OPINION OF THE COURT
DOE V. CHAO
540 U. S. ____ (2004)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 02-1377
BUCK DOE, PETITIONER
v. ELAINE L. CHAO,
SECRETARY OF LABOR
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit
[February 24, 2004]
Justice Souter delivered the
opinion of the Court.
The United States is subject to a
cause of action for the benefit of at least some individuals
adversely affected by a federal agency’s violation of the Privacy
Act of 1974. The question before us is whether plaintiffs must
prove some actual damages to qualify for a minimum statutory award
of $1,000. We hold that they must.
I
Petitioner Buck Doe filed for
benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 83 Stat. 792, 30 U.
S. C. §901
et seq., with the Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs, the division of the Department of Labor
responsible for adjudicating it. The application form called for a
Social Security number, which the agency then used to identify the
applicant’s claim, as on documents like “multicaptioned” notices of
hearing dates, sent to groups of claimants, their employers, and
the lawyers involved in their cases. The Government concedes that
following this practice led to disclosing Doe’s Social Security
number beyond the limits set by the Privacy Act. See 5 U.
S. C. §552a(b).
Doe joined with six other black lung claimants
to sue the Department of Labor, alleging repeated violations of the
Act and seeking certification of a class of “ ‘all claimants
for Black Lung Benefits since the passage of the Privacy
Act.’ ” Pet. for Cert. 6a. Early on, the United States
stipulated to an order prohibiting future publication of
applicants’ Social Security numbers on multicaptioned hearing
notices, and the parties then filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The District Court denied class certification and entered
judgment against all individual plaintiffs except Doe, finding that
their submissions had raised no issues of cognizable harm. As to
Doe, the Court accepted his uncontroverted evidence of distress on
learning of the improper disclosure, granted summary judgment, and
awarded $1,000 in statutory damages under 5 U. S. C.
§552a(g)(4).
A divided panel of the Fourth
Circuit affirmed in part but reversed on Doe’s claim, holding the
United States entitled to summary judgment across the board. 306
F. 3d 170 (2002). The Circuit treated the $1,000 statutory
minimum as available only to plaintiffs who suffered actual damages
because of the agency’s violation,
id., at 176–179, and
then found that Doe had not raised a triable issue of fact about
actual damages, having submitted no corroboration for his claim of
emotional distress, such as evidence of physical symptoms, medical
treatment, loss of income, or impact on his behavior. In fact, the
only indication of emotional affliction was Doe’s conclusory
allegations that he was “ ‘torn … all to pieces’ ” and
“ ‘greatly concerned and worried’ ” because of the
disclosure of his Social Security number and its potentially
“ ‘devastating’ ” consequences.
Id., at 181.
Doe petitioned for review of the holding that
some actual damages must be proven before a plaintiff may receive
the minimum statutory award. See Pet. for Cert. i. Because the
Fourth Circuit’s decision requiring proof of actual damages
conflicted with the views of other Circuits, see,
e.g.,
Orekoya v.
Mooney, 330 F. 3d 1, 7–8 (CA1
2003);
Wilborn v.
Department of Health and Human
Servs., 49 F. 3d 597, 603 (CA9 1995);
Waters v.
Thornburgh, 888 F. 2d 870, 872 (CADC 1989);
Johnson v.
Department of Treasury, 700 F. 2d
971, 977, and n. 12 (CA5 1983);
Fitzpatrick v.
IRS, 665 F. 2d 327, 330–331 (CA11 1982), we granted
certiorari. 539 U. S. ___ (2003). We now affirm.
II
“[I]n order to protect the
privacy of individuals identified in information systems maintained
by Federal agencies, it is necessary … to regulate the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by such
agencies.” Privacy Act of 1974, §2(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1896. The Act
gives agencies detailed instructions for managing their records and
provides for various sorts of civil relief to individuals aggrieved
by failures on the Government’s part to comply with the
requirements.
Subsection (g)(1) recognizes a
civil action for agency misconduct fitting within any of four
categories (the fourth, in issue here, being a catchall), 5 U.
S. C. §§552a(g)(1)(A)–(D), and then makes separate provision
for the redress of each. The first two categories cover deficient
management of records: subsection (g)(1)(A) provides for the
correction of any inaccurate or otherwise improper material in a
record, and subsection (g)(1)(B) provides a right of access against
any agency refusing to allow an individual to inspect a record kept
on him. In each instance, further provisions specify such things as
the
de novo nature of the suit (as distinct from any form
of deferential review), §§552a(g)(2)(A), (g)(3)(A), and mechanisms
for exercising judicial equity jurisdiction (by
in camera
inspection, for example), §552a(g)(3)(A).
The two remaining categories deal with
derelictions having consequences beyond the statutory violations
per se. Subsection (g)(1)(C) describes an agency’s failure
to maintain an adequate record on an individual, when the result is
a determination “adverse” to that person. Subsection (g)(1)(D)
speaks of a violation when someone suffers an “adverse effect” from
any other failure to hew to the terms of the Act. Like the
inspection and correction infractions, breaches of the statute with
adverse consequences are addressed by specific terms governing
relief:
“In any suit brought under the
provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of this section in which
the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was
intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the
individual in an amount equal to the sum of—
“(A) actual damages sustained by the
individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case
shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of
$1,000; and
“(B) the costs of the action together
with reason- able attorney fees as determined by the court.”
§552a(g)(4).[
Footnote 1]
III
Doe argues that subsection
(g)(4)(A) entitles any plaintiff adversely affected by an
intentional or willful violation to the $1,000 minimum on proof of
nothing more than a statutory violation: anyone suffering an
adverse consequence of intentional or willful disclosure is
entitled to recovery. The Government claims the minimum guarantee
goes only to victims who prove some actual dam- ages. We think the
Government has the better side of the argument.
To begin with, the Government’s position is
supported by a straightforward textual analysis. When the statute
gets to the point of guaranteeing the $1,000 minimum, it not only
has confined any eligibility to victims of adverse effects caused
by intentional or willful actions, but has provided expressly for
liability to such victims for “actual damages sustained.” It has
made specific provision, in other words, for what a victim within
the limited class may recover. When the very next clause of the
sentence containing the explicit provision guarantees $1,000 to a
“person entitled to recovery,” the simplest reading of that phrase
looks back to the immediately preceding provision for recovering
actual damages, which is also the Act’s sole provision for
recovering anything (as distinct from equitable relief). With such
an obvious referent for “person entitled to recovery” in the
plaintiff who sustains “actual damages,” Doe’s theory is
immediately questionable in ignoring the “actual damages” language
so directly at hand and instead looking for “a person entitled to
recovery” in a separate part of the statute devoid of any mention
either of recovery or of what might be recovered.
Nor is it too strong to say that Doe does
ignore statutory language. When Doe reads the statute to mean that
the United States shall be liable to any adversely affected subject
of an intentional or willful violation, without more, he treats
willful action as the last fact necessary to make the Government
“liable,” and he is thus able to describe anyone to whom it is
liable as entitled to the $1,000 guarantee. But this way of reading
the statute simply pays no attention to the fact that the statute
does not speak of liability (and consequent entitlement to
recovery) in a freestanding, unqualified way, but in a limited way,
by reference to enumerated damages.[
Footnote 2]
Doe’s manner of reading “entitle[ment] to
recovery” as satisfied by adverse effect caused by intentional or
willful violation is in tension with more than the text, however.
It is at odds with the traditional understanding that tort recovery
requires not only wrongful act plus causation reaching to the
plaintiff, but proof of some harm for which damages can reasonably
be assessed. See,
e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs,
R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of
Torts §30 (5th ed. 1984). Doe, instead, identifies a person as
entitled to recover without any reference to proof of damages,
actual or otherwise. Doe might respond that it makes sense to speak
of a privacy tort victim as entitled to recover without reference
to damages because analogous common law would not require him to
show particular items of injury in order to receive a dollar
recovery. Traditionally, the common law has provided such victims
with a claim for “general” damages, which for privacy and
defamation torts are presumed damages: a monetary award calculated
without reference to specific harm.[
Footnote 3]
Such a rejoinder would not pass muster under
the Privacy Act, however, because a provision of the Act not
previously mentioned indicates beyond serious doubt that general
damages are not authorized for a statutory violation. An uncodified
section of the Act established a Privacy Protection Study
Commission, which was charged, among its other jobs, to consider
“whether the Federal Government should be liable for general
damages incurred by an individual as the result of a willful or
intentional violation of the provisions of sections 552a(g)(1)(C)
or (D) of title 5.”[
Footnote 4]
§5(c)(2)(B)(iii), 88 Stat. 1907. Congress left the question of
general damages, that is, for another day. Because presumed damages
are therefore clearly unavailable, we have no business treating
just any adversely affected victim of an intentional or willful
violation as entitled to recovery, without something more.
This inference from the terms of the
Commission’s mandate is underscored by drafting history showing
that Congress cut out the very language in the bill that would have
authorized any presumed damages.[
Footnote 5] The Senate bill would have authorized an award
of “actual and general damages sustained by any person,” with that
language followed by the guarantee that “in no case shall a person
entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000.” S. 3418,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., §303(c)(1) (1974). Although the provision for
general damages would have covered presumed damages, see n. 3,
supra, this language was trimmed from the final statute,
subject to any later revision that might be recommended by the
Commission. The deletion of “general damages” from the bill is
fairly seen, then, as a deliberate elimination of any possibility
of imputing harm and awarding presumed damages.[
Footnote 6] The deletion thus precludes any hope
of a sound interpretation of entitlement to recovery without
reference to actual damages.[
Footnote 7]
Finally, Doe’s reading is open to the
objection that no purpose is served by conditioning the guarantee
on a person’s being entitled to recovery. As Doe treats the text,
Congress could have accomplished its object simply by providing
that the Government would be liable to the individual for actual
damages “but in no case … less than the sum of $1,000” plus fees
and costs. Doe’s reading leaves the reference to entitlement to
recovery with no job to do, and it accordingly accomplishes
nothing.[
Footnote 8]
IV
There are three loose ends. Doe’s
argument suggests it would have been illogical for Congress to
create a cause of action for anyone who suffers an adverse effect
from intentional or willful agency action, then deny recovery
without actual damages. But this objection assumes that the
language in subsection (g)(1)(D) recognizing a federal “civil
action” on the part of someone adversely affected was meant,
without more, to provide a complete cause of action, and of course
this is not so. A subsequent provision requires proof of intent or
willfulness in addition to adverse effect, and if the specific
state of mind must be proven additionally, it is equally consistent
with logic to require some actual damages as well. Nor does our
view deprive the language recognizing a civil action by an
adversely affected person of any independent effect, for it may
readily be understood as having a limited but specific function:
the reference in §552a(g)(1)(D) to “adverse effect” acts as a term
of art identifying a potential plaintiff who satisfies the
injury-in-fact and causation requirements of Article III standing,
and who may consequently bring a civil action without suffering
dismissal for want of standing to sue. See
Director, Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs v.
Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,
514 U. S. 122, 126
(1995) (“The phrase ‘person adversely affected or aggrieved’ is a
term of art used in many statutes to designate those who have
standing to challenge or appeal an agency decision, within the
agency or before the courts”); see also 5 U. S. C. §702
(providing review of agency action under the Administrative
Procedure Act to individuals who have been “adversely affected or
aggrieved”). That is, an individual subjected to an adverse effect
has injury enough to open the courthouse door, but without more has
no cause of action for damages under the Privacy Act.[
Footnote 9]
Next, Doe also suggests there is
something peculiar in offering some guaranteed damages, as a form
of presumed damages not requiring proof of amount, only to those
plaintiffs who can demonstrate actual damages. But this approach
parallels another remedial scheme that the drafters of the Privacy
Act would probably have known about. At common law, certain
defamation torts were redressed by general damages but only when a
plaintiff first proved some “special harm,”
i.e., “harm of
a material and generally of a pecuniary nature.” 3 Restatement of
Torts §575, Comments
a and
b (1938) (discussing
defamation torts that are “not actionable per se”); see also 3
Restatement (Second) of Torts §575, Comments
a and
b (1976) (same). Plaintiffs claiming such torts could
recover presumed damages only if they could demonstrate some
actual, quantifiable pecuniary loss. Because the recovery of
presumed damages in these cases was supplemental to compensation
for specific harm, it was hardly unprecedented for Congress to make
a guaranteed minimum contingent upon some showing of actual
damages, thereby avoiding giveaways to plaintiffs with nothing more
than “abstract injuries,”
Los Angeles v.
Lyons,
461 U. S. 95,
101–102 (1983).[
Footnote
10]
In a final effort to save his claim, Doe
points to a pair of statutes with remedial provisions that are
worded similarly to §552a(g)(4). See Tax Reform Act of 1976,
§1201(i)(2)(A), 90 Stat. 1665–1666, 26 U. S. C.
§6110(j)(2)(A); §1202(e)(1), 90 Stat. 1687, 26 U. S. C.
§7217(c) (1976 ed., Supp. V) (repealed 1982); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, §201, 100 Stat. 1866, 18 U.
S. C. §2707(c). He contends that legislative history of these
subsequent enactments shows that Congress sometimes used language
similar to 5 U. S. C. §552a(g)(4) with the object of
authorizing true liquidated damages remedies. See,
e.g.,
S. Rep. No. 94–938, p. 348 (1976) (discussing §1202(e)(1)
of the Tax Reform Act); S. Rep. No. 99–541, p. 43 (1986)
(discussing §201 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act).
There are two problems with this argument. First, as to
§1201(i)(2)(A) of the Tax Reform Act, the text is too far different
from the language of the Privacy Act to serve as any sound basis
for analogy; it does not include the critical limiting phrase
“entitled to recovery.” But even as to §1202(e)(1) of the Tax
Reform Act and §201 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
the trouble with Doe’s position is its reliance on the legislative
histories of completely separate statutes passed well after the
Privacy Act. Those of us who look to legislative history have been
wary about expecting to find reliable interpretive help outside the
record of the statute being construed, and we have said repeatedly
that “ ‘subsequent legislative history will rarely override a
reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its
language and legislative history prior to its enactment,’ ”
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v.
Army Corps
of Engineers,
531 U. S. 159, 170,
n. 5 (2001) (quoting
Consumer Product Safety Comm’n
v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U. S. 102, 118,
n. 13 (1980)).[
Footnote
11]
V
The “entitle[ment] to recovery”
necessary to qualify for the $1,000 minimum is not shown merely by
an intentional or willful violation of the Act producing some
adverse effect. The statute guarantees $1,000 only to plaintiffs
who have suffered some actual damages.[
Footnote 12] The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Footnote 1
The Privacy Act says nothing about standards
of proof governing equitable relief that may be open to victims of
adverse determinations or effects, although it may be that this
inattention is explained by the general provisions for equitable
relief within the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.
S. C. §706. Indeed, the District Court relied on the APA in
determining that it had jurisdiction to enforce the stipulated
order prohibiting the Department of Labor from using Social
Security numbers in multiparty captions.
Doe v.
Herman, Civ. Action No. 97–0043–B (DC Va., Mar. 18, 1998),
pp. 9–11.
Footnote 2
Indeed, if adverse effect of intentional or
willful violation were alone enough to make a person entitled to
recovery, then Congress could have conditioned the entire
subsection (g)(4)(A) as applying only to “a person entitled to
recovery.” That, of course, is not what Congress wrote. As we
mentioned before, Congress used the entitled-to-recovery phrase
only to describe those entitled to the $1,000 guarantee, and it
spoke of entitlement and guarantee only after referring to an
individual’s actual damages, indicating that “actual damages” is a
further touchstone of the entitlement.
Footnote 3
3 Restatement of Torts §621, Comment
a (1938) (“It is not necessary for the plaintiff [who is
seeking general damages in an action for defamation] to prove any
specific harm to his reputation or any other loss caused thereby”);
4
id., §867, Comment
d (1939) (noting that
damages are available for privacy torts “in the same way in which
general damages are given for defamation,” without proof of
“pecuniary loss [or] physical harm”); see also 3 Restatement
(Second) of Torts §621, Comment
a (1976).
Footnote 4
The Commission ultimately recommended that
the Act should “permit the recovery of special and general damages
… but in no case should a person entitled to recovery receive less
than the sum of $1,000 or more than the sum of $10,000 for general
damages in excess of the dollar amount of any special damages.”
Personal Privacy in an Information Society: The Report of the
Privacy Protection Study Commission 531 (July 1977).
Footnote 5
On this point, we do not understand Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent to take issue with our conclusion that Congress
explicitly rejected the proposal to make presumed damages available
for Privacy Act violations. Instead, Justice Ginsburg appears to
argue only that Congress would have wanted nonpecuniary harm to
qualify as actual damages under subsection (g)(4)(A).
Post, at 8, n. 4 (plaintiff may recover for emotional
distress “ ‘that he proves to have been actually suffered by
him’ ” (quoting 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts,
supra, at 402, Comment
b)). That issue, however,
is not before us today. See n. 12,
infra.
Footnote 6
While theoretically there could also have
been a third category, that of “nominal damages,” it is implausible
that Congress intended tacitly to recognize a nominal damages
remedy after eliminating the explicit reference to general
damages.
Footnote 7
Justice Scalia does not join this paragraph
or footnote 8.
Footnote 8
Justice Ginsburg responds that our reading is
subject to a similar criticism: “Congress more rationally [c]ould
have written: ‘actual damages … but in no case shall a person who
proves such damages [in any amount] receive less than
$1,000.’ ”
Post, at 3–4. Congress’s use of the
entitlement phrase actually contained in the statute, however, is
explained by drafting history. The first bill passed by the Senate
authorized recovery of both actual and general damages. See
infra, at 7–8. At that point, when discussing eligibility
for the $1,000 guarantee, it was reasonable to refer to plaintiffs
with either sort of damages by the general term “a person entitled
to recovery.” When subsequent amendment limited recovery to actual
damages by eliminating the general, no one apparently thought to
delete the inclusive reference to entitlement. But this failure to
remove the old language did not affect its reference to “actual
damages,” the term remaining from the original pair, “actual and
general.”
Footnote 9
Nor are we convinced by the analysis
mentioned in the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, that
any plaintiff who can demonstrate that he was adversely affected by
intentional or willful agency action is entitled to costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees under §552a(g)(4)(B), and is for that
reason “a person entitled to recovery” under subsection (g)(4)(A).
See 306 F. 3d 170, 188–189 (CA4 2002). Instead of treating
damages as a recovery entitling a plaintiff to costs and fees, see,
e.g., 42 U. S. C. §1988(b) (allowing “a reasonable
attorney’s fee” to a “prevailing party” under many federal civil
rights statutes);
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society,
421 U. S. 240, 247–258
(1975) (discussing history of American courts’ power to award fees
and costs to prevailing plaintiffs), this analysis would treat
costs and fees as the recovery entitling a plaintiff to minimum
damages; it would get the cart before the horse.
Footnote 10
We also reject the related suggestion that
the category of cases with actual damages not exceeding $1,000 is
so small as to render the minimum award meaningless under our
reading. It is easy enough to imagine pecuniary expenses that might
turn out to be reasonable in particular cases but fall well short
of $1,000: fees associated with running a credit report, for
example, or the charge for a Valium prescription. Since we do not
address the definition of actual damages today, see n. 12,
infra, this challenge is too speculative to overcome our
interpretation of the statute’s plain language and history.
Footnote 11
In support of Doe’s position, Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent also cites another item of extratextual
material, an interpretation of the Privacy Act that was published
by the Office of Management and Budget in 1975 as a guideline for
federal agencies seeking to comply with the Act.
Post, at
6–7. The dissent does not claim that any deference is due this
interpretation, however, and we do not find its unelaborated
conclusion persuasive.
Footnote 12
The Courts of Appeals are divided on the
precise definition of actual damages. Compare
Fitzpatrick
v.
IRS, 665 F. 2d 327, 331 (CA11 1982) (actual
damages are restricted to pecuniary loss), with
Johnson v.
Department of Treasury, 700 F. 2d 971, 972–974 (CA5
1983) (actual damages can cover adequately demonstrated mental
anxiety even without any out-of-pocket loss). That issue is not
before us, however, since the petition for certiorari did not raise
it for our review. We assume without deciding that the Fourth
Circuit was correct to hold that Doe’s complaints in this case did
not rise to the level of alleging actual damages. We do not suggest
that out-of-pocket expenses are necessary for recovery of the
$1,000 minimum; only that they suffice to qualify under any view of
actual damages.
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