OCTOBER TERM, 1991
Syllabus
ESTELLE, WARDEN
v. McGUIRE
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
No. 90-1074. Argued October 9, 1991-Decided December 4, 1991
Respondent McGuire was found guilty in a California state court
of the second-degree murder of his infant daughter, Tori. Among the
prosecution's witnesses were two physicians, who testified that
Tori was a battered child who had suffered prior injuries. The
battered child testimony revealed evidence of rectal tearing, which
was at least six weeks old, and evidence of partially healed rib
fractures, which were approximately seven weeks old. The trial
court instructed the jury that the prior injury evidence could be
considered for "the limited purpose of determining if it tends to
show ... a clear connection between the other two offense[s] and
the one of which [McGuire] is accused, so that it may be logically
concluded that if the Defendant committed other offenses, he also
committed the crime charged in this case." The State Court of
Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the introduction of
prior injury evidence was proper under state law to prove "battered
child syndrome," which exists when a child has sustained repeated
and/or serious injuries by nonaccidental means. Subsequently, the
Federal District Court denied McGuire's petition for habeas corpus.
The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial was
arbitrary and fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. It
ruled that the prior injury evidence was erroneously admitted to
establish battered child syndrome, because there was no evidence
linking McGuire to the prior injuries and no claim made at trial
that Tori died accidently, and that the jury instruction on the use
of prior act evidence allowed a finding of guilt based simply on a
judgment that he committed the prior acts.
Held: Neither the admission of the challenged evidence
nor the jury instruction as to its use rises to the level of a due
process violation. Pp.67-75.
(a) The prior injury evidence, although not linked to McGuire
himself, was probative on the question of the intent with which the
person who caused Tori's injuries acted, since it demonstrated that
her death was the result of an intentional act by
someone,
and not an accident. The fact that no claim that Tori died
accidentally was made at trial did not relieve the prosecution of
its burden to prove all of the essential elements of second-degree
murder beyond a reasonable doubt. By eliminating the possibility of
accident, the evidence was clearly probative of
63
such an element: that the killing was intentional. It was also
improper for the Court of Appeals to base its holding on its
conclusion that the evidence was incorrectly admitted under state
law, since it is not the province of a federal habeas court to
reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.
Lewis v.
Jeffers, 497 U. S. 764, 780.
pp.67-70.
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the
instruction allowed the jury to consider the prior injury evidence
for more than simply proof of battered child syndrome. The
instruction's language forecloses McGuire's claim that the jury was
directed to find that he had committed the prior acts. The trial
court's inclusion of the words "if the Defendant committed other
offenses" unquestionably left it to the jury to determine whether
he committed the prior acts and to use the evidence in deciding his
guilt
only if it believed that he had committed those acts.
To the extent that the jury may have believed that he inflicted the
prior injuries, there was sufficient evidence in the record to
support that conclusion. Also rejected is McGuire's argument that,
even if the determination of the perpetrator was left to the jury,
the instruction was a propensity instruction, allowing the jury to
base its determination of guilt in part upon the conclusion that
McGuire had committed the prior acts and therefore had a
disposition to commit this type of crime. While the instruction was
ambiguous, there is no "reasonable likelihood" that the jury would
have concluded that it, read in the context of other instructions,
authorized the use of propensity evidence.
Boyde v.
California, 494 U. S. 370, 380. It
seems far more likely that the jury understood the instruction to
mean that if it found a "clear connection" between the prior and
instant injuries, and if it found that McGuire had committed the
prior injuries, then it could use that fact in determining that he
committed the crime charged. This parallels the use of prior act
evidence for the purpose of showing intent, identity, motive, or
plan, see,
e. g., Fed. Rule Evid. 404(b). More importantly,
the court specifically guarded against possible misuse by advising
the jury that the prior injury evidence, if believed, could not be
considered to prove that McGuire was "a person of bad character or
that he ha[d] a disposition to commit crimes." Neither the belief
that the instruction violated state law nor a belief that the trial
judge incorrectly interpreted the state evidence code is a ground
for federal habeas relief. Pp. 70-75.
902 F.2d
749, reversed.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, BLACKMUN, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined, and in
Part I of
64
which STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which
STEVENS, J., joined,
post, p. 75. THOMAS, J., took no part
in the consideration or decision of the case.
Dane R. Gillette, Deputy Attorney General of California,
argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General,
George
Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
John H.
Sugiyama, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and
Morris
Beatus, Supervising Deputy Attorney General.
Ann Hardgrove Voris, by appointment of the Court, 499 U.
S. 917, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. *
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Mark Owen McGuire was found guilty in a California
state court of second-degree murder for the killing of his infant
daughter. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction on appeal
in the state courts, McGuire sought federal habeas relief, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set aside his
conviction.
902 F.2d
749 (1990). We hold that in so doing the Court of Appeals
exceeded the limited scope of federal habeas review of state
convictions.
McGuire and his wife brought their 6-month-old daughter, Tori,
to a hospital in Hayward, California. The baby was bluish in color
and was not breathing. The attending physician noticed a large and
relatively recent bruise on Tori's chest with multiple bruises
around it, as well as black and
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the
United States by Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney
General Mueller, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and Clifford M.
Sloan; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S.
Scheidegger.
Charles D. Weisselberg and
Dennis E. Curtis filed
a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et
al. as
amici curiae urging affirmance.
65
blue marks around her ears. Efforts to revive the child were
unsuccessful; Tori died 45 minutes after being brought to the
hospital. An autopsy revealed 17 contusions on the baby's chest, 29
contusions in her abdominal area, a split liver, a split pancreas,
a lacerated large intestine, and damage to her heart and one of her
lungs. The autopsy also uncovered evidence of rectal tearing, which
was at least six weeks old, and evidence of partially healed rib
fractures, which were approximately seven weeks old.
The police questioned McGuire and his wife. McGuire stated his
belief that Tori's injuries must have resulted from a fall off the
family couch. He told the police that when his wife went out to
make a telephone call, he went upstairs, leaving Tori lying on the
couch; when he heard the baby cry, he came back downstairs to find
her lying on the floor. After a police officer expressed skepticism
at this explanation, McGuire replied that "[m]aybe some Mexicans
came in" while he was upstairs.
Id., at 751. During separate
questioning, McGuire's wife stated that she had not hit Tori, and
that she was unsure whether her husband had done so.
McGuire was charged with second-degree murder. At trial, the
prosecution introduced both the statements made by McGuire to
police and the medical evidence, including the evidence of prior
rectal tearing and fractured ribs. Two physicians testified that
Tori was a battered child, relying in part on the prior rib and
rectal injuries, as well as on the more recent injuries. McGuire's
neighbor testified that she had seen McGuire carry Tori by one of
her arms to the car and roughly pinch her cheeks together when she
cried. The neighbor added that McGuire's wife had expressed fear in
leaving Tori alone with McGuire, because he had been rough with the
baby and "did bad things" to her.
In addition, the prosecution called a witness who had overheard
a conversation between McGuire and his wife in the hospital
emergency room the night of Tori's death. According to the witness,
McGuire's wife several times insistently
66
asked, "What really happened?" McGuire replied that he "didn't
know," and that he "guessed" the baby fell off the couch. His wife
continued to press for an answer, stating, "I am very patient. I
can wait a long time. I want to know what really happened."
Finally, she told McGuire that "the baby was alright when I left.
You are responsible." App. 44; Brief for United States as
Amicus
Curiae 3-4. McGuire's wife was called by the prosecution to
testify at trial, after having been granted transactional immunity
from future prosecution. In contrast to her prior statement to the
police and her declarations at the hospital, she stated that she
had beaten Tori on the day of her death before her husband arrived
home. The jury convicted McGuire of seconddegree murder.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed McGuire's conviction.
The court observed that the evidence of prior rib and rectal
injuries was introduced to prove "battered child syndrome." That
syndrome exists when a child has sustained repeated and/or serious
injuries by nonaccidental means.
People v.
Bledsoe,
36 Cal. 3d 236, 249, 681 P. 2d 291, 299 (1984). After reviewing
California authority on the subject, the court concluded that
"proof of Tori's 'prior injuries' tending to establish the
'battered child syndrome' was patently proper." App. 47. The
California Supreme Court denied review.
McGuire then filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. That court denied relief. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed and granted McGuire's habeas petition. The
court ruled that the prior injury evidence was erroneously admitted
to establish battered child syndrome, because no evidence linked
McGuire to the prior injuries and no claim had been made at trial
that the baby died accidentally. In addition, the court believed
that the trial court's instruction on the use of prior act evidence
allowed a finding of guilt based simply on a judgment that
67
McGuire committed the prior bad acts.1 The court concluded that
the admission of the evidence, in conjunction with the prejudicial
instruction, "rendered [McGuire's] trial arbitrary and
fundamentally unfair" in violation of due process. 902 F. 2d, at
753. We hold that none of the alleged errors rise to the level of a
due process violation, and so reverse.
I
We first consider whether the admission of the prior injury
evidence justified habeas relief. In ruling that McGuire's due
process rights were violated by the admission of the evidence, the
Court of Appeals relied in part on its conclusion that the evidence
was "incorrectly admitted ... pursuant to California law."
Id., at 754. Such an inquiry, however, is no part of a
federal court's habeas review of a state conviction. We have stated
many times that "federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for
errors of state law."
Lewis v.
Jeffers, 497 U. S. 764, 780
(1990); see also
Pulley v.
Harris, 465 U. S. 37, 41
(1984). Today, we reemphasize that it is not the
1 The court instructed the jury:
"Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that
the Defendant committed acts similar to those constituting a crime
other than that for which he is on trial. Such evidence, if
believed, was not received, and may not be considered by you[,] to
prove that he is a person of bad character or that he has a
disposition to commit crimes. Such evidence was received and may be
considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it
tends to show three things:
"1. The impeachment of Daisy McGuire's testimony that she had no
cause to be afraid of the Defendant,
"2. To establish the battered child syndrome, and
"3. Also a clear connection between the other two offense[s] and
the one of which the Defendant is accused, so that it may be
logically concluded that if the Defendant committed other offenses,
he also committed the crime charged in this case.
"For the limited purpose for which you may consider such
evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other
evidence in the case. You are not permitted to consider evidence
for any other purpose." App.40-41.
68
province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court
determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review,
a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction
violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
28 U. S. C. § 2241;
Rose v.
Hodges, 423 U. S. 19, 21 (1975)
(per curiam}.2
We thus turn to the question whether the admission of the
evidence violated McGuire's federal constitutional rights.
California law allows the prosecution to introduce expert testimony
and evidence related to prior injuries in order to prove "battered
child syndrome."
People v.
Bledsoe, supra, at 249,
681 P. 2d, at 299;
Landeros v.
Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399,
409,551 P. 2d 389, 393 (1976);
People v.
Jackson, 18
Cal. App. 3d 504, 506-508, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921-922 (1971). The
demonstration of battered child syndrome "simply indicates that a
child found with [serious, repeated injuries] has not suffered
those injuries by accidental means."
Id., at 507, 95 Cal.
Rptr., at 921. Thus, evidence demonstrating battered child syndrome
helps to prove that the child died at the hands of another and not
by falling off a couch, for example; it also tends to establish
that the "other," whoever it may be, inflicted the injuries
intentionally. When offered to show that certain injuries are a
product of child abuse, rather than accident, evidence of prior
injuries is relevant even though it does not purport to prove the
identity of the person who might have inflicted those injuries. See
id., at 506-508, 95 Cal. Rptr., at 921-922;
People v.
Bledsoe, supra, at 249, 681 P. 2d, at 299. Because the
prosecution had
2 In this regard, we observe that the Ninth Circuit reached a
similar result in
Blair v.
McCarthy, 881 F.2d
602 (1989), cert. granted, 498 U. S. 807, vacated as moot and
remanded, 498 U. S. 954 (1990). In that case, the Court of Appeals
based its grant of habeas relief solely on a violation of state law
that prejudiced the defendant.
Blair v.
McCarthy,
supra, at 603-604. As our discussion above makes clear, such
state-law violations provide no basis for federal habeas
relief.
69
charged McGuire with second-degree murder, it was required to
prove that Tori's death was caused by the defendant's intentional
act. Proof of Tori's battered child status helped to do just that;
although not linked by any direct evidence to McGuire, the evidence
demonstrated that Tori's death was the result of an intentional act
by
someone, and not an accident. The Court of Appeals,
however, ignored the principle of battered child syndrome evidence
in holding that this evidence was incorrectly admitted. For
example, the court stated that "[e]vidence cannot have probative
value unless a party connects it to the defendant in some
meaningful way." 902 F. 2d, at 753. We conclude that the evidence
of prior injuries presented at McGuire's trial, whether it was
directly linked to McGuire or not, was probative on the question of
the intent with which the person who caused the injuries acted.
In holding the prior injury evidence inadmissible, the Court of
Appeals also relied on the theory that, because no claim was made
at trial that Tori died accidentally, the battered child syndrome
evidence was irrelevant and violative of due process.
Id.,
at 754. This ruling ignores the fact that the prosecution must
prove all the elements of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. In this seconddegree murder case, for example, the
prosecution was required to demonstrate that the killing was
intentional. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 187, 189 (West 1988). By
eliminating the possibility of accident, the evidence regarding
battered child syndrome was clearly probative of that essential
element, especially in light of the fact that McGuire had claimed
prior to trial that Tori had injured herself by falling from the
couch. The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the evidence
should have been excluded because McGuire did not raise the defense
of accidental death at trial. But the prosecution's burden to prove
every element of the crime is not relieved by a defendant's
tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the
offense. In the federal courts, "[a]
70
simple plea of not guilty ... puts the prosecution to its proof
as to all elements of the crime charged."
Mathews v.
United States, 485 U. S. 58, 64-65
(1988). N either the Court of Appeals nor the parties have given us
any reason to think that the rule is different in California. The
evidence of battered child syndrome was relevant to show intent,
and nothing in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the State to refrain from introducing relevant evidence
simply because the defense chooses not to contest the point.
Concluding, as we do, that the prior injury evidence was
relevant to an issue in the case, we need not explore further the
apparent assumption of the Court of Appeals that it is a violation
of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment for
evidence that is not relevant to be received in a criminal trial.
We hold that McGuire's due process rights were not violated by the
admission of the evidence. See
Spencer v.
Texas,
385 U. S. 554,
563-564 (1967) ("Cases in this Court have long proceeded on the
premise that the Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental
elements of fairness in a criminal trial. ... But it has never been
thought that such cases establish this Court as a rule-making organ
for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure")
(citations omitted).
II
The Court of Appeals, however, did not rely solely on a finding
that the admission of the evidence was unconstitutional. It based
its decision in part on a belief that the instruction given by the
trial court, set forth in n. 1,
supra, allowed the jury to
consider the prior injury evidence for more than simply proof of
the battered child syndrome, and thereby violated McGuire's due
process rights. McGuire focuses on the portion of the instruction
explaining to the jury that the prior injury evidence
71
"was received and may be considered by you only for the limited
purpose of determining if it tends to show ... a clear connection
between the other two offense[s] and the one of which the Defendant
is accused, so that it may be logically concluded that if the
Defendant committed other offenses, he also committed the crime
charged in this case." App. 41.
McGuire argues that, despite the absence of any direct evidence
showing that he caused the rib and rectal injuries, the instruction
told the jury to find that he had committed those prior offenses.
Furthermore, he argues, the instruction left the jury with the
mistaken impression that it could base its finding of guilt on the
simple fact that he had previously harmed Tori. Under McGuire's
reading, the instruction is transformed into a propensity
instruction, allowing the jury to consider as evidence of his guilt
the fact that his prior acts show a disposition to commit this type
of crime. This, he contends, violates the Due Process Clause.
In arguing his point, McGuire makes much of the fact that, in
giving its instruction, the trial court deviated in part from
standard jury instruction 2.50, 1 California Jury Instructions,
Criminal (4th ed. 1979) (CALJIC).3 As we have stated above,
however, the fact that the instruction was allegedly incorrect
under state law is not a basis for habeas
3Meticulous compliance with CALJIC 2.50, as in effect at
McGuire's trial, would have led the trial court to instruct the
jury that the prior injury evidence
"was received and may be considered by you only for the limited
purpose of determining if it tends to show:
"A characteristic method, plan or scheme in the commission of
criminal acts similar to the method, plan or scheme used in the
commission of the offense in this case which would further tend to
show a clear connection between the other offense[s] and the
one of which defendant is accused so that it may be logically
concluded that if defendant committed the other offense[s] he also
committed the crime charged in this case" (portion in italics was
omitted from the actual jury instruction given at McGuire's
trial).
72
relief. See
Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 438, n. 6
(1983) ("[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit the federal
courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state
evidentiary rules"). Federal habeas courts therefore do not grant
relief, as might a state appellate court, simply because the
instruction may have been deficient in comparison to the CALJIC
model. Nor do our habeas powers allow us to reverse McGuire's
conviction based on a belief that the trial judge incorrectly
interpreted the California Evidence Code in ruling that the prior
injury evidence was admissible as bad acts evidence in this case.
See Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 1l01(b) (West 1988). The only question
for us is "whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the
entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process."
Cupp v.
Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 147
(1973); see also
Henderson v.
Kibbe, 431 U. S. 145, 154
(1977);
Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637, 643 (1974)
(" '[I]t must be established not merely that the instruction is
undesirable, erroneous, or even "universally condemned," but that
it violated some [constitutional] right' "). It is well established
that the instruction "may not be judged in artificial isolation,"
but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a
whole and the trial record.
Cupp v.
Naughten, supra,
at 147. In addition, in reviewing an ambiguous instruction such as
the one at issue here, we inquire "whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in
a way" that violates the Constitution.
Boyde v.
California, 494 U. S. 370, 380
(1990).4 And we also bear
4 We acknowledge that language in the later cases of
Cage
v.
Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39 (1990), and
Yates v.
Evatt, 500 U. S. 391 (1991),
might be read as endorsing a different standard of review for jury
instructions. See
Cage, supra, at 41 ("In construing the
instruction, we consider how reasonable jurors could have
understood the charge as a whole");
Yates, supra, at 401
("We think a reasonable juror would have understood the
[instruction] to mean ... "). In
Boyde, however, we made it
a point to settle on a single standard of review for jury
instructions-the "reasonable likelihood" standard-after considering
the many different phrasings that had
73
in mind our previous admonition that we "have defined the
category of infractions that violate 'fundamental fairness' very
narrowly."
Dowling v.
United States, 493 U. S. 342, 352
(1990). "Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of
Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation."
Ibid.
McGuire first claims that the instruction directed the jury to
find that he had caused the prior injuries, thereby effectively
taking that question from the jury. One might argue that the "two
offense[s]" referred to in the instruction were McGuire's pinching
of the child's cheeks and the lifting of the child by her arm. When
read in context, however, we conclude that the most likely
interpretation is that the reference was to the rectal tearing and
fractured ribs. McGuire argues that, despite the lack of any direct
evidence linking him to those injuries, the instruction directed
the jury to find that he had committed them. This claim is clearly
foreclosed, however, by the language of the instruction. The
challenged portion of the instruction included the words "if the
Defendant committed other offenses." App. 41. By including this
phrase, the trial court unquestionably left it to the jury to
determine whether McGuire committed the prior acts;
only if
the jury believed he was the perpetrator could it use the evidence
in deciding whether McGuire was guilty of the crime charged.
Therefore, if the jury did not believe McGuire caused the prior
injuries, he was not harmed by the challenged portion of the
instruction. To the extent that the jury may have believed McGuire
committed the prior acts and used that as a factor in its
deliberation, we observe that there was sufficient evidence to
sustain such a jury
previously been used by this Court. 494 U. S., at 379-380
(considering and rejecting standards that required examination of
either what a reasonable juror "could" have done or "would" have
done). So that we may once again speak with one voice on this
issue, we now disapprove the standard of review language in
Cage and
Yates, and reaffirm the standard set out in
Boyde.
74
finding by a preponderance of the evidence. Cf.
People v.
Simon, 184 Cal. App. 3d 125, 134, 228 Cal. Rptr. 855, 858
(1986); Huddleston v.
United States, 485 U. S. 681, 690
(1988). The proof of battered child syndrome itself narrowed the
group of possible perpetrators to McGuire and his wife, because
they were the only two people regularly caring for Tori during her
short life. See
People v.
Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d,
at 507, 95 Cal. Rptr., at 921 ("Only someone regularly 'caring' for
the child has the continuing opportunity to inflict these types of
injuries; an isolated contact with a vicious stranger would not
result in this pattern of successive injuries stretching through
several months"). A neighbor testified that she had seen McGuire
treat Tori roughly on two occasions, and that McGuire's wife was
scared to leave Tori alone with McGuire because he "did bad things"
to her; the neighbor further testified that she had never seen
McGuire's wife abuse the child in any way. Futhermore, when being
questioned by the police after Tori died, McGuire's wife stated
that she observed bruises on the baby's body when bathing her. When
asked by the police for an explanation, she replied, "I don't
really know, you know, I am not the only one who is taking care of
her." App. 131. The evidence described, along with other evidence
in the record, convinces us that there was sufficient proof for the
jury to conclude, if it so desired, that McGuire caused the prior
rib and rectal injuries.
McGuire also contends that, even if the determination of the
perpetrator was left to the jury, the instruction constituted a
"propensity" instruction, allowing the jury to base its
determination of guilt in part upon the conclusion that McGuire had
committed the prior acts and therefore had a propensity to commit
this type of crime. While the instruction was not as clear as it
might have been, we find that there is not a "reasonable
likelihood" that the jury would have concluded that this
instruction, read in the context of other instructions, authorized
the use of propensity evidence
75
pure and simple.
Boyde v.
California, supra, at
380. It seems far more likely that the jury understood the
instruction,
supra, at 71, to mean that
if it found a
"clear connection" between the prior injuries and the instant
injuries, and
if it found that McGuire had committed the
prior injuries, then it could use that fact in determining that
McGuire committed the crime charged. The use of the evidence of
prior offenses permitted by this instruction was therefore parallel
to the familiar use of evidence of prior acts for the purpose of
showing intent, identity, motive, or plan. See,
e. g., Fed.
Rule Evid. 404(b). Furthermore, the trial court guarded against
possible misuse of the instruction by specifically advising the
jury that the "[prior injury] evidence, if believed, was not
received, and may not be considered by you[,] to prove that
[McGuire] is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition
to commit crimes." See n. 1,
supra. Especially in light of
this limiting provision, we reject McGuire's claim that the
instruction should be viewed as a propensity instruction.5
We therefore hold that neither the introduction of the
challenged evidence, nor the jury instruction as to its use, "so
infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law."
Lisenba v.
California, 314 U. S. 219, 228
(1941); see also
Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.
S., at 643. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that the evidence of battered child
syndrome was relevant. The State had to prove that Mark
5 Because we need not reach the issue, we express no opinion on
whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it
permitted the use of "prior crimes" evidence to show propensity to
commit a charged crime.
76
Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.
McGuire intended to kill his daughter, and the evidence that
Tori was a battered child was probative of causation and intent. I
therefore join Part I of the Court's opinion.
I do not join Part II of the opinion because I think there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the prior acts
instruction. The trial court instructed the jury that evidence of
Tori's prior injuries had been admitted to show that McGuire had
committed offenses similar to that for which he was on trial, and
that, if the jury found a "clear connection" between the prior
offenses and the charged offense, "it may be logically concluded
that if the Defendant committed other offenses, he also committed
the crime charged in this case." App.41. In my view, the
instruction encouraged the jury to assume that McGuire had
inflicted the prior injuries and then directed the jury to conclude
that the prior abuser was the murderer. Because the instruction may
have relieved the State of its burden of proving the identity of
Tori's murderer beyond a reasonable doubt, I would hold that the
instruction was error and remand to the Court of Appeals for a
determination of whether that error was harmless.
The fact that a 6-month-old child was repeatedly beaten in the
course of her short life is so horrifying that a trial court should
take special care to inform the jury as to the significance of that
evidence. As the Court notes, the demonstration of battered child
syndrome is relevant because it " 'indicates that a child found
with [serious, repeated injuries] has not suffered those injuries
by accidental means,'"
ante, at 68 (quoting
People v.
Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507; 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921
(1971)). I therefore agree that proof of Tori's battered child
status, although "not linked by any direct evidence to McGuire,"
was properly admitted because "the evidence demonstrated that
Tori's death was the result of an intentional act by
someone, and not an accident."
Ante, at 69. Precisely
because the relevance of battered child syndrome is
not tied
to the identity of the abuser, however, I
77
believe that a jury instruction clarifying the limited probative
value of that evidence was required.
Instead of an instruction limiting the use of evidence of Tori's
prior injuries, the trial judge gave an instruction limiting the
use of evidence of McGuire's prior bad acts. In so doing, the trial
judge himself appears to have assumed that the prior injuries could
be attributed to McGuire. The judge told the jury that "[e]vidence
has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the Defendant
committed acts similar to those constituting a crime other than
that for which he is on trial." App. 40. The State concedes that
this category of evidence encompasses both the acts for which
McGuire was positively identified as the actor (carrying the child
by one arm and roughly pinching her cheeks) and the far more brutal
acts for which no actor was identified (the fractured ribs and the
rectal tearing). The grouping of these two distinct classes of
evidence created a reasonable likelihood that the jury would
believe that McGuire had been identified-at least in the eyes of
the trial judge-as the prior abuser.
The trial court's error in implying that McGuire had been
identified as the prior abuser was compounded by its further
instruction that, if the jury found a "clear connection" between
the prior offenses and the charged offense, "it may be logically
concluded that if the Defendant committed other offenses, he also
committed the crime charged in this case." The Court finds it
"likely" that the jury understood the instruction to mean that
"if it found a 'clear connection' between the prior injuries
and the instant injuries, and
if it found that McGuire had
committed the prior injuries, then it could use that fact in
determining that McGuire committed the crime charged."
Ante,
at 75. In my view, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury
did not understand this single sentence to establish a two-step
process.
The jury was instructed to "consider" the evidence that McGuire
had "committed acts similar" to the crime charged
78
Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.
and to "determin[eJ" whether there was a "clear connection"
between these prior acts and the ones that resulted in Tori's
death. App. 40, 41. The trial court did not instruct the jury that
it must first "determine" whether McGuire had in fact inflicted the
prior injuries. The part of the instruction relied upon by the
Court-"it may be logically concluded that if the defendant
committed other offenses, he also committed the crime charged in
this case"-does not make clear that it is the jury's role to
ascertain whether McGuire was the perpetrator of the prior abuse.
Rather, coming as it does in the middle of what appears to be a
conclusion of law, it is reasonably likely that the jury understood
that such a determination had already been made and that its role
was merely to determine if there was a "clear connection" between
Tori's prior injuries and the injuries that killed her.
Although we "have defined the category of infractions that
violate 'fundamental fairness' very narrowly,"
Dowling v.
United States, 493 U. S. 342, 352
(1990), it is well established that the fundamental fairness
guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense.
In
re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970);
McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 85 (1986).
This constitutional principle "prohibits the State from using
evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of
relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable
doubt of every essential element of a crime."
Francis v.
Franklin, 471
U. S. 307, 313
(1985); Sandstrom v.
Montana,
442 U. S. 510
(1979). Thus, we have held that mandatory presumptions violate the
Due Process Clause if they relieve the State of the burden of
persuasion on an element of the offense.
Patterson v.
New
York, 432 U. S.
197, 215 (1977);
Sandstrom, supra, at 520524. By
contrast, a permissive inference is not a violation
79
of due process because the State still has the burden of
persuading the jury that the suggested conclusion should be
inferred based on the predicate facts proved.
Ulster County
Court v.
Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 157-163
(1979).
In this case, the instruction perhaps was intended to posit a
permissive inference that whoever had inflicted Tori's prior
injuries was likely to have inflicted the injuries that caused her
death. But the trial court did not make clear that the State first
had to prove the predicate facts from which the inference was to be
drawn. Furthermore, the wording of the instruction is such that the
jury may well have assumed that it had no choice but to "logically
conclud[e]" that McGuire was the murderer once it found a "clear
connection" between the prior injuries and the fatal ones. *
Because I cannot say with any confidence that the instruction
allowed a mere permissive inference drawing from proven facts, I
think the instruction should be treated as a mandatory presumption
that may have relieved the State of its burden of proving the
identity of Tori's killer beyond a reasonable doubt.
Had the instruction been clearly worded, I would agree with the
Court that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence in the
record to support a finding that McGuire was the perpetrator of the
prior injuries. After all, as the Court points out, "[t]he proof of
battered child syndrome itself narrowed the group of possible
perpetrators to McGuire and his wife, because they were the only
two people regularly caring for Tori."
Ante, at 74. In this
case, however, it is important to remember that the other person
regularly caring for Tori-Daisy McGuire-took the stand and
testified, under a grant of immunity, that
she was the one
who inflicted the fatal injuries on the night of July 7, 1981.
* Although not dispositive, it is worth noting that California's
model jury instructions on "evidence of other crimes" has since
been revised to eliminate the phrase "so that it may be logically
concluded." See 1 California Jury Instructions, Criminal 2.50 (5th
ed. 1987).
80
Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.
McGuire's jury deliberated for three days before returning a
verdict of guilty. Any evaluation of the jury instruction must be
conducted against the background of Daisy McGuire's surprise
testimony and the dilemma it so clearly posed for the jury. In my
view, the jury instruction on similar acts was so "ambiguous,"
ante, at 72, that there was a reasonable likelihood that the
jury was encouraged to make assumptions and conclusions about the
identity of Tori's murderer that relieved the State of having to
prove that element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In
cases where the Court has found that jury instructions included
mandatory presumptions inconsistent with the guarantees of the Due
Process Clause, the Court has remanded to determine whether the
erroneous instruction was harmless, which is the course that should
be followed here. See,
e. g.,
Sandstrom, supra, at
526-527;
Rose v.
Clark, 478 U. S. 570, 584
(1986);
Carella v.
California, 491 U. S. 263, 266-267
(1989)
(per curiam).
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