations omitted) (quoting
Garland, supra, at 791-792).1
The majority reasoned that even if an award of nominal damages
represented some sort of victory, "surely [the Farrars'] was 'a
technical victory ... so insignificant and ... so near the
situations addressed in
Hewitt and
Rhodes, as to be
insufficient to support prevailing party status.'" 941 F. 2d, at
1315 (quoting
Garland, supra, at 792).2
The dissent argued that
"Hewitt, Rhodes and
Garland [do not] go so far" as to hold that "where plaintiff
obtains only
1 Although the Fifth Circuit's original opinion on liability
made clear that Joseph Farrar alone was to receive nominal damages
for violation of his due process rights,
Farrar v.
Cain, 756 F.2d
1148, 1152 (1985), the District Court on remand awarded
attorney's fees not only to petitioners as coadministrators of
Joseph Farrar's estate but also to Dale Farrar in his personal
capacity, see App. to Pet. for Cert. A-12. The Fifth Circuit
reversed Dale Farrar's fee award on the apparent assumption that he
too had received nominal damages. Dale Farrar has not petitioned
from the Fifth Circuit's judgment in his personal capacity, and the
only issue before us is the award of attorney's fees to Dale Farrar
and Pat Smith as coadministrators of Joseph Farrar's estate.
2 The majority acknowledged its conflict with the Courts of
Appeals for the Second, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits. 941 F. 2d, at 1316-1317, and nn. 22 and 26. See
Ruggiero v.
Krzeminski, 928 F.2d
558,
564 (CA2 1991);
Coleman v.
Turner,
838 F.2d
1004, 1005
(CA8 1988);
Scofield v.
Hillsborough, 862 F.2d
759, 766
(CA9 1988);
Nephew v.
Aurora,
830 F.2d
1547, 1553, n. 2 (CAlO 1987) (en bane) (Barrett, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 976 (1988);
Garner v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 807 F. 2d 1536, 1539 (CAll 1987).
After the Fifth Circuit decided this case, the First and Ninth
Circuits rejected the Fifth Circuit's position and held that a
nominal damages award does confer prevailing party status on a
civil rights plaintiff.
Domegan v.
Ponte, 972 F.2d
401, 410
(CA1 1992); Romberg v.
Nichols,
970 F.2d
512, 519-520
(CA9 1992), cert. pending, No. 92-402; 970
F. 2d, at 525-526 (Wallace, C. J., concurring). The Fourth Circuit
has adopted a position consistent with the Fifth Circuit's.
Lawrence v.
Hinton, 20 Fed. Rules Servo 3d 934,
936-937 (1991);
Spencer V.
General Elec. Co.,
894 F.2d
651, 662 (1990) (dicta).
109
nominal damages for his constitutional deprivation, he cannot be
considered the prevailing party." 941 F. 2d, at 1317 (Reavley, J.,
dissenting).
We granted certiorari. 502 U. S. 1090 (1992).
II
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat.
2641, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, provides in relevant
part:
"In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public
Law 92-318 ... , or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... ,
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs."
"Congress intended to permit the ... award of counsel fees only
when a party has prevailed on the merits."
Hanrahan v.
Hampton, 446
U. S. 754, 758 (1980)
(per curiam). Therefore, in order
to qualify for attorney's fees under § 1988, a plaintiff must be a
"prevailing party." Under our "generous formulation" of the term,
"'plaintiffs may be considered "prevailing parties" for attorney's
fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in
litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in
bringing suit.'"
Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433 (1983)
(quoting
Nadeau v.
Helgemoe, 581
F.2d 275, 278-279 (CA1 1978)). "[L]iability on the merits and
responsibility for fees go hand in hand; where a defendant has not
been prevailed against, either because of legal immunity or on the
merits, § 1988 does not authorize a fee award against that
defendant."
Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 165
(1985).
We have elaborated on the definition of prevailing party in
three recent cases. In
Hewitt v.
Helms, 482 U. S. 755 (1987), we
addressed "the peculiar-sounding question whether a party who
litigates to judgment and loses on all of his claims
110
can nonetheless be a 'prevailing party.'"
Id., at 757. In
his § 1983 action against state prison officials for alleged due
process violations, respondent Helms obtained no relief. "The most
that he obtained was an interlocutory ruling that his complaint
should not have been dismissed for failure to state a
constitutional claim."
Id., at 760. Observing that
"[r]espect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive
at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be
said to prevail," we held that Helms was not a prevailing party.
Ibid. We required the plaintiff to prove "the settling of
some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards
the plaintiff."
Id., at 761 (emphasis omitted).
In
Rhodes v.
Stewart, 488 U. S. 1 (1988)
(per
curiam), we reversed an award of attorney's fees premised
solely on a declaratory judgment that prison officials had violated
the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. By the time
the District Court entered judgment, "one of the plaintiffs had
died and the other was no longer in custody."
Id., at 2.
Under these circumstances, we held, neither plaintiff was a
prevailing party. We explained that "nothing in
[Hewitt]
suggested that the entry of [a declaratory] judgment in a party's
favor automatically renders that party prevailing under § 1988."
Id., at 3. We reaffirmed that a judgment-declaratory or
otherwise-"will constitute relief, for purposes of § 1988, if, and
only if, it affects the behavior of the defendant toward the
plaintiff."
Id., at 4. Whatever "modification of prison
policies" the declaratory judgment might have effected "could not
in any way have benefited either plaintiff, one of whom was dead
and the other released."
Ibid.3
3 Similarly, the plaintiff in
Hewitt v.
Helms,
482 U. S. 755,
763 (1987), "had long since been released from prison" by the time
his failed lawsuit putatively prompted beneficial changes in prison
policy. We held that the "fortuity" of a subsequent return to
prison, which presumably allowed the plaintiff to benefit from the
new procedures, could "hardly render him,
111
Finally, in
Texas State Teachers Assn. v.
Garland
Independent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782 (1989), we
synthesized the teachings of
Hewitt and
Rhodes. "[T]o
be considered a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988," we
held, "the plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the
dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the
defendant." 489 U. S., at 792. We reemphasized that "[t]he
touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties."
Id.,
at 792-793. Under this test, the plaintiffs in
Garland were
prevailing parties because they "obtained a judgment vindicating
[their] First Amendment rights [as] public employees" and
"materially altered the [defendant] school district's policy
limiting the rights of teachers to communicate with each other
concerning employee organizations and union activities."
Id., at 793.
Therefore, to qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights
plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his
claim. The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against
the defendant from whom fees are sought,
Hewitt, supra, at
760, or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement,
Maher v.
Gagne, 448 U. S. 122, 129
(1980). Whatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly benefit
him at the time of the judgment or settlement. See
Hewitt,
supra, at 764. Otherwise the judgment or settlement cannot be
said to "affec[t] the behavior of the defendant toward the
plaintiff."
Rhodes, supra, at 4. Only under these
circumstances can civil rights litigation effect "the material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties" and thereby
transform the plaintiff into a prevailing party.
Garland,
supra, at 792-793. In short, a plaintiff "prevails" when actual
relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal
relationship between the parties by modifying the
retroactively, a 'prevailing party' ... , even though he was not
such when the final judgment was entered."
Id., at 764.
112
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the
plaintiff.
III A
Doubtless "the basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be
to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of
constitutional rights."
Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U. S.
247, 254 (1978). For this reason, no compensatory damages may be
awarded in a § 1983 suit absent proof of actual injury.
Id.,
at 264. Accord,
Memphis Community School Dist. v.
Stachura, 477
U. S. 299, 307, 308, n. 11 (1986). We have also held, however,
that "the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for
nominal damages without proof of actual injury."
Carey,
supra, at 266. The awarding of nominal damages for the
"absolute" right to procedural due process "recognizes the
importance to organized society that [this] righ[t] be scrupulously
observed" while "remain[ing] true to the principle that substantial
damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury." 435 U.
S., at 266. Thus,
Carey obligates a court to award nominal
damages when a plaintiff establishes the violation of his right to
procedural due process but cannot prove actual injury.
We therefore hold that a plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a
prevailing party under § 1988. When a court awards nominal damages,
it neither enters judgment for defendant on the merits nor declares
the defendant's legal immunity to suit. Cf.
Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U. S., at 165;
Supreme Court of Va. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719, 738
(1980). To be sure, a judicial pronouncement that the defendant has
violated the Constitution, unaccompanied by an enforceable judgment
on the merits, does not render the plaintiff a prevailing party. Of
itself, "the moral satisfaction [that] results from any favorable
statement of law" cannot bestow prevailing party status.
113
Hewitt, 482 U. S., at 762. No material alteration of the
legal relationship between the parties occurs until the plaintiff
becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree, or
settlement against the defendant. A plaintiff may demand payment
for nominal damages no less than he may demand payment for millions
of dollars in compensatory damages. A judgment for damages in any
amount, whether compensatory or nominal, modifies the defendant's
behavior for the plaintiff's benefit by forcing the defendant to
pay an amount of money he otherwise would not pay. As a result, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that
petitioners' nominal damages award failed to render them prevailing
parties.
We have previously stated that "a technical victory may be so
insignificant ... as to be insufficient to support prevailing party
status."
Garland, 489 U. S., at 792.4 The example chosen in
Garland to illustrate this sort of "technical" victory,
however, would fail to support prevailing party status under the
test we adopt today. In that case, the District Court declared
unconstitutionally vague a regulation requiring that "non school
hour meetings be conducted only with prior approval from the local
school principal."
Ibid. We suggested that this finding
alone would not sustain prevailing party status if there were "'no
evidence that the plaintiffs were ever refused permission to use
school premises during non-school hours.'''
Ibid. The
deficiency in such a hypothetical "victory" is identical to the
shortcoming in
Rhodes. Despite winning a declaratory
judgment, the plaintiffs could not alter the defendant school
board's behavior toward them for their benefit. Now that we are
confronted with the question whether a nominal damages award is the
sort of "technical," "insignificant" victory that cannot confer
4 We did not consider whether the plaintiffs in
Garland
could be denied prevailing party status on this basis, because
"[t]hey prevailed on a significant issue in the litigation and ...
obtained some of the relief they sought." 489 U. S., at 793.
114
prevailing party status, we hold that the prevailing party
inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained. We
recognized as much in
Garland when we noted that "the
degree of the plaintiff's success" does not affect
"eligibility for a fee award." 489 U. S., at 790 (emphasis in
original). See also id., at 793.
B
Although the "technical" nature of a nominal damages award or
any other judgment does not affect the prevailing party inquiry, it
does bear on the propriety of fees awarded under § 1988. Once civil
rights litigation materially alters the legal relationship between
the parties, "the degree of the plaintiff's overall success goes to
the reasonableness" of a fee award under
Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461
U. S. 424 (1983).
Garland, supra, at 793. Indeed, "the
most critical factor" in determining the reasonableness of a fee
award "is the degree of success obtained."
Hensley, supra,
at 436. Accord,
Marek v.
Chesny, 473 U. S. 1, 11 (1985). In
this case, petitioners received nominal damages instead of the $17
million in compensatory damages that they sought. This litigation
accomplished little beyond giving petitioners "the moral
satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded that [their]
rights had been violated" in some unspecified way.
Hewitt,
supra, at 762. We have already observed that if "a plaintiff
has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable
hourly rate may be an excessive amount."
Hensley, supra, at
436. Yet the District Court calculated petitioners' fee award in
precisely this fashion, without engaging in any measured exercise
of discretion. "Where recovery of private damages is the purpose of
... civil rights litigation, a district court, in fixing fees, is
obligated to give primary consideration to the amount of damages
awarded as compared to the amount sought."
Riverside v.
Rivera, 477 U.
S. 561, 585 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Such a
comparison promotes the
115
court's "central" responsibility to "make the assessment of what
is a reasonable fee under the circumstances of the case."
Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U. S. 87,96 (1989).
Having considered the amount and nature of damages awarded, the
court may lawfully award low fees or no fees without reciting the
12 factors bearing on reasonableness, see
Hensley, 461 U.
S., at 430, n. 3, or multiplying "the number of hours reasonably
expended ... by a reasonable hourly rate," id., at 433.
In some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally "prevails"
under § 1988 should receive no attorney's fees at all. A plaintiff
who seeks compensatory damages but receives no more than nominal
damages is often such a prevailing party. As we have held, a
nominal damages award does render a plaintiff a prevailing party by
allowing him to vindicate his "absolute" right to procedural due
process through enforcement of a judgment against the defendant.
Carey, 435 U. S., at 266. In a civil rights suit for
damages, however, the awarding of nominal damages also highlights
the plaintiff's failure to prove actual, compensable injury.
Id., at 254-264. Whatever the constitutional basis for
substantive liability, damages awarded in a § 1983 action "must
always be designed 'to
compensate injuries caused by the
[constitutional] deprivation.'"
Memphis Community School
Dist. v.
Stachura, 477 U. S., at 309 (quoting
Carey,
supra, at 265) (emphasis and brackets in original). When a
plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to
prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, see
Carey, supra, at 256-257, 264, the only reasonable fee is
usually no fee at all. In an apparent failure to heed our
admonition that fee awards under § 1988 were never intended to
"'produce windfalls to attorneys,'"
Riverside v.
Rivera,
supra, at 580 (plurality opinion) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011,
p. 6 (1976)), the District Court awarded $280,000 in attorney's
fees without "consider[ing] the relationship between
116
the extent of success and the amount of the fee award."
Hensley, supra, at 438.
Although the Court of Appeals erred in failing to recognize that
petitioners were prevailing parties, it correctly reversed the
District Court's fee award. We accordingly affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
So ordered.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.
If ever there was a plaintiff who deserved no attorney's fees at
all, that plaintiff is Joseph Farrar. He filed a lawsuit demanding
17 million dollars from six defendants. After 10 years of
litigation and two trips to the Court of Appeals, he got one dollar
from one defendant. As the Court holds today, that is simply not
the type of victory that merits an award of attorney's fees.
Accordingly, I join the Court's opinion and concur in its judgment.
I write separately only to explain more fully why, in my view, it
is appropriate to deny fees in this case.
I
Congress has authorized the federal courts to award "a
reasonable attorney's fee" in certain civil rights cases, but only
to "the prevailing party." 42 U. s. C. § 1988;
Texas State
Teachers Assn. v.
Garland Independent School Dist.,
489 U. S. 782,
789 (1989). To become a prevailing party, a plaintiff must obtain,
at an absolute minimum, "actual relief on the merits of [the]
claim,"
ante, at 111, which "affects the behavior of the
defendant towards the plaintiff,"
Hewitt v.
Helms,
482 U. S. 755,
761 (1987) (emphasis omitted); accord,
ante, at 111-112
(relief obtained must "alte[r] the legal relationship between the
parties" and "modif[y] the defendant's behavior in a way that
directly benefits the plaintiff"). Joseph Farrar met that minimum
condition for prevailing party status. Through this lawsuit, he
obtained an enforceable judgment for one dollar in nominal damages.
One dollar is not exactly a bonanza, but it constitutes relief on
the merits.
117
And it affects the defendant's behavior toward the plaintiff, if
only by forcing him to pay one dollar-something he would not
otherwise have done.
Ante, at 113.
Nonetheless,
Garland explicitly states that an
enforceable judgment alone is not always enough: "Beyond thee]
absolute limitation [of some relief on the merits], a technical
victory may be so insignificant ... as to be insufficient" to
support an award of attorney's fees. 489 U. S., at 792. While
Garland may be read as indicating that this
de
minimis or technical victory exclusion is a second barrier to
prevailing party status, the Court makes clear today that, in fact,
it is part of the determination of what constitutes a reasonable
fee. Compare
ibid. (purely technical or
de minimis
victories are "insufficient to support prevailing party status")
with
ante, at 114 (the" 'technical'" nature of the victory
"does not affect the prevailing party inquiry" but instead "bear[s]
on the propriety of fees awarded under § 1988"). And even if the
exclusion's location is debatable, its effect is not: When the
plaintiff's success is purely technical or
de minimis, no
fees can be awarded. Such a plaintiff either has failed to achieve
victory at all, or has obtained only a Pyrrhic victory for which
the reasonable fee is zero. The Court's opinion today and its
unanimous opinion in
Garland are thus in accord. See
ante, at 115 (merely "forma[l]" victory can yield "no
attorney's fees at all");
Garland, supra, at 792 ("Where the
plaintiff's success on a legal claim can be characterized as purely
technical or
de minimis, a district court would be justified
in concluding that" denial of attorney's fees is appropriate).
Consequently, the Court properly holds that, when a plaintiff's
victory is purely technical or
de minimis, a district court
need not go through the usual complexities involved in calculating
attorney's fees.
Ante, at 114-115 (court need not calculate
presumptive fee by determining the number of hours reasonably
expended and multiplying it by the reasonable hourly rate; nor must
it apply the 12 factors bearing on reasonableness). As a matter of
common sense and sound
118
judicial administration, it would be wasteful indeed to require
that courts laboriously and mechanically go through those steps
when the
de minimis nature of the victory makes the proper
fee immediately obvious. Instead, it is enough for a court to
explain why the victory is
de minimis and announce a
sensible decision to "award low fees or no fees" at all.
Ante, at 115.
Precedent confirms what common sense suggests. It goes without
saying that, if the
de minimis exclusion were to prevent the
plaintiff from obtaining prevailing party status, fees would have
to be denied.
Supra, at 116. And if the
de minimis
victory exclusion is in fact part of the reasonableness inquiry,
see
ante, at 114, summary denial of fees is still
appropriate. We have explained that even the prevailing plaintiff
may be denied fees if "'special circumstances would render [the]
award unjust.'"
Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 429 (1983)
(citations omitted). While that exception to fee awards has often
been articulated separately from the reasonableness inquiry,
sometimes it is bound up with reasonableness: It serves as a
short-hand way of saying that, even before calculating a lodestar
or wading through all the reasonableness factors, it is clear that
the reasonable fee is no fee at all. After all, where
the
only reasonable fee is no fee, an award of fees would be
unjust; conversely, where a fee award would be unjust, the
reasonable fee is no fee at all.
Of course, no matter how much sense this approach makes, it
would be wholly inappropriate to adopt it if Congress had declared
a contrary intent. When construing a statute, this Court is bound
by the choices Congress has made, not the choices we might wish it
had made. Felicitously, here they are one and the same. Section
1988 was enacted for a specific purpose: to restore the former
equitable practice of awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing
party in certain civil rights cases, a practice this Court had
disapproved in
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness
Society, 421 U.
S. 240 (1975).
Hensley, supra, at 429; see S. Rep. No.
94-1011,
119
p. 6 (1976) ("This bill creates no startling new remedy-it only
meets the technical requirements that the Supreme Court has laid
down if the Federal courts are to continue the practice of awarding
attorneys' fees which had been going on for years prior to the
Court's
[AlyeskaJ decision"). That practice included the
denial of fees to plaintiffs who, although technically prevailing
parties, had achieved only
de minimis success. See,
e.
g., Tatum v.
Morton, 386 F. Supp. 1308, 1317-1319 (DC
1974) (fees denied where plaintiffs recovered $100 each); see also
Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 392, 396
(1970) (under judge-made fee-shifting rule for shareholder actions
that benefit the corporation, no fees are available if the only
benefit achieved is merely "'technical in its consequence'"
(quoting
Bosch v.
Meeker Cooperative Light &
Power Assn., 257 Minn. 362, 366, 367, 101 N. W. 2d 423, 426,
427 (1960))); cf.
Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 463 U.
S. 680, 688, n. 9 (1983) ("[W]e do not mean to suggest that trivial
success on the merits, or purely procedural victories, would
justify an award of fees under statutes setting out the 'when
appropriate' standard"). And although Congress did not intend to
restore every detail of
pre-Alyeska practice, see
West
Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v.
Casey, 499 U. S. 83, 97-98
(1991), the practice of denying fees to Pyrrhic victors is one it
clearly intended to preserve. Section 1988 expressly grants
district courts discretion to withhold attorney's fees from
prevailing parties in appropriate circumstances: It states that a
court "may" award fees "in its discretion." 42 U. S. C. § 1988. As
under
pre-Alyeska practice, the occurrence of a purely
technical or
de minimis victory is such a circumstance.
Chimerical accomplishments are simply not the kind of legal change
that Congress sought to promote in the fee statute.
Indeed, § 1988 contemplates the denial of fees to
de
minimis victors through yet another mechanism. The statute only
authorizes courts to award fees "as part of the costs." 42 U. S. C.
§ 1988. As a result, when a court denies costs, it
120
must deny fees as well; if there are no costs, there is nothing
for the fees to be awarded "as part of." And when Congress enacted
§ 1988, the courts would deny even a prevailing party costs under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (d) where the victory was purely
technical.
Lewis v.
Pennington, 400
F.2d 806, 819 (CA6) (" 'prevailing party is prima facie
entitled to costs' " unless" 'the judgment recovered was
insignificant in comparison to the amount actually sought and
actually amounted to a victory for the defendant'" (quoting
Lichter Foundation, Inc. v.
Welch, 269 F.2d
142, 146 (CA6 1959))), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 983 (1968);
Esso Standard (Libya), Inc. v. SS
Wisconsin, 54 F. R.
D. 26, 27 (SD Tex. 1971) ("Circumstances justifying denial of costs
to the prevailing party [exist] where the judgment recovered was
insignificant in comparison to the amount actually sought"); see
also
Brown v.
GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 828 (1976)
(inquiry is Congress' understanding of the law, correct or not).
Just as a Pyrrhic victor would be denied costs under Rule 54(d), so
too should it be denied fees under § 1988.
II
In the context of this litigation, the technical or
de
minimis nature of Joseph Farrar's victory is readily apparent:
He asked for a bundle and got a pittance. While we hold today that
this pittance is enough to render him a prevailing party,
ante, at 113-114, it does not by itself prevent his victory
from being purely technical. It is true that Joseph Farrar
recovered something. But holding that any award of nominal damages
renders the victory material would "render the concept of de
minimis relief meaningless.
Every nominal damage award has
as its basis a finding of liability, but obviously many such
victories are Pyrrhic ones."
Lawrence v.
Hinton, 20
Fed. Rules Servo 3d 934, 937 (CA4 1991); accord,
Commissioners
Court of Medina County, Texas v.
United States, 221 U.
S. App. D. C. 116, 123-124,
683 F.2d
435, 442443 (1982) (where "the net result achieved is so far
from the
121
position originally propounded ... it would be stretching the
imagination to consider the result a 'victory' in the sense of
vindicating the rights of the fee claimants"). That is not to say
that
all nominal damages awards are
de minimis.
Nominal relief does not necessarily a nominal victory make. See
ante, at 115. But, as in
pre-Alyeska and Rule 54 (d)
practice, see
supra, at 119, 120, a substantial difference
between the judgment recovered and the recovery sought suggests
that the victory is in fact purely technical. See
ante, at
115 ("A plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages but receives no
more than nominal damages" may "formally 'prevai[l]' under § 1988"
but will "often" receive no fees at all). Here that suggestion is
quite strong. Joseph Farrar asked for 17 million dollars; he got
one. It is hard to envision a more dramatic difference.
The difference between the amount recovered and the damages
sought is not the only consideration, however.
Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.
S. 247, 254 (1978), makes clear that an award of nominal
damages can represent a victory in the sense of vindicating rights
even though no actual damages are proved.
Ante, at 112.
Accordingly, the courts also must look to other factors. One is the
significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff claims to
have prevailed.
Garland, 489 U. S., at 792. Petitioners
correctly point out that Joseph Farrar in a sense succeeded on a
significant issue-liability. But even on that issue he cannot be
said to have achieved a true victory. Respondent was just one of
six defendants and the only one not found to have engaged in a
conspiracy. If recovering one dollar from the least culpable
defendant and nothing from the rest legitimately can be labeled a
victory-and I doubt that it can-surely it is a hollow one. Joseph
Farrar may have won a point, but the game, set, and match all went
to the defendants.
Given that Joseph Farrar got
some of what he wantedone
seventeen millionth, to be precise-his success might be considered
material if it also accomplished some public goal
122
Opinion of WHITE, J.
other than occupying the time and energy of counsel, court, and
client. Section 1988 is not "a relief Act for lawyers."
Riverside v.
Rivera, 477 U. S. 561, 588 (1986)
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). Instead, it is a tool that ensures the
vindication of important rights, even when large sums of money are
not at stake, by making attorney's fees available under a private
attorney general theory. Yet one searches these facts in vain for
the public purpose this litigation might have served. The District
Court speculated that the judgment, if accompanied by a large fee
award, might deter future lawless conduct, see App. to Pet. for
Cert. A23-A24, but did not identify the kind of lawless conduct
that might be prevented. Nor is the conduct to be deterred apparent
from the verdict, which even petitioners acknowledge is
"regrettably obtuse." Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. Such a judgment cannot
deter misconduct any more than a bolt of lightning can; its results
might be devastating, but it teaches no valuable lesson because it
carries no discernable meaning. Cf.
Chicano Police
Offi
cer's Assn. v.
Stover, 624
F.2d 127, 131 (CAlO 1980) (nuisance settlement that does not
promote any public purpose cannot support award of attorney's
fees), cited and quoted in
Garland, supra, at 792.
III
In this case, the relevant indicia of success-the extent of
relief, the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff
prevailed, and the public purpose served-all point to a single
conclusion: Joseph Farrar achieved only a
de minimis
victory. As the Court correctly holds today, the appropriate fee in
such a case is no fee at all. Because the Court of Appeals gave
Joseph Farrar everything he deserved-nothing-I join the Court's
opinion affirming the judgment below.
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE STEVENS, and
JUSTICE SOUTER join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether 42 U. S. C.
§ 1988 entitles a civil rights plaintiff who recovers
123
nominal damages to reasonable attorney's fees. Following our
decisions in
Texas State Teachers Assn. v.
Garland
Independent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782 (1989),
Hewitt v.
Helms, 482 U. S. 755 (1987),
Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983), and
Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1978), the
Court holds that it does. With that aspect of today's decision, I
agree. Because Farrar won an enforceable judgment against
respondent, he has achieved a "material alteration" of their legal
relationship,
Garland, supra, at 792-793, and thus he is a
"prevailing party" under the statute.
However, I see no reason for the Court to reach out and decide
what amount of attorney's fees constitutes a reasonable amount in
this instance. That issue was neither presented in the petition for
certiorari nor briefed by petitioners. The opinion of the Court of
Appeals was grounded exclusively in its determination that Farrar
had not met the threshold requirement under § 1988. At no point did
it purport to decide what a reasonable award should be if Farrar
was a prevailing party.
It may be that the District Court abused its discretion and
misapplied our precedents by belittling the significance of the
amount of damages awarded in ascertaining petitioners' fees. Cf.
Hensley, supra, at 436. But it is one thing to say that the
court erred as a matter of law in awarding $280,000; quite another
to decree, especially without the benefit of petitioners' views or
consideration by the Court of Appeals, that the only fair fee was
no fee whatsoever. *
Litigation in this case lasted for more than a decade, has
entailed a 6-week trial and given rise to two appeals. Civil rights
cases often are complex, and we therefore have committed the task
of calculating attorney's fees to the trial court's discretion for
good reason. See,
e. g., Hensley, supra,
*In his brief to the Fifth Circuit, respondent did not argue
that petitioners should be denied all fees even if they were found
to be prevailing parties. Rather, he asserted that the District
Court misapplied the law by awarding "excessive" fees and requested
that they be reduced. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant in No.
90-2830, pp. 38-42.
124
Opinion of WHITE, J.
at 436-437;
Garland, supra, at 789-790;
Blanchard
v.
Bergeron, 489 U. S. 87, 96 (1989).
Estimating what specific amount would be reasonable in this
particular situation is not a matter of general importance on which
our guidance is needed. Short of holding that recovery of nominal
damages
never can support the award of attorney's
fees-which, clearly, the majority does not, see
ante, at
115-the Court should follow its sensible practice and remand the
case for reconsideration of the fee amount. Cf.
FTC v.
AnheuserBusch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 542
(1960). Indeed, respondent's counsel all but conceded at oral
argument that, assuming the Court found Farrar to be a prevailing
party, the question of reasonableness should be addressed on
remand. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-32.
I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand
the case for further proceedings. Accordingly, I dissent.
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