OCTOBER TERM, 1992
Syllabus
CONROY
v. ANISKOFF ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE No. 91-1353.
Argued January 11, 1993-Decided March 31,1993
When petitioner Conroy, an officer in the United States Army,
failed to pay local real estate taxes on property he owned in
Danforth, Maine, the town acquired the property and sold it. In his
suit against the town and the property's purchasers, Conroy claimed
that § 525 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1940-which provides that the "period of military service" shall not
"be included in computing any period ... provided by any law for
the redemption of real property sold or forfeited to enforce any
obligation, tax, or assessment" -tolled the redemption period while
he was in military service, and federal law therefore prevented the
town from acquiring good title to the property. The Maine District
Court rejected his claim, holding that the redemption period could
not be tolled unless the taxpayer could show that military service
resulted in hardship excusing timely legal action, and that it
would be absurd and illogical to toll limitations periods for
career service personnel who had not been handicapped by their
military status. The State Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
Held: A member of the Armed Services need not show that
his military service prejudiced his ability to redeem title to
property before he can qualify for the statutory suspension of
time. The statutory command in § 525 is unambiguous, unequivocal,
and unlimited. There is no support for respondents' argument that
when § 525 is read in the context of the entire statute, it
implicitly conditions its protection on a demonstration of hardship
or prejudice resulting from military service. The statute's
complete legislative history confirms a congressional intent to
protect all military personnel on active duty, not just those whose
lives have been temporarily disrupted by the service. In addition,
the statute's comprehensive character indicates that Congress
included a prejudice requirement whenever it considered it
appropriate to do so, and that its omission of any such requirement
in § 525 was deliberate. Finally, both the history of this
carefully reticulated statute, and this Court's history of
interpreting it, refute any argument that a literal construction of
§ 525 is so absurd or illogical that Congress could not have
intended it. Pp. 514-518.
599 A. 2d 426, reversed.
512
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and
SOUTER, JJ., joined, and in all but n. 12 of which THOMAS, J.,
joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p. 518.
Robert H. Klonoff argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioner.
John F. Manning argued the cause for the United States as amicus
curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bruton, Deputy
Solicitor General Wallace, Richard Farber, and Bridget M.
Rowan.
Kevin M. Cuddy argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondents. *
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.t The
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940,54 Stat. 1178, as
amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 501
et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp.
III) (Act), suspends various civil liabilities of persons in
military service. At issue in this case is the provision in § 525
that the "period of military service shall not be included in
computing any period ... provided by any law for the redemption of
real property sold or forfeited to enforce any obligation, tax, or
assessment." 1 The question presented is
*Lawrence M. Maher filed a brief for Veterans of Foreign
Wars of the
United States as
amicus curiae.
tJUSTICE THOMAS joins all but footnote 12 of the opinion. 1 The
full text of § 525 presently reads as follows:
"The period of military service shall not be included in
computing any period now or hereafter to be limited by any law,
regulation, or order for the bringing of any action or proceeding
in any court, board, bureau, commission, department, or other
agency of government by or against any person in military service
or by or against his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns,
whether such cause of action or the right or privilege to institute
such action or proceeding shall have accrued prior to or during the
period of such service, nor shall any part of such period which
occurs after October 6, 1942 be included in computing any period
now or hereafter provided by any law for the redemption of real
property sold or
513
whether a member of the Armed Services must show that his
military service prejudiced his ability to redeem title to property
before he can qualify for the statutory suspension of time.
I
Petitioner is an officer in the United States Army. He was on
active duty continuously from 1966 until the time of trial. In
1973, he purchased a parcel of vacant land in the town of Danforth,
Maine. He paid taxes on the property for 10 years, but failed to
pay the 1984, 1985, and 1986 local real estate taxes.2 In 1986,
following the Maine statutory procedures that authorize it to
acquire tax-delinquent real estate, the town sold the
property.3
In 1987, petitioner brought suit in the Maine District Court
against the town and the two purchasers. He claimed that § 525 of
the Act tolled the redemption period while he was in military
service, and federal law therefore prevented the town from
acquiring good title to the property even though the State's
statutory procedures had been followed. The trial court rejected
the claim. In an unreported opinion, it noted that some courts had
construed § 525 literally, but it elected to follow a line of
decisions that refused to toll the redemption period unless the
taxpayer could show that
forfeited to enforce any obligation, tax, or assessment." 50 U.
S. C. App. § 525 (1988 ed., Supp. III).
2 He testified that he did not receive tax bills for those years
and that his letters asking for tax bills were not answered by the
town.
3 Under Maine law a taxing authority has a lien against real
estate until properly assessed taxes are paid. If taxes remain
unpaid for 30 days after a notice of lien and demand for payment
has been sent to the owner, the tax collector may record a tax lien
certificate to create a tax lien mortgage. The taxpayer then has an
18-month period of redemption in which he may recover his property
by paying the overdue taxes plus interest and costs. See Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, §§ 552, 942, 943 (1990). It is stipulated that
the required procedures were followed in this case and that the
town's title was perfected, unless petitioner's objection based on
§ 525 requires a different result.
514
"military service resulted in hardship excusing timely legal
action." 4 It agreed with those courts that it would be "absurd and
illogical" to toll limitations periods for career service personnel
who had not been "handicapped by their military status." 5 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed by an equally divided
court.6 We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the
interpretation of § 525. 505 U. S. 1203 (1992).
II
The statutory command in § 525 is unambiguous, unequivocal, and
unlimited. It states that the period of military service "shall not
be included" in the computation of "any period now or hereafter
provided by any law for the redemption of real property .... "
Respondents do not dispute the plain meaning of this text. Rather,
they argue that when § 525 is read in the context of the entire
statute, it implicitly conditions its protection on a demonstration
of hardship or prejudice resulting from military service. They make
three points in support of this argument: that the history of the
Act reveals an intent to provide protection only to those whose
lives have been temporarily disrupted by military service; that
other provisions of the Act are expressly conditioned on a showing
of prejudice; and that a literal interpretation produces illogical
and absurd results. Neither separately nor in combination do these
points justify a departure from the unambiguous statutory text.
Respondents correctly describe the immediate cause for the
statute's enactment in 1940, the year before our entry into World
War II. Congress stated its purpose to "expedite the national
defense under the emergent conditions which are threatening the
peace and security of the United
4 Pet. for Cert. 33. The court particularly relied on
Pannell v.
Continental Can Co., 554
F.2d 216 (CA5 1977);
Bailey v.
Barranca,
83 N. M. 90, 488 P. 2d 725 (1971);
King v.
Zagorski,
207 So. 2d 61 (Fla. App. 1968). 5 Pet. for Cert. 34.
6
Conroy v.
Danforth, 599 A. 2d 426 (1991).
515
States .... " 50 U. S. C. App. § 510. That purpose undoubtedly
contemplated the special hardship that military duty imposed on
those suddenly drafted into service by the national emergency.7
Neither that emergency, nor a particular legislative interest in
easing sudden transfers from civilian to military status, however,
justifies the conclusion that Congress did not intend all members
of the Armed Forces, including career personnel, to receive the
Act's protections. Indeed, because Congress extended the life of
the Act indefinitely in 1948,8 well after the end of World War II,
the complete legislative history confirms a congressional intent to
protect all military personnel on active duty, just as the
statutory language provides.
Respondents also correctly remind us to "follow the cardinal
rule that a statute is to be read as a whole, see
Massachusetts v.
Morash, 490 U. S. 107, 115
(1989), since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not,
depends on context."
King v.
St. Vincent's Hospital,
502 U. S. 215,
221 (1991). But as in
King, the context of this statute
actually supports the conclusion that Congress meant what § 525
says. Several provisions of the statute condition the protection
they offer on a showing that military service adversely affected
the ability to assert or protect a legal right. To choose one of
many examples, § 532(2) authorizes a stay of enforcement of secured
obligations unless "the ability of the defendant to comply with the
terms of the obligation is not materially
7 Respondents emphasize that the statement of purposes refers to
the "'temporary suspension of legal proceedings and
transactions.''' Brief for Respondents 8, quoting 50 U. S. C. App.
§ 510. The length of a suspension that lasts as long as the period
of active service is "temporary," however, whether it applies to a
short enlistment or a long career.
s Section 14 of the Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 623,
provided that the 1940 Act "shall be applicable to all persons in
the armed forces of the United States" until the 1940 Act "is
repealed or otherwise terminated by subsequent Act of the
Congress."
516
affected by reason of his military service."9 The comprehensive
character of the entire statute indicates that Congress included a
prejudice requirement whenever it considered it appropriate to do
so, and that its omission of any such requirement in § 525 was
deliberate.
Finally, both the history of this carefully reticulated statute,
and our history of interpreting it, refute any argument that a
literal construction of § 525 is so absurd or illogical that
Congress could not have intended it. In many respects the 1940 Act
was a reenactment of World War I legislation that had, in turn,
been modeled after legislation that several States adopted during
the Civil War. See
Boone v.
Lightner, 319 U. S. 561, 565-569
(1943). The Court had emphasized the comprehensive character and
carefully segregated arrangement of the various provisions of the
World War I statute in
Ebert v.
Poston, 266 U. S. 548, 554
(1925), and it had considered the consequences of requiring a
showing of prejudice when it construed the World War II statute in
Boone, supra. Since we presume that Congress was familiar
with those cases,10 we also assume that Congress considered the
decision in
Ebert to interpret and apply each provision of
the Act separately when it temporarily reestablished the law as a
whole in 1940, and then considered
Boone's analysis of a
prejudice requirement when it permanently extended the Act in
1948.
Legislative history confirms that assumption. Since the
enactment of the 1918 Act, Congress has expressed its understanding
that absolute exemptions might save time or
9 Similar qualifications appear in § 520(4) (applying to the
reopening of judgments against an absent service member); §§ 521
and 523 (providing for stays of legal proceedings, attachments, and
garnishments); § 526 (regulating interest rates on obligations
incurred prior to military service); § 530(3) (covering eviction
and distress proceedings); § 531(3) (involving the termination of
installment contracts); § 535(1) (involving the assignment of
insurance coverage); and § 535(2) (limiting the right to enforce
liens for the storage of personal property).
10 See Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U. S. 677, 696-697
(1979).
517
money for service members only at the cost of injuring their own
credit, their family's credit, and the domestic economy; 11 it
presumably required a showing of prejudice only when it seemed
necessary to confer on the service member a genuine benefit. By
distinguishing sharply between the two types of protections,
Congress unquestionably contemplated the ways that either type of
protection would affect both military debtors and their civilian
creditors.
The long and consistent history and the structure of this
legislation therefore lead us to conclude that-just as the language
of § 525 suggests-Congress made a deliberate policy judgment
placing a higher value on firmly protecting the service member's
redemption rights than on occasionally burdening the tax collection
process. Given the limited number of situations in which this
precisely structured statute offers such absolute protection, we
cannot say that Con-
11 The House Report on the suspension of suits in the 1918 Act,
for example, provided in part:
"The lesson of the stay laws of the Civil War teaches that an
arbitrary and rigid protection against suits is as much a mistaken
kindness to the soldier as it is unnecessary. A total suspension
for the period of the war of all rights against a soldier defeats
its own purpose. In time of war credit is of even more importance
than in time of peace, and if there were a total prohibition upon
enforcing obligations against one in military service, the credit
of a soldier and his family would be utterly cut off. No one could
be found who would extend them credit." H. R. Rep. No. 181, 65th
Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1917).
And Congressman Webb, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
stated:
"Manifestly, if this Congress should undertake to pass an
arbitrary stay law providing that no creditor should ever sue or
bring proceedings against any soldier while in the military service
of his country, that would upset business very largely in many
parts of the country. In the next place, it would be unfair to the
creditor as well as to the soldier. It would disturb the soldier's
credit probably in many cases and would deny the right of the
creditor to his just debts from a person who was amply able to pay
and whose military service did not in the least impair his ability
to meet the obligation." 55 Congo Rec. 7787 (1917). See
Boone V.
Lightner, 319 U. S. 561, 566, 567,
568 (1943).
518
SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
gress would have found our straightforward interpretation and
application of its words either absurd or illogical.12 If the
consequences of that interpretation had been-or prove to be-as
unjust as respondents contend, we are confident that Congress would
have corrected the injustice-or will do so in the future.
The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine is
reversed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment.
The Court begins its analysis with the observation: "The
statutory command in § 525 is unambiguous, unequivocal, and
unlimited."
Ante, at 514. In my view, discussion of that
point is where the remainder of the analysis should have ended.
Instead, however, the Court feels compelled to demonstrate that its
holding is consonant with legislative history, including some
dating back to
1917-a full quarter century
12 In his ll-page opinion concurring in the judgment, JUSTICE
SCALIA suggests that our response to respondents' reliance on
legislative history "is not merely a waste of research time and
ink," but also "a false and disruptive lesson in the law."
Post, at 519. His "hapless law clerk,"
post, at 527,
has found a good deal of evidence in the legislative history that
many provisions of this statute were intended to confer discretion
on trial judges. That, of course, is precisely our point: It is
reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to authorize such
discretion when it expressly provided for it and to deny such
discretion when it did not. A jurisprudence that confines a court's
inquiry to the "law as it is passed," and is wholly unconcerned
about "the intentions of legislators,"
post, at 519, would
enforce an unambiguous statutory text even when it produces
manifestly unintended and profoundly unwise consequences.
Respondents have argued that this is such a case. We disagree.
JUSTICE SCALIA, however, is apparently willing to assume that this
is such a case, but would nevertheless conclude that we have a duty
to enforce the statute as written even if fully convinced that
every Member of the enacting Congress, as well as the President who
signed the Act, intended a different result. Again, we disagree.
See
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U. S.
597, 610, n. 4 (1991).
519
before the provision at issue was enacted. That is not merely a
waste of research time and ink; it is a false and disruptive lesson
in the law. It says to the bar that even an "unambiguous [and]
unequivocal" statute can never be dispositive; that, presumably
under penalty of malpractice liability, the oracles of legislative
history, far into the dimmy past, must always be consulted. This
undermines the clarity of law, and condemns litigants (who, unlike
us, must pay for it out of their own pockets) to subsidizing
historical research by lawyers.
The greatest defect of legislative history is its
illegitimacy.
We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.
As the Court said in 1844: "The law as it passed is the will of the
majority of both houses,
and the only mode in which that will is
spoken is in the act itself .... " Aldridge v.
Williams,
3 How. 9,24 (emphasis added). But not the least of the defects of
legislative history is its indeterminacy. If one were to search for
an interpretive technique that,
on the whole, was more
likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more
promising candidate than legislative history. And the present case
nicely proves that point.
Judge Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legis lative
history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and
looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends. If I may
pursue that metaphor: The legislative history of § 205 of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act 1 contains a variety of
diverse personages, a selected few of whom-its "friends"-the Court
has introduced to us in support of its result. But there are many
other faces in the crowd, most of which, I think, are set against
today's result.
I will limit my exposition of the legislative history to the
enactment of four statutes:
1 The Court refers to this section as "§ 525," which corresponds
to the unofficial codification of the section in the United States
Code, 50 U. S. C. App. § 525. I find it more convenient to use the
actual statutory section number-"§ 205" -in discussing the history
of the provision.
520
SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
1. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1918 (1918
Act), 40 Stat. 440;
2. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (1940 Act
or Act), 54 Stat. 1178;
3. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of
1942 (1942 Amendments), 56 Stat. 769;
4. The Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604.
That, of course, cannot be said to be the
"complete
legislative history" relevant to this provision. Cf.
ante,
at 515. One of the problems with legislative history is that it is
inherently open ended. In this case, for example, one could go back
further in time to examine the Civil War-era relief Acts, many of
which are in fact set forth in an appendix to the House Report on
the 1918 Act, see App. A, H. R. Rep. No. 181, 65th Cong., 1st
Sess., 18-32 (1917) (hereinafter 1917 House Report). Or one could
extend the search abroad and consider the various foreign statutes
that were mentioned in that same House Report. See id., at 4, 13-14
(discussing English and French enactments). Those additional
statutes might be of questionable relevance, but then so too are
the 1918 Act and the 1940 Act, neither of which contained a
provision governing redemption periods. Nevertheless, I will limit
my legislative history inquiry to those four statutes for the
simple reason that that is the scope chosen by the Court.
The 1918 Act appears to have been the first comprehensive
national soldiers' relief Act. See 55 Congo Rec. 7787 (1917). The
legislative history reveals that Congress intended 2 that
2 When I say "Congress intended," here and hereafter in this
excursus into legislative history, I am speaking as legislative
historians speak, attributing to all Members of both Houses of
Congress (or at least to a majority of the Members of each House),
and to the President (or, if the President did not sign the bill in
question, then to at least two-thirds of the Members of both Houses
of Congress) views expressed by the particular personage, or
committee of personages, whose statements are being described-in
the case of the citation at issue in this sentence, a committee of
the House of Representatives. It is to be assumed-by a sort of
sus-
521
it serve the same vital purpose-providing "protection against
suit to men in military service" -as various state statutes had
served during the Civil War. 1917 House Report 3; see also id., at
18-32 (App. A) (setting forth text of numerous state soldiers'
relief Acts from the Civil War era). Congress intended, however,
that the 1918 Act should differ from the Civil War statutes "in two
material respects." 55 Congo Rec. 7787 (1917) (statement of Rep.
Webb). The first was that, being a national statute, it would
produce a disposition "uniform throughout the Nation." 1917 House
Report 3; see also 55 Congo Rec. 7787 (1917) (statement of Rep.
Webb). But it is the second difference which has particular
relevance to the Court's ruling today:
"The next material difference between this law and the various
State laws is this, and in this I think you will find the chief
excellence of the bill which we propose:
Instead of the bill we are now considering being arbitrary,
inelastic, inflexible, the discretion as to dealing out even-handed
justice between the creditor and the soldier, taking into
consideration the fact that the soldier has been called to his
country's cause, rests largely, and in some cases entirely, in the
breast of the judge who tries the case." Id., at 7787
(statement of Rep. Webb).3
This comment cannot be dismissed as the passing remark of an
insignificant Member, since the speaker was the Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, the committee that re-
pension of disbelief-that two-thirds of the Members of both
Houses of Congress (or a majority plus the President) were aware of
those statements and must have agreed with them; or perhaps it is
to be assumedby a sort of suspension of the Constitution-that
Congress delegated to that personage or personages the authority to
say what its laws mean.
3 In quoting this floor statement, I follow the convention of
legislative history, which is to assume conclusively that
statements recorded in the Congressional Record were in fact made.
That assumption of course does not accord with reality. See 117
Congo Rec. 36506-36507 (1971) (supposed floor statement shown by
internal evidence never to have been delivered).
522
SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
ported the bill to the House floor. Moreover, his remarks merely
echoed the House Report, which barely a page into its text stated:
"We cannot point out too soon, or too emphatically, that the bill
is not an inflexible stay of all claims against persons in military
service." 1917 House Report 2. Congress intended to depart from the
"arbitrary and rigid protection" that had been provided under the
Civil War-era stay laws,
ibid., which could give protection
to men "who can and should pay their obligations in full," id., at
3. It is clear, therefore, that in the 1918 Act Congress intended
to create flexible rules that would permit denial of protection to
members of the military who could show no hardship.
The 1918 Act expired by its own terms six months after the end
of the First World War. See 1918 Act, § 603, 40 Stat. 449. The 1940
Act was adopted as the Nation prepared for its coming participation
in the Second World War. Both the House and Senate Reports
described it as being, "in substance, identical with the [1918
Act]." H. R. Rep. No. 3001, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 3 (1940); S. Rep.
No. 2109, 76 Cong., 3d Sess., 4 (1940). Moreover, in
Boone
v.
Lightner, 319 U. S. 561, 565
(1943), we acknowledged that the 1940 Act was "a substantial
reenactment" of the 1918 Act, and looked to the legislative history
of the 1918 Act for indications of congressional intent with
respect to the 1940 Act. Relying on that legislative history, we
found that "the very heart of the policy of the Act" was to provide
"judicial discretion ... instead of rigid and undiscriminating
suspension of civil proceedings."
Ibid.
Although the Court never mentions this fact, it is clear that
under the 1918 and 1940 Acts a redemption period would not be
tolled during the period of military service. In both enactments, §
205 governed only statutes of limitations and did not mention
redemption periods.4 Moreover, in
4 Section 205 of the 1918 Act provided:
"That the period of military service shall not be included in
computing any period now or hereafter to be limited by any law for
the bringing of
523
Ebert v.
Poston, 266 U. S. 548 (1925),
this Court held that neither § 205 nor § 302, which provides
protection from foreclosures, conferred on a court any power to
extend a statutory redemption period. Congress overturned the rule
of
Ebert in the 1942 Amendments, a central part of the
legislative history that the Court curiously fails to discuss.
Section 5 of those amendments rewrote § 205 of the Act to place it
in its current form, which directly addresses the redemption
periods. See 56 Stat. 770-771;
ante, at 512-513, n. 1
(setting forth current version of § 205). The crucial question in
the present case (if one believes in legislative history) is
whether Congress intended this amendment to be consistent with the
"heart of the policy of the Act"-conferring judicial discretion-or
rather intended it to confer an unqualified right to extend the
period of redemption. Both the House and Senate Reports state that,
under the amended § 205, "[t]he running of the statutory period
during which real property may be redeemed after sale to enforce
any obligation, tax, or assessment is
likewise tolled during
the part of such period which occurs after the enactment of the
[1942 Amendments]." H. R. Rep. No. 2198, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4
(1942) (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 1558, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 4
(1942) (emphasis added). The Reports also state that "[a]lthough
the tolling of such periods is now within the spirit of the law, it
has not been held to be within the letter thereof" (citing
Ebert). H. R. Rep. No. 2198,
supra, at 4; S. Rep. No.
1558,
supra, at 4. These statements surely indicate an
intention to provide a tolling period for redemptions similar to
that already provided for statutes of limitationswhich, on the
basis of the legislative history I have de-
any action by or against any person in military service or by or
against his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, whether
such cause of action shall have accrued prior to or during the
period of such service." 40 Stat. 443.
Section 205 of the 1940 Act was identical, except that the word
"That" at the beginning of the section was omitted.
524
SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
scribed, can be considered discretionary rather than rigid. The
existence of discretionary authority to suspend the tolling is also
suggested by the House floor debates. Responding to questions,
Representative Sparkman (who submitted the Report on behalf of the
House Committee on Military Affairs) agreed that, while the bill
"pertains to all persons in the armed forces," a man "serving in
the armed forces for more money than he got in civil life ... is
not entitled to any of the benefits of the provisions of this
bill." 88 Congo Rec. 5364, 5365 (1942). In response to that last
comment, another Representative inquired further whether "[t]his is
to take care of the men who are handicapped because of their
military service."
Id., at 5365. Representative Sparkman
answered affirmatively.
Ibid. He confirmed that Congress did
not intend to abandon the discretionary nature of the scheme: "With
reference to all these matters we have tried to make the law
flexible by lodging discretion within the courts to do or not to do
as justice and equity may require."
Ibid. And finally, at a
later point in the debates, Representative Brooks made clear that
the Act was intended to remedy the prejudice resulting from
compelled military service: "We feel that the normal obligations of
the man contracted prior to service induction should be suspended
as far as practicable during this tour of duty, and that the
soldier should be protected from default in his obligations due to
his inability to pay caused by reduction in income due to service."
Id., at 5369.
The final component of the legislative history that I shall
treat is the extension of the 1940 Act in the Selective Service Act
of 1948, 62 Stat. 604. The Court misconstrues Congress's intent in
this enactment in two respects. First, it asserts that "because
Congress extended the life of the Act indefinitely in 1948, well
after the end of World War II, the complete legislative history
confirms a congressional intent to protect all military personnel
on active duty, just as the statutory language provides."
Ante, at 515 (footnote omit-
525
ted). It is true enough that the War was over; but the draft was
not. The extension of the 1940 Act was contained in the
Selective Service Act of 1948, which
required
military service from citizens. And it would appear to have been
contemplated that the "life of the Act" would be extended not
"indefinitely," as the Court says,
ibid., but for the
duration of the draft. See H. R. Rep. No. 1881, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess., 12 (1948) (extension was intended to "continu[e] the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 in its application
to the personnel inducted or entering the armed forces during the
life of this act"). The legislative history states that Congress
intended to extend the provisions of the 1940 Act "to persons
serving in the armed forces
pursuant to this act." S. Rep.
No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1948) (emphasis added). Career
members of the military such as petitioner would not have been
serving "pursuant to" the Selective Service Act, since they were
expressly excepted from its service requirement. See Selective
Service Act of 1948 § 6(a), 62 Stat. 609. In this focus upon
draftees, the legislative history of the 1948 extension merely
replicates that of the 1940 Act and the 1942 Amendments. The former
was enacted on the heels of the Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, and was introduced on the Senate floor with
the explanation that it would provide "relief ... to those who are
to be
inducted into the military service for training under
[the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940]." 86 Congo Rec.
10292 (1940) (statement of Rep. Overton) (emphasis added). In the
debate on the 1942 Amendments, Representative Sparkman noted that
"hundreds of thousands, and even millions, have been called" into
military service since the enactment of the 1940 Act, and
admonished his colleagues to "keep uppermost in your mind at all
times the fact that the primary purpose of this legislation is to
give relief to the boy that is called into service." 88 Congo Rec.
5364 (1942). In other words, the legislative history of the 1948
extension, like that of the Act itself and
526
SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
of the 1942 Amendments, suggests an intent to protect those who
were
prejudiced by military service, as many who were
drafted would be.
The Court also errs in mistaking the probable effect of
Congress's presumed awareness of our earlier opinions in
Ebert and
Boone. See
ante, at 516. In
Boone, we stated that the Act "is always to be liberally
construed to protect those who have been
obliged to drop
their own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation," 319 U. S.,
at 575 (emphasis added), but that discretion was vested in the
courts to ensure that the immunities of the Act are not put to
"unworthy use,"
ibid., since "the very heart of the policy
of the Act" was to provide "judicial discretion ... instead of
rigid and undiscriminating suspension of civil proceedings," id.,
at 565. Awareness of
Boone would likely have caused Congress
to assume that the courts would
vindicate "the very heart of
the policy of the Act" by requiring a showing of prejudice. The
Court argues, however, that Congress would
also have been
aware that
Ebert recognized the "carefully segregated
arrangement of the various provisions" of the Act,
ante, at
516. It is already an extension of the normal convention to assume
that Congress was aware of the precise reasoning (as opposed to the
holding) of earlier judicial opinions; but it goes much further to
assume that Congress not only knew, but expected the courts would
continue to follow, the reasoning of a case
(Ebert) whose
holding Congress had repudiated six years earlier. See
supra, at 523. In any event, the Court seeks to use
Ebert only to establish that Congress was aware that this
Court was aware of the "carefully segregated arrangement" of the
Act. That adds little, if anything, to direct reliance upon the
plain language of the statute.
After reading the above described legislative history, one might
well conclude that the result reached by the Court today, though
faithful to law, betrays the congressional intent. Many have done
so. Indeed, as far as I am aware,
every court that has
chosen to interpret § 205 in light of its
527
legislative history rather than on the basis of its plain text
has found that Congress did not intend § 205 to apply to career
members of the military who cannot show prejudice or hardship. See,
in addition to the court below,
Pannell v.
Continental
Can Co., 554 F.2d
216, 224-225 (CA5 1977);
Bailey v.
Barranca, 83
N. M. 90, 94-95, 488 P. 2d 725, 729-730
(1971); King v.
Zagorski, 207 So. 2d 61, 66-67 (Fla. App. 1968). The only
scholarly commentary I am aware of addressing this issue concludes:
"An examination of the legislative history of the Act shows that
the prevailing interpretation of section 205 [i.
e., the
Court's interpretation] is not consistent with congressional
intent." Folk, Tolling of Statutes of Limitations under Section 205
of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 102 Mil. L. Rev.
157, 168 (1983). Finally, even the Government itself, which
successfully urged in this case the position we have adopted, until
recently believed, on the basis of legislative history, the
contrary. See
Townsend v.
Secretary of Air Force, No.
90-1168,1991 U. S. App. LEXIS 26578, *5-*7 (CA4, Nov. 12, 1991);
Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 17, n. 19 (filed
June 2, 1992) (noting Government's position in
Townsend that
§ 205 requires a showing of prejudice); see also
Bickford v.
United States, 656 F.2d
636, 640 (Ct. Cl. 1981) ("The Government argues that the
statute does not mean what it says because the legislative history
evinces Congress' intent to limit the applicability of [§ 205] to
those servicemen engaged in battle or who are otherwise handicapped
from asserting their legal claims").
I confess that I have not personally investigated the entire
legislative history-or even that portion of it which relates to the
four statutes listed above. The excerpts I have examined and quoted
were unearthed by a hapless law clerk to whom I assigned the task.
The other Justices have, in the aggregate, many more law clerks
than I, and it is quite possible that if they all were unleashed
upon this enterprise they would discover, in the legislative
materials dating back to
528
SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment
1917
or earlier, many faces friendly to the Court's
holding. Whether they would or not makes no difference to me-and
evidently makes no difference to the Court, which gives lipservice
to legislative history but does not trouble to set forth and
discuss the foregoing material that others found so persuasive. In
my view, that is as it should be, except for the lip service. The
language of the statute is entirely clear, and if that is not what
Congress meant then Congress has made a mistake and Congress will
have to correct it. We should not pretend to care about legislative
intent (as opposed to the meaning of the law), lest we impose upon
the practicing bar and their clients obligations that we do not
ourselves take seriously.
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