An Alabama statute that provides that an employee excused for
jury duty "shall be entitled to his usual compensation . . . less
the fee or compensation he received for serving" as a juror, does
not deprive the employer of property in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421.
Certiorari granted; 49 Ala.App. 45,
268
So. 2d 829, reversed.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner sued respondent, his employer, to recover
compensation lost as a result of the employee's being required to
serve as a juror. An Alabama statute provides that an employee
excused for jury duty "shall be entitled to his usual compensation
received from such employment less the fee or compensation he
received for serving" as a juror. Ala.Code of 1940, Tit. 30, § 7(1)
(Supp. 1971). It appears that petitioner served on a jury, received
pay for the jury duty and submitted a bill of $63 to respondent,
the difference between his regular wages and his jury pay.
Respondent refused to pay; the trial court rendered a judgment for
petitioner; but the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama held the
state Act unconstitutional. 49 Ala.App. 45,
268
So. 2d 829. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari to
review that judgment. 289 Ala. 743,
268 So. 2d
834. The case is here on petition for a writ of certiorari
which we grant.
The Court of Civil Appeals held that the Act deprives the
employer of property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, its main reliance
Page 412 U. S. 544
being on
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S.
1.
Coppage declared unconstitutional as
violative of due process a state statute which made it a
misdemeanor or an employer to require an employee to agree not to
join or remain a member of a union during his employment. That was
when substantive due process was in its heyday. We cited
Coppage along with other decisions of like tenor in
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.
S. 421, where we sustained a state statute which made it
a misdemeanor for an employer to deduct wages of an employee for
four hours when the employee absents himself from his job in order
to vote. We held that the requirement placed on the employer to pay
wages for this brief period when the employee is voting stood
constitutional muster.
We said:
"Most regulations of business necessarily impose financial
burdens on the enterprise for which no compensation is paid. Those
are part of the costs of our civilization. Extreme cases are
conjured up where an employer is required to pay wages for a period
that has no relation to the legitimate end. Those cases can await
decision as and when they arise. The present law has no such
infirmity. It is designed to eliminate any penalty for exercising
the right of suffrage and to remove a practical obstacle to getting
out the vote. The public welfare is a broad and inclusive concept.
The moral, social, economic, and physical wellbeing of the
community is one part of it; the political wellbeing, another. The
police power which is adequate to fix the financial burden for one
is adequate for the other. The judgment of the legislature that
time out for voting should cost the employee nothing may be a
debatable one. It is indeed conceded by the
Page 412 U. S. 545
opposition to be such. But if our recent cases mean anything,
they leave debatable issues as respects business, economic, and
social affairs to legislative decision. We could strike down this
law only if we returned to the philosophy of the
Lochner,
[
Footnote 1]
Coppage,
and
Adkins [
Footnote
2] cases."
Id. at
342 U. S.
424-425.
The Alabama statute stands on no less sturdy a footing.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45.
[
Footnote 2]
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.
S. 525.
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