OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
DICKERSON
v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT
No. 99-5525. Argued April 19, 2000-Decided June 26, 2000
In the wake of
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, in which
the Court held that certain warnings must be given before a
suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be
admitted in evidence,
id., at 479, Congress enacted 18 U. S.
C. § 3501, which in essence makes the admissibility of such
statements turn solely on whether they were made voluntarily.
Petitioner, under indictment for bank robbery and related federal
crimes, moved to suppress a statement he had made to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, on the ground he had not received
"Miranda warnings" before being interrogated. The District
Court granted his motion, and the Government took an interlocutory
appeal. In reversing, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that
petitioner had not received
Miranda warnings, but held that
§ 3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary. It
concluded that
Miranda was not a constitutional holding, and
that, therefore, Congress could by statute have the final say on
the admissibility question.
Held: Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the
admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in
both state and federal courts. Pp. 432-444.
(a)
Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this
Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress. Given
§ 3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of
admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and its
instruction for trial courts to consider the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, this Court
agrees with the Fourth Circuit that Congress intended § 3501 to
overrule
Miranda. The law is clear as to whether Congress
has constitutional authority to do so. This Court has supervisory
authority over the federal courts to prescribe binding rules of
evidence and procedure.
Carlisle v.
United States,
517 U. S. 416,
426. While Congress has ultimate authority to modify or set aside
any such rules that are not constitutionally required,
e.
g., Palermo v.
United States, 360 U. S. 343, 345-348,
it may not supersede this Court's decisions interpreting and
applying the Constitution, see,
e. g., City of
Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 517-521.
That
Miranda announced a constitutional rule is
demonstrated, first and foremost, by the fact that both
Miranda and two of its companion cases applied its rule to
proceedings in state courts, and that the Court has consistently
done
429
so ever since. See,
e. g., Stansbury v.
California, 511 U. S. 318 (per
curiam). The Court does not hold supervisory power over the
state courts,
e. g., Smith v.
Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 221, as to
which its authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the
Constitution,
e. g., Mu'Min v.
Virginia, 500
U. S. 415, 422. The conclusion that
Miranda is
constitutionally based is also supported by the fact that that case
is replete with statements indicating that the majority thought it
was announcing a constitutional rule, see,
e. g., 384
U. S., at 445. Although
Miranda invited legislative action
to protect the constitutional right against coerced
self-incrimination, it stated that any legislative alternative must
be "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their
right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it."
Id., at 467.
A contrary conclusion is not required by the fact that the Court
has subsequently made exceptions from the
Miranda rule, see,
e. g., New York v.
Quarles, 467 U. S. 649. No
constitutional rule is immutable, and the sort of refinements made
by such cases are merely a normal part of constitutional law.
Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 306-in
which the Court, in refusing to apply the traditional "fruits"
doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases, stated that
Miranda's exclusionary rule serves the Fifth Amendment and
sweeps more broadly than that Amendment itself-does not prove that
Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but simply
recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the
Fifth. Finally, although the Court agrees with the court-appointed
amicus curiae that there are more remedies available for
abusive police conduct than there were when
Miranda was
decided--e.
g., a suit under
Bivens v.
Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388-it does not
agree that such additional measures supplement § 3501's protections
sufficiently to create an adequate substitute for the
Miranda warnings.
Miranda requires procedures that
will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and
assure him that the exercise of that right will be honored, see,
e. g., 384 U. S., at 467, while § 3501 explicitly
eschews a requirement of preinterrogation warnings in favor of an
approach that looks to the administration of such warnings as only
one factor in determining the voluntariness of a suspect's
confession. Section 3501, therefore, cannot be sustained if
Miranda is to remain the law. Pp. 432-443.
(b) This Court declines to overrule
Miranda. Whether or
not this Court would agree with
Miranda's reasoning and its
rule in the first instance,
stare decisis weighs heavily
against overruling it now. Even in constitutional cases,
stare
decisis carries such persuasive force that the Court has always
required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special
justification.
E. g., United States v.
Inter-
430
Syllabus
national Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856. There
is no such justification here.
Miranda has become embedded
in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have
become part of our national culture. See
Mitchell v.
United States, 526 U. S. 314, 331-332.
While the Court has overruled its precedents when subsequent cases
have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings, that has not
happened to
Miranda. If anything, subsequent cases have
reduced
Miranda's impact on legitimate law enforcement while
reaffirming the decision's core ruling. The rule's disadvantage is
that it may result in a guilty defendant going free. But experience
suggests that § 3501's totalityof-the-circumstances test is more
difficult than
Miranda for officers to conform to, and for
courts to apply consistently. See,
e. g., Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 515. The
requirement that
Miranda warnings be given does not dispense
with the voluntariness inquiry, but cases in which a defendant can
make a colorable argument that a selfincriminating statement was
compelled despite officers' adherence to
Miranda are rare.
Pp. 443-444.
166 F.3d
667, reversed.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ.,
joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS,
J., joined,
post, p.444.
James W Hundley, by appointment of the Court, 528 U. S.
1072, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were
Carter G.
Phillips, Jeffrey T. Green, and
Kurt H.
Jacobs.
Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the briefs were Attorney General Reno, Assistant
Attorney General Robinson, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, James
A. Feldman, and Lisa S. Blatt.
Paul G.
Cassell, by invitation of the Court, 528
U. S. 1045, argued the cause as
amicus curiae urging
affirmance. With him on the brief were
Daniel J.
Popeo and
Paul D. Kamenar.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the
American Civil Liberties Union by Jonathan L. Abram, Audrey
J. Anderson, Steven R. Shapiro, Vivian Berger, Susan N.
Herman, and Stephen Schulhofer;
431
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), we
held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect's
statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted
in
for the House Democratic Leadership by Charles Tiefer and
Jonathan W Cuneo; for the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers et al. by Paul M. Smith, Deanne E. Maynard, Lisa B. Kemler,
and John T. Philipsborn; for the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association by Charles D. Weisselberg and Michelle Falkoff; for the
Rutherford Institute by James Joseph Lynch, Jr., and John W
Whitehead; for Griffin B. Bell by Robert S. Litt, John A. Freedman,
and Daniel C. Richman; and for Benjamin R. Civiletti by Mr.
Civiletti, pro se, Kenneth C. Bass III, and John F. Cooney.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the State of South Carolina et al. by
Charles M. Condon,
Attorney General of South Carolina,
Treva Ashworth, Deputy
Attorney General,
Kenneth P. Woodington, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, and
Travey Colton Green, Assistant
Attorney General; for the Maricopa County Attorney's Office by
Theodore B. Olson, Douglas R. Cox, and
Miguel A.
Estrada; for Arizona Voices for Victims et al. by
Douglas
Beloof; for the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United
States House of Representatives by
Geraldine R. Gennet, Kerry W
Kircher, and
Michael L. Stern; for the Center for the
Community Interest et al. by
Daniel P. Collins, Kristin Linsley
Myles, and
Kelly M. Klaus; for the Center for the
Original Intent of the Constitution by
Michael P. Farris;
for Citizens for Law and Order et al. by
Theodore M.
Cooperstein; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by
Kent S.
Scheidegger, Charles L. Hobson, and
Edwin
Meese III; for the Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents
Association by
Robert F.
Hoyt; for the Fraternal
Order of Police by
Patrick F.
Philbin and
Thomas
T. Rutherford; for the National Association of Police
Organizations et al. by
Stephen R. McSpadden, Robert
J. Cynkar, and
Margaret A. Ryan; for the
National District Attorneys Association et al. by
Lynne Abraham,
Ronald Eisenberg, Jeffrey C.
Sullivan, John M. Tyson, Jr.,
Grover Trask, Christine A. Cooke, John B. Dangler, and
Richard E. Trodden; for Former Attorneys General of the
United States William P. Barr and Edwin Meese III by
Andrew
G.
McBride; for Senator Orrin G. Hatch et al. by
Senator
Hatch, pro se; and for Manning & Marder, Kass, Ellrod,
Ramirez by
Davis
Wayne W Schmidt, James P. Manak, and
Bernard
J. Farber filed a brief for Americans for Effective
Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. as
amici curiae.
432
evidence. In the wake of that decision, Congress enacted 18 U.
S. C. § 3501, which in essence laid down a rule that the
admissibility of such statements should turn only on whether or not
they were voluntarily made. We hold that
Miranda, being a
constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect
overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule
Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that
Miranda and
its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements
made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal
courts.
Petitioner Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy
to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of
committing a crime of violence, all in violation of the applicable
provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. Before trial,
Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal
Bureau of Investigation field office, on the grounds that he had
not received
"Miranda warnings" before being interrogated.
The District Court granted his motion to suppress, and the
Government took an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That court, by a divided vote,
reversed the District Court's suppression order. It agreed with the
District Court's conclusion that petitioner had not received
Miranda warnings before making his statement. But it went on
to hold that § 3501, which in effect makes the admissibility of
statements such as Dickerson's turn solely on whether they were
made voluntarily, was satisfied in this case. It then concluded
that our decision in
Miranda was not a constitutional
holding, and that, therefore, Congress could by statute have the
final say on the question of admissibility.
166
F.3d 667 (1999).
Because of the importance of the questions raised by the Court
of Appeals' decision, we granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 1045 (1999),
and now reverse.
We begin with a brief historical account of the law governing
the admission of confessions. Prior to
Miranda, we
433
evaluated the admissibility of a suspect's confession under a
voluntariness test. The roots of this test developed in the common
law, as the courts of England and then the United States recognized
that coerced confessions are inherently untrustworthy. See,
e.
g., King v.
Rudd, 1 Leach 115, 117-118, 122-123, 168
Eng. Rep. 160, 161, 164 (K. B. 1783) (Lord Mansfield, C. J.)
(stating that the English courts excluded confessions obtained by
threats and promises);
King v.
Warickshall, 1 Leach
262, 263-264, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K. B. 1783) ("A free and
voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it
is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt ... but a
confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the
torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape ... that no
credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected");
King v.
Parratt, 4 Car. & P. 570, 172 Eng. Rep.
829 (N. P. 1831);
Queen v.
Garner, 1 Den. 329, 169
Eng. Rep. 267 (Ct. Crim. App. 1848);
Queen v.
Baldry,
2 Den. 430, 169 Eng. Rep. 568 (Ct. Crim. App.
1852); Hopt v.
Territory of Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884);
Pierce v.
United States, 160 U. S. 355, 357
(1896). Over time, our cases recognized two constitutional bases
for the requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted
into evidence: the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See,
e.
g., Bram v.
United States, 168 U. S. 532, 542 (1897)
(stating that the voluntariness test "is controlled by that portion
of the Fifth Amendment ... commanding that no person 'shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself' ");
Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936)
(reversing a criminal conviction under the Due Process Clause
because it was based on a confession obtained by physical
coercion).
While
Bram was decided before
Brown and its
progeny, for the middle third of the 20th century our cases based
the rule against admitting coerced confessions primarily, if not
exclusively, on notions of due process. We applied the
434
due process voluntariness test in "some 30 different cases
decided during the era that intervened between
Brown and
Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 [(1964)]."
Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 223
(1973). See,
e. g., Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U. S. 503 (1963);
Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944);
Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940). Those
cases refined the test into an inquiry that examines "whether a
defendant's will was overborne" by the circumstances surrounding
the giving of a confession.
Schneckloth, 412 U. S., at 226.
The due process test takes into consideration "the totality of all
the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation."
Ibid. See
also
Haynes, supra, at 513;
Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370
U. S. 49, 55 (1962);
Reck v.
Pate, 367 U. S. 433, 440 (1961)
("[A]ll the circumstances attendant upon the confession must be
taken into account");
Malinski v.
New York, 324 U. S. 401, 404 (1945)
("If all the attendant circumstances indicate that the confession
was coerced or compelled, it may not be used to convict a
defendant"). The determination "depend[s] upon a weighing of the
circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the
person confessing."
Stein v.
New York, 346 U. S. 156,
185 (1953).
We have never abandoned this due process jurisprudence, and thus
continue to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily.
But our decisions in
Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1
(1964), and
Miranda changed the focus of much of the inquiry
in determining the admissibility of suspects' incriminating
statements. In
Malloy, we held that the Fifth Amendment's
Self-Incrimination Clause is incorporated in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applies to the States. 378 U.
S., at 6-11. We decided
Miranda on the heels of
Malloy.
In
Miranda, we noted that the advent of modern custodial
police interrogation brought with it an increased con-
435
cern about confessions obtained by coercion.1 384 U. S., at
445-458. Because custodial police interrogation, by its very
nature, isolates and pressures the individual, we stated that
"[e]ven without employing brutality, the 'third degree' or [other]
specific stratagems, ... custodial interrogation exacts a heavy
toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of
individuals."
Id., at 455. We concluded that the coercion
inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between
voluntary and involuntary statements, and thus heightens the risk
that an individual will not be "accorded his privilege under the
Fifth Amendment ... not to be compelled to incriminate himself."
Id., at 439. Accordingly, we laid down "concrete
constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts
to follow."
Id., at 442. Those guidelines established that
the admissibility in evidence of any statement given during
custodial interrogation of a suspect would depend on whether the
police provided the suspect with four warnings. These warnings
(which have come to be known colloquially as
"Miranda
rights") are: a suspect "has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires."
Id., at 479.
Two years after
Miranda was decided, Congress enacted §
3501. That section provides, in relevant part:
"(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or
by the District of Columbia, a confession ... shall be admissible
in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is
received in evidence, the trial
1 While our cases have long interpreted the Due Process and
SelfIncrimination Clauses to require that a suspect be accorded a
fair trial free from coerced testimony, our application of those
Clauses to the context of custodial police interrogation is
relatively recent because the routine practice of such
interrogation is itself a relatively new development. See,
e. g., Miranda, 384 U. S., at 445-458.
436
judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any
issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the
confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence
and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence
on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give
such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under
all the circumstances.
"(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness
shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the
giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between
arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if
it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such
defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged
or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession,
(3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was
not required to make any statement and that any such statement
could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had
been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of
counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the
assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such
confession.
"The presence or absence of any of the abovementioned factors to
be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on
the issue of voluntariness of the confession."
Given § 3501's express designation of voluntariness as the
touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any warning
requirement, and the instruction for trial courts to consider a
nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the circumstances of a
confession, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress
intended by its enactment to overrule
Miranda. See also
Davis v.
United States, 512 U. S. 452, 464 (1994)
(SCALIA, J., concurring) (stating that, prior to
Miranda,
437
"voluntariness
vel non was the touchstone of
admissibility of confessions"). Because of the obvious conflict
between our decision in
Miranda and § 3501, we must address
whether Congress has constitutional authority to thus supersede
Miranda. If Congress has such authority, § 3501's
totalityof-the-circumstances approach must prevail over
Miranda's requirement of warnings; if not, that section must
yield to
Miranda's more specific requirements.
The law in this area is clear. This Court has supervisory
authority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority to
prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding in those
tribunals.
Carlisle v.
United States, 517 U. S. 416, 426
(1996). However, the power to judicially create and enforce
nonconstitutional "rules of procedure and evidence for the federal
courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress."
Palermo v.
United States, 360 U. S. 343, 353, n. 11
(1959) (citing
Funk v.
United States, 290 U. S. 371, 382
(1933), and
Gordon v.
United States, 344 U. S. 414, 418
(1953)). Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set
aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that
are not required by the Constitution.
Palermo, supra, at
345-348;
Carlisle, supra, at
426; Vance v.
Terrazas, 444
U. S. 252, 265 (1980).
But Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions
interpreting and applying the Constitution. See,
e.
g., City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 517-521
(1997). This case therefore turns on whether the
Miranda
Court announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its
supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of
congressional direction. Recognizing this point, the Court of
Appeals surveyed
Miranda and its progeny to determine the
constitutional status of the
Miranda decision. 166 F. 3d, at
687-692. Relying on the fact that we have created several
exceptions to
Miranda's warnings requirement and that we
have repeatedly referred to the
Miranda warnings as
"prophylactic,"
New York v.
Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 653
438
(1984), and "not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution,"
Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 444
(1974),2 the Court of Appeals concluded that the protections
announced in
Miranda are not constitutionally required. 166
F. 3d, at 687-690.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, although we
concede that there is language in some of our opinions that
supports the view taken by that court. But first and foremost of
the factors on the other side-that
Miranda is a
constitutional decision-is that both
Miranda and two of its
companion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state courts-to
wit, Arizona, California, and New York. See 384 U. S., at 491-494,
497-499. Since that time, we have consistently applied
Miranda's rule to prosecutions arising in state courts. See,
e. g., Stansbury v.
California, 511 U. S. 318 (1994)
(per curiam); Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U. S. 146
(1990);
Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U. S. 675 (1988);
Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 481-482
(1981). It is beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory
power over the courts of the several States.
Smith v.
Phillips, 455
U. S. 209, 221 (1982) ("Federal courts hold no supervisory
authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to
correct wrongs of constitutional dimension");
Cicenia v.
Lagay, 357 U.
S. 504, 508-509 (1958). With respect to proceedings in state
courts, our "authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the
United States Constitution."
Mu'Min v.
Virginia,
500 U. S. 415,
422 (1991). See also
Harris v.
Rivera, 454 U. S. 339, 344-345
(1981)
(per curiam) (stating that "[f]ederal judges ... may
not require the ob-
2 See also
Davis v.
United States, 512 U. S. 452, 457-458
(1994);
Withrow v.
Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 690-691
(1993)
("Miranda's safeguards are not constitutional in
character");
Duckworth v.
Eagan, 492 U. S. 195, 203
(1989); Connecticut v.
Barrett, 479 U. S. 523, 528 (1987)
("[T]he
Miranda Court adopted prophylactic rules designed to
insulate the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights");
Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.
S. 298, 306 (1985);
Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 492 (1981)
(Powell, J., concurring in result).
439
servance of any special procedures" in state courts "except when
necessary to assure compliance with the dictates of the Federal
Constitution").3
The
Miranda opinion itself begins by stating that the
Court granted certiorari "to explore some facets of the problems
... of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to
in-custody interrogation,
and to give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow."
384 U. S., at 441-442 (emphasis added). In fact, the majority
opinion is replete with statements indicating that the majority
thought it was announcing a constitutional rule.4 Indeed, the
Court's ultimate conclusion was that the
3 Our conclusion regarding
Miranda's constitutional basis
is further buttressed by the fact that we have allowed prisoners to
bring alleged
Miranda violations before the federal courts
in habeas corpus proceedings. See
Thompson v.
Keohane, 516 U.
S. 99 (1995);
Withrow, supra, at 690-695. Habeas corpus
proceedings are available only for claims that a person "is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U. S. C. §2254(a). Since the
Miranda rule
is clearly not based on federal laws or treaties, our decision
allowing habeas review for
Miranda claims obviously assumes
that
Miranda is of constitutional origin.
4 See 384 U. S., at 445 ("The constitutional issue we decide in
each of these cases is the admissibility of statements obtained
from a defendant questioned while in custody"), 457 (stating that
the
Miranda Court was concerned with "adequate safeguards to
protect precious Fifth Amendment rights"), 458 (examining the
"history and precedent underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause to
determine its applicability in this situation"), 476 ("The
requirement of warnings and waiver ofrights is ... fundamental with
respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a
preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation"), 479
("The whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that
the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when
confronted with the power of government when it provided in the
Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a
witness against himself"), 481, n. 52 (stating that the Court dealt
with "constitutional standards in relation to statements made"),
490 ("[T]he issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and
must be determined by the courts"), 489 (stating that the
Miranda Court was dealing "with rights grounded in a
specific requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution").
440
unwarned confessions obtained in the four cases before the Court
in
Miranda "were obtained from the defendant under
circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for
protection of the privilege." 5
Id., at 491.
Additional support for our conclusion that
Miranda is
constitutionally based is found in the
Miranda Court's
invitation for legislative action to protect the constitutional
right against coerced self-incrimination. After discussing the
"compelling pressures" inherent in custodial police interrogation,
the
Miranda Court concluded that, "[i]n order to combat
these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be
adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise
of those rights must be fully honored."
Id., at 467.
However, the Court emphasized that it could not foresee "the
potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which might be
devised by Congress or the States," and it accordingly opined that
the Constitution would not preclude legislative solutions that
differed from the prescribed
Miranda warnings but
which were "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of
their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it." 6
Ibid.
5 Many of our subsequent cases have also referred to
Miranda's constitutional underpinnings. See,
e. g.,
Withrow, supra, at 691 (" 'Prophylactic' though it may be, in
protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination,
Miranda safeguards a 'fundamental trial
right' ");
Illinois v.
Perkins, 496 U. S. 292, 296 (1990)
(describing
Miranda's warning requirement as resting on "the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination");
Butler v.
McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 411 (1990)
("[T]he Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated interrogation
following a suspect's request for counsel in the context of a
separate investigation");
Michigan v.
Jackson,
475 U. S. 625,
629 (1986) ("The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled
self-incrimination provides the right to counsel at custodial
interrogations");
Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 427 (1986)
(referring to
Miranda as "our interpretation of the Federal
Constitution");
Edwards, supra, at 481-482.
6 The Court of Appeals relied in part on our statement that the
Miranda decision in no way "creates a 'constitutional
straightjacket.''' See
166 F.3d
667, 672
(CA4 1999) (quoting
Miranda, 384 U. S.,
at 467). However, a
441
The Court of Appeals also relied on the fact that we have, after
our
Miranda decision, made exceptions from its rule in cases
such as
New York v.
Quarles, 467 U. S. 649 (1984), and
Harris v.
New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971). See
166 F. 3d, at 672, 689-691. But we have also broadened the
application of the
Miranda doctrine in cases such as
Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (1976), and
Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U. S. 675 (1988).
These decisions illustrate the principle-not that
Miranda is
not a constitutional rule-but that no constitutional rule is
immutable. No court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee
the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it,
and the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as
much a normal part of constitutional law as the original
decision.
The Court of Appeals also noted that in
Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.
S. 298 (1985), we stated that" '[t]he
Miranda
exclusionary rule ... serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.'" 166 F. 3d, at 690
(quoting
Elstad, supra, at 306). Our decision in that
case-refusing to apply the traditional "fruits" doctrine developed
in Fourth Amendment cases-does not prove that
Miranda is a
nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that
unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from
unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment.
As an alternative argument for sustaining the Court of Appeals'
decision, the court-invited
amicus curiae 7 contends that
the section complies with the requirement that a legislative
alternative to
Miranda be equally as effective in preventing
coerced confessions. See Brief for Paul G. Cassell
review of our opinion in
Miranda clarifies that this
disclaimer was intended to indicate that the Constitution does not
require police to administer the particular
Miranda
warnings, not that the Constitution does not require a procedure
that is effective in securing Fifth Amendment rights.
7 Because no party to the underlying litigation argued in favor
of § 3501's constitutionality in this Court, we invited Professor
Paul Cassell to assist our deliberations by arguing in support of
the judgment below.
442
as
Amicus Curiae 28-39. We agree with the
amicus'
contention that there are more remedies available for abusive
police conduct than there were at the time
Miranda was
decided, see,
e. g., Wilkins v.
May, 872 F.2d
190, 194
(CA71989) (applying
Bivens v.
Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), to
hold that a suspect may bring a federal cause of action under the
Due Process Clause for police misconduct during custodial
interrogation). But we do not agree that these additional measures
supplement § 3501's protections sufficiently to meet the
constitutional minimum.
Miranda requires procedures that
will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and
which will assure the suspect that the exercise of that right will
be honored. See,
e. g., 384 U. S., at 467. As
discussed above, § 3501 explicitly eschews a requirement of
preinterrogation warnings in favor of an approach that looks to the
administration of such warnings as only one factor in determining
the voluntariness of a suspect's confession. The additional
remedies cited by
amicus do not, in our view, render them,
together with § 3501, an adequate substitute for the warnings
required by
Miranda.
The dissent argues that it is judicial overreaching for this
Court to hold § 3501 unconstitutional unless we hold that the
Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution, in the
sense that nothing else will suffice to satisfy constitutional
requirements.
Post, at 453-454, 465 (opinion of SCALIA, J.).
But we need not go further than
Miranda to decide this case.
In
Miranda, the Court noted that reliance on the traditional
totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an
involuntary custodial confession, 384 U. S, at 457, a risk that the
Court found unacceptably great when the confession is offered in
the case in chief to prove guilt. The Court therefore concluded
that something more than the totality test was necessary. See
ibid.; see also
id., at 467, 490-491. As discussed
above, § 3501 reinstates the totality test as
443
sufficient. Section 3501 therefore cannot be sustained if
Miranda is to remain the law.
Whether or not we would agree with
Miranda's reasoning
and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first
instance, the principles of
stare decisis weigh heavily
against overruling it now. See,
e. g., Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.
S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C. J., concurring in judgment)
("The meaning of
Miranda has become reasonably clear and law
enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would
neither overrule
Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at
this late date"). While"
'stare decisis is not an inexorable
command,'"
State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20
(1997) (quoting
Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828
(1991)), particularly when we are interpreting the Constitution,
Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 235
(1997), "even in constitutional cases, the doctrine carries such
persuasive force that we have always required a departure from
precedent to be supported by some 'special justification.'"
United States v.
International Business Machines
Corp., 517 U. S.
843, 856 (1996) (quoting
Payne, supra, at 842 (SouTER,
J., concurring), in turn quoting
Arizona v.
Rumsey,
467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984)).
We do not think there is such justification for overruling
Miranda. Miranda has become embedded in routine police
practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our
national culture. See
Mitchell v.
United States, 526
U. S. 314, 331-332 (1999) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (stating that
the fact that a rule has found "'wide acceptance in the legal
culture'" is "adequate reason not to overrule" it). While we have
overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined
their doctrinal underpinnings, see,
e. g., Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 173
(1989), we do not believe that this has happened to the
Miranda decision. If anything, our subsequent cases have
reduced the impact of the
Miranda rule on legitimate law
enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling that
unwarned
444
statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case
in chief.
The disadvantage of the
Miranda rule is that statements
which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is
aware of his "rights," may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty
defendant go free as a result. But experience suggests that the
totality-of-the-circumstances test which § 3501 seeks to revive is
more difficult than
Miranda for law enforcement officers to
conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner. See,
e. g., Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U. S., at 515 ("The
line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques
and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one
to draw"). The requirement that
Miranda warnings be given
does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry. But
as we said in
Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U. S. 420 (1984),
"[c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a
self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that
the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of
Miranda are rare."
Id., at 433, n. 20.
In sum, we conclude that
Miranda announced a
constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.
Following the rule of
stare decisis, we decline to overrule
Miranda ourselves.8 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
therefore
Reversed.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, dissenting.
Those to whom judicial decisions are an unconnected series of
judgments that produce either favored or disfa-
8 Various other contentions and suggestions have been pressed by
the numerous
amici, but because of the procedural posture of
this case we do not think it appropriate to consider them. See
United Parcel Service, Inc. v.
Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 60, n. 2
(1981);
Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 531-532,
n. 13 (1979);
Knetsch v.
United States, 364 U. S. 361, 370
(1960).
445
vored results will doubtless greet today's decision as a paragon
of moderation, since it declines to overrule
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384
U. S. 436 (1966). Those who understand the judicial process
will appreciate that today's decision is not a reaffirmation of
Miranda, but a radical revision of the most significant
element of
Miranda (as of all cases): the rationale that
gives it a permanent place in our jurisprudence.
Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), held that
an Act of Congress will not be enforced by the courts if what it
prescribes violates the Constitution of the United States. That was
the basis on which
Miranda was decided. One will search
today's opinion in vain, however, for a statement (surely simple
enough to make) that what 18 U. S. C. § 3501 prescribes-the use at
trial of a voluntary confession, even when a
Miranda warning
or its equivalent has failed to be given-violates the Constitution.
The reason the statement does not appear is not only (and perhaps
not so much) that it would be absurd, inasmuch as § 3501 excludes
from trial precisely what the Constitution excludes from trial,
viz., compelled confessions; but also that Justices whose votes are
needed to compose today's majority are on record as believing that
a violation of
Miranda is
not a violation of the
Constitution. See
Davis v.
United States, 512 U. S. 452, 457-458
(1994) (opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, J., joined);
Duckworth v.
Eagan, 492 U. S. 195, 203 (1989)
(opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, J., joined);
Oregon
v.
Elstad, 470
U. S. 298 (1985) (opinion of the Court by O'CONNOR, J.);
New
York v.
Quarles, 467 U. S. 649 (1984)
(opinion of the Court by REHNQUIST, J.). And so, to justify today's
agreed-upon result, the Court must adopt a significant
new,
if not entirely comprehensible, principle of constitutional law. As
the Court chooses to describe that principle, statutes of Congress
can be disregarded, not only when what they prescribe violates the
Constitution, but when what they prescribe contradicts a decision
of this Court that "announced a constitutional rule,"
ante,
at 437. As I shall discuss in some
446
detail, the only thing that can possibly mean in the context of
this case is that this Court has the power, not merely to apply the
Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as useful
"prophylactic" restrictions upon Congress and the States. That is
an immense and frightening antidemocratic power, and it does not
exist.
It takes only a small step to bring to day's opinion out of the
realm of power-judging and into the mainstream of legal reasoning:
The Court need only go beyond its carefully couched iterations that
"Miranda is a constitutional decision,"
ante, at 438,
that
"Miranda is constitutionally based,"
ante, at
440, that
Miranda has "constitutional underpinnings,"
ante, at 440, n. 5, and come out and say quite clearly:
"We reaffirm today that custodial interrogation that is not
preceded by
Miranda warnings or their equivalent violates
the Constitution of the United States." It cannot say that, because
a majority of the Court does not believe it. The Court therefore
acts in plain violation of the Constitution when it denies effect
to this Act of Congress.
I
Early in this Nation's history, this Court established the sound
proposition that constitutional government in a system of separated
powers requires judges to regard as inoperative any legislative
Act, even of Congress itself, that is "repugnant to the
Constitution."
"So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the
law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the
court must either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution,
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules governs the case." Marbury, supra, at
178.
The power we recognized in
Marbury will thus permit us,
indeed require us, to "disregar[d]" § 3501, a duly enacted
447
statute governing the admissibility of evidence in the federal
courts, only if it "be in opposition to the constitution"-here,
assertedly, the dictates of the Fifth Amendment.
It was once possible to characterize the so-called
Miranda rule as resting (however implausibly) upon the
proposition that what the statute here before us permits-the
admission at trial of
un-Mirandized confessions-violates the
Constitution. That is the fairest reading of the
Miranda
case itself. The Court began by announcing that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination applied in the context of
extrajudicial custodial interrogation, see 384 U. S., at
460467-itself a doubtful proposition as a matter both of history
and precedent, see
id., at 510-511 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the Court's conclusion that the Fifth Amendment
privilege, rather than the Due Process Clause, governed station
house confessions as a
"trompe l'oeil"). Having extended the
privilege into the confines of the station house, the Court
liberally sprinkled throughout its sprawling 60-page opinion
suggestions that, because of the compulsion inherent in custodial
interrogation, the privilege was violated by any statement thus
obtained that did not conform to the rules set forth in
Miranda, or some functional equivalent. See
id., at
458 ("Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the
compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings,
no
statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of
his free choice" (emphases added));
id., at 461 ("An
individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody,
surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques
of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than under
compulsion to speak");
id., at 467 ("We have concluded that
without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation
... contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely");
id., at
457, n. 26 (noting
448
the "absurdity of denying that a confession obtained under these
circumstances is compelled").
The dissenters, for their part, also understood
Miranda's
holding to be based on the "premise ... that pressure on the
suspect must be eliminated though it be only the subtle influence
of the atmosphere and surroundings."
Id., at 512 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). See also
id., at 535 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]t has never been suggested, until today, that such
questioning was so coercive and accused persons so lacking in
hardihood that the very first response to the very first question
following the commencement of custody must be conclusively presumed
to be the product of an overborne will"). And at least one case
decided shortly after
Miranda explicitly confirmed the view.
See
Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U. S. 324, 326 (1969)
("[T]he use of these admissions obtained in the absence of the
required warnings was a flat violation of the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment as construed in
Miranda").
So understood,
Miranda was objectionable for innumerable
reasons, not least the fact that cases spanning more than 70 years
had rejected its core premise that, absent the warnings and an
effective waiver of the right to remain silent and of the
(thitherto unknown) right to have an attorney present, a statement
obtained pursuant to custodial interrogation was necessarily the
product of compulsion. See
Crooker v.
California,
357 U. S. 433
(1958) (confession not involuntary despite denial of access to
counsel);
Cicenia v.
Lagay, 357 U. S. 504 (1958)
(same);
Powers v.
United States, 223 U. S. 303 (1912)
(lack of warnings and counsel did not render statement before
United States Commissioner involuntary);
Wilson v.
United
States, 162 U. S.
613 (1896) (same). Moreover, history and precedent aside, the
decision in
Miranda, if read as an explication of what the
Constitution
requires, is preposterous. There is, for
example, simply no basis in reason for concluding that a response
to the very first question asked, by a suspect who already
knows all of the rights de-
449
scribed in the
Miranda warning, is anything other than a
volitional act. See
Miranda, supra, at 533-534 (White, J.,
dissenting). And even if one assumes that the elimination of
compulsion absolutely requires informing even the most
knowledgeable suspect of his right to remain silent, it cannot
conceivably require the right to have
counsel present. There
is a world of difference, which the Court recognized under the
traditional voluntariness test but ignored in
Miranda, between compelling a suspect to incriminate
himself and preventing him from foolishly doing so of his own
accord. Only the latter (which is
not required by the
Constitution) could explain the Court's inclusion of a right to
counsel and the requirement that it, too, be knowingly and
intelligently waived. Counsel's presence is not required to tell
the suspect that he
need not speak; the interrogators can do
that. The only good reason for having counsel there is that he can
be counted on to advise the suspect that he
should not
speak. See
Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 59 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part)
("[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain
terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances").
Preventing foolish (rather than compelled) confessions is
likewise the only conceivable basis for the rules (suggested in
Miranda, see 384 U. S., at 444-445, 473-474), that courts
must exclude any confession elicited by questioning conducted,
without interruption, after the suspect has indicated a desire to
stand on his right to remain silent, see
Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.
S. 96, 105-106 (1975), or initiated by police after the suspect
has expressed a desire to have counsel present, see
Edwards
v.
Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 484485
(1981). Nonthreatening attempts to persuade the suspect to
reconsider that initial decision are not, without more, enough to
render a change of heart the product of anything other than the
suspect's free will. Thus, what is most remarkable about the
Miranda decision-and what
450
made it unacceptable as a matter of straightforward
constitutional interpretation in the
Marbury tradition-is
its palpable hostility toward the act of confession
per se,
rather than toward what the Constitution abhors,
compelled
confession. See
United States v.
Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187 (1977)
("[F]ar from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of
guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable").
The Constitution is not, unlike the
Miranda majority,
offended by a criminal's commendable qualm of conscience or
fortunate fit of stupidity. Cf.
Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U. S. 146, 166-167
(1990) (SCALIA, J., dissenting).
For these reasons, and others more than adequately developed in
the
Miranda dissents and in the subsequent works of the
decision's many critics, any conclusion that a violation of the
Miranda rules
necessarily amounts to a violation of
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination can claim no
support in history, precedent, or common sense, and as a result
would at least presumptively be worth reconsidering even at this
late date. But that is unnecessary, since the Court has
(thankfully) long since abandoned the notion that failure to comply
with
Miranda's rules is itself a violation of the
Constitution.
II
As the Court today acknowledges, since
Miranda we have
explicitly, and repeatedly, interpreted that decision as having
announced, not the circumstances in which custodial interrogation
runs afoul of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, but rather only
"prophylactic" rules that go beyond the right against compelled
self-incrimination. Of course the seeds of this "prophylactic"
interpretation of
Miranda were present in the decision
itself. See
Miranda, 384 U. S., at 439 (discussing the
"necessity for procedures which assure that the [suspect] is
accorded his privilege");
id., at 447 ("[u]nless a proper
limitation upon custodial interrogation is achievedsuch as these
decisions will advance-there can be no as sur-
451
ance that practices of this nature will be eradicated");
id., at 457 ("[i]n these cases, we might not find the
defendants' statements to have been involuntary in traditional
terms");
ibid. (noting "concern for adequate safeguards to
protect precious Fifth Amendment rights" and the "potentiality for
compulsion" in Ernesto Miranda's interrogation). In subsequent
cases, the seeds have sprouted and borne fruit: The Court has
squarely concluded that it is possible-indeed not uncommon-for the
police to violate
Miranda without also violating the
Constitution.
Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), an
opinion for the Court written by then-JusTIcE REHNQUIST, rejected
the true-to-
Marbury, failure-to- warn-as-constitutional-
violation interpretation of
Miranda. It held that exclusion
of the "fruits" of a
Miranda violation-the statement of a
witness whose identity the defendant had revealed while in
custody-was not required. The opinion explained that the question
whether the "police conduct complained of directly infringed upon
respondent's right against compulsory selfincrimination" was a
"separate question" from "whether it instead violated only the
prophylactic rules developed to protect that right." 417 U. S., at
439. The "procedural safeguards" adopted in
Miranda, the
Court said, "were not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination was protected," and to
"provide practical reinforcement for the right," 417 U. S., at 444.
Comparing the particular facts of the custodial interrogation with
the "historical circumstances underlying the privilege,"
ibid., the Court concluded, unequivocally, that the
defendant's statement could not be termed "involuntary as that term
has been defined in the decisions of this Court,"
id., at
445, and thus that there had been no constitutional violation,
notwithstanding the clear violation of the "procedural rules later
established in
Miranda," ibid. Lest there be any confusion
on the point, the Court reiterated that the "police conduct at
452
issue here did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the
prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in
Miranda to safeguard that privilege."
Id., at 446. It
is clear from our cases, of course, that if the statement in
Tucker had been obtained in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, the statement and its fruits would have been excluded.
See
Nix v.
Williams, 467 U. S. 431, 442
(1984).
The next year, in
Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U. S. 714 (1975), the
Court held that a defendant's statement taken in violation of
Miranda that was nonetheless
voluntary could be used
at trial for impeachment purposes. This holding turned upon the
recognition that violation of
Miranda is not
unconstitutional compulsion, since statements obtained in actual
violation of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination,
"as opposed to ... taken in violation of
Miranda," quite
simply "may not be put to any testimonial use whatever against [the
defendant] in a criminal trial," including as impeachment evidence.
New Jersey v.
Portash, 440 U. S. 450, 459
(1979). See also
Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 397398
(1978) (holding that while statements obtained in violation of
Miranda may be used for impeachment if otherwise
trustworthy, the Constitution prohibits
"any criminal trial
use against a defendant of his
involuntary statement").
Nearly a decade later, in
New York v.
Quarles,
467 U. S. 649
(1984), the Court relied upon the fact that "[t]he prophylactic
Miranda warnings ... are 'not themselves rights protected by
the Constitution,'"
id., at 654 (quoting
Tucker,
supra, at 444), to create a "public safety" exception. In that
case, police apprehended, after a chase in a grocery store, a rape
suspect known to be carrying a gun. After handcuffing and searching
him (and finding no gun)-but before reading him his
Miranda
warnings-the police demanded to know where the gun was. The
defendant nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and
responded that "the gun is over there." The Court held that both
the unwarned
453
statement-"the gun is over there"-and the recovered weapon were
admissible in the prosecution's case in chief under a "public
safety exception" to the "prophylactic rules enunciated in
Miranda." 467 U. S., at 653. It explicitly acknowledged that
if the
Miranda warnings were an imperative of the Fifth
Amendment itself, such an exigency exception would be impossible,
since the Fifth Amendment's bar on compelled self-incrimination is
absolute, and its " 'strictures, unlike the Fourth's are not
removed by showing reasonableness,'" 467 U. S., at 653, n. 3. (For
the latter reason, the Court found it necessary to note that
respondent did not "claim that [his] statements were actually
compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist,"
id., at 654.)
The next year, the Court again declined to apply the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine to a
Miranda violation, this
time allowing the admission of a suspect's properly warned
statement even though it had been preceded (and, arguably, induced)
by an earlier inculpatory statement taken in violation of
Miranda. Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985). As
in
Tucker, the Court distinguished the case from those
holding that a confession obtained as a result of an
unconstitutional search is inadmissible, on the ground that the
violation of
Miranda does not involve an "actual
infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights," 470 U. S., at
308.
Miranda, the Court explained, "sweeps more broadly than
the Fifth Amendment itself," and
"Miranda's preventive
medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered
no identifiable constitutional harm." 470 U. S., at 306-307.
"[E]rrors [that] are made by law enforcement officers in
administering the prophylactic
Miranda procedures ... should
not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement
of the Fifth Amendment itself."
Id., at 308-309.
In light of these cases, and our statements to the same effect
in others, see,
e. g., Davis v.
United States, 512 U.
S., at
457-458; Withrow v.
Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 690-691
(1993);
454
Eagan, 492 U. S., at 203, it is simply no longer possible
for the Court to conclude, even if it wanted to, that a violation
of
Miranda's rules is a violation of the Constitution. But
as I explained at the outset, that is what is required before the
Court may disregard a law of Congress governing the admissibility
of evidence in federal court. The Court today insists that the
decision in
Miranda is a "constitutional" one,
ante, at 432, 438; that it has "constitutional
underpinnings,"
ante, at 440, n. 5; a "constitutional basis"
and a "constitutional origin,"
ante, at 439, n. 3; that it
was "constitutionally based,"
ante, at 440; and that it
announced a "constitutional rule,"
ante, at 437, 439, 441,
444. It is fine to play these word games; but what makes a decision
"constitutional" in the only sense relevant here-in the sense that
renders it impervious to supersession by congressional legislation
such as § 3501is the determination that the Constitution
requires the result that the decision announces and the
statute ignores. By disregarding congressional action that
concededly does not violate the Constitution, the Court flagrantly
offends fundamental principles of separation of powers, and
arrogates to itself prerogatives reserved to the representatives of
the people.
The Court seeks to avoid this conclusion in two ways:
First, by misdescribing these
post-Miranda cases as mere
dicta. The Court concedes only "that there is language in some of
our opinions that supports the view" that
Miranda's
protections are not "constitutionally required."
Ante, at
438. It is not a matter of
language; it is a matter of
holdings. The proposition that failure to comply with
Miranda's rules does not establish a constitutional
violation was central to the
holdings of
Tucker, Hass,
Quarles, and
Elstad.
The second way the Court seeks to avoid the impact of these
cases is simply to disclaim responsibility for reasoned
decisionmaking. It says:
"These decisions illustrate the principle-not that
Miranda is not a constitutional rule-but that no
constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying down a gen-
455
eral rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances in
which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modifications
represented by these cases are as much a normal part of
constitutional law as the original decision." Ante, at
441.
The issue, however, is not whether court rules are "mutable";
they assuredly are. It is not whether, in the light of "various
circumstances," they can be "modifi[ed]"; they assuredly can. The
issue is whether,
as mutated and modified, they must
make
sense. The requirement that they do so is the only thing that
prevents this Court from being some sort of nine-headed Caesar,
giving thumbs-up or thumbs-down to whatever outcome, case by case,
suits or offends its collective fancy. And if confessions procured
in violation of
Miranda are confessions "compelled" in
violation of the Constitution, the
post-Miranda decisions I
have discussed do not make sense. The only reasoned basis for their
outcome was that a violation of
Miranda is
not a
violation of the Constitution. If, for example, as the Court
acknowledges was the holding of
Elstad, "the traditional
'fruits' doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases" (that the
fruits of evidence obtained unconstitutionally must be excluded
from trial) does
not apply to the fruits of
Miranda
violations,
ante, at 441; and if the reason for the
difference is
not that
Miranda violations are not
constitutional violations (which is plainly and flatly what
Elstad said); then the Court must come up with some
other explanation for the difference. (That will take quite
a bit of doing, by the way, since it is
not clear on the
face of the Fourth Amendment that evidence obtained in violation of
that guarantee must be excluded from trial, whereas it
is
clear on the face of the Fifth Amendment that unconstitutionally
compelled confessions cannot be used.) To say simply that
"unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different
from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment,"
ante, at 441, is true but supremely unhelpful.
456
Finally, the Court asserts that
Miranda must be a
"constitutional decision" announcing a "constitutional rule," and
thus immune to congressional modification, because we have since
its inception applied it to the States. If this argument is meant
as an invocation of
stare decisis, it fails because, though
it is true that our cases applying
Miranda against the
States must be reconsidered if
Miranda is not required by
the Constitution, it is likewise true that our cases (discussed
above) based on the principle that
Miranda is
not
required by the Constitution will have to be reconsidered if it
is. So the
stare decisis argument is a wash. If, on
the other hand, the argument is meant as an appeal to logic rather
than
stare decisis, it is a classic example of begging the
question: Congress's attempt to set aside
Miranda, since it
represents an assertion that violation of
Miranda is not a
violation of the Constitution,
also represents an assertion
that the Court has no power to impose
Miranda on the States.
To answer this assertion-not by showing why violation of
Miranda
is a violation of the Constitution-but by asserting that
Miranda does apply against the States, is to assume
precisely the point at issue. In my view, our continued application
of the
Miranda code to the States despite our consistent
statements that running afoul of its dictates does not
necessarily-or even usually-result in an actual constitutional
violation, represents not the source of
Miranda's
salvation but rather evidence of its ultimate illegitimacy. See
generally J. Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the Law 173-198 (1993);
Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of
Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100 (1985). As JUSTICE
STEVENS has elsewhere explained: "This Court's power to require
state courts to exclude probative self-incriminatory statements
rests entirely on the premise that the use of such evidence
violates the Federal Constitution .... If the Court does not accept
that premise, it must regard the holding in the
Miranda case
itself, as well as all of the federal jurisprudence that has
457
evolved from that decision, as nothing more than an illegitimate
exercise of raw judicial power."
Elstad, 470 U. S., at 370
(dissenting opinion). Quite so.
III
There was available to the Court a means of reconciling the
established proposition that a violation of
Miranda does not
itself offend the Fifth Amendment with the Court's assertion of a
right to ignore the present statute. That means of reconciliation
was argued strenuously by both petitioner and the United States,
who were evidently more concerned than the Court is with
maintaining the coherence of our jurisprudence. It is not mentioned
in the Court's opinion because, I assume, a majority of the
Justices intent on reversing believes that incoherence is the
lesser evil. They may be right.
Petitioner and the United States contend that there is nothing
at all exceptional, much less unconstitutional, about the Court's
adopting prophylactic rules to buttress constitutional rights, and
enforcing them against Congress and the States. Indeed, the United
States argues that "[p]rophylactic rules are now and have been for
many years a feature of this Court's constitutional adjudication."
Brief for United States 47. That statement is not wholly
inaccurate, if by "many years" one means since the mid-1960's.
However, in their zeal to validate what is in my view a lawless
practice, the United States and petitioner greatly overstate the
frequency with which we have engaged in it. For instance,
petitioner cites several cases in which the Court quite simply
exercised its traditional judicial power to define the scope of
constitutional protections and, relate diy, the circumstances in
which they are violated. See
Loretto v.
Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 436-437
(1982) (holding that a permanent physical occupation constitutes a
per se taking);
Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U. S. 159, 176 (1985)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment right to the assist-
458
ance of counsel is
actually "violated when the State
obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the
accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between
the accused and a state agent").
Similarly unsupportive of the supposed practice is
Bruton
v.
United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968),
where we concluded that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment forbids the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's
facially incriminating confession in a joint trial, even where the
jury has been given a limiting instruction. That decision was
based, not upon the theory that this was desirable protection
"beyond" what the Confrontation Clause technically required; but
rather upon the self-evident proposition that the inability to
cross-examine an available witness whose damaging out-of-court
testimony is introduced violates the Confrontation Clause, combined
with the conclusion that in these circumstances a mere jury
instruction can never be relied upon to prevent the testimony from
being damaging, see
Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 207-208
(1987).
The United States also relies on our cases involving the
question whether a State's procedure for appointed counsel's
withdrawal of representation on appeal satisfies the State's
constitutional obligation to "'affor[d] adequate and effective
appellate review to indigent defendants.'"
Smith v.
Robbins, 528
U. S. 259, 276 (2000) (quoting
Griffin v.
Illinois,
351 U. S. 12, 20 (1956)). In
Anders v.
California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967), we
concluded that California's procedure governing withdrawal fell
short of the constitutional minimum, and we outlined a procedure
that
would meet that standard. But as we made clear earlier
this Term in
Smith, which upheld a procedure
different from the one
Anders suggested, the
benchmark of constitutionality is the constitutional requirement of
adequate representation, and not some excrescence upon that
requirement decreed, for safety's sake, by this Court.
459
In a footnote, the United States directs our attention to
certain overprotective First Amendment rules that we have adopted
to ensure "breathing space" for expression. See
Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 340, 342
(1974) (recognizing that in
New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), we "extended a measure of
strategic protection to defamatory falsehood" of public officials);
Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 58 (1965)
(setting forth "procedural safeguards designed to obviate the
dangers of a censorship system" with respect to motion picture
obscenity). In these cases, and others involving the First
Amendment, the Court has acknowledged that in order to guarantee
that protected speech is not "chilled" and thus forgone, it is in
some instances necessary to incorporate in our substantive rules a
"measure of strategic protection." But that is because the Court
has viewed the importation of "chill" as
itself a violation
of the First Amendment-not because the Court thought it could go
beyond what the First Amendment
demanded in order to provide
some prophylaxis.
Petitioner and the United States are right on target, however,
in characterizing the Court's actions in a case decided within a
few years of
Miranda, North Carolina v.
Pearce,
395 U. S. 711
(1969). There, the Court concluded that due process would be
offended were a judge vindictively to resentence with added
severity a defendant who had successfully appealed his original
conviction. Rather than simply announce that vindictive sentencing
violates the Due Process Clause, the Court went on to hold that
"[i]n order to assure the absence of such a [vindictive]
motivation, ... the reasons for [imposing the increased sentence]
must affirmatively appear" and must "be based upon objective
information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the
defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing
proceeding."
Id., at 726. The Court later explicitly
acknowledged
Pearce's prophylactic character, see
Michigan v.
Payne, 412 U. S. 47, 53 (1973).
It is true, therefore, that the
460
case exhibits the same fundamental flaw as does
Miranda
when deprived (as it has been) of its original (implausible)
pretension to announcement of what the Constitution itself
required. That is, although the Due Process Clause may well
prohibit punishment based on judicial vindictiveness, the
Constitution by no means vests in the courts "any general power to
prescribe particular devices 'in order to assure the absence of
such a motivation,'" 395 U. S., at 741 (Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Black surely had the right idea when he derided the Court's
requirement as "pure legislation if there ever was legislation,"
ibid., although in truth
Pearce's rule pales as a
legislative achievement when compared to the detailed code
promulgated in
Miranda.1
The foregoing demonstrates that, petitioner's and the United
States' suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding, what the Court
did in
Miranda (assuming, as later cases hold, that
Miranda went beyond what the Constitution actually requires)
is in fact extraordinary. That the Court has, on rare and recent
occasion, repeated the mistake does not transform error into truth,
but illustrates the potential for future mischief that the error
entails. Where the Constitution has wished to lodge in one of the
branches of the Federal Government some limited power to supplement
its guarantees, it has said so. See Arndt. 14, § 5 ("The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article"). The power with which the Court would
endow itself under a "prophylactic" justification for
Miranda goes far beyond what it has permitted Congress to do
under authority of that text. Whereas we have in-
1 As for
Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986),
upon which petitioner and the United States also rely, in that case
we extended to the Sixth Amendment, postindictment, context the
Miranda-based prophylactic rule of
Edwards v.
Arizona, 451
U. S. 477 (1981), that the police cannot initiate interrogation
after counsel has been requested. I think it less a separate
instance of claimed judicial power to impose constitutional
prophylaxis than a direct, logic-driven consequence of
Miranda itself.
461
sisted that congressional action under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment must be "congruent" with, and "proportional" to, a
constitutional violation, see
City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.
S. 507, 520 (1997), the
Miranda nontextual power to
embellish confers authority to prescribe preventive measures
against not only constitutionally prohibited compelled confessions,
but also (as discussed earlier) foolhardy ones.
I applaud, therefore, the refusal of the Justices in the
majority to enunciate this boundless doctrine of judicial
empowerment as a means of rendering to day's decision rational. In
nonetheless joining the Court's judgment, however, they overlook
two truisms: that actions speak louder than silence, and that (in
judge-made law at least) logic will out. Since there is in fact no
other principle that can reconcile to day's judgment with the
post-Miranda cases that the Court refuses to abandon, what
today's decision will stand for, whether the Justices can bring
themselves to say it or not, is the power of the Supreme Court to
write a prophylactic, extraconstitutional Constitution, binding on
Congress and the States.
IV
Thus, while I agree with the Court that § 3501 cannot be upheld
without also concluding that
Miranda represents an
illegitimate exercise of our authority to review state-court
judgments, I do not share the Court's hesitation in reaching that
conclusion. For while the Court is also correct that the doctrine
of
stare decisis demands some "special justification" for a
departure from longstanding precedent-even precedent of the
constitutional variety-that criterion is more than met here. To
repeat JUSTICE STEVENS' cogent observation, it is "[o]bviou[s]"
that "the Court's power to reverse Miranda's conviction rested
entirely on the determination that a violation of the
Federal Constitution had occurred."
Elstad, 470 U. S., at
367, n. 9 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added). Despite the
Court's Orwellian assertion to the contrary, it is undeniable that
later cases (discussed
462
above) have "undermined
[Miranda's] doctrinal
underpinnings,"
ante, at 443, denying constitutional
violation and thus stripping the holding of its only
constitutionally legitimate support.
Miranda's critics and
supporters alike have long made this point. See Office of Legal
Policy, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Report to Attorney General on Law
of Pre-Trial Interrogation 97 (Feb. 12, 1986) ("The current Court
has repudiated the premises on which
Miranda was based, but
has drawn back from recognizing the full implications of its
decisions");
id., at 78
("Michigan v.
Tucker
accordingly repudiated the doctrinal basis of the
Miranda
decision"); Sonenshein,
Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends
and Countertrends, 13 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. 405, 407-408 (1982)
("Although the Burger Court has not overruled
Miranda, the
Court has consistently undermined the rationales, assumptions, and
values which gave
Miranda life");
id., at 425-426
("Seemingly, the Court [in
Michigan v.
Tucker]
utterly destroyed both
Miranda's rationale and its
holding"); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 S.
Ct. Rev. 99, 118 ("Mr. Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that there is
a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause only if a confession
is involuntary ... is an outright rejection of the core premises of
Miranda").
The Court cites
Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union,
491 U. S. 164, 173 (1989), as accurately reflecting our
standard for overruling, see
ante, at 443-which I am pleased
to accept, even though
Patterson was speaking of overruling
statutory cases and the standard for constitutional decisions is
somewhat more lenient. What is set forth there reads as though it
was written precisely with the current status of
Miranda in
mind:
"In cases where statutory precedents have been overruled, the
primary reason for the Court's shift in position has been the
intervening development of the law, through either the growth of
judicial doctrine or further action taken by Congress. Where such
changes have
463
removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior
decision, ... or where the later law has rendered the decision
irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies, ... the
Court has not hesitated to overrule an earlier decision." 491 U.
S., at 173.
Neither am I persuaded by the argument for retaining
Miranda that touts its supposed workability as compared with
the totality-of-the-circumstances test it purported to replace.
Miranda's proponents cite
ad nauseam the fact that
the Court was called upon to make difficult and subtle distinctions
in applying the "voluntariness" test in some 30-odd due process
"coerced confessions" cases in the 30 years between
Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936), and
Miranda. It is not immediately apparent, however, that the
judicial burden has been eased by the "bright-line" rules adopted
in
Miranda. In fact, in the 34 years since
Miranda
was decided, this Court has been called upon to decide nearly
60 cases involving a host of
Miranda issues, most of
them predicted with remarkable prescience by Justice White in his
Miranda dissent. 384 U. S., at 545.
Moreover, it is not clear why the Court thinks that the
"totality-of-the-circumstances test ... is more difficult than
Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for
courts to apply in a consistent manner."
Ante, at 444.
Indeed, I find myself persuaded by JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S rejection of
this same argument in her opinion in
Williams, 507 U. S., at
711-712 (O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part):
"Miranda, for all its alleged brightness, is not without
its difficulties; and voluntariness is not without its strengths
....
" ... Miranda creates as many close questions as it
resolves. The task of determining whether a defendant is in
'custody' has proved to be 'a slippery one.' And the supposedly
'bright' lines that separate interrogation
464
from spontaneous declaration, the exercise of a right from
waiver, and the adequate warning from the inadequate, likewise have
turned out to be rather dim and ill defined ....
"The totality-of-the-circumstances approach, on the other hand,
permits each fact to be taken into account without resort to formal
and dispositive labels. By dispensing with the difficulty of
producing a yes-or-no answer to questions that are often better
answered in shades and degrees, the voluntariness inquiry often
can make judicial decisionmaking easier rather than more
onerous." (Emphasis added; citations omitted.)
But even were I to agree that the old
totality-of-thecircumstances test was more cumbersome, it is simply
not true that
Miranda has banished it from the law and
replaced it with a new test. Under the current regime, which the
Court today retains in its entirety, courts are frequently called
upon to undertake
both inquiries. That is because, as
explained earlier, voluntariness remains the
constitutional
standard, and as such continues to govern the admissibility for
impeachment purposes of statements taken in violation of
Miranda, the admissibility of the "fruits" of such
statements, and the admissibility of statements challenged as
unconstitutionally obtained
despite the interrogator's
compliance with
Miranda, see,
e. g., Colorado v.
Connelly, 479
U. S. 157 (1986).
Finally, I am not convinced by petitioner's argument that
Miranda should be preserved because the decision occupies a
special place in the "public's consciousness." Brief for Petitioner
44. As far as I am aware, the public is not under the illusion that
we are infallible. I see little harm in admitting that we made a
mistake in taking away from the people the ability to decide for
themselves what protections (beyond those required by the
Constitution) are reasonably affordable in the criminal
investigatory process. And I see much to be gained by reaffirming
for the people the wonderful reality
465
that they govern themselves-which means that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution" that the people
adopted, "nor prohibited ... to the States" by that Constitution,
"are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people," U. S.
Const., Arndt. 10.2
***
Today's judgment converts
Miranda from a milestone of
judicial overreaching into the very Cheops' Pyramid (or perhaps the
Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial arrogance. In
imposing its Court-made code upon the States, the original opinion
at least
asserted that it was demanded by the Constitution.
Today's decision does not pretend that it is-and yet
still
asserts the right to impose it against the will of the people's
representatives in Congress. Far from believing that
stare
decisis compels this result, I believe we cannot allow to
remain on the books even a celebrated de
cision-especially a
celebrated decision-that has come to stand for the proposition that
the Supreme Court has power to impose extraconstitutional
constraints upon Congress and the States. This is not the system
that was established by the Framers, or that would be established
by any sane supporter of government by the people.
I dissent from to day's decision, and, until § 3501 is repealed,
will continue to apply it in all cases where there has been a
sustainable finding that the defendant's confession was
voluntary.
2 The Court cites my dissenting opinion in
Mitchell v.
United States, 526 U. S. 314, 331-332
(1999), for the proposition that "the fact that a rule has found
'wide acceptance in the legal culture' is 'adequate reason not to
overrule' it."
Ante, at 443. But the legal culture is not
the same as the "public's consciousness"; and unlike the rule at
issue in
Mitchell (prohibiting comment on a defendant's
refusal to testify),
Miranda has been continually criticized
by lawyers, law enforcement officials, and scholars since its
pronouncement (not to mention by Congress, as § 3501 shows). In
Mitchell, moreover, the constitutional underpinnings of the
earlier rule had not been demolished by subsequent cases.
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