OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
DRYE ET AL.
v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT
No.98-1101. Argued November 8, 1999-Decided December 7,1999
In 1994, Irma Drye died intestate, leaving a $233,000 estate in
Pulaski County, Arkansas. Petitioner Rohn Drye, her son, was sole
heir to the estate under Arkansas law. Drye was insolvent at the
time of his mother's death and owed the Federal Government some
$325,000 on unpaid tax assessments. The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) had valid tax liens against all of Drye's "property and
rights to property" pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 6321. Drye petitioned
the Pulaski County Probate Court for appointment as administrator
of his mother's estate and was so appointed. Several months after
his mother's death, Drye resigned as administrator after filing in
the Probate Court and county land records a written disclaimer of
all interests in the estate. Under Arkansas law, such a disclaimer
creates the legal fiction that the disclaimant predeceased the
decedent; consequently, the disclaimant's share of the estate
passes to the person next in line to receive that share. The
disavowing heir's creditors, Arkansas law provides, may not reach
property thus disclaimed. Here, Drye's disclaimer caused the estate
to pass to his daughter, Theresa Drye, who succeeded her father as
administrator and promptly established the Drye Family 1995 Trust
(Trust). The Probate Court declared Drye's disclaimer valid and
accordingly ordered final distribution of the estate to Theresa,
who then used the estate's proceeds to fund the Trust, of which she
and, during their lifetimes, her parents are the beneficiaries.
Under the Trust's terms, distributions are at the discretion of the
trustee, Drye's counsel, and may be made only for the health,
maintenance, and support of the beneficiaries. The Trust is
spendthrift, and under state law, its assets are therefore shielded
from creditors seeking to satisfy the debts of the Trust's
beneficiaries. After Drye revealed to the IRS his beneficial
interest in the Trust, the IRS filed with the county a notice of
federal tax lien against the Trust as Drye's nominee, served a
notice of levy on accounts held in the Trust's name by an
investment bank, and notified the Trust of the levy. The Trust
filed a wrongful levy action against the United States in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
The Government counterclaimed against the Trust, the trustee, and
the trust beneficiaries, seeking to reduce to judgment the tax
assessments against Drye, confirm its right to seize the Trust's
assets in collection
50
Syllabus
of those debts, foreclose on its liens, and sell the Trust
property. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court
ruled in the Government's favor. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, reading this Court's precedents to convey
that state law determines whether a given set of circumstances
creates a right or interest, but federal law dictates whether that
right or interest constitutes "property" or the "righ[t] to
property" under § 6321.
Held: Drye's disclaimer did not defeat the federal tax
liens. The Internal Revenue Code's prescriptions are most sensibly
read to look to state law for delineation of the taxpayer's rights
or interests in the property the Government seeks to reach, but to
leave to federal law the determination whether those rights or
interests constitute "property" or "rights to property" under §
6321. Once it has been determined that state law creates sufficient
interests in the taxpayer to satisfy the requirements of the
federal tax lien provision, state law is inoperative to prevent the
attachment of the federal liens.
United States v.
Bess, 357 U. S.
51, 56-57. Pp. 55-61.
(a) To satisfy a tax deficiency, the Government may impose a
lien on any "property" or "rights to property" belonging to the
taxpayer. §§ 6321, 6331(a). When Congress so broadly uses the term
"property," this Court recognizes that the Legislature aims to
reach every species of right or interest protected by law and
having an exchangeable value.
E. g., Jewett v.
Commissioner, 455 U. S. 305, 309.
Section 6334(a), which lists items exempt from levy, is
corroborative. Section 6334(a)'s list is rendered exclusive by §
6334(c), which provides that no other "property or rights to
property shall be exempt." Inheritances or devises disclaimed under
state law are not included in § 6334(a)'s catalog of exempt
property. See,
e. g., Bess, 357 U. S., at 57.
The absence of any recognition of disclaimers in §§ 6321, 6322,
6331(a), and 6334(a) and (c), the relevant tax collection
provisions, contrasts with § 2518(a), which renders qualifying
state-law disclaimers "with respect to any interest in property"
effective for federal wealth-transfer tax purposes and for those
purposes only. Although this Court's decisions in point have not
been phrased so meticulously as to preclude the argument that state
law is the proper guide to the critical determination whether
Drye's interest constituted "property" or "rights to property"
under § 6321, the Court is satisfied that the Code and interpretive
case law place under federal, not state, control the ultimate issue
whether a taxpayer has a beneficial interest in any property
subject to levy for unpaid federal taxes. Pp.55-57.
(b) The question whether a state-law right constitutes
"property" or "rights to property" under § 6321 is a matter of
federal law.
United
51
States v.
National Bank of Commerce, 472 U. S. 713, 727. This
Court looks initially to state law to determine what rights the
taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to
federal law to determine whether the taxpayer's state-delineated
rights qualify as "property" or "rights to property" within the
compass of the federal tax lien legislation. Cf.
Morgan v.
Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78, 80. Just as
exempt status under state law does not bind the federal collector,
United States v.
Mitchell, 403 U. S. 190, 204, so
federal tax law is not struck blind by a disclaimer,
United
States v.
Irvine, 511 U. S. 224, 240. Pp.
58-59.
(c) The Eighth Circuit, with fidelity to the relevant Code
provisions and this Court's case law, determined first what rights
state law accorded Drye in his mother's estate. The Court of
Appeals observed that under Arkansas law Drye had, at his mother's
death, a valuable, transferable, legally protected right to the
property at issue, and noted, for example, that a prospective heir
may effectively assign his expectancy in an estate under Arkansas
law, and the assignment will be enforced when the expectancy ripens
into a present estate. Drye emphasizes his undoubted right under
Arkansas law to disclaim the inheritance, a right that is indeed
personal and not marketable. But Arkansas law primarily gave him a
right of considerable value-the right either to inherit or to
channel the inheritance to a close family member (the next lineal
descendant). That right simply cannot be written off as a mere
personal right to accept or reject a gift. In pressing the analogy
to a rejected gift, Drye overlooks this crucial distinction. A
donee who declines an
inter vivos gift restores the status
quo
ante, leaving the donor to do with the gift what she
will. The disclaiming heir or devisee, in contrast, does not
restore the status quo, for the decedent cannot be revived. Thus
the heir inevitably exercises dominion over the property. He
determines who will receive the propertyhimself if he does not
disclaim, a known other if he does. This power to channel the
estate's assets warrants the conclusion that Drye held "property"
or a "righ[t] to property" subject to the Government's liens under
§ 6321. Pp. 59-61.
152 F.3d
892, affirmed.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Daniel M. Traylor argued the cause and filed a brief for
petitioners.
Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, As-
52
sistant Attorney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General
Wallace, David 1. Pincus, and Anthony T. Sheehan.
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. This case
concerns the respective provinces of state and federal law in
determining what is property for purposes of federal tax lien
legislation. At the time of his mother's death, petitioner Rohn F.
Drye, Jr., was insolvent and owed the Federal Government some
$325,000 on unpaid tax assessments for which notices of federal tax
liens had been filed. His mother died intestate, leaving an estate
with a total value of approximately $233,000 to which he was sole
heir. After the passage of several months, Drye disclaimed his
interest in his mother's estate, which then passed by operation of
state law to his daughter. This case presents the question whether
Drye's interest as heir to his mother's estate constituted
"property" or a "righ[t] to property" to which the federal tax
liens attached under 26 U. S. C. § 6321, despite Drye's exercise of
the prerogative state law accorded him to disclaim the interest
retroactively.
We hold that the disclaimer did not defeat the federal tax
liens. The Internal Revenue Code's prescriptions are most sensibly
read to look to state law for delineation of the taxpayer's rights
or interests, but to leave to federal law the determination whether
those rights or interests constitute "property" or "rights to
property" within the meaning of § 6321. "[O]nce it has been
determined that state law creates sufficient interests in the
[taxpayer] to satisfy the requirements of [the federal tax lien
provision], state law is inoperative to prevent the attachment of
liens created by federal statutes in favor of the United States."
United States v.
Bess, 357 U. S. 51, 56-57
(1958).
I A
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On August 3, 1994, Irma
Deliah Drye died intestate, leaving an estate worth
53
approximately $233,000, of which $158,000 was personalty and
$75,000 was realty located in Pulaski County, Arkansas. Petitioner
Rohn F. Drye, Jr., her son, was sole heir to the estate under
Arkansas law. See Ark. Code Ann. § 28-9-214 (1987) (intestate
interest passes "[f]irst, to the children of the intestate"). On
the date of his mother's death, Drye was insolvent and owed the
Government approximately $325,000, representing assessments for tax
deficiencies in years 1988, 1989, and 1990. The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS or Service) had made assessments against Drye in
November 1990 and May 1991 and had valid tax liens against all of
Drye's "property and rights to property" pursuant to 26 U. S. C. §
6321.
Drye petitioned the Pulaski County Probate Court for appointment
as administrator of his mother's estate and was so appointed on
August 17, 1994. Almost six months later, on February 4, 1995, Drye
filed in the Probate Court and land records of Pulaski County a
written disclaimer of all interests in his mother's estate. Two
days later, Drye resigned as administrator of the estate.
Under Arkansas law, an heir may disavow his inheritance by
filing a written disclaimer no later than nine months after the
death of the decedent. Ark. Code Ann. §§28-2-101, 282-107 (1987).
The disclaimer creates the legal fiction that the disclaimant
predeceased the decedent; consequently, the disclaimant's share of
the estate passes to the person next in line to receive that share.
The disavowing heir's creditors, Arkansas law provides, may not
reach property thus disclaimed. §28-2-108. In the case at hand,
Drye's disclaimer caused the estate to pass to his daughter,
Theresa Drye, who succeeded her father as administrator and
promptly established the Drye Family 1995 Trust (Trust).
On March 10, 1995, the Probate Court declared valid Drye's
disclaimer of all interest in his mother's estate and accordingly
ordered final distribution of the estate to Theresa Drye. Theresa
Drye then used the estate's proceeds to fund the Trust, of which
she and, during their lifetimes, her
54
parents are the beneficiaries. Under the Trust's terms,
distributions are at the discretion of the trustee, Drye's counsel
Daniel M. Traylor, and may be made only for the health,
maintenance, and support of the beneficiaries. The Trust is
spendthrift, and under state law, its assets are therefore shielded
from creditors seeking to satisfy the debts of the Trust's
beneficiaries.
Also in 1995, the IRS and Drye began negotiations regarding
Drye's tax liabilities. During the course of the negotiations, Drye
revealed to the Service his beneficial interest in the Trust.
Thereafter, on April 11, 1996, the IRS filed with the Pulaski
County Circuit Clerk and Recorder a notice of federal tax lien
against the Trust as Drye's nominee. The Service also served a
notice of levy on accounts held in the Trust's name by an
investment bank and notified the Trust of the levy.
B
On May 1, 1996, invoking 26 U. S. C. § 7426(a)(1), the Trust
filed a wrongful levy action against the United States in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
The Government counterclaimed against the Trust, the trustee, and
the trust beneficiaries, seeking to reduce to judgment the tax
assessments against Drye, confirm its right to seize the Trust's
assets in collection of those debts, foreclose on its liens, and
sell the Trust property. On crossmotions for summary judgment, the
District Court ruled in the Government's favor.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's judgment.
Drye Family 1995
Trust v.
United States, 152 F.3d
892 (1998). The Court of Appeals understood our precedents to
convey that "state law determines whether a given set of
circumstances creates a right or interest; federal law then
dictates whether that right or interest constitutes 'property' or
the 'right to property' under § 6321."
Id., at 898.
55
We granted certiorari, 526 U. S. 1063 (1999), to resolve a
conflict between the Eighth Circuit's holding and decisions of the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits.1 We now affirm.
II
Under the relevant prOVlSlons of the Internal Revenue Code, to
satisfy a tax deficiency, the Government may impose a lien on any
"property" or "rights to property" belonging to the taxpayer.
Section 6321 provides: "If any person liable to pay any tax
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount ...
shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and
rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such
person." 26 U. S. C. § 6321. A complementary provision, § 6331(a),
states:
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay
the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful
for the Secretary to collect such tax ... by levy upon all property
and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under
section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there is a lien
provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax." 2
1 In the view of those courts, state law holds sway. Under their
approach, in a State adhering to an acceptance-rejection theory,
under which a property interest vests only when the beneficiary
accepts the inheritance or devise, the disclaiming taxpayer
prevails and the federal liens do not attach. If, instead, the
State holds to a transfer theory, under which the property is
deemed to vest in the beneficiary immediately upon the death of the
testator or intestate, the taxpayer loses and the federal lien runs
with the property. See
Leggett v.
United States,
120 F.3d
592, 594
(CA5 1997); Mapes v.
United States,
15 F.3d
138, 140
(CA9 1994); accord,
United States v.
Davidson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1155 (Colo. 1999). Drye
maintains that Arkansas adheres to the acceptance-rejection
theory.
2 The Code further provides:
"Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien
imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is
made and shall continue until the liability for the amount so
assessed (or a judgment against the taxpayer arising out of such
liability) is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason oflapse
of time." 26 U. S. C. § 6322.
56
The language in §§ 6321 and 6331(a), this Court has observed,
"is broad and reveals on its face that Congress meant to reach
every interest in property that a taxpayer might have."
United
States v.
National Bank of Commerce, 472 U. S. 713, 719-720
(1985) (citing 4 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates
and Gifts ~ 111.5.4, p. 111-100 (1981)); see also
Glass City
Bank v.
United States, 326 U. S. 265, 267 (1945)
("Stronger language could hardly have been selected to reveal a
purpose to assure the collection of taxes."). When Congress so
broadly uses the term "property," we recognize, as we did in the
context of the gift tax, that the Legislature aims to reach" 'every
species of right or interest protected by law and having an
exchangeable value.'"
Jewett v.
Commissioner,
455 U. S. 305,
309 (1982) (quoting S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 39
(1932); H. R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 27 (1932)).
Section 6334(a) of the Code is corroborative. That provision
lists property exempt from levy. The list includes 13 categories of
items; among the enumerated exemptions are certain items necessary
to clothe and care for one's family, unemployment compensation, and
workers' compensation benefits. §§ 6334(a)(1), (2), (4), (7). The
enumeration contained in § 6334(a), Congress directed, is
exclusive: "Notwithstanding any other law of the United States ...
, no property or rights to property shall be exempt from levy other
than the property specifically made exempt by subsection (a)." §
6334(c). Inheritances or devises disclaimed under state law are not
included in § 6334(a)'s catalog of property exempt from levy. See
Bess, 357 U. S., at 57 ("The fact that ... Congress provided
specific exemptions from distraint is evidence that Congress did
not intend to recognize further exemptions which would prevent
attachment of [federal tax] liens[.]");
United States v.
Mitchell, 403
U. S. 190, 205 (1971) ("Th[e] language [of § 6334] is specific
and it is clear and there is no room in it for automatic exemption
of property that
57
happens to be exempt from state levy under state law."). The
absence of any recognition of disclaimers in §§ 6321, 6322,
6331(a), and 6334(a) and (c), the relevant tax collection
provisions, contrasts with § 2518(a) of the Code, which renders
qualifying state-law disclaimers "with respect to any interest in
property" effective for federal wealth-transfer tax purposes and
for those purposes only. 3
Drye nevertheless refers to cases indicating that state law is
the proper guide to the critical determination whether his interest
in his mother's estate constituted "property" or "rights to
property" under § 6321. His position draws support from two recent
appellate opinions:
Leggett v.
United States,
120 F.3d
592, 597
(CA5 1997) ("Section 6321 adopts the state's
definition of property interest."); and
Mapes v.
United
States, 15 F.3d
138, 140
(CA9 1994) ("For the answer to thee] question
[whether taxpayer had the requisite interest in property], we must
look to state law, not federal law."). Although our decisions in
point have not been phrased so meticulously as to preclude Drye's
argument,4 we are satisfied that the Code and interpretive case law
place under federal, not state, control the ultimate issue whether
a taxpayer has a beneficial interest in any property subject to
levy for unpaid federal taxes.
3 See Pennell, Recent Wealth Transfer Tax Developments, in
Sophisticated Estate Planning Techniques 69, 117-118 (ALl-ABA
Continuing Legal Ed. 1997) ("The fact that a qualified disclaimer
by an estate beneficiary is deemed to relate back to the decedent's
death for state property law or federal gift tax purposes is not
sufficient to preclude a federal tax lien for the disclaimant's
delinquent taxes from attaching to the disclaimed property as of
the moment of the decedent's death .... [T]he qualified disclaimer
provision in § 2518 only applies for purposes of Subtitle Band the
lien provisions are in Subtitle F.").
4 See,
e. g., United States v.
National
Bank of Commerce, 472 U. S. 713, 722 (1985)
("[T]he federal statute 'creates no property rights but merely
attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under
state law.''') (quoting
United States v.
Bess,
357 U. S. 51, 55
(1958)).
58
III
As restated in
National Bank of Commerce: "The question
whether a state-law right constitutes 'property' or 'rights to
property' is a matter of federal law." 472 U. S., at 727. We look
initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in
the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to
determine whether the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify as
"property" or "rights to property" within the compass of the
federal tax lien legislation. Cf.
Morgan v.
Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78,80 (1940)
("State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue
acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be
taxed.").
In line with this division of competence, we held that a
taxpayer's right under state law to withdraw the whole of the
proceeds from a joint bank account constitutes "property" or the
"righ[t] to property" subject to levy for unpaid federal taxes,
although state law would not allow ordinary creditors similarly to
deplete the account.
National Bank of Commerce, 472 U. S.,
at 723-727. And we earlier held that a taxpayer's right under a
life insurance policy to compel his insurer to pay him the cash
surrender value qualifies as "property" or a "righ[t] to property"
subject to attachment for unpaid federal taxes, although state law
shielded the cash surrender value from creditors' liens.
Bess, 357 U. S., at 5657.5 By contrast, we also concluded,
again as a matter of
5 Accord,
Bank One Ohio Trust Co. v.
United
States, 80 F.3d
173, 176
(CA6 1996) ("Federal law did not create [the
taxpayer's] equitable income interest [in a spendthrift trust], but
federal law must be applied in determining whether the interest
constitutes 'property' for purposes of § 6321."); 21
West
Lancaster Corp. v.
Main Line Restaurant, Inc., 790 F.2d
354, 357-358
(CA3 1986) (although a liquor license did
not constitute "property" and could not be reached by creditors
under state law, it was nevertheless "property" subject to federal
tax lien); W. Plumb, Federal Tax Liens 27 (3d ed. 1972) ("[I]t is
not material that the economic benefit to which the [taxpayer's
local law property] right pertains is not characterized as
'property' by local law.").
59
federal law, that no federal tax lien could attach to policy
proceeds unavailable to the insured in his lifetime.
Id., at
55-56 ("It would be anomalous to view as 'property' subject to lien
proceeds never within the insured's reach to enjoy.").6
Just as "exempt status under state law does not bind the federal
collector,"
Mitchell, 403 U. S., at 204, so federal tax law
"is not struck blind by a disclaimer,"
United States v.
Irvine, 511 U.
S. 224, 240 (1994). Thus, in
Mitchell, the Court held
that, although a wife's renunciation of a marital interest was
treated as retroactive under state law, that state-law disclaimer
did not determine the wife's liability for federal tax on her share
of the community income realized before the renunciation. See 403
U. S., at 204 (right to renounce does not indicate that taxpayer
never had a right to property).
IV
The Eighth Circuit, with fidelity to the relevant Code
provisions and our case law, determined first what rights state law
accorded Drye in his mother's estate. It is beyond debate, the
Court of Appeals observed, that under Arkansas
6 Compatibly, in
Aquilino v.
United States,
363 U. S. 509
(1960), we held that courts should look first to state law to
determine "'the nature of the legal interest'" a taxpayer has in
the property the Government seeks to reach under its tax lien.
Id., at 513 (quoting
Morgan v.
Commissioner,
309 U. S. 78, 82
(1940)). We then reaffirmed that federal law determines whether the
taxpayer's interests are sufficient to constitute "property" or
"rights to property" subject to the Government's lien. 363 U. S.,
at 513-514. We remanded in
Aquilino for a determination
whether the contractor-taxpayer held any beneficial interest, as
opposed to "bare legal title," in the funds at issue.
Id.,
at 515-516; see also Note, Property Subject to the Federal Tax
Lien, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 1491 (1964)
("Aquilino supports
the view that the Court has chosen to apply a federal test of
classification, for the contractor concededly had legal title to
the funds and yet in remanding the Court indicated that this
state-created incident of ownership was not a sufficient 'right to
property' in the contract proceeds to allow the tax lien to attach.
In this sense
Aquilino follows
Bess in requiring that
the taxpayer must have a beneficial interest in any property
subject to the lien." (footnote omitted)).
60
law Drye had, at his mother's death, a valuable, transferable,
legally protected right to the property at issue. See 152 F. 3d, at
895 (although Code does not define "property" or "rights to
property," appellate courts read those terms to encompass
"state-law rights or interests that have pecuniary value and are
transferable"). The court noted, for example, that a prospective
heir may effectively assign his expectancy in an estate under
Arkansas law, and the assignment will be enforced when the
expectancy ripens into a present estate. See
id., at 895-896
(citing several Arkansas Supreme Court decisions, including:
Clark v.
Rutherford, 227 Ark. 270, 270271, 298 S. W.
2d 327, 330 (1957);
Bradley Lumber Co. of Ark. v.
Burbridge, 213 Ark. 165, 172, 210 S. W. 2d 284, 288 (1948);
Leggett v.
Martin, 203 Ark. 88, 94, 156 S. W. 2d 71,
74-75 (1941)).7
Drye emphasizes his undoubted right under Arkansas law to
disclaim the inheritance, see Ark. Code Ann. § 28-2-101 (1987), a
right that is indeed personal and not marketable. See Brief for
Petitioners 13 (right to disclaim is not transferable and has no
pecuniary value). But Arkansas law primarily gave Drye a right of
considerable value-the right either to inherit or to channel the
inheritance to a close family member (the next lineal descendant).
That right simply cannot be written off as a mere "personal right
... to accept or reject [a] gift."
Ibid.
In pressing the analogy to a rejected gift, Drye overlooks this
crucial distinction. A donee who declines an
inter vivos
7 In recognizing that state-law rights that have pecuniary value
and are transferable fall within § 6321, we do not mean to suggest
that transferability is essential to the existence of "property" or
"rights to property" under that section. For example, although we
do not here decide the matter, we note that an interest in a
spendthrift trust has been held to constitute" 'property' for
purposes of § 6321" even though the beneficiary may not transfer
that interest to third parties. See
Bank One, 80 F. 3d, at
176. Nor do we mean to suggest that an expectancy that has
pecuniary value and is transferable under state law would fall
within § 6321 prior to the time it ripens into a present
estate.
61
gift generally restores the status quo
ante, leaving the
donor to do with the gift what she will. The disclaiming heir or
devisee, in contrast, does not restore the status quo, for the
decedent cannot be revived. Thus the heir inevitably exercises
dominion over the property. He determines who will receive the
property-himself if he does not disclaim, a known other if he does.
See Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 Cornell L. Rev.
587, 607-608 (1989). This power to channel the estate's assets
warrants the conclusion that Drye held "property" or a "righ[t] to
property" subject to the Government's liens.
***
In sum, in determining whether a federal taxpayer's state-law
rights constitute "property" or "rights to property," "[t]he
important consideration is the breadth of the control the
[taxpayer] could exercise over the property."
Morgan, 309 U.
S., at 83. Drye had the unqualified right to receive the entire
value of his mother's estate (less administrative expenses), see
National Bank of Commerce, 472 U. S., at 725 (confirming
that unqualified "right to receive property is itself a property
right" subject to the tax collector's levy), or to channel that
value to his daughter. The control rein he held under state law, we
hold, rendered the inheritance "property" or "rights to property"
belonging to him within the meaning of § 6321, and hence subject to
the federal tax liens that sparked this controversy.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit is
Affirmed.
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