OCTOBER TERM, 1993
Syllabus
DAVIS
v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
No. 92-1949. Argued March 29, 1994-Decided June 24, 1994
Petitioner, a member of the United States Navy, initially waived
his rights to remain silent and to counsel when he was interviewed
by Naval Investigative Service agents in connection with the murder
of a sailor. About an hour and a half into the interview, he said,
"Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." However, when the agents
inquired if he was asking for a lawyer, he replied that he was not.
They took a short break, he was reminded of his rights, and the
interview continued for another hour, until he asked to have a
lawyer present before saying anything more. A military judge denied
his motion to suppress statements made at the interview, holding
that his mention of a lawyer during the interrogation was not a
request for counsel. He was convicted of murder, and, ultimately,
the Court of Military Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. After a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights under
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, law
enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless a
suspect clearly requests an attorney. A suspect is entitled to the
assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation even though
the Constitution does not provide for such assistance.
Id.,
at 469-473. If the suspect invokes that right at any time, the
police must immediately cease questioning him until an attorney is
present.
Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 484-485.
The
Edwards rule serves the prophylactic purpose of
preventing officers from badgering a suspect into waiving his
previously asserted
Miranda rights, and its applicability
requires courts to determine whether the accused actually invoked
his right to counsel. This is an objective inquiry, requiring some
statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a
desire for an attorney's assistance. However, if a reference is
ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the
circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be
invoking the right to counsel,
Edwards does not require that
officers stop questioning the suspect. Extending
Edwards to
create such a requirement would transform the
Miranda
safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate
investigative activity by needlessly preventing the police from
questioning a suspect in the absence of an attorney, even if
the
453
suspect does not wish to have one present. The
Edwards
rule provides a bright line that can be applied by officers in the
real world ofinvestigation and interrogation without unduly
hampering the gathering of information. This clarity and ease of
application would be lost if officers were required to cease
questioning based on an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an
attorney, since they would be forced to make difficult judgment
calls about what the suspect wants, with the threat of suppression
if they guess wrong. While it will often be good police practice
for officers to clarify whether a suspect making an ambiguous
statement really wants an attorney, they are not required to ask
clarifying questions. Pp. 456-462.
2. There is no reason to disturb the conclusion of the courts
below that petitioner's remark-"Maybe I should talk to a
lawyer"-was not a request for counsel. P. 462.
36 M. J. 337, affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined.
SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p. 462.
SOUTER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined,
post, p.
466.
David S.
Jonas argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were
Philip L. Sundel, Daniel S.
Jonas, and
David Rudovsky.
Richard H. Seamon argued the cause for the United States. With
him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney
General Harris, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, Joel M.
Gershowitz, Theodore G. Hess, and Brett D. Barkey. *
* Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W Schmidt, James P. Manak, Richard M.
Weintraub, William C. O'Malley, and Bernard J. Farber filed a brief
for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. as amici
curiae urging affirmance.
Briefs of
amici curiae were filed for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by
Janet E.
Ainsworth; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by
Paul G.
Cassell, Daniel J.
Popeo, and
Paul
D. Kamenar.
454
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), we
held that law enforcement officers must immediately cease
questioning a suspect who has clearly asserted his right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation. In this case we
decide how law enforcement officers should respond when a suspect
makes a reference to counsel that is insufficiently clear to invoke
the
Edwards prohibition on further questioning.
I
Pool brought trouble-not to River City, but to the Charleston
Naval Base. Petitioner, a member of the United States Navy, spent
the evening of October 2, 1988, shooting pool at a club on the
base. Another sailor, Keith Shackleton, lost a game and a $30 wager
to petitioner, but Shackleton refused to pay. After the club
closed, Shackleton was beaten to death with a pool cue on a loading
dock behind the commissary. The body was found early the next
morning.
The investigation by the Naval Investigative Service (NIS)
gradually focused on petitioner. Investigative agents determined
that petitioner was at the club that evening, and that he was
absent without authorization from his duty station the next
morning. The agents also learned that only privately owned pool
cues could be removed from the club premises, and that petitioner
owned two cues-one of which had a bloodstain on it. The agents were
told by various people that petitioner either had admitted
committing the crime or had recounted details that clearly
indicated his involvement in the killing.
On November 4, 1988, petitioner was interviewed at the NIS
office. As required by military law, the agents advised petitioner
that he was a suspect in the killing, that he was not required to
make a statement, that any statement could be used against him at a
trial by court-martial, and that he was entitled to speak with an
attorney and have an attorney present during questioning. See Art.
31, Uniform Code of
455
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U. s. C. § 831; Mil. Rule Evid. 305;
Manual for Courts-Martial A22-13 (1984). Petitioner waived his
rights to remain silent and to counsel, both orally and in
writing.
About an hour and a half into the interview, petitioner said,
"Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." App. 135. According to the
uncontradicted testimony of one of the interviewing agents, the
interview then proceeded as follows:
"[We m]ade it very clear that we're not here to violate his
rights, that if he wants a lawyer, then we will stop any kind of
questioning with him, that we weren't going to pursue the matter
unless we have it clarified is he asking for a lawyer or is he just
making a comment about a lawyer, and he said, [']No, I'm not asking
for a lawyer,' and then he continued on, and said, 'No, I don't
want a lawyer.'" Id., at 136.
After a short break, the agents reminded petitioner of his
rights to remain silent and to counsel. The interview then
continued for another hour, until petitioner said, "I think I want
a lawyer before I say anything else."
Id., at 137. At that
point, questioning ceased.
At his general court-martial, petitioner moved to suppress
statements made during the November 4 interview. The Military Judge
denied the motion, holding that "the mention of a lawyer by
[petitioner] during the course of the interrogation [was] not in
the form of a request for counsel and ... the agents properly
determined that [petitioner] was not indicating a desire for or
invoking his right to counseL"
Id., at 164. Petitioner was
convicted on one specification of unpremeditated murder, in
violation of Art. 118, UCMJ, 10 U. s. C. § 918. He was sentenced to
confinement for life, a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all
pay and allowances, and a reduction to the lowest pay grade. The
convening authority approved the findings and sentence. The
Navy-
456
Marine Corps Court of Military Review affirmed. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 12a-15a.
The United States Court of Military Appeals granted
discretionary review and affirmed. 36 M. J. 337 (1993). The court
recognized that the state and federal courts have developed three
different approaches to a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal request
for counsel:
"Some jurisdictions have held that any mention of counsel,
however ambiguous, is sufficient to require that all questioning
cease. Others have attempted to define a threshold standard of
clarity for invoking the right to counsel and have held that
comments falling short of the threshold do not invoke the right to
counsel. Some jurisdictions ... have held that all interrogation
about the offense must immediately cease whenever a suspect
mentions counsel, but they allow interrogators to ask narrow
questions designed to clarify the earlier statement and the
[suspect's] desires respecting counsel." Id., at 341
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Applying the third approach, the court held that petitioner's
comment was ambiguous, and that the NIS agents properly clarified
petitioner's wishes with respect to counsel before continuing
questioning him about the offense.
Id., at 341-342.
Although we have twice previously noted the varying approaches
the lower courts have adopted with respect to ambiguous or
equivocal references to counsel during custodial interrogation, see
Connecticut v.
Barrett, 479 U. S. 523, 529530, n.
3 (1987);
Smith v.
Illinois, 469 U. S. 91, 96, n. 3
(1984)
(per curiam), we have not addressed the issue on the
merits. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 942 (1993), to do so.
II
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at the
initiation of adversary criminal proceedings, see
United
457
States v.
Gouveia, 467 U. S. 180, 188
(1984), and before proceedings are initiated a suspect in a
criminal investigation has no constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel. Nevertheless, we held in
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384
U. S. 436, 469-473 (1966), that a suspect subject to custodial
interrogation has the right to consult with an attorney and to have
counsel present during questioning, and that the police must
explain this right to him before questioning begins. The right to
counsel established in
Miranda was one of a "series of
recommended 'procedural safeguards' ... [that] were not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to
insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was
protected."
Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 443-444
(1974); see U. S. Const., Arndt. 5 ("No person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself").
*
*We have never had occasion to consider whether the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or the attendant
right to counsel during custodial interrogation, applies of its own
force to the military, and we need not do so here. The President,
exercising his authority to prescribe procedures for military
criminal proceedings, see Art. 36(a), UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 836(a),
has decreed that statements obtained in violation of the
Self-Incrimination Clause are generally not admissible at trials by
courtmartial. Mil. Rules Evid. 304(a) and (c)(3). Because the Court
of Military Appeals has held that our cases construing the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel apply to military interrogations and
control the admissibility of evidence at trials by court-martial,
see,
e. g., United States v.
McLaren, 38 M. J. 112,
115 (1993);
United States v.
Applewhite, 23 M. J.
196, 198 (1987), and the parties do not contest this point, we
proceed on the assumption that our precedents apply to
courts-martial just as they apply to state and federal criminal
prosecutions.
We also note that the Government has not sought to rely in this
case on 18 U. S. C. § 3501, "the statute governing the
admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions,"
United
States v.
Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 351
(1994), and we therefore decline the invitation of some
amici to consider it. See Brief for Washington Legal
Foundation et al. as
Amici Curiae 7-14. Although we will
consider arguments raised only in an
amicus brief, see
Teague v.
Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 300 (1989)
(plurality opinion), we are reluctant to do so when the issue is
one of first impression involving
458
The right to counsel recognized in
Miranda is
sufficiently important to suspects in criminal investigations, we
have held, that it "requir[es] the special protection of the
knowing and intelligent waiver standard."
Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U. S., at 483. See
Oregon v.
Bradshaw, 462
U. S. 1039, 10461047 (1983) (plurality opinion); id., at 1051
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment). If the suspect effectively
waives his right to counsel after receiving the
Miranda
warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question him.
North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 372-376
(1979). But if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the
interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer
has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates
conversation.
Edwards v.
Arizona, supra, at 484-485.
This "second layer of prophylaxis for the
Miranda right to
counsel,"
McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171, 176
(1991), is "designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant
into waiving his previously asserted
Miranda rights,"
Michigan v.
Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 350
(1990). To that end, we have held that a suspect who has invoked
the right to counsel cannot be questioned regarding any offense
unless an attorney is actually present.
Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U. S. 146 (1990);
Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U. S. 675 (1988). "It
remains clear, however, that this prohibition on further
questioning-like other aspects of
Miranda-is not itself
required by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on coerced
confessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its
prophylactic purpose."
Connecticut v.
Barrett, supra,
at 528.
The applicability of the "'rigid' prophylactic rule" of
Edwards requires courts to "determine whether the accused
actually invoked his right to counsel."
Smith v.
Illinois, supra, at 95 (emphasis added), quoting
Fare
v.
Michael c.,
442 U. S. 707, 719
(1979). To avoid difficulties of proof and to
the interpretation of a federal statute on which the Department
of Justice expressly declines to take a position. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 44-47.
459
provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is
an objective inquiry. See
Connecticut v.
Barrett,
supra, at 529. Invocation of the
Miranda right to
counsel "requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably
be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of
an attorney."
McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U. S., at 178.
But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous
or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the
circumstances would have understood only that the suspect
might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do
not require the cessation of questioning. See
ibid. ("[T]he
likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present
is not the test for applicability of
Edwards"); Edwards v.
Arizona, supra, at 485 (impermissible for authorities "to
reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has
clearly
asserted his right to counsel") (emphasis added).
Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel.
As we have observed, "a statement either is such an assertion of
the right to counselor it is not."
Smith v.
Illinois,
469 U. S., at 97-98 (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted). Although a suspect need not "speak with the
discrimination of an Oxford don,"
post, at 476 (SOUTER, J.,
concurring in judgment), he must articulate his desire to have
counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police
officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a
request for an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the
requisite level of clarity,
Edwards does not require that
the officers stop questioning the suspect. See
Moran v.
Burbine, 475
U. S. 412, 433, n. 4 (1986) ("[T]he interrogation must cease
until an attorney is present
only [i]f the individual states
that he wants an attorney") (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
We decline petitioner's invitation to extend
Edwards and
require law enforcement officers to cease questioning immediately
upon the making of an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an
attorney. See
Arizona v.
Roberson, supra, at 688
460
(KENNEDY, J., dissenting) ("[T]he rule of
Edwards is our
rule, not a constitutional command; and it is our obligation to
justify its expansion"). The rationale underlying
Edwards is
that the police must respect a suspect's wishes regarding his right
to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation. But
when the officers conducting the questioning reasonably do not know
whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the
immediate cessation of questioning "would transform the
Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to
legitimate police investigative activity,"
Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.
S. 96, 102 (1975), because it would needlessly prevent the
police from questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel even if
the suspect did not wish to have a lawyer present. Nothing in
Edwards requires the provision of counsel to a suspect who
consents to answer questions without the assistance of a lawyer. In
Miranda itself, we expressly rejected the suggestion "that
each police station must have a 'station house lawyer' present at
all times to advise prisoners," 384 U. S., at 474, and held instead
that a suspect must be told of his right to have an attorney
present and that he may not be questioned after invoking his right
to counsel. We also noted that if a suspect is "indecisive in his
request for counsel," the officers need not always cease
questioning. See id., at 485.
We recognize that requiring a clear assertion of the right to
counsel might disadvantage some suspects who-because of fear,
intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other
reasons-will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although
they actually want to have a lawyer present. But the primary
protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is
the
Miranda warnings themselves. "[F]ull comprehension of
the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient
to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation
process."
Moran v.
Burbine, supra, at 427. A suspect
who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel after
having that right explained
461
to him has indicated his willingness to deal with the police
unassisted. Although
Edwards provides an additional
protection-if a suspect subsequently requests an attorney,
questioning must cease-it is one that must be affirmatively invoked
by the suspect.
In considering how a suspect must invoke the right to counsel,
we must consider the other side of the
Miranda equation: the
need for effective law enforcement. Although the courts ensure
compliance with the
Miranda requirements through the
exclusionary rule, it is police officers who must actually decide
whether or not they can question a suspect. The
Edwards
rule-questioning must cease if the suspect asks for a
lawyer-provides a bright line that can be applied by officers in
the real world of investigation and interrogation without unduly
hampering the gathering of information. But if we were to require
questioning to cease if a suspect makes a statement that might be a
request for an attorney, this clarity and ease of application would
be lost. Police officers would be forced to make difficult judgment
calls about whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though
he has not said so, with the threat of suppression if they guess
wrong. We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver
of the
Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue
questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an
attorney.
Of course, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal
statement it will often be good police practice for the
interviewing officers to clarify whether or not he actually wants
an attorney. That was the procedure followed by the NIB agents in
this case. Clarifying questions help protect the rights of the
suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney if he wants one, and
will minimize the chance of a confession being suppressed due to
subsequent judicial secondguessing as to the meaning of the
suspect's statement regarding counsel. But we decline to adopt a
rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions. If the
suspect's state-
462
ment is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel,
the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.
To recapitulate: We held in
Miranda that a suspect is
entitled to the assistance of counsel during custodial
interrogation even though the Constitution does not provide for
such assistance. We held in
Edwards that if the suspect
invokes the right to counsel at any time, the police must
immediately cease questioning him until an attorney is present. But
we are unwilling to create a third layer of prophylaxis to prevent
police questioning when the suspect
might want a lawyer.
Unless the suspect actually requests an attorney, questioning may
continue.
The courts below found that petitioner's remark to the NIS
agents-"Maybe I should talk to a lawyer"-was not a request for
counsel, and we see no reason to disturb that conclusion. The NIS
agents therefore were not required to stop questioning petitioner,
though it was entirely proper for them to clarify whether
petitioner in fact wanted a lawyer. Because there is no ground for
suppression of petitioner's statements, the judgment of the Court
of Military Appeals is
Affirmed.
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring.
Section 3501 of Title 18 of the United States Code is "the
statute governing the admissibility of confessions in federal
prosecutions."
United States v.
Alvarez-Sanchez,
511 U. S. 350,
351 (1994). That provision declares that "a confession
... shall
be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given," and that
the issue of voluntariness shall be determined on the basis of
"all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the
confession,
including whether or not [the] defendant was
advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement ...
[;] ... whether or not [the] defendant had been advised prior to
questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and ...
whether or not [the] defendant was without the assistance of
counsel when questioned .... "
463
§§ 3501(a), (b) (emphases added). It continues (lest the import
be doubtful): "The presence or absence of any of the
above-mentioned factors ... need not be conclusive on the issue of
voluntariness of the confession." § 3501(b). Legal analysis of the
admissibility of a confession without reference to these provisions
is equivalent to legal analysis of the admissibility of hearsay
without consulting the Rules of Evidence; it is an unreal exercise.
Yet as the Court observes, see
ante, at 457-458, n., that is
precisely what the United States has undertaken in this case. It
did not raise § 3501(a) below and asserted that it is "not at
issue" here, Brief for United States 18, n. 13.*
This is not the first case in which the United States has
declined to invoke § 3501 before us-nor even the first case in
which that failure has been called to its attention. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. in
United States v.
Green, O. T. 1992, No.
91-1521, pp. 18-21. In fact, with limited exceptions the
*The United States makes the unusually self-denying assertion
that the provision "in any event would appear not to be applicable
in court-martial cases" since (1) court-martial cases are not
"'criminal prosecutions'" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment
and "therefore would not appear to be 'criminal prosecution[s]' for
purposes of Section 3501(a)," and (2) courts-martial are governed
by Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C.
§ 831, and Rules 304 and 305 of the Military Rules of Evidence. The
first point seems to me questionable: The meaning of terms in
statutes does not necessarily parallel their meaning in the
Constitution. Moreover, even accepting the premise that § 3501 does
not apply to courts-martial directly, it does apply indirectly,
through Rule 101(b)(1) of the Military Rules of Evidence, which
requires courts-martial to apply "the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States
district courts." As for the second point: The cited provisions of
the Uniform Code and the Military Rules may (though I doubt it) be
independent reasons why the confession here should be excluded, but
they cannot
possibly be reasons why § 3501 does not prevent
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),
from being a basis for excluding them, which is the issue before
us. In any event, the Court today bases its refusal to consider §
3501 not upon the fact that the provision is inapplicable, but upon
the fact that the Government failed to argue it-and it is
that refusal which my present statement addresses.
464
provision has been studiously avoided by every Administration,
not only in this Court but in the lower courts, since its enactment
more than 25 years ago. See Office of Legal Policy, U. S. Dept. of
Justice, Report to Attorney General on Law of Pre-Trial
Interrogation 72-73 (1986) (discussing "[t]he abortive
implementation of § 3501" after its passage in 1968).
I agree with the Court that it is
proper, given the
Government's failure to raise the point, to render judgment without
taking account of § 3501. But the refusal to consider arguments not
raised is a sound prudential practice, rather than a statutory or
constitutional mandate, and there are times when prudence dictates
the contrary. See
United States Nat. Bank of Ore. v.
Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U. S. 439, 445-448
(1993) (proper for Court of Appeals to consider whether an
allegedly controlling statute had been repealed, despite parties'
failure, upon invitation, to assert the point). As far as I am
concerned, such a time will have arrived when a case that comes
within the terms of this statute is next presented to us.
For most of this century, voluntariness
vel non was the
touchstone of admissibility of confessions. See
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384
U. S. 436, 506-507 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Section
3501 of Title 18
seems to provide for that standard in
federal criminal prosecutions today. I say "seems" because I do not
wish to prejudge any issue of law. I am entirely open to the
argument that § 3501 does not mean what it appears to say; that it
is inapplicable for some other reason; or even that it is
unconstitutional. But I will no longer be open to the argument that
this Court should continue to ignore the commands of § 3501 simply
because the Executive declines to insist that we observe them.
The Executive has the power (whether or not it has the right)
effectively to nullify some provisions of law by the mere failure
to prosecute-the exercise of so-called prosecutorial discretion.
And it has the power (whether or not it
465
has the right) to avoid application of § 3501 by simply
declining to introduce into evidence confessions admissible under
its terms. But once a prosecution has been commenced and a
confession introduced, the Executive assuredly has neither the
power nor the right to determine what objections to admissibility
of the confession are valid in law. Section § 3501 of Title 18 is a
provision of law directed
to the courts, reflecting the
people's assessment of the proper balance to be struck between
concern for persons interrogated in custody and the needs of
effective law enforcement. We shirk our duty if we systematically
disregard that statutory command simply because the Justice
Department systematically declines to remind us of it.
The United States' repeated refusal to invoke § 3501, combined
with the courts' traditional (albeit merely prudential) refusal to
consider arguments not raised, has caused the federal judiciary to
confront a host of
"Miranda" issues that might be entirely
irrelevant under federal law. See,
e. g., in addition to the
present case,
United States v.
Green, 507 U. S. 545 (1993)
(dism'g cert. as moot);
United States v.
Griffin,
922 F.2d
1343 (CA8 1990);
United States v.
Vazquez,
857 F.2d
857 (CA1 1988);
United States v.
Scalf, 725 F.2d
1272 (CAlO 1984). Worse still, it may have produced-during an
era of intense national concern about the problem of runaway
crime-the acquittal and the nonprosecution of many dangerous
felons, enabling them to continue their depredations upon our
citizens. There is no excuse for this. Perhaps (though I do not
immediately see why) the Justice Department has good basis for
believing that allowing prosecutions to be defeated on grounds that
could be avoided by invocation of § 3501 is consistent with the
Executive's obligation to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed," U. S. Const., Art. II, § 3. That is not the point. The
point is whether
our continuing refusal to
consider §
3501 is consistent with the Third Branch's obligation to decide
according to the law. I think it is not.
466
SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment
JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JusTICE STEVENS, and
JUSTICE GINSBURG join, concurring in the judgment.
In the midst of his questioning by naval investigators,
petitioner said "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." The
investigators promptly stopped questioning Davis about the killing
of Keith Shackleton and instead undertook to determine whether he
meant to invoke his right to counsel, see Mi
randa v.
Arizona, 384
U. S. 436 (1966). According to testimony accepted by the courts
below, Davis answered the investigators' questions on that point by
saying, "I'm not asking for a lawyer," and "No, I don't want to
talk to a lawyer." Only then did the interrogation resume (stopping
for good when petitioner said, "I think I want a lawyer before I
say anything else").
I agree with the majority that the Constitution does not forbid
law enforcement officers to pose questions (like those directed at
Davis) aimed solely at clarifying whether a suspect's ambiguous
reference to counsel was meant to assert his Fifth Amendment right.
Accordingly I concur in the judgment affirming Davis's conviction,
resting partly on evidence of statements given after agents
ascertained that he did not wish to deal with them through counsel.
I cannot, however, join in my colleagues' further conclusion that
if the investigators here had been so inclined, they were at
liberty to disregard Davis's reference to a lawyer entirely, in
accordance with a general rule that interrogators have no legal
obligation to discover what a custodial subject meant by an
ambiguous statement that could reasonably be understood to express
a desire to consult a lawyer.
Our own precedent, the reasonable judgments of the majority of
the many courts already to have addressed the issue before US,l and
the advocacy of a considerable body of law
1 See,
e. g., United States v.
Porter, 776 F.2d
370 (CA1 1985) (en bane);
United States v.
Gotay, 844 F.2d
971, 975
(CA2 1988);
Thompson v.
Wainwright, 601 F.2d
768, 771-772
(CA5 1979) (en bane);
United States
v.
Fouche, 833 F.2d
1284, 1287
(CA9 1987);
United States v.
March, 999 F. 2d
467
enforcement officials 2 are to the contrary. All argue against
the Court's approach today, which draws a sharp line between
interrogated suspects who "clearly" assert their right to counsel,
ante, at 461, and those who say something that may, but may
not, express a desire for counsel's presence, the former suspects
being assured that questioning will not resume without counsel
present, see
Miranda, supra, at 474,
Edwards v.
Arizona, 451
U. S. 477, 484-485 (1981);
Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U. S. 146 (1990), the
latter being left to fend for themselves. The concerns of fairness
and practicality that have long anchored our
Miranda case
law point to a different response: when law enforcement officials
"reasonably do not know whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer,"
ante, at 460, they should stop their interrogation and ask
him to make his choice clear.
I A
While the question we address today is an open one,3 its answer
requires coherence with nearly three decades of case
456, 461-462 (CAlO 1993);
United States v.
Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d
1467, 1472 (CAll 1992); see also
Howard v.
Pung,
862 F.2d
1348 (CA8 1988). The weight of state-court authority is
similarly lopsided, see,
e. g.,
People v.
Benjamin, 732 P. 2d 1167, 1171 (Colo. 1987);
Crawford
v.
State, 580 A. 2d 571, 576-577 (Del. 1990);
Martinez v.
State, 564 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 1990);
State v.
Robinson, 427 N. W. 2d 217, 223 (Minn.
1988).
2 See Brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.,
International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., National
District Attorneys Association, and National Sheriffs' Association
as
Amici Curiae 5 (The approach advocated here "is a common
sense resolution of the problem. It fully accommodates the rights
of the subject, while at the same time preserv[ing] the interests
of law enforcement and of the public welfare"); see also Brief for
United States 20 (approach taken by the Court does not "fulfill the
fundamental purpose of
Miranda") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
3 The majority acknowledges,
ante, at 456, that we have
declined (despite the persistence of divergent approaches in the
lower courts) to decide the operative rule for such ambiguous
statements, see,
e. g., Connecticut v.
Barrett,
479 U. S.
523,529, n. 3 (1987);
Mueller v.
Virginia, 507 U.
S. 1043
468
SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment
law addressing the relationship between police and criminal
suspects in custodial interrogation. Throughout that period, two
precepts have commanded broad assent: that the
(1993) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), but
then suggests that the conclusion it reaches was foreshadowed by
McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171 (1991),
where we noted that the
"likelihood that a suspect would
wish counsel to be present" was not dispositive, id., at 178. But
we were not addressing the degree of clarity required to activate
the counsel right (let alone endorsing the standard embraced
today), as is evident from the very page of
McNeil cited,
where we were careful to say only that the
Miranda counsel
right "requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably
be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of
an attorney." 501 U. S., at 178.
McNeil instead made the
different and familiar point that courts may not presume that a
silent defendant "would" want a lawyer whenever circumstances
suggest that representation "would" be in his interest.
Nor may this case be disposed of by italicizing the words of
Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 485
(1981), to the effect that when a suspect "clearly assert[s]" his
right, questioning must cease. See
ante, at 459. Even
putting aside that the particular statement in that case was not
entirely clear (the highest court to address the question described
it as "equivocal," see
State v.
Edwards, 122 Ariz.
206, 211, 594 P. 2d 72, 77 (1979); see also 451 U. S., at 480, n.
6),
Edwards no more decided the legal consequences of a less
than "clear" statement than
Miranda, by saying that explicit
waivers are sufficient, 384 U. S., at 475, settled whether they are
necessary. See
North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 373 (1979)
(holding they are not). Were it otherwise, there would have been no
reason after
Edwards to identify the issue as unresolved,
but see
Barrett, supra; Smith v.
Illinois, 469 U. S. 91, 95-96 (1984)
(per curiam).
Nor, finally, is it plausible to read
Miranda itself as a
presage of the Court's rule, on account of language suggesting that
questioning need not stop when a request for counsel is
"'indecisive.'''
Ante, at 460 (quoting
Miranda, 384
U. S., at 485). The statement quoted, however, is not taken from
the Court's holding, but rather from a lengthy direct quotation of
a letter to the Court from the Solicitor General, purporting to
summarize then-current FBI practice (which the Court observed was
"consistent," id., at 484, with the rule announced). In any event,
the letter further explains that, under the FBI policy, the
"indecisive" suspect may be "question[ed] on whether he did or did
not waive counsel," id., at 485, an approach closer to the one
advocated here than to the one the Court adopts.
469
Miranda safeguards exist" 'to assure that
the
individual's right to choose between speech and silence remains
unfettered throughout the interrogation process,'" see
Connecticut v.
Barrett, 479 U. S. 523, 528 (1987)
(quoting
Miranda, 384 U. S., at 469, and supplying
emphasis), and that the justification for
Miranda rules,
intended to operate in the real world, "must be consistent with ...
practical realities,"
Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U. S. 675, 688 (1988)
(KENNEDY, J., dissenting). A rule barring government agents from
further interrogation until they determine whether a suspect's
ambiguous statement was meant as a request for counsel fulfills
both ambitions. It assures that a suspect's choice whether or not
to deal with police through counsel will be "scrupulously honored,"
Miranda, supra, at 479; cf.
Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.
S. 96,110, n. 2 (1975) (White, J., concurring in result), and
it faces both the real-world reasons why misunderstandings arise
between suspect and interrogator and the real-world limitations on
the capacity of police and trial courts to apply fine distinctions
and intricate rules.
B
Tested against the same two principles, the approach the Court
adopts does not fare so well. First, as the majority expressly
acknowledges, see
ante, at 460, criminal suspects who may
(in
Miranda's words) be "thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation
procedures," 384 U. S., at 457, would seem an odd group to single
out for the Court's demand of heightened linguistic care. A
substantial percentage of them lack anything like a confident
command of the English language, see,
e. g., United States
v.
De la Jara, 973 F.2d
746, 750 (CA9 1992); many are "woefully ignorant,"
Miranda,
supra, at 468; cf.
Davis v.
North Carolina,
384 U. S. 737,
742 (1966); and many more will be sufficiently intimidated by the
interrogation process or overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their
predicament that
470
SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment
the ability to speak assertively will abandon them.4 Indeed, the
awareness of just these realities has, in the past, dissuaded the
Court from placing any burden of clarity upon individuals in
custody, but has led it instead to require that requests for
counsel be "give[n] a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation,"
see
Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U. S. 625, 633
(1986);
Barrett, supra, at 529, and that courts "indulge
every reasonable presumption,"
Johnson v.
Zerbst,
304 U. S. 458,
464 (1938) (internal quotation marks omitted), that a suspect has
not waived his right to counsel under
Miranda, see,
e.
g., Oregon v.
Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039, 1051
(1983) (Powell, J., concurring) ("We are unanimous in agreeing ...
that the
[Miranda] right to counsel is a prime example of
those rights requiring the special protection of the knowing and
intelligent waiver standard") (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted); cf.
Minnick, 498 U. S., at 160 (SCALIA,
J., dissenting) ("[WJe have adhered to the principle that nothing
less than the
Zerbst standard" is appropriate for
Miranda waivers).
Nor may the standard governing waivers as expressed in these
statements be deflected away by drawing a distinction between
initial waivers of
Miranda rights and subsequent
4 Social science confirms what common sense would suggest, that
individuals who feel intimidated or powerless are more likely to
speak in equivocal or nonstandard terms when no ambiguity or
equivocation is meant. See W. O'Barr, Linguistic Evidence:
Language, Power, and Strategy in the Courtroom 61-71 (1982).
Suspects in police interrogation are strong candidates for these
effects. Even while resort by the police to the "third degree" has
abated since
Miranda, the basic forms of psychological
pressure applied by police appear to have changed less. Compare,
e. g.,
Miranda, supra, at 449 (" '[T]he principal
psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is
privacy''') (quoting F. Inbau & J. Reid, Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions 1 (1962)), with F. Inbau, J. Reid,
& J. Buckley, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 24 (3d ed.
1986) ("The principal psychological factor contributing to a
successful interrogation is privacy").
471
decisions to reinvoke them, on the theory that so long as the
burden to demonstrate waiver rests on the government, it is only
fair to make the suspect shoulder a burden of showing a clear
subsequent assertion.
Miranda itself discredited the
legitimacy of any such distinction. The opinion described the
object of the warning as being to assure "a continuous opportunity
to exercise [the right of silence]," 384 U. S., at 444; see also
Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 458 (1986)
(STEVENS, J., dissenting); accord, id., at 423, n. 1. "[C]ontinuous
opportunity" suggests an unvarying one, governed by a common
standard of effectiveness. The suggestion is confirmed by the very
first statement that follows, that "there can be no questioning" if
the suspect "indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney,"
Miranda, 384 U. S., at 444-445. "[A]t any stage" obviously
includes the stage after initial waiver and the commencement of
questioning, and "indicates in any manner" is a rule plainly in
tension with the indication "with a vengeance," see id., at 505
(Harlan, J., dissenting), that the Court would require for exercise
of the "continuous" right at some point after initial waiver.
The Court defends as tolerable the certainty that some poorly
expressed requests for counsel will be disregarded on the ground
that
Miranda warnings suffice to alleviate the inherent
coercion of the custodial interrogation.
Ante, at 460. But,
"[a] once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the
interrogation, cannot itself suffice" to "assure that the ... right
to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout
the interrogation process," 384 U. S., at 469. Nor does the Court's
defense reflect a sound reading of the case it relies on,
Moran v.
Burbine, supra:
"Beyond [the] duty to inform, Miranda requires that the
police respect the [suspect's] decision to exercise the rights
outlined in the warnings. 'If the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during ques-
472
SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment
tioning, that he wishes to remain silent, [or if he] states that
he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease.'" 475 U. S., at
420 (quoting Miranda, supra, at 473-474).
While
Moran held that a subject's knowing and voluntary
waiver of the right to counsel is not undermined by the fact that
police prevented an unsummoned lawyer from making contact with him,
it contains no suggestion that
Miranda affords as ready a
tolerance for police conduct frustrating the suspect's subjectively
held (if ambiguously expressed) desire for counsel. See 475 U. S.,
at 423 (contrasting
Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 481
(1964), where "police incorrectly told the
suspect that his
lawyer 'didn't want to see him' "); see also
Miranda, supra,
at 468 (purpose of warnings is to "show the individual that his
interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he
choose to exercise it").
Indeed, it is easy, amidst the discussion of layers of
protection, to lose sight of a real risk in the majority's
approach, going close to the core of what the Court has held that
the Fifth Amendment provides. The experience of the timid or
verbally inept suspect (whose existence the Court acknowledges) may
not always closely follow that of the defendant in
Edwards
v.
Arizona (whose purported waiver of his right to counsel,
made after having invoked the right, was held ineffective, lest
police be tempted to "badge[r]" others like him, see
Michigan v.
Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 350
(1990)). Indeed, it may be more like that of the defendant in
Escobedo v.
Illinois, supra, whose sense of dilemma
was heightened by his interrogators' denial of his requests to talk
to a lawyer. When a suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to
have been ignored (and by hypothesis, he has said something that an
objective listener could "reasonably," although not necessarily,
take to be a request), in contravention of the "rights" just read
to him by his interrogator, he may well
473
see further objection as futile and confession (true or not) as
the only way to end his interrogation.5
Nor is it enough to say that a "'statement either is ... an
assertion of the right to counselor it is not.'"
Ante, at
459 (quoting
Smith v.
Illinois, 469 U. S., at 97-98)
(omitting brackets and internal quotation marks). In
Smith,
we neither denied the possibility that a reference to counsel could
be ambiguous, see id., at 98; accord, id., at 101 (REHNQUIST, J.,
dissenting), nor suggested that particular statements should be
considered in isolation, id., at 98.6 While it might be fair to say
that every statement is meant either to express a desire to deal
with police through counselor not, this fact does not dictate the
rule that interrogators who hear a statement consistent with either
possibility may presume the latter and forge ahead; on the
contrary, clarification is the intuitively sensible course.
The other justifications offered for the "requisite level of
clarity" rule,
ante, at 459, are that, whatever its costs,
it will further society's strong interest in "effective law
enforcement,"
ante, at 461, and maintain the "ease of
application,"
5 See
People v.
Harper, 94 Ill. App. 3d 298, 300,
418 N. E. 2d 894, 896 (1981) (defendant who asked interrogator to
retrieve an attorney's business card from his wallet but was told
that it "'wouldn't be necessary'" held not to have "availed
himself" of right to counsel); see also
Cooper v.
Dupnik, 963 F.2d
1220, 1225
(CA9 1992) (en banc) (describing elaborate
police Task Force plan to ignore systematically a suspect's
requests for counsel, on the theory that such would induce
hopelessness and thereby elicit an admission, which would then be
used to keep the suspect off the witness stand, see
Oregon
v.
Hass, 420
U. S. 714 (1975) (statements obtained in violation of
Miranda rules admissible for impeachment purposes)).
6 Indeed, our
Smith decision was quoting from the dissent
below, which adverts in the same sentence to the possibility of
"bona fide doubt the officer may still have as to whether
the defendant desires counsel," in which case "strictly" limited
questioning is prescribed. See
People v.
Smith, 102
Ill. 2d 365, 375, 466 N. E. 2d 236, 241 (1984) (opinion of Simon,
J.).
474
SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment
ibid., that has long been a concern of our
Miranda
jurisprudence. With respect to the first point, the margin of
difference between the clarification approach advocated here and
the one the Court adopts is defined by the class of cases in which
a suspect, if asked, would make it plain that he meant to request
counsel (at which point questioning would cease). While these lost
confessions do extract a real price from society, it is one that
Miranda itself determined should be borne. Cf. Brief for
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. as
Amici
Curiae 5 (the clarification approach "preserves the interests
of law enforcement and of the public welfare");
Escobedo,
supra, at 490 ("No system worth preserving should have to
fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a
lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, [his constitutional]
rights").
As for practical application, while every approach, including
the majority's, will involve some "difficult judgment calls," 7 the
rule argued for here would relieve the officer of
7 In the abstract, nothing may seem more clear than a "clear
statement" rule, but in police stations and trial courts the
question, "how clear is clear?" is not so readily answered. When a
suspect says, "uh, yeah, I'd like to do that" after being told he
has a right to a lawyer, has he "clearly asserted" his right?
Compare
Smith v.
Illinois, 469 U. S., at 97
(statement was "'neither indecisive nor ambiguous''') (citation
omitted), with
id., at 101 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting)
(questioning clarity); see also
Oregon v.
Bradshaw,
462 U. S. 1039,
1041-1042 (1983) (plurality opinion) ("I do want an attorney before
it goes very much further");
Edwards, 451 U. S., at 479
('''I want an attorney before making a deal"'); cf. n. 3,
supra. Indeed, in this case, when Davis finally said, "I
think I want a lawyer before I say anything else," the agents
ceased questioning; but see
People v.
Kendricks, 121
Ill. App. 3d 442, 446, 459 N. E. 2d 1137, 1139 (1984) (agents need
not stop interrogation when suspect says, "'I think I might need a
lawyer' "); cf.
People v.
Santiago, 133 App. Div.
429, 430-431, 519 N. Y. S. 2d 413, 414-415 (1987) (" 'Will you
supply [a lawyer] now so that I may ask him should I continue with
this interview at this moment?''' held "not ... an unequivocal
invocation"). See generally
Smith, supra, at 101 (REHNQUIST,
J., dissenting) (noting that statements are rarely "crystal-clear";
"differences between certainty and hesitancy may well
475
any responsibility for guessing "whether the suspect in fact
wants a lawyer even though he hasn't said so,"
ante, at 461.
To the contrary, it would assure that the "judgment call" will be
made by the party most competent to resolve the ambiguity, who our
case law has always assumed should make it: the individual
suspect.
II
Although I am convinced that the Court has taken the wrong path,
I am not persuaded by petitioner's contention that even ambiguous
statements require an end to all police questioning. I recognize
that the approach petitioner urges on us can claim some support
from our case law, most notably in the "indicates in any manner"
language of
Miranda, and I do not deny that the rule I
endorse could be abused by "clarifying" questions that shade subtly
into illicitly badgering a suspect who wants counsel, but see
Thompson v.
Wainwright, 601 F.2d
768, 771-772 (CA5 1979); cf.
State v.
Walkowiak,
183 Wis. 2d 478,515 N. W. 2d 863 (1994) (Abrahamson, J.,
concurring) (suggesting means properly to focus clarification
enquiry). But petitioner's proposal is not entirely in harmony with
all the major themes of
Miranda case law, its virtues and
demerits being the reverse images of those that mark the Court's
rule. While it is plainly wrong, for example, to continue
interrogation when the suspect wants it to stop (and so indicates),
the strong bias in favor of individual choice may also be disserved
by stopping questioning when a suspect wants it to continue (but
where his statement might be understood otherwise), see
Michigan v.
turn on the inflection with which words are spoken, especially
where [a] statement is isolated from the statements surrounding
it").
As a practical matter, of course, the primary arbiters of
"clarity" will be the interrogators themselves, who tend as well to
be courts' preferred source in determining the precise words a
suspect used. And when an inculpatory statement has been obtained
as a result of an unrecorded, incommunicado interrogation, these
officers rarely lose "swearing matches" against criminal defendants
at suppression hearings.
476
SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment
Mosley, 423
U. S. 96, 109 (1975) (White, J., concurring in result) ("[W]e
have ... rejected [the] paternalistic rule protecting a defendant
from his intelligent and voluntary decisions about his own criminal
case"). The costs to society of losing confessions would, moreover,
be especially hard to bear where the suspect, if asked for his
choice, would have chosen to continue. One need not sign the
majority's opinion here to agree that resort to the rule petitioner
argues for should be had only if experience shows that less drastic
means of safeguarding suspects' constitutional rights are not up to
the job, see generally
United States v.
Leon,
468 U. S. 897,
927928 (1984) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring) (exclusionary rule
exception must be "tested in the real world of state and federal
law enforcement, and this Court will attend to the results").
***
Our cases are best respected by a rule that when a suspect under
custodial interrogation makes an ambiguous statement that might
reasonably be understood as expressing a wish that a lawyer be
summoned (and questioning cease), interrogators' questions should
be confined to verifying whether the individual meant to ask for a
lawyer. While there is reason to expect that trial courts will
apply today's ruling sensibly (without requiring criminal suspects
to speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don) and that
interrogators will continue to follow what the Court rightly calls
"good police practice" (compelled up to now by a substantial body
of state and Circuit law), I believe that the case law under
Miranda does not allow them to do otherwise.
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