On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of
California for the Second Appellate District.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice MARSHALL, dissenting.
Petitioner, a 13-year-old minor, was taken from his home to a
police station for questioning by police officers who had neither
an arrest warrant nor probable cause for his arrest. The court
below held that there was no violation of petitioner's
constitutional rights because the officers acted on instructions
from his mother. Because I believe the case presents an important
question concerning a parent's authority to waive her minor child's
right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from
"unreasonable seizures," I dissent from denial of the petition for
a writ of certiorari.
I
On March 8, 1979, an investigator with the Los Angeles Police
Department told two of his subordinates that he had been in contact
with a mother about one of her children who allegedly had been
involved in a burglary. He told the officers that the mother had
agreed to bring the minor to the police station the previous day
but had failed to do so, and he instructed the officers to go to
the woman's house and find out when she would bring her son to the
station.
At the house, the officers were invited into a bedroom where
they saw petitioner's mother lying in bed. The officers informed
her of the reason for their visit and asked why she had not brought
her son to the police station the previous day as she had promised.
Petitioner's mother explained that her car had broken down, and
when the officers asked her if
Page 449 U.S.
1043 , 1044
she could bring the boy in that day, she told them that her car
was still not working. The officers next inquired where her son
was. The mother pointed to petitioner, who was lying in another bed
in the same room, and told him to wake up. The officers then asked
her when she would be able to bring her son in and she replied:
"Well, you officers are here. You can take him down." She told the
officers that she had been having trouble with her son and wanted
to know if he had been involved in a burglary so she could notify
his probation officer. She then told petitioner to get out of bed
and get dressed because the officers were waiting for him.
Petitioner dressed and left the house with the officers, who placed
him in handcuffs before driving him to the police station. At the
station, petitioner was given the warnings required by Miranda v.
Arizona,
384 U.S.
436 (1966). He indicated that he understood them, waived his
rights, and confessed to the burglary.
1
A petition was filed against petitioner in juvenile court
charging him with burglary in violation of 459 of the Cal.Penal
Code Ann. (West Supp.1980). Petitioner filed a motion to suppress
the confession he made at the police station as the fruit of an
illegal arrest. At the combined suppression and adjudication
hearing, the State conceded that the police officers had neither an
arrest warrant nor probable cause to arrest petitioner at the time
he was taken to the station for questioning. Nonetheless, the court
denied the suppression motion and relied on the confession in
sustaining the charge against petitioner. At the dispositional
hearing, the court ordered that petitioner be removed from the
custody of his mother. Physical confinement was set at a maximum
period of two years.
Page 449 U.S.
1043 , 1045
On appeal, a divided California Court of Appeal affirmed the
judgment of the juvenile court. The majority found no proof that
petitioner had agreed to accompany the officers to the station. But
relying on California cases that had "recognized and acknowledged
the supervisorial authority and control of parents over their
children," 2 the majority held that petitioner's constitutional
rights were not violated because both petitioner and the police
officers complied with his mother's request that he be taken to the
station for questioning. [
Footnote
3] The Supreme Court of California denied a petition for a
hearing without opinion. [
Footnote
4]
II
If petitioner had been five years older when the arrest
occurred, there would be no question that the judgment below must
be reversed. In Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S.
200, 216, 2258 (1979), we held that "detention for custodial
interrogation-regardless of its label-intrudes so severely on
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to
trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrests." Here,
the court below specifically found that petitioner did not
personally consent to accompany the officers to the station.
[
Footnote 5] The officers did
not ask petitioner if he was willing to accompany them to the
station. And the officers did not believe that petitioner was
accompanying them voluntarily, for they placed him in handcuffs to
prevent him escaping en route to the station. Moreover, as
respondent concedes, the officers had neither a warrant nor
probable cause to arrest petitioner
Page 449 U.S.
1043 , 1046
when they took him to the station for questioning. If he were an
adult, petitioner's subsequent confession would have to be
suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest. Wong Sun v. United
States,
371 U.S.
471, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963).6
The court below reached a different result solely because
petitioner is a minor. Thus, the case squarely presents the
question whether a constitutional violation occurred when
petitioner, a minor, was taken from his home to a police station
for questioning by police officers who, although they had his
mother's consent to their action, had neither an arrest warrant nor
probable cause for petitioner's arrest. I believe that the Court
should consider this issue.
The Court has never previously considered the scope of Fourth
Amendment protections when asserted by a minor. [
Footnote 7] Indeed, we have never attempted to
define the "totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the
state." In re Gault,
387 U.S.
1, 13, 1436 (1967). Nonetheless our cases have established that
minors "are 'persons' under our Constitution . . . possessed of
fundamental rights which the state must respect. . . ." Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist.,
393 U.S.
503, 511, 739 (1969). As we explained in Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth,
428 U.S.
52, 74, 2843 (1976): "Constitutional rights do not mature and
come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined
age of maturity. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights." 8
Page 449 U.S.
1043 , 1047
Moreover, our cases have exhibited particular sensitivity to
minors' claims to constitutional protection against deprivations of
liberty by the State. Because loss of liberty is no less a
deprivation for a child than for an adult, In re Gault, 387 U.S.,
at 27, we have held that a minor's right with respect to many of
these claims is virtually coextensive with an adult's. Thus, we
have extended the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against
deprivation of liberty without due process of law to minors
involved in juvenile proceedings. We have held that a minor facing
juvenile charges is entitled to notice, counsel, and confrontation
of witnesses. Id., 387 U.S., at 33, 36-37, 57, 1448-1449, 1459. "
'Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods
which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law.' "
Id., at 13 quoting with approval Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S.
596, 601, 304 (1948) ( Douglas, J., plurality opinion).
Similarly, our cases have accorded minors the right against
self-incrimination, In re Gault, supra, protection against coerced
confessions, Gallegos v. Colorado,
370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley
v. Ohio, supra, guarantees against double jeopardy, Breed v. Jones,
421 U.S. 519, 44
L. Ed. 2d 346 (1975), and the presumption of innocence implemented
by the government's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
I believe that if the Court examined this issue, we would be
hard- pressed to find reasons to distinguish these rights, which
clearly apply to minors from the Fourth Amendment right invoked by
petitioner. [
Footnote 9] No
less than due process pro-
Page 449 U.S.
1043 , 1048
tections, the guarantee against unreasonable governmental
searches and seizures "defines the rights of the individual and
delimits the powers which the state may exercise." In re Gault,
supra, 387 U.S., at 20, 87 S. Ct., at 1439 (footnote omitted). As
the Court has stated, the Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he security
of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police. . . ."
Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S.
25, 27, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 1361 (1949). Neither the court below
nor respondent goes so far as to suggest that minors enjoy no
protection of this personal privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
Instead, respondent argues that the court below correctly held that
petitioner's mother had lawful authority to instruct the police
officers to take her son to the station for questioning. Respondent
contends that inasmuch as petitioner's mother could have brought
him to the station herself, she merely authorized the officers to
do what she could have done herself.
Essential to this claim is the assumption that a parent's right
to guide her child's upbringing 10 includes the authority to waive
a constitutional right that the child may have. [
Footnote 11]
Page 449 U.S.
1043 , 1049
I find this assumption extremely disturbing for I see no way to
cabin its implications. If a parent may, without even consulting
the child, waive his constitutional rights, then the police may
constitutionally coerce confessions from minors so long as the
officers have the parents' consent to their action. Even more
troubling, there is nothing in respondent's reasoning to preclude a
juvenile court from finding a minor guilty upon proof less than
beyond a reasonable doubt, as long as the parent waives that
critical due process requirement. The view of parental authority
advanced by respondent and adopted by the court below suggests no
reason to bar these actions.
But even assuming that the view of parental authority espoused
by the court below is correct, there is a major inconsistency in
the court's reasoning. The court's view of parental authority rests
on the supposition that petitioner was too immature to make the
decision about whether to go to the station with the police
officers for himself. But if that is the case, I find it hard to
discern the logic of the same court's conclusion that petitioner
was capable of making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his
Miranda rights, whose application to a minor are not in doubt.
Surely, if a minor in his home lacks the capacity to decide whether
to accompany police officers to the station for questioning, there
must be some question about the same minor's capacity to make a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights at the police station.
A coherent view, fully adopting the court's theory of a minor's
incapacity, would result in the exclusion of petitioner's
confession because he would be deemed incapable of waiving his
Miranda rights. And his conviction would be reversed because it was
based on the confession. [
Footnote 12]
Page 449 U.S.
1043 , 1050
Because I believe that the case raises important questions that
were not adequately addressed by the court below, I would grant the
petition for a writ of certiorari and set the case for plenary
consideration.
Justice BRENNAN and Justice WHITE, agreeing for the most part
with Justice MARSHALL'S dissenting opinion, would also grant
certiorari.
Footnotes
Footnote 1 This statement of
facts is from the opinion of the court below which was originally
published at
103 Cal. App.
3d 469, 163 Cal. Rptr. 67 ( 1980) (advance sheets) and included
as petitioner's appendix to his petition for certiorari before this
Court. On July 18, 1980, the California Supreme Court ordered that
the opinion not be published in the official California Appellate
Reports.
Footnote 2 App. to Pet. for
Cert. 6.
Footnote 3 On this issue,
the dissenting judge argued that the police officers violated
petitioner's constitutional right by detaining him for custodial
interrogation at a time when they had neither a warrant nor
probable cause for his arrest. Id., at 15-20 (Jefferson, J.,
dissenting).
Footnote 4 Two judges of
that court indicated that they would have granted the petition for
a hearing.
Footnote 5 Id., at 5.
Footnote 6 There is no
suggestion that the causal connection between petitioner's
detention and his confession was broken in a manner which might
purge the taint of the arrest.
Footnote 7 The Fourth
Amendment is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643d 1081
(1961).
Footnote 8 We have held that
minors are entitled to constitutional protection for freedom of
speech, Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969); West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943),
equal protection against racial discrimination, Brown v. Board of
Education,
347 U.S.
483 (1954), and due process in civil proceedings, Goss v.
Lopez,
419 U.S.
565 ( 1975).
Footnote 9 Many state and
lower federal courts have extended Fourth Amendment guarantees to
minors involved in juvenile proceedings. See, e. g., Brown v.
Fauntleroy, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 116,
442 F.2d
838 (1971); Cooley v. Stone, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 317,
414 F.2d
1213 (1969); In re Scott K.,
24 Cal. 3d
395, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671, 595 P.2d 105 (1979); In re Harvey, 222
Pa.Super. 222, 229, 295 A.2d 93, 96-97 (1972); In re Morris, 29
Ohio Misc. 71, 278 N.E.2d 701 (Columbiana Cty. Common Pleas Ct.
1971); Ciulla v. State, 434 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex.Civ.App.1968);
State v. Lowry, 95 N.J.Super. 307, 313- 317,
230 A.2d 907, 910-912 (1967); In re Williams, 49 Misc.2d 154,
169- 170, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91, 109-110 (Ulster Cty. Family Ct. 1966);
Urbasek v. People, 76 Ill.App.2d 375, 222 N.E.2d 233 (1966).
Footnote 10 See Wisconsin
v. Yoder,
406 U.S.
205, 232, 1541 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S.
510, 534-535, 573-574 (1925).
Footnote 11 The Fourth
Amendment's warrant and probable-cause requirements impose limits
on the actions of the police. Respondent concedes that the police
had neither a warrant nor probable cause for petitioner's detention
. His mother's consent could not and did not supply the requisite
probable cause or warrant. Even though petitioner's mother could
have taken him to the station herself, it does not follow from this
that she had the authority to waive petitioner's Fourth Amendment
right and permit the police to detain him without complying with
constitutional requirements.
The Supreme Court of California rejected a similar claim by the
State in another case that also involved a minor's Fourth Amendment
right. In re Scott K., supra. In that case a police officer
obtained permission from a parent to search a box that belonged to
his minor son. The court rejected the State's suggestion that
because the father could have searched the box himself, he had the
authority to permit the police to search it.
Footnote 12
Alternatively, if petitioner is presumed capable of making a
knowing and intelligent decision, as the court below assumed in
connection with his waiver of his Miranda rights, then petitioner
could object to being taken, handcuffed, to the police station. And
he would here be permitted to claim violation of the Fourth
Amendment's probable-cause and warrant requirements by the police.
This view is perhaps more consistent with decisions by this Court
that have recognized the rights of minors faced with decisions that
critically affect their own lives. See Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(upholding pregnant minor's right to make an abortion decision
without parental consent).
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