OCTOBER TERM, 1996
Syllabus
DE BUONO, NEW YORK COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH, ET AL.
v.
NYSA-ILA MEDICAL AND CLINICAL SERVICES FUND, BY ITS TRUSTEES,
BOWERS, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT
No. 95-1594. Argued February 24, 1997-Decided June 2,1997
New York's Health Facility Assessment (HFA) imposes a tax on
gross receipts for patient services at,
inter alia,
diagnostic and treatment centers. The NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical
Services Fund (Fund), which administers a plan subject to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), owns and
operates New York treatment centers for longshore workers,
retirees, and their dependents. Respondents, the Fund's trustees,
discontinued paying the tax and filed this action to enjoin
petitioner state officials from making future assessments and to
obtain a refund, alleging that the HFA is a state law that "relates
to" the Fund within the meaning of § 514(a) of ERISA, and is
therefore pre-empted as applied to hospitals run by ERISA plans.
The District Court concluded that the HFA is not pre-empted because
it is a tax of general application having only an incidental impact
on benefit plans. The Second Circuit reversed, reasoning that the
HFA relates to the Fund by reducing the amount of Fund assets that
would otherwise be available to provide plan members with benefits,
and could cause the plan to limit its benefits or to charge plan
members higher fees. On remand from this Court in light of
New
York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield
Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645-in which
this Court held that ERISA did not pre-empt a New York statute
requiring hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by
a commercial insurer but not from patients insured by a Blue
Cross/Blue Shield plan-the Second Circuit reinstated its judgment,
distinguishing
Travelers on the ground that the statute
there at issue had only an indirect economic influence on the
decisions of ERISA plan administrators, whereas the HFA depletes
the Fund's assets directly, and thus has an immediate impact on an
ERISA plan's operations.
Held: Section 514(a) does not preclude New York from
imposing a gross receipts tax on ERISA funded medical centers. Pp.
812-816.
(a) When the Second Circuit initially found the HFA pre-empted,
it relied substantially on an expansive and literal interpretation
of the
807
words "relate to" in § 514(a). It appears to have adhered to
that approach on remand, failing to give proper weight to
Travelers' rejection of such a strictly literal reading. In
Travelers, the Court unequivocally concluded that the
"relates to" language was not intended to modify "the starting
presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law."
514 U. S., at 654. In evaluating whether the normal presumption
against pre-emption has been overcome in a particular case, this
Court must look to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide
to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would
survive.
Id., at 656. Pp. 812-814.
(b) Following that approach here, the HFA clearly operates in a
field that has been traditionally occupied by the States: the
regulation of health and safety matters.
Hillsborough County
v.
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 715.
Nothing in the HFA's operation convinces this Court that it is the
type of state law that Congress intended ERISA to supersede. It is
one of myriad state laws of general applicability that impose some
burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do
not relate to them within the statute's meaning. See,
e. g.,
Travelers, 514 U. S., at 668. The supposed difference between
direct and indirect impact-upon which the Second Circuit relied in
distinguishing this case from
Travelers-cannot withstand
scrutiny. While the Fund has arranged to provide medical benefits
for its beneficiaries directly, had it chosen to purchase the
services at independently run hospitals, those hospitals would have
passed their HFA costs onto the Fund through their rates. Although
the tax would be "indirect," its impact on the Fund's decisions
would be in all relevant respects identical to the "direct" impact
felt here. Pp. 814-816.
74 F.3d
28, reversed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and
BREYER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which THOMAS, J., joined,
post, p. 816.
M. Patricia Smith, Assistant Attorney General of New
York, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were
Dennis C.
Vacco, Attorney General,
Barbara G.
Billet, Solicitor General,
Peter H. Schiff, Deputy
Solicitor General, and
Daniel F. De Vita, Assistant Attorney
General.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger,
808
James A. Feldman,
J. Davitt McAteer, Allen H. Feldman,
Nathaniel 1. Spiller, and Judith D. Heimlich.
Donato Caruso argued the cause for respondents. With him on the
brief were C. Peter Lambos, Thomas W Gleason, and Ernest L.
Mathews, Jr.*
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. This is
another Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
pre-emption case.1 Broadly stated, the
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed by
Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, and
Phyllis E. Hyman, Assistant Attorney General, and by the
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:
Grant
Woods of Arizona,
Winston Bryant of Arkansas,
Robert
A. Butterworth of Florida,
Margery S.
Bronster of
Hawaii,
Pamela Carter of Indiana,
Andrew Ketterer of
Maine,
J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland,
Scott
Harshbarger of Massachusetts,
Frank J.
Kelley of Michigan,
Hubert H. Humphrey III of
Minnesota,
Mike Moore of Mississippi,
Jeremiah W (Jay)
Nixon of Missouri,
Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana,
Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada,
Jeffrey R. Howard of
New Hampshire,
Peter Verniero of New Jersey,
W A. Drew
Edmondson of Oklahoma,
Theodore R. Kulongoski of Oregon,
Thomas W Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania,
Jeffrey B.
Pine of Rhode Island,
Dan Morales of Texas,
Jeffrey
L. Amestoy of Vermont,
James S.
Gilmore III of
Virginia,
Christine Q Gregoire of Washington,
Darrell V.
McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and
James E. Doyle of
Wisconsin; for the American Federation of State County and
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, by
Larry Weinberg, John C.
Dempsey, Andrew D. Roth, and
Nancy E. Hoffman; for
the Healthcare Association of New York State et al. by
Jeffrey J. Sherrin and
Mark Thomas; for
the National Employment Lawyers Association by
Mary Ellen
Signorille and
Jeffrey Lewis; and for the National
Governors' Association et al. by
Richard Ruda.
Ronald S.
Longhofer and
John H. Eggertsen
filed a brief for the SelfInsurance Institute of America, Inc., as
amicus curiae urging affirmance.
1 The boundaries of ERISA's pre-emptive reach have been the
focus of considerable attention from this Court. This case is one
of three addressing the issue this Term. See
Boggs v.
Boggs, post, p. 833;
California Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U.
S. 316 (1997). And in the 16 years since we first took up the
question, we have decided no fewer than 13 cases. See
New York
State Conference
809
question presented is whether hospitals operated by ERISA plans
are subject to the same laws as other hospitals. More precisely,
the question is whether the opaque language in ERISA's § 514(a) 2
precludes N ew York from imposing a gross receipts tax on the
income of medical centers operated by ERISA funds. We hold that New
York may collect its tax.
I
In 1990, faced with the choice of either curtailing its Medicaid
program or generating additional revenue to reduce the program
deficit, the New York General Assembly enacted the Health Facility
Assessment (HFA).3 The HFA imposes a tax on gross receipts for
patient services at hospitals, residential health care facilities,
and diagnostic and treatment
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U. S. 645
(1995); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav.
Bank,
510 U. S. 86
(1993); District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade,
506 U. S. 125
(1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
498 U. S. 133 (1990); FMC
Corp. v. Holliday,
498
U. S. 52 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash,
490 U. S. 107 (1989);
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.,
486 U. S. 825 (1988);
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
482 U. S. 1 (1987);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
481 U. S. 58 (1987); Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U. S. 41 (1987);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U. S. 724 (1985);
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U. S. 85 (1983); and
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
451 U. S. 504 (1981). The
issue has also generated an avalanche of litigation in the lower
courts. See Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U. S., at 135, and
n. 3 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (observing that in 1992, a LEXIS
search uncovered more than 2,800 opinions on ERISA
pre-emption).
2 Section 514(a) of ERISA informs us that "[e]xcept as provided
in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this [statute]
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by the
statute. 88 Stat. 897, 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). None of the
exceptions in subsection (b) is directly at issue in this case.
3 N. Y. Pub. Health Law § 2807-d (McKinney Supp. 1992).
810
centers.4 The assessments become a part of the State's general
revenues.
Respondents are the trustees of the NYSA-ILA Medical and
Clinical Services Fund (Fund), which administers a self-insured,
multiemployer welfare benefit plan. The Fund owns and operates
three medical centers-two in New York and one in New Jersey-that
provide medical, dental, and other health care benefits primarily
to longshore workers, retirees, and their dependents. The New York
centers are licensed by the State as "diagnostic and treatment
centers," App. 80, and are thus subject to a 0.6 percent tax on
gross receipts under the HF A. N. Y. Pub. Health Law § 2807d(2)(c)
(McKinney 1993).
During the period from January through November of 1991,
respondents paid HFA assessments totaling $7,066 based on the two
New York hospitals' patient care income of $1,177,670. At that
time, they discontinued the payments and brought this action
against appropriate state officials (petitioners) to enjoin future
assessments and to obtain a refund of the tax paid in 1991. The
complaint alleged that the HF A is a state law that "relates to"
the Fund within the meaning of § 514(a) of ERISA, and is therefore
pre-empted as applied to hospitals run by ERISA plans.
The District Court denied relief. It concluded that HFA was not
pre-empted because it was a "tax of general application" that did
not "interfere with the calculation of benefits or the
determination of an employee's eligibility for benefits" and thus
had only an incidental impact on benefit plans. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 21a.5
4 In addition to taxing the income derived from patient services
at these facilities, the HFA taxes investment income and certain
operating income. N. Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 2807-d(3)(c),
2807-d(3)(d) (McKinney 1993). The taxation of these activities is
not challenged here.
5 In response to the complaint filed in 1992, petitioners
objected to federal jurisdiction, relying on the Tax Injunction
Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341, which provides that federal courts "shall
not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection
of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such
811
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It
distinguished cases in which we had found that certain "laws of
general application" were not pre-empted by ERISA,6 explaining that
the HF A "targets only the health care industry," which is, "by
definition, the realm where ERISA welfare plans must operate,"
NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund v.
Axelrod,
M. D., 27 F.3d
823, 827 (1994). The court reasoned that because the HFA
"operates as an immediate tax on payments and contributions which
were intended to pay for participants' medical benefits," it
directly affects "the very operations and functions that make the
Fund what it is, a provider of medical, surgical, and hospital
State." Respondents contended that the statute did not apply
because the New York courts do not provide the "plain" remedy
required to bar federal jurisdiction. The District Court appears to
have agreed with respondents, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a, but
when it ultimately granted summary judgment and dismissed the
complaint, it did not squarely decide the question,
id., at
19a, 22a-23a. The Court of Appeals did not address the Tax
Injunction Act in either of its two opinions in this case and there
is no suggestion anywhere in the papers that the State raised the
issue before that court. The Second Circuit had previously held,
however, that the Tax Injunction Act is not a bar to actions such
as this. See
Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Cuomo, 14 F.3d
708, 713-714 (1993), rev'd on other grounds,
New York State
Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645 (1995). In
Travelers, we noted, but did not reexamine, that conclusion.
See
id., at 652-653, n. 4. In the case at bar, the Court of
Appeals presumably was satisfied that its jurisdiction was secure
for the reasons given in
Travelers. Before this Court, no
party in either
Travelers or the current case has mentioned
the Tax Injunction Act or questioned the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that a "plain" remedy is unavailable in the New York
courts. Given our settled practice of according respect to the
courts of appeals' greater familiarity with issues of state law,
cf.
Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 346-347,
and n. 10 (1976), and the State's active participation in nearly
four years of federal litigation with no complaint about federal
jurisdiction, it is appropriate for us to presume that the Court of
Appeals correctly determined that, under these circumstances, New
York courts did not provide a "plain" remedy barring federal
consideration of the state tax.
6 See,
e. g., Mackey, 486 U. S., at 838 (generally
applicable garnishment law not pre-empted);
Fort Halifax Packing
Co., 482 U. S., at 19 (state law requiring one-time severance
payment not pre-empted).
812
care to its participants and their beneficiaries."
Ibid.
The HF A, concluded the court, thus "related to" the Fund because
it reduced the amount of Fund assets that would otherwise be
available to provide plan members with benefits, and could cause
the plan to limit its benefits, or to charge plan members higher
fees.
The first petition for certiorari in this case was filed before
we handed down our opinion in
New York State Conference of Blue
Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U. S.
645 (1995). In that case we held that ERISA did not pre-empt a
New York statute that required hospitals to collect surcharges from
patients covered by a commercial insurer but not from patients
insured by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan.
Id., at 649-651.
After deciding
Travelers, we vacated the judgment of the
Court of Appeals in this case and remanded for further
consideration in light of that opinion. 514 U. S. 1094 (1995).
On remand the Court of Appeals reinstated its original judgment.
The court distinguished the statute involved in
Travelers on
the ground that-by imposing a tax on the health insurance carriers
who provided coverage to plans and their beneficiaries-it had only
an indirect economic influence on the decisions of ERISA plan
administrators, whereas the HFA "depletes the Fund's assets
directly, and thus has an immediate impact on the operations of an
ERISA plan,"
NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund v.
Axelrod, M. D., 74 F.3d
28,30 (1996). We granted the New York officials' second
petition for certiorari, 519 U. S. 926 (1996), and now reverse.
II
When the Second Circuit initially found the HFA preempted as
applied to Fund-operated hospitals, that court relied substantially
on an expansive and literal interpretation of the words "relate to"
in § 514(a) of ERISA. 27 F. 3d, at 826. In reconsidering the case
on remand, the court appears to have adhered to that approach,
failing to give proper
813
weight to
Travelers' rejection of a strictly literal
reading of §514(a).
In
Travelers, as in our earlier cases, we noted that the
literal text of § 514(a) is "clearly expansive." 514 U. S., at 655.
But we were quite clear in that case that the text could not be
read to "extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, [or]
for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course,
for '[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere,' H. James,
Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed., World's Classics 1980)."
Ibid.7
In our earlier ERISA pre-emption cases, it had not been
necessary to rely on the expansive character of ERISA's
literallanguage in order to find pre-emption because the state laws
at issue in those cases had a clear "connection with or reference
to,"
Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 96-97
(1983), ERISA benefit plans. But in
Travelers we confronted
directly the question whether ERISA's "relates to" language was
intended to modify "the starting presumption that Congress does not
intend to supplant state law." 514 U. S., at 654.8 We unequivocally
concluded that it did not, and we acknowledged "that our prior
attempt[s] to construe the phrase 'relate to' d[o] not give us much
help drawing the line here."
Id., at 655. In order to
evaluate whether the normal presumption against pre-emption has
been overcome in a particular case, we concluded that we "must go
beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of
defining its key term, and look instead to the objec-
7See also
Dillingham Constr., 519 U. S., at 335 (SCALIA,
J., concurring) ("[A]pplying the 'relate to' provision according to
its terms was a project doomed to failure, since, as many a
curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to
everything else").
8 Where "federal law is said to bar state action in fields of
traditional state regulation ... we have worked on the 'assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.'"
Travelers, 514 U. S., at 655
(quoting
Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230
(1947). See also
Dillingham Constr., 519 U. S., at 325.
814
tives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state
law that Congress understood would survive."
Id., at 656. We
endorsed that approach once again earlier this Term in concluding
that California's prevailing wage law was not pre-empted by ERISA.
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr., N.
A., Inc., 519 U. S. 316, 325
(1997).9
Following that approach here, we begin by noting that the
historic police powers of the State include the regulation of
matters of health and safety.
Hillsborough County v.
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 715
(1985). While the HFA is a revenue raising measure, rather than a
regulation of hospitals, it clearly operates in a field that" 'has
been traditionally occupied by the States.'''
Ibid. (quoting
Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525
(1977)).10 Respondents therefore bear the considerable burden of
overcoming "the starting presumption that Congress does not intend
to supplant state law."
Travelers, 514 U. S., at 654.
There is nothing in the operation of the HFA that convinces us
it is the type of state law that Congress intended ERISA to
supersedeY This is not a case in which New
9 "The prevailing wage statute alters the incentives, but does
not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans. In this regard, it is
'no different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject
to local regulation, which Congress could not possibly have
intended to eliminate.'
Travelers, 514 U. S., at 668. We
could not hold pre-empted a state law in an area of traditional
state regulation based on so tenuous a relation without doing grave
violence to our presumption that Congress intended nothing of the
sort. We thus conclude that California's prevailing wage laws and
apprenticeship standards do not have a 'connection with,' and
therefore do not 'relate to,' ERISA plans."
Dillingham
Constr., 519 U. S., at 334.
10 Indeed, the Court of Appeals rested its conclusion in no
small part on the fact that the HFA "targets only the health care
industry."
NYSAILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund v.
Axelrod, M. D., 27 F.3d
823,
827 (CA2 1994). Rather than warranting pre-emption,
this point supports the application of the "starting presumption"
against pre-emption.
11 The respondents place great weight on the fact that in 1983
Congress added a specific provision to ERISA to save Hawaii's
Prepaid Health Care Act from pre-emption, and that in so doing, the
Legislature noted that
815
York has forbidden a method of calculating pension benefits that
federal law permits,12 or required employers to provide certain
benefitsP Nor is it a case in which the existence of a pension plan
is a critical element of a state-law cause of action,14 or one in
which the state statute contains provisions that expressly refer to
ERISA or ERISA plans.15
A consideration of the actual operation of the state statute
leads us to the conclusion that the HFA is one of "myriad state
laws" of general applicability that impose some burdens on the
administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not "relate to"
them within the meaning of the governing statute. See
Travelers, 514 U. S., at 668;
Dillingham
ERISA generally does pre-empt "any State tax law relating to
employee benefit plans." 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(5)(B)(i). See Brief
for Respondents 17-23. But there is no significant difference
between the language in this provision and the pre-emption
provision in § 514(a), and we are unconvinced that a stricter
standard of pre-emption should apply to state tax provisions than
to other state laws.
12 See,
e. g., Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U. S., at 524-525 (''Whatever the purpose or purposes
of the New Jersey statute, we conclude that it 'relate[s] to
pension plans' governed by ERISA because it eliminates one method
for calculating pension benefits-integration-that is permitted by
federal law").
13 See,
e. g., Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U. S. 85
(1983) (ERISA pre-empted state law requiring the provision of
pregnancy benefits);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724 (1985) (law
that required benefit plans to include minimum mental health
benefits "related to" ERISA plans).
14 See,
e. g., Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U. S., at 139-140
(''We are not dealing here with a generally applicable statute that
makes no reference to, or indeed functions irrespective of, the
existence of an ERISA plan .... Here, the existence of a pension
plan is a critical factor in establishing liability under the
State's wrongful discharge law. As a result, this cause of action
relates not merely to pension benefits, but to the essence of the
pension
plan itself").
15 See
Mackey, 486 U. S., at 828-830 (a provision that
explicitly refers to ERISA in defining the scope of the state law's
application is pre-empted);
Greater Washington Ed. of Trade,
506 U. S., at 130-131 ("Section 2(c)(2) of the District's Equity
Amendment Act specifically refers to welfare benefit plans
regulated by ERISA and on that basis alone is pre-empted").
816
SCALIA, J., dissenting
Constr., 519 U. S., at 333-334. The HFA is a tax on
hospitals. Most hospitals are not owned or operated by ERISA funds.
This particular ERISA fund has arranged to provide medical benefits
for its plan beneficiaries by running hospitals directly, rather
than by purchasing the same services at independently run
hospitals. If the Fund had made the other choice, and had purchased
health care services from a hospital, that facility would have
passed the expense of the HF A onto the Fund and its plan
beneficiaries through the rates it set for the services provided.
The Fund would then have had to decide whether to cover a more
limited range of services for its beneficiaries, or perhaps to
charge plan members higher rates. Although the tax in such a
circumstance would be "indirect," its impact on the Fund's
decisions would be in all relevant respects identical to the
"direct" impact felt here. Thus, the supposed difference between
direct and indirect impact-upon which the Court of Appeals relied
in distinguishing this case from
Travelers-cannot withstand
scrutiny. Any state tax, or other law, that increases the cost of
providing benefits to covered employees will have some effect on
the administration of ERISA plans, but that simply cannot mean that
every state law with such an effect is preempted by the federal
statute.16
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, dissenting.
"[I]t is the duty of this court to see to it that the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, which is defined and limited
by
16 As we acknowledged in
Travelers, there might be a
state law whose economic effects, intentionally or otherwise, were
so acute "as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of
substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of
insurers" and such a state law "might indeed be pre-empted under §
514," 514 U. S., at 668. That is not the case here.
817
statute, is not exceeded."
Louisville &
Nashville
R. Co. v.
Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, 152
(1908). Despite our obligation to examine federal-court
jurisdiction even if the issue is not raised by either party,
ibid., and despite the Court's explicit acknowledgment,
ante, at 810-811, n. 5, of the possibility that jurisdiction
over this case is barred by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. §
1341, the Court proceeds to decide the merits of respondents'
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) pre-emption
challenge. The Court offers two grounds for passing over the
threshold question of jurisdiction: our "settled practice of
according respect to the courts of appeals' greater familiarity
with issues of state law," and petitioners' "active participation
in nearly four years of federal litigation with no complaint about
federal jurisdiction."
Ante, at 811, n. 5. In my view,
neither of these factors justifies our proceeding without resolving
the issue of jurisdiction.
The Tax Injunction Act bars federal-court jurisdiction over an
action seeking to enjoin a state tax (such as the one at issue
here) where "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State." 28 U. S. C. § 1341; see
Arkansas v.
Farm Credit Servs. of Central Ark., post, at 825 (describing
the Act as a "jurisdictional rule" and "broad jurisdictional
barrier"). The District Court in this case suggested that the Tax
Injunction Act might not bar jurisdiction here, since New York
courts might not afford respondents a "plain" remedy within the
meaning of the Act. See
NYSAILA Medical and Clinical Services
Fund v.
Axelrod, No. 92 Civ. 2779 (SDNY, Feb. 18, 1993),
App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a. That suggestion was not, however, based
upon the District Court's resolution of any "issues of state law,"
as today's opinion intimates,
ante, at 811, n. 5; rather, it
rested upon the District Court's conclusion that uncertainty over
the implications of a
federal statute-§ 502(e)(1) of ERISA,
29 U. S. C. § 1132(e)(1)-might render the availability of a
state-
818
SCALIA, J., dissenting
court remedy not "plain." App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a. * The
Court of Appeals, in turn, made no mention of the jurisdictional
issue, presumably because, under controlling Circuit precedent,
jurisdiction was secure: The Second Circuit had previously held
that state courts could not provide any remedy for ERISA-based
challenges to state taxes within the meaning of the Tax Injunction
Act, since "Congress has divested the state courts of jurisdiction"
over ERISA claims.
Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Cuomo,
14 F.3d
708, 714 (1993) (citing ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U. S. C. §
1132(e)(1)), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. New York State
Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645 (1995).
That holding (like the District Court's discussion of the issue in
this case) in no way turns on New York state law, so I am at a loss
to understand the Court's invoca-
*That the District Court rested its conclusion on 29 U. S. C. §
1132(e)(1) is demonstrated by the sole authorities it cited in
support of that conclusion:
Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996 (SDNY 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part,
14 F.3d
708 (CA2 1993), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom.
New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield
Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645 (1995); and
National Carriers' Conference Committee v.
Heffernan,
440 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (Conn. 1977). The only argument in
Travelers that supports the conclusion reached here is the
argument that "[b]ecause ERISA generally confers exclusive
jurisdiction on the federal courts [under 29 U. S. C. §
1132(e)(1)], a New York state court might well feel compelled to
dismiss a state court action on the grounds that its jurisdiction
has been preempted .... Thus, at a minimum the availability of a
state court remedy is not 'plain.''' 813 F. Supp., at 1001
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Likewise,
Heffernan (which arose in Connecticut, not New York) offers
pertinent reasoning based only on federal law: "Jurisdiction over
suits arising under ERISA is, with minor exceptions, vested
exclusively in the federal courts. 29 U. S. C. § 1132(e)(1). If
this suit were brought before a ... state court, that court might
well feel compelled to dismiss the action on the grounds that its
jurisdiction had been preempted by federal legislation and the
supremacy clause. Consequently the plaintiff cannot be said to have
a 'plain, speedy and efficient' remedy in state court ... ." 440 F.
Supp., at 1283 (footnote omitted).
819
tion of "our settled practice of according respect to the courts
of appeals' greater familiarity with issues of state law,"
ante, at 811, n. 5, as a basis for overlooking the question
whether the Tax Injunction Act bars federal-court jurisdiction.
The second factor relied upon by the Court in support of its
treatment of the jurisdictional issue is that petitioners dropped
the issue after the District Court failed to adopt their
interpretation of the Tax Injunction Act. But the fact that
petitioners have "active[ly] participat[ed] in nearly four years of
federal litigation with no complaint about federal jurisdiction,"
ibid., cannot possibly confer upon us jurisdiction that we
do not otherwise possess. It is our duty to resolve the
jurisdictional question, whether or not it has been preserved by
the parties.
Sumner v.
Mata, 449 U. S. 539, 548, n. 2
(1981);
Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., supra, at
152. In
Sumner we confronted the identical circumstance
presented here-a jurisdictional argument raised before the District
Court but abandoned before the Court of Appealsand felt the need to
address the jurisdictional issue. 449 U. S., at 547, n. 2.
I have previously noted the split among the Circuits on the
question whether the Tax Injunction Act deprives federal courts of
jurisdiction over ERISA-based challenges to state taxes. See
Barnes v.
E-Systems, Inc. Group Hospital Medical
&
Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U. S. 1301,
1302-1303 (1991) (SCALIA, J., in chambers). In a prior case, we
expressly left the question open, saying that "[w]e express no
opinion [on] whether a party [can] sue under ERISA to enjoin or to
declare invalid a state tax levy, despite the Tax Injunction Act";
we noted that the answer would depend on whether "state law
provide[s] no 'speedy and efficient remedy'" and on whether
"Congress intended § 502 of ERISA to be an exception to the Tax
Injunction Act."
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal.,
463 U. S. 1, 20, n.
21 (1983). Because I am
820
SCALIA, J., dissenting
uncertain of the federal courts' jurisdiction over this case, I
would set the jurisdictional issue for briefing and argument, and
would resolve that issue before reaching the merits of respondents'
ERISA pre-emption claim. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from
today's opinion.
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