OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
v. UNITED STATES EX REL.
CHANDLER
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
No. 01-1572. Argued January 14, 2003-Decided March 10,2003
Under the False Claims Act (FCA), "[a]ny person" who,
inter
alia, "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an
officer or employee of the United States Government ... a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval," 31 U. S. C. §
3729(a)(1), is liable to the Government for a civil penalty, treble
damages, and costs, § 3729(a). Although the Attorney General may
sue under the FCA, a private person, known as a relator, may also
bring a
qui tam action "in the name of the Government." §
3730(b). The relator must inform the Justice Department of her
intentions and keep the pleadings under seal while the Government
decides whether to intervene and do its own litigating. §
3730(b)(2). If the claim succeeds, the relator's share may be up to
30 percent of the proceeds of the action, plus reasonable expenses,
costs, and attorney's fees. § 3730(d). This case involves a
National Institute of Drug Abuse research grant to Cook County
Hospital for a study that was later administered by a nonprofit
research institute affiliated with the hospital. Respondent
Chandler, who ran the study for the institute, filed this
qui
tam action, claiming that Cook County (hereinafter County) and
the institute had submitted false statements to obtain grant funds
in violation of § 3729(a)(1). After this Court held in
Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.
S. 765, that States are not "persons" subject to FCA
qui
tam actions, the District Court granted the County's motion to
dismiss the claims against it. The court held that the County, like
a State, could not be subjected to treble damages, which
Stevens described as "essentially punitive,"
id., at
784. The Seventh Circuit distinguished
Stevens and
reversed.
Held: Local governments are "persons" amenable to
qui
tam actions under the FCA. Pp. 125-134.
(a) While § 3729 does not define the term "person," its meaning
has remained unchanged since the original FCA was passed in 1863.
Stevens, supra, at 783, n. 12. There is no doubt that the
term then extended to corporations. Indeed, this Court as early as
1826 in
United States v.
Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392, 412,
recognized the presumption that "person" also includes "persons
politic and incorporate." Essentially conceding that private
corporations were taken to be persons when the
120
120 COOK COUNTY
v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLER
Syllabus
FCA was passed in 1863, the County argues that municipal
corporations were not so understood until six years later, when the
Court decided
Cowles v.
Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118.
Cowles, however, was not an extension of principle but a
natural recognition of the common understanding that municipal
corporations and private ones were to be treated alike in terms of
their legal status as persons capable of suing and being sued. This
explains how the Court in
Cowles could conclude
"automatically and without discussion" that municipal corporations,
like private ones, "should be treated as natural persons for
virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis."
Monell v.
New York City Dept. of Social Servs.,
436 U. S. 658,
687-688. Of course, the meaning of "person" recognized in
Cowles was only a presumptive one, but neither the history
nor the text of the original FCA provides contextual evidence that
Congress intended to exclude municipalities from the class of
"persons" covered by the FCA in 1863. pp. 125-129.
(b) The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 did not repeal
municipal liability. As part of an effort to modernize the FCA, the
1986 amendments raised the ceiling on damages recoverable under §
3729(a) from double to treble. Relying on the common law
presumption against punitive damages for municipalities, see
Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 259-260,
and n. 21, and on this Court's statement in
Stevens, supra,
at 784, 785, that the change from double to treble damages turned
what had been a "remedial" provision into an "essentially punitive"
one, the County argues that, even if municipalities were covered by
the term "person" from 1863 to 1986, Congress's adoption of a
"punitive" remedy entailed the elimination of municipal liability
in 1986. It does not follow from
Stevens, however, that the
punitive feature of FCA damages has the force to show congressional
intent to repeal implicitly the existing definition of "person." To
begin with, the FCA's damages multiplier has a compensatory
function as well as a punitive one. Most obviously, the statute's
qui tam feature means that as much as 30 percent of the
Government's recovery may go to a private relator who began the
action. Even when there is no
qui tam relator to be paid,
liability beyond actual damages may be necessary for full recovery,
since the FCA has no separate provision for prejudgment interest or
consequential damages. The force of the treble damages remedy's
"punitive" nature in arguing against municipal liability is not as
robust as it would be if that remedy were a pure penalty in all
cases. What is more, treble damages certainly does not equate with
classic punitive damages, which leaves the jury with open-ended
discretion over the amount, and so raises two concerns specific to
municipal defendants: that local government's taxing power will
make it an easy target for an unduly generous
121
jury and that blameless or unknowing taxpayers will be unfairly
taxed for the wrongdoing of local officials. Neither of these
concerns is serious in FCA cases. The presumption against punitive
damages thus brings only limited vigor to the County's aid. Working
against the County's position, however, is a different presumption,
this one at full strength: the "cardinal rule ... that repeals by
implication are not favored."
Posadas v.
National City
Bank, 296 U. S.
497, 503. Inferring repeal of municipal liability from the
increase in the damages ceiling from double to triple would be
difficult in the abstract, but it is impossible given that the
basic purpose of the 1986 amendments was to make the FCA a more
useful tool against fraud in modern times. Whether or not this was
true in 1863, local governments now often administer or receive
federal funds. It is simply not plausible that Congress intended to
repeal municipal liability
sub silentio by the very Act it
passed to strengthen the Government's hand in fighting false
claims. Pp. 129-134.
277 F.3d
969, affirmed.
SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Donna M. Lach argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the
briefs were Richard A. Devine, Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., Sanjay T.
Tailor, Jerold S. Solovy, and Barry Sullivan.
Judson H. Miner argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were
George F. Galland, Jr., and
Charlotte
Crane.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum,
Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Douglas N. Letter, and Michael E.
Robinson.
*
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the City of New York et al. by
Michael A. Cardozo, Leonard
J. Koerner, Gail Rubin, Merita A. Hopkins, A. Scott
Chinn, and
Grant F.
Langley; for the County of
Orange, California, et al. by
Walter Dellinger, Jonathan D.
Hacker, and
James R. Asperger; for 43 Local Governmental
Airport Proprietors by
Scott P. Lewis; for the National
Association of Counties et al. by
Richard Ruda, Robert K.
Huffman, Miriam R. Nemetz, Charles A. Rothfeld, and
Robert
L. Bronston; for the National Association of Public Hospitals
and
122
122 COOK COUNTY
v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLER
JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765 (2000), we
held that States are not "persons" subject to
qui tam
actions under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U. S. C. §§ 3729-3733.
Here, the question is whether local governments are amenable to
such suits, and we hold that they are.
I
Stevens, supra, at 768-770, explains in some detail how
the FCA currently provides for civil penalties against "[a]ny
person" who (so far as it concerns us here) "knowingly presents, or
causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United
States Government ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval." § 3729(a)(1). Although the Attorney General may sue
under the FCA, so may a private person, known as a relator, in a
qui tam action brought "in the name of the Government," but
with the hope of sharing in any recovery. § 3730(b). The relator
must inform the Department of Justice of her intentions and keep
the pleadings under seal for 60 days while the Government decides
whether to intervene and do its own litigating. § 3730(b)(2); see
also § 3730(c). If the claim succeeds, the defendant is liable to
the Government for a civil penalty between $5,000 and $10,000 for
each violation, treble damages (reducible to double damages for
cooperative defendants), and costs.
Health Systems et al. by
Charles Luband; and by the Texas
Association of School Boards Legal Assistance Fund et al. by
William J. Boyce and
Warren S.
Huang.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for K
& R Limited Partnership et al. by
Carl A. S.
Coan
III and
Regina D. Poserina; and for Taxpayers Against
Fraud, the False Claims Act Legal Center, by
Charles
Michael P. Dignazio and
Francis X. Crowley filed a
brief as
amicus curiae for the County of Delaware,
Pennsylvania.
123
§ 3729(a).1 The relator's share of the "proceeds of the action
or settlement" may be up to 30 percent, depending on whether the
Government intervened and, if so, how much the relator contributed
to the prosecution of the claim. § 3730(d).2 The relator may also
get reasonable expenses, costs, and attorney's fees.
Ibid.
The fraud in this case allegedly occurred in administering a $5
million grant from the National Institute of Drug Abuse to Cook
County Hospital, owned and operated as the name implies, with the
object of studying a treatment regimen for pregnant drug addicts.
The grant was subject to a variety of conditions, including the
terms of a compliance plan meant to assure that the study would
jibe with federal regulations for research on human subjects.
Administration of the study was later transferred to the Hektoen
Institute for Medical Research, a nonprofit research organization
affiliated with the hospital. Respondent, Dr. Janet Chandler, ran
the study from September 1993 until the institute fired her in
January 1995.
1 The statutory penalties are adjusted upward for inflation
under the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990,
Pub. L. 101-410, § 5, 104 Stat. 891, note following 28 U. S. C. §
2461. The penalty is currently $5,500 to $11,000. 28 CFR §
85.3(a)(9) (2002).
2 If the Government does not intervene, the relator is entitled
to 25 to 30 percent of the proceeds. 31 U. S. C. § 3730(d)(2). If
the Government chooses to intervene, the relator "shall ... receive
at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of
the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to
which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of
the action." § 3730(d)(I). If, however, the court determines that
the action was "based primarily on disclosures of specific
information (other than information provided by the person bringing
the action) relating to allegations or transactions in a criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional,
administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing,
audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the court may
award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no case more
than 10 percent of the proceeds .... "
Ibid. (footnote
omitted).
124
124 COOK COUNTY
v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLER
In 1997, Chandler filed this
qui tam action, claiming
that Cook County (hereinafter County) and the institute had
submitted false statements to obtain grant funds in violation of §
3729(a)(1).3 Chandler said that the defendants had violated the
grant's express conditions, had failed to comply with the
regulations on human-subject research, and had submitted false
reports of what she called "ghost" research subjects. Chandler also
alleged that she was fired for reporting the fraud to doctors at
the hospital and to the granting agency, rendering her dismissal a
violation of both state law and the whistle-blower provision of the
FCA, § 3730(h).4 The Government declined to intervene in the
action.
The County moved to dismiss the claims against it, arguing,
among other things, that it was not a "person" subject to liability
under the FCA.5 The District Court denied the motion, reading the
term "person" in the FCA to include state and local governments.
United States ex rel. Chandler v.
Hektoen Institute for
Medical Research, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (ND Ill. 1999). The Court
of Appeals dismissed the County's interlocutory appeal, and we
denied certiorari. 528 U. S. 931 (1999). After
Stevens came
down, however, the District Court reconsidered the County's motion
and dismissed Chandler's action. Although the court found "no
reason to alter its conclusion that the County is a 'person' for
purposes of the FCA," it held that the County, like a State, could
not be subjected to treble damages, which
Stevens, supra, at
784, described not as "remedial" but as "essentially punitive." 118
F. Supp. 2d 902, 903 (2000). The
3 The hospital was originally a defendant as well but was
dismissed from the case as having no identity independent of the
County.
277 F.3d
969, 971, n. 2 (CA72002).
4 Chandler's retaliation claims against the County were
dismissed because the institute, not the County, was her employer.
United States ex rel. Chandler v.
Hektoen Institute for
Medical Research, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1087 (ND Ill. 1999).
5 The institute also moved to dismiss, on different grounds; the
denial of that motion is not before us. 277 F. 3d, at 969, n.
1.
125
Court of Appeals, in conflict with two other Circuits,6
distinguished
Stevens and reversed,
277
F.3d 969 (CA72002). We granted certiorari, 536 U. S. 956
(2002), and now affirm the Court of Appeals.
II
While § 3729 does not define the term "person," we have held
that its meaning has remained unchanged since the original FCA was
passed in 1863.
Stevens, 529 U. S., at 783, n. 12. There is
no doubt that the term then extended to corporations, the Court in
1826 having expressly recognized the presumption that the statutory
term "person" " 'extends as well to persons politic and
incorporate, as to natural persons whatsoever.'"
United
States v.
Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392, 412 (1826) (quoting 2 E.
Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 736
(1787 ed.) (reprinted in 5B 2d Historical Writings in Law and
Jurisprudence (1986)); see 11 Wheat., at 412 ("That corporations
are, in law, for civil purposes, deemed persons, is
unquestionable"); accord,
Beaston v.
Farmers' Bank of
Del., 12 Pet. 102, 135 (1838); see also
Trustees of
Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 667 (1819)
(opinion of Story, J.) (A corporation "is, in short, an artificial
person, existing in contemplation of law, and endowed with certain
powers and franchises which, though they must be exercised through
the medium of its natural members, are yet considered as subsisting
in the corporation itself, as distinctly as if it were a real
personage"). This position accorded with the common understanding
among contemporary commentators that corporations were "persons" in
the general enjoyment of the capacity to sue and be sued. See,
e. g., 2 J. Bouvier, A Law Dictionary 332 (6th ed.
1856) (def. 2: The term "person" "is also used to denote a
corporation which is an artificial person"); 1 S. Kyd, A Trea-
6 United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware,
279 F.3d
219 (CA3 2002); United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans
Parish School Bd.,
244 F.3d
486 (CA5 2001).
126
126 COOK COUNTY
v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLER
tise on the Law of Corporations 13 (1793) ("A CORPORATION then,
or a body politic, or body incorporate, is a collection of many
individuals, united into one body, ... and vested, by the policy of
the law, with the capacity of acting, in several respects, as an
individual, particularly of taking and granting property, of
contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued ... "). While
it is true that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Bank of
United States v.
Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 86-87 (1809),
declined to rely on the presumption when it decided the separate
issue whether a corporation was a "citizen" for purposes of federal
diversity jurisdiction, by 1844 the
Deveaux position had
been abandoned and a corporation was understood to have citizenship
independent of its constituent members by virtue of its status as
"a person, although an artificial person."
Louisville, C.
& C.
R. Co. v.
Letson, 2 How. 497, 558 (1844);
see 1 A. Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 383 (2d ed. 1859)
("A corporation has been declared to be not only a
person,
... but to be capable of being considered an
inhabitant
of a state, and even of being treated as a
citizen, for all
purposes of suing and being sued").
Essentially conceding that private corporations were taken to be
persons when the FCA was passed in 1863, the County argues that
municipal corporations were not so understood until six years
later, when
Cowles v.
Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118
(1869), applied the
Letson rule to them.
Cowles,
however, was not an extension of principle but a natural
recognition of an understanding going back at least to Coke,
supra, that municipal corporations and private ones were
simply two species of "body politic and corporate," treated alike
in terms of their legal status as persons capable of suing and
being sued. See,
e. g., W. Glover, A Practical
Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations 41 (1837) (Municipal
corporations have, as an attribute "necessarily and inseparably
incident to every corporation," the ability "[t]o sue or be sued,
... and do all other acts as natural
127
persons may"); see also 1 J. Dillon, The Law of Municipal
Corporations 92 (rev. 2d ed. 1873). Indeed, "[t]he archetypal
American corporation of the eighteenth century [was] the
municipality"; only in the early 19th century did private
corporations become widespread. M. Horwitz, The Transformation of
American Law, 1780-1860, p. 112 (1977). This history explains how
the Court in
Cowles could conclude "automatically and
without discussion" that municipal corporations, like private ones,
"should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of
constitutional and statutory analysis."
Monell v.
New
York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 687-688
(1978); see
Cowles, supra, at 121 (describing the question
as one that "presents but little difficulty").7
Of course, the meaning of "person" recognized in
Cowles
is the usual one, but not immutable, see
Monell, supra, at
688, and the County asks us to take a cue from the qualification
included in the later definition in the Dictionary Act, Act of Feb.
25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, that "the word 'person' may extend and
be applied to bodies politic and corporate ... unless the context
shows that [it was] intended to be used in a more limited sense."
Cf. J. Angell & S. Ames, A Treatise on the Law of Private
Corporations Aggregate 4 (rev. 3d ed. 1846) ("The construction is,
that when 'persons' are mentioned in a statute, corporations are
included if they fall within the general reason and design of the
statute"). The County invokes two points of context that it takes
as
7 The County and some of its supporting
amici urge a
further distinction between full-fledged municipal corporations
such as towns and cities, which were incorporated at the request of
their inhabitants, and
"quasi corporations" such as
counties, which were unilateral creations of the State. See
Barnes v.
District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, 552 (1876).
While the liability of quasi corporations at common law may have
differed from that of municipal corporations, see
ibid.,
both were treated equally as legal "persons." Indeed,
Cowles
itself applied to an Illinois county like Cook County.
128
128 COOK COUNTY
v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLER
indicating that in the FCA Congress intended a more limited
meaning.
First, it says that the statutory text is "inherently
inconsistent with local governmental liability," Brief for
Petitioner 13, owing to the references of the original enactment to
"any person in the land or naval forces of the United States" and
"any person not in the military or naval forces of the United
States," together with a provision imposing criminal liability,
including imprisonment, on defendants in the latter category, see
Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, §§ 1,3, 12 Stat. 696, 697, 698.8 But
the old text merely shows that "any person in the land or naval
forces" was directed at natural persons. The second phrase,
covering all other "persons," could not have been that limited, or
even private corporations would be outside the FCA's coverage, a
reading that not even the County espouses and one that we seriously
doubted in
Stevens, 529 U. S., at 782. As for the FCA's
reference to criminalliability, "[t]he short answer is that it has
not been regarded as anomalous to require compliance by
municipalities with the substantive standards of ... federal laws
which impose [both civil and criminal] sanctions upon 'persons.'"
Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power &
Light Co.,
435 U. S. 389,
400 (1978). Municipalities may not be susceptible to every
statutory penalty, but that is no reason to exempt them from
remedies that sensibly apply.
Id., at 400-401;
United
States v.
Union Supply Co., 215 U. S. 50, 54-55
(1909).
The other contextual evidence cited by the County is the history
of the FCA. We recounted in
Stevens that Congress's primary
concern in 1863 was" 'stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by
large [private] contractors during the Civil War.'" 529 U. S., at
781 (quoting
United States v.
Bornstein, 423 U. S. 303, 309
(1976), but adding "[private]"). Local governments, the County
says, were not players in the
8 The FCA's civil and criminal provisions were bifurcated in
1878, see
Rainwater v.
United States, 356 U. S. 590, 592, n. 8
(1958), and the latter provisions have since been recodified at 18
U. S. C. § 287.
129
game of war profiteering that the FCA was meant to stop. Of
course, this is true, but in no way does it affect the fact that
Congress wrote expansively, meaning "to reach all types of fraud,
without qualification, that might result in financialloss to the
Government."
United States v.
NeifertWhite Co.,
390 U. S. 228,
232 (1968). Whatever municipal corporations may have been doing in
1863, in 2003 local governments are commonly at the receiving end
of all sorts of federal funding schemes and thus no less able than
individuals or private corporations to impose on the federal fisc
and exploit the exercise of the federal spending power. Cf.
Monell, supra, at 685-686 (noting that municipalities can,
"equally with natural persons, create the harms intended to be
remedied [by 42 U. S. C. § 1983]"). In sum, neither history nor
text points to exclusion of municipalities from the class of
"persons" covered by the FCA in 1863.
III
Nor is the application of this reading of the statute affected
by the County's alternative position, based on the evolution of the
FCA's provisions for relief. The County's argument leads off, at
least, with a sound premise about the historical tension between
municipal liability and damages imposed as punishment. Although it
was well established in 1863 "that a municipality, like a private
corporation, was to be treated as a natural person subject to suit
for a wide range of tortious activity, ... this understanding did
not extend to the award of punitive or exemplary damages,"
Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 259-260
(1981). Since municipalities' common law resistance to punitive
damages still obtains, "[t]he general rule today is that no
punitive damages are allowed unless expressly authorized by
statute."
Id., at 260, n. 21.
The County relies on this general statement in asking us to
infer a remarkable consequence unstated in the 1986 amendments to
the FCA. As part of an effort to modernize
130
130 COOK COUNTY
v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLER
the FCA, Congress then raised the fine from $2,000 to the
current range of $5,000 to $10,000, and raised the ceiling on
damages recoverable under § 3729(a) from double to treble. False
Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-562, § 2(7), 100 Stat.
3153. In
Stevens, we spoke of this change as turning what
had been a "remedial" provision into an "essentially punitive" one.
529 U. S., at 784, 785. The County relies on this characterization
to argue that, even if municipalities were covered by the term
"person" from 1863 to 1986, Congress's adoption of a "punitive"
remedy entailed the elimination of municipal liability in 1986.
Although we did indeed find the punitive character of the treble
damages provision a reason not to read "person" to include a State,
see
id., at 785, it does not follow that the punitive
feature has the force to show congressional intent to repeal
implicitly the existing definition of that word, which included
municipalities. To begin with it is important to realize that
treble damages have a compensatory side, serving remedial purposes
in addition to punitive objectives. See,
e. g., Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 635-636
(1985) (citing
Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U. S.
477, 485-486 (1977));
American Soc. of Mechanical Engineers,
Inc. v.
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U. S. 556, 575
(1982); see also
Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff
&
Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 151
(1987). While the tipping point between payback and punishment
defies general formulation, being dependent on the workings of a
particular statute and the course of particular litigation, the
facts about the FCA show that the damages multiplier has
compensatory traits along with the punitive.
There is no question that some liability beyond the amount of
the fraud is usually "necessary to compensate the Government
completely for the costs, delays, and inconveniences occasioned by
fraudulent claims."
Bornstein, supra, at 315; see
United
States v.
Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 445 (1989)
(noting that the Government's injury includes "not merely the
131
amount of the fraud itself, but also ancillary costs, such as
the costs of detection and investigation, that routinely attend the
Government's efforts to root out deceptive practices directed at
the public purse"). The most obvious indication that the treble
damages ceiling has a remedial place under this statute is its
qui tam feature with its possibility of diverting as much as
30 percent of the Government's recovery to a private relator who
began the action. In
qui tam cases the rough difference
between double and triple damages may well serve not to punish, but
to quicken the self-interest of some private plaintiff who can spot
violations and start litigating to compensate the Government, while
benefiting himself as well. See
United States ex rel. Marcus
v.
Hess, 317
U. S. 537, 547 (1943). The treble feature thus leaves the
remaining double damages to provide elements of makewhole recovery
beyond mere recoupment of the fraud. Cf.
Bornstein, 423 U.
S., at 315, and n. 11. It may also be necessary for full recovery
even when there is no
qui tam relator to be paid. The FCA
has no separate provision for prejudgment interest, which is
usually thought essential to compensation, see,
e. g.,
Kansas v.
Colorado, 533 U. S. 1, 10-11 (2001),
and might well be substantial given the FCA's long statute of
limitations, § 3731(b). Nor does the FCA expressly provide for the
consequential damages that typically come with recovery for fraud,
see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 549(1)(b), and Comment
d
(1976).9
Thus, although
Stevens recognized that the FCA's treble
damages remedy is still "punitive" in that recovery will exceed
full compensation in a good many cases, the force of this
9 The treble damages provision was, in a way, adopted by
Congress as a substitute for consequential damages. The Senate
version of the bill proposed consequential damages on top of treble
damages, while the House version proposed consequential damages
plus double damages. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, p. 39 (1986)
(hereinafter S. Rep.); H. R. Rep. No. 99-660, p. 20 (1986).
Ultimately, the Senate's treble figure was adopted and the
consequential damages provision dropped.
132
132 COOK COUNTY
v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLER
punitive nature in arguing against municipal liability is not as
robust as if it were a pure penalty in all cases. Treble damages
certainly do not equate with classic punitive damages, which leave
the jury with open-ended discretion over the amount and so raises
two concerns specific to municipal defendants. One is that a local
government's taxing power makes it an easy target for an unduly
generous jury. See
Newport, 453 U. S., at 270-271. But under
the FCA, the jury is open to no such temptation; if it finds
liability, its instruction is to return a verdict for actual
damages, for which the court alone then determines any multiplier,
just as the court alone sets any separate penalty. § 3729(a); see
277 F. 3d, at 978. There is mitigation, also, for the second worry,
that "blameless or unknowing taxpayers" will be unfairly taxed for
the wrongdoing of local officials.
Newport, 453 U. S., at
267. This very case shows how FCA liability may expose only local
taxpayers who have already enjoyed the indirect benefit of the
fraud, to the extent that the federal money has already been passed
along in lower taxes or expanded services. Cf.
ibid. The
question in such cases is whether the local taxpayer should make up
for an undeserved benefit, or the federal taxpayer be permanently
out of pocket, a question that can be answered in any given case,
not by an opportunistic
qui tam relator, but by a
combination of the judge's discretion and the Government's power to
intervene and dismiss or settle an action, see § 3730(c)(2).
The presumption against punitive damages thus brings only
limited vigor to the County's aid. Working against the County's
position, however, is a different presumption, this one at full
strength: the "cardinal rule ... that repeals by implication are
not favored."
Posadas v.
National City Bank,
296 U. S. 497, 503
(1936). Inferring repeal from legislative silence is hazardous at
best, and error seems overwhelmingly likely in the notion that the
1986 amendments wordlessly redefined "person" to exclude
municipalities. The County's argument, it must be remembered, is
not
133
merely that the treble damages feature of the 1986 amendments
was meant to bypass municipal corporations; the argument is that
the treble damages amendment must be read to eliminate the FCA's
coverage of municipal corporations entirely, after being the
statutory law for over a century. This would be a hard case to make
in the abstract, but it is impossible when we consider what is
known about the object of the amendments in 1986.
The basic purpose of the 1986 amendments was to make the FCA a
"more useful tool against fraud in modern times." S. Rep., at 2.
Because Congress was concerned about pervasive fraud in "all
Government programs,"
ibid., it allowed private parties to
sue even based on information already in the Government's
possession, see
Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States ex
rel. Schumer, 520
U. S. 939, 946 (1997); increased the Government's measure of
recovery; and enhanced the incentives for relators to bring suit.
Yet the County urges that in so doing Congress made local
governments, which today often administer or receive federal funds,
immune not only from treble damages but from any liability
whatsoever under the FCA. Congress could have done that, of course,
but it makes no sense to suggest Congress did it under its
breath.10 It is simply not plausible that Congress intended to
repeal municipal liability
sub silentio by the very Act it
passed to strengthen the Government's hand
10 Indeed, there is some evidence that Congress affirmatively
endorsed municipal liability when it passed the 1986 amendments.
See S. Rep., at 8 (noting that "[t]he term 'person' is used in its
broad sense to include partnerships, associations, and corporations
... as well as States and political subdivisions thereof" (citing,
inter alia, Monell v.
New York City Dept. of Social
Servs., 436 U. S.
658 (1978))). Although in
Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v.
United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765 (2000), we
considered this evidence insufficient to overcome the background
presumption that States are not "persons," in the present case the
statement belies the County's argument that Congress meant to
change the contrary presumption applicable to local governments and
to remove municipal liability.
134
134 COOK COUNTY
v. UNITED STATES EX REL. CHANDLER
in fighting false claims. See
Burns v.
United States,
501 U. S. 129, 136
(1991).11
IV
The term "person" in § 3729 included local governments in 1863
and nothing in the 1986 amendments redefined it. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
11 The presumption against implied repeal also explains why two
of the County's subsidiary arguments cannot succeed here, despite
the fact that we gave them credence in
Stevens. First, the
County contrasts § 3729 with the Civil Investigative Demand
provision enacted as part of the 1986 amendments, § 3733, which
expressly includes both States and local governments in the
definition of "person." In
Stevens, supra, at 783-784, we
read that express reference in the later § 3733 to confirm the
reading of the earlier § 3729, which was based on a common
understanding in 1863 that "person" did not include a State; but
"person" did presumptively include a municipality in 1863.
The County also argues it is not sensible to expose local
governments to FCA liability but not to liability under the Program
Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986 (PFCRA), Pub. L. 99-509, 100 Stat.
1934 (codified at 31 U. S. C. § 3801
et seq.), a statute
enacted just before the FCA amendments and "designed to operate in
tandem with the FCA."
Stevens, supra, at 786, n. 17. The
PFCRA prohibits the same conduct as the FCA and specifically
defines a "person" subject to liability as "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or private organization." §
3801(a)(6). Even assuming the County is correct that local
governments are not covered by the PFCRA despite the term
"corporation," this is hardly a weighty argument for an implied
repeal of municipal liability under the FCA, a separately enacted
statute.
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