The Seventh Amendment of the Constitution entitles either party
to demand a jury trial in an action for damages in the federal
courts under § 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which
authorizes private plaintiffs to bring civil actions to redress
violations of the Act's fair housing provisions. Pp.
415 U. S.
191-198.
467 F.2d 1110, affirmed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 88, 42
U.S.C. § 3612, authorizes private plaintiffs to bring civil actions
to redress violations of Title VIII, the fair housing provisions of
the Act, and provides that
"[t]he court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any
permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or
other order, and may award to the plaintiff
Page 415 U. S. 190
actual damages and not more than $1,000 punitive damages,
together with court costs and reasonable attorney fees. . . ."
The question presented in this case is whether the Civil Rights
Act or the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial upon demand by
one of the parties in an action for damages and injunctive relief
under this section.
Petitioner, a Negro woman, brought this action under § 812,
claiming that respondents, who are white, had refused to rent an
apartment to her because of her race, in violation of § 804(a) of
the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). In her complaint she sought only
injunctive relief and punitive damages; a claim for compensatory
damages was later added. [
Footnote
1] After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted
preliminary injunctive relief, enjoining the respondents from
renting the apartment in question to anyone else pending the trial
on the merits. This injunction was dissolved some five months later
with the petitioner's consent, after she had finally obtained other
housing, and the case went to trial on the issues of actual and
punitive damages.
Respondents made a timely demand for jury trial in their answer.
The District Court, however, held that
Page 415 U. S. 191
jury trial was neither authorized by Title VIII nor required by
the Seventh Amendment, and denied the jury request.
Rogers v.
Loether, 312 F.
Supp. 1008 (ED Wis.1970). After trial on the merits, the
District Judge found that respondents had, in fact, discriminated
against petitioner on account of her race. Although he found no
actual damages,
see n
1,
supra, he awarded $250 in punitive damages, denying
petitioner's request for attorney's fees and court costs.
The Court of Appeals reversed on the jury trial issue.
Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110 (CA7 1972). After an
extended analysis, the court concluded essentially that the Seventh
Amendment gave respondents the right to a jury trial in this
action, and therefore interpreted the statute to authorize jury
trials so as to eliminate any question of its constitutionality. In
view of the importance of the jury trial issue in the
administration and enforcement of Title VIII and the diversity of
views in the lower courts on the question, [
Footnote 2] we granted certiorari, 412 U.S. 937 (1973).
[
Footnote 3] We affirm.
The legislative history on the jury trial question is sparse,
and what little is available is ambiguous. There seems to be some
indication that supporters of Title VIII were concerned that the
possibility of racial prejudice on juries might reduce the
effectiveness of civil
Page 415 U. S. 192
rights.damages actions. [
Footnote 4] On the other hand, one bit of testimony during
committee hearings indicates an awareness that jury trials would
have to be afforded in damages actions under Title VIII. [
Footnote 5] Both petitioner and
respondents have presented plausible arguments from the wording and
construction of § 812. We see no point to giving extended
consideration to these arguments, however, for we think it is clear
that the Seventh Amendment entitles either party to demand a jury
trial in an action for damages in the federal courts under § 812.
[
Footnote 6]
The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
Page 415 U. S. 193
Although the thrust of the Amendment was to preserve the right
to jury trial as it existed in 1791, it has long been settled that
the right extends beyond the common law forms of action recognized
at that time. Mr. Justice Story established the basic principle in
1830:
"The phrase 'common law,' found in this clause, is used in
contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime
jurisprudence. . . . By
common law, [the Framers of the
Amendment] meant . . . not merely suits, which the
common
law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in
which
legal rights were to be ascertained and determined,
in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were
recognized, and equitable remedies were administered. . . . In a
just sense, the amendment then may well be construed to embrace all
suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever
might be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal
rights."
Parsons v.
Bedford, 3 Pet. 433,
28 U. S.
446-447 (1830) (emphasis in original).
Petitioner nevertheless argues that the Amendment is
inapplicable to new causes of action created by congressional
enactment. As the Court of Appeals observed, however, we have
considered the applicability of the constitutional right to jury
trial in actions enforcing statutory rights "as a matter too
obvious to be doubted." 467 F.2d at 1114. Although the Court has
apparently never discussed the issue at any length, we have often
found the Seventh Amendment applicable to causes of action based on
statutes.
See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,
369 U. S. 469,
369 U. S. 477
(1962) (trademark laws);
Hepner v. United States,
213 U. S. 103,
213 U. S. 115
(1909) (immigration laws);
cf. Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street
Lighting Co., 240 U. S. 27 (1916)
(antitrust laws), and the
Page 415 U. S. 194
discussion of
Fleitmann in
Ross v. Bernhard,
396 U. S. 531,
396 U. S.
535-536 (1970). [
Footnote 7] Whatever doubt may have existed should now be
dispelled. The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing
statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the
statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action
for damages in the ordinary courts of law.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S.
1 (1937), relied on by petitioner, lends no support to
her statutory rights argument. The Court there upheld the award of
backpay without jury trial in an NLRB unfair labor practice
proceeding, rejecting a Seventh Amendment claim on the ground that
the case involved a "statutory proceeding," and "not a suit at
common law or in the nature of such a suit."
Id. at
301 U. S. 48.
Jones & Laughlin merely stands for the proposition
that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in
administrative proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible
with the whole concept of administrative adjudication [
Footnote 8] and would substantially
interfere with the NLRB's role in the statutory scheme.
Katchen
Page 415 U. S. 195
v. Landy, 382 U. S. 323
(1966), also relied upon by petitioner, is to like effect. There,
the Court upheld, over a Seventh Amendment challenge, the
Bankruptcy Act's grant of summary jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
court over the trustee's action to compel a claimant to surrender a
voidable preference; the Court recognized that a bankruptcy court
has been traditionally viewed as a court of equity, and that jury
trials would "dismember" the statutory scheme of the Bankruptcy
Act.
Id. at
382 U. S. 339.
See also Guthrie National Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.
S. 528 (1899). These cases uphold congressional power to
entrust enforcement of statutory rights to an administrative
process or specialized court of equity free from the strictures of
the Seventh Amendment. But when Congress provides for enforcement
of statutory rights in an ordinary civil action in the district
courts, where there is obviously no functional justification for
denying the jury trial right, a jury trial must be available if the
action involves rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced
in an action at law. [
Footnote
9]
We think it is clear that a damages action under § 812 is an
action to enforce "legal rights" within the meaning of our Seventh
Amendment decisions.
See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, supra,
at
396 U. S. 533,
396 U. S. 542;
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, supra, at
369 U. S.
476-477. A damages action under the statute sounds
basically in tort -- the statute merely defines a new legal duty,
and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury
caused by the defendant's wrongful breach. As the Court of Appeals
noted, this cause of action is analogous to a number of tort
actions recognized at common law. [
Footnote 10]
Page 415 U. S. 196
More important, the relief sought here -- actual and punitive
damages -- is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts
of law. [
Footnote 11]
We need not, and do not, go so far as to say that any award of
monetary relief must necessarily be "legal" relief.
See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.
S. 288 (1960);
Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
328 U. S. 395
(1946). [
Footnote 12] A
comparison of Title VIII with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, where the courts of appeals have held that jury trial is not
required in an action for reinstatement and backpay, [
Footnote 13] is
Page 415 U. S. 197
instructive, although we of course express no view on the jury
trial issue in that context. In Title VII cases, the courts of
appeals have characterized backpay as an integral part of an
equitable remedy, a form of restitution. But the statutory language
on which this characterization is based --
"[T]he court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . .
. . or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate,"
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970 ed., Supp. II) -- contrasts sharply
with § 812's simple authorization of an action for actual and
punitive damages. In Title VII cases, also, the courts have relied
on the fact that the decision whether to award backpay is committed
to the discretion of the trial judge. There is no comparable
discretion here: if a plaintiff proves unlawful discrimination and
actual damages, he is entitled to judgment for that amount. Nor is
there any sense in which the award here can be viewed as requiring
the defendant to disgorge funds wrongfully withheld from the
plaintiff. Whatever may be the merit of the "equitable"
characterization in Title VII cases, there is surely no basis for
characterizing the award of compensatory and punitive damages here
as equitable relief. [
Footnote
14]
Page 415 U. S. 198
We are not oblivious to the force of petitioner's policy
arguments. Jury trials may delay to some extent the disposition of
Title VIII damages actions. But Title VIII actions seeking only
equitable relief will be unaffected, and preliminary injunctive
relief remains available without a jury trial even in damages
actions.
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. at
369 U. S. 479
n. 20. Moreover, the statutory requirement of expedition of § 812
actions, 42 U.S.C. § 3614, applies equally to jury and nonjury
trials. We recognize, too, the possibility that jury prejudice may
deprive a victim of discrimination of the verdict to which he or
she is entitled. Of course, the trial judge's power to direct a
verdict, to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or to grant
a new trial provides substantial protection against this risk, and
respondents' suggestion that jury trials will expose a broader
segment of the populace to the example of the federal civil rights
laws in operation has some force. More fundamentally, however,
these considerations are insufficient to overcome the clear command
of the Seventh Amendment. [
Footnote 15] The decision of the Court of Appeals must
be
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Although the lower courts treated the action as one for
compensatory and punitive damages, petitioner has emphasized in
this Court that her complaint sought only punitive damages. It is
apparent, however, that petitioner later sought to recover actual
damages as well. The District Court's pretrial order indicates the
judge's understanding, following a pretrial conference with
counsel, that the question of actual damages would be one of the
issues to be tried. App. 18a. Petitioner, in fact, attempted to
prove actual damages, App. 45a, but her testimony was excluded for
failure to comply with a pretrial discovery order. The District
Judge later dismissed the claim of actual damages for failure of
roof. In these circumstances, it is irrelevant that the pleadings
were never formally amended. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 15(b), 16.
[
Footnote 2]
The Seventh Circuit here was the first court of appeals to
consider this issue, but the reported decisions of the district
courts are evenly divided on the question. In addition to the
District Court in this case, the court in
Cauley v.
Smith, 347 F.
Supp. 114 (ED Va.1972), held that jury trial was not required
in an action under § 812.
Kastner v.
Brackett, 326 F.
Supp. 1151 (Nev.1971), and
Kelly v.
Armbrust, 351 F.
Supp. 869 (N.D.1972), held that jury trial was required.
[
Footnote 3]
Petitioner married while the case was pending before the Court,
and her motion to change the caption of the case accordingly was
granted. 414 U.S. 1140 (1974).
[
Footnote 4]
See, e.g., Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals
Regarding Civil Rights before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 16, p. 1183
(1966).
[
Footnote 5]
See Hearings on S. 3296 before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 1178 (1966).
[
Footnote 6]
We recognize, of course, the "cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be
avoided."
United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs,
402 U. S. 363,
402 U. S. 369
(1971), and cases there cited. In this case, however, the necessity
for jury trial is so clearly settled by our prior Seventh Amendment
decisions that it would be futile to spend time on the statutory
issue, particularly since our result is not to invalidate the Civil
Rights Act, but only to direct that a certain form of procedure be
employed in federal court actions under § 812.
Moreover, the Seventh Amendment issue in this case is, in a very
real sense, the narrower ground of decision. Section 812(a)
expressly authorizes actions to be brought "in appropriate State or
local courts of general jurisdiction," as well as in the federal
courts. The Court has not held that the right to jury trial in
civil cases is an element of due process applicable to state courts
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Since we rest our decision on
Seventh Amendment, rather than statutory, grounds, we express no
view as to whether jury trials must be afforded in § 812 actions in
the state courts.
[
Footnote 7]
See also Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.
S. 395,
328 U. S.
401-402 (1946) (Emergency Price Control Act);
Texas
& Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S.
33 (1916) (Safety Appliance Act). The Courts of Appeals
have similarly rejected the notion that the Seventh Amendment has
no application to causes of action created by statute
See,
e.g., International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Braswell,
388 F.2d 193, 197 (CA5),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935
(1968);
Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350
F.2d 1012, 1018 (CA4 1965);
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d
464, 468 (CA2 1946), as well as the decision of the Seventh Circuit
in this case, 467 F.2d at 1113-1116.
See generally
Developments in the Law -- Employment Discrimination and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1109, 1266
(1971).
[
Footnote 8]
"[T]he concept of expertise on which the administrative agency
rests is not consistent with the use by it of a jury as
factfinder." L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 90
(1965).
[
Footnote 9]
See Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1115-1116 (CA7
1972); Developments in the Law,
supra, n 7, at 1267-1268.
[
Footnote 10]
For example, the Court of Appeals recognized that Title VIII
could be viewed as an extension of the common law duty of
innkeepers not to refuse temporary lodging to a traveler without
justification, a duty enforceable in a damages action triable to a
jury, to those who rent apartments on a long-term basis.
See 467 F.2d at 1117. An action to redress racial
discrimination may also be likened to an action for defamation or
intentional infliction of mental distress. Indeed, the contours of
the latter tort are still developing, and it has been suggested
that, "under the logic of the common law development of a law of
insult and indignity, racial discrimination might be treated as a
dignitary tort." C. Gregory & H. Kalven, Cases and Materials on
Torts 961 (2d ed.1969).
[
Footnote 11]
The procedural history of this case generated some question in
the courts below as to whether the action should be viewed as one
for damages and injunctive relief, or as one for damages alone, for
purposes of analyzing the jury trial issue. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the right to jury trial was properly tested by the
relief sought in the complaint, and not by the claims remaining at
the time of trial. 467 F.2d at 1118-1119. We need express no view
on this question. If the action is properly viewed as one for
damages only, our conclusion that this is a legal claim obviously
requires a jury trial on demand. And if this legal claim is joined
with an equitable claim, the right to jury trial on the legal
claim, including all issues common to both claims, remains intact.
The right cannot be abridged by characterizing the legal claim as
"incidental" to the equitable relief sought.
Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500
(1959);
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.
S. 469,
369 U. S.
470-473 (1962).
[
Footnote 12]
See also Swofford v. B&W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 414
(CA5 1964).
[
Footnote 13]
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d
1122, 1125 (CA5 1969);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791, 802 (CA4),
cert. dismissed under Rule 60, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971);
cf. McFerren v. County Board of
Education, 455 F.2d 199, 202-204 (CA6 1972);
Harkless v.
Sweeny Independent School District, 427 F.2d 319, 324 (CA5
1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971);
Smith v.
Hampton Training School, 360 F.2d 577, 581 n. 8 (CA4 1966) (en
banc);
see generally Developments in the Law,
supra, n 7, at
1265-1266.
[
Footnote 14]
See Comment, The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights
Statutes: History Adrift in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw.U.L.Rev. 503,
524-527 (1973).
[
Footnote 15]
Although petitioner has emphasized that the policies underlying
the Fair Housing Act are derived from the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, she expressly "does not maintain that these
constitutional considerations could prevent a jury trial if a jury
were otherwise required by the Seventh Amendment." Brief for
Petitioner 7. Moreover, although the legislative history of Title
VIII with respect to jury trials is ambiguous, there is surely no
indication that Congress intended to override the requirements of
the Seventh Amendment if it mandates that jury trials be provided
in § 812 damage actions. We therefore have no occasion to consider
in this case any question of the scope of congressional power to
enforce § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment or § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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