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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 20–1650
_________________
CARLOS CONCEPCION, PETITIONER
v. UNITED
STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the first circuit
[June 27, 2022]
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the
Court.
There is a longstanding tradition in American
law, dating back to the dawn of the Republic, that a judge at
sentencing considers the whole person before him or her “as an
individual.”
Koon v.
United States,
518 U.S.
81, 113 (1996). In line with this history, federal courts today
generally “exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of
evidence used” to craft appropriate sentences.
Williams v.
New York,
337 U.S.
241, 246 (1949). When a defendant appears for sentencing, the
sentencing court considers the defendant on that day, not on the
date of his offense or the date of his conviction.
Pepper v.
United States,
562 U.S.
476, 492 (2011). Similarly, when a defendant’s sentence is set
aside on appeal, the district court at resentencing can (and in
many cases, must) consider the defendant’s conduct and changes in
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines since the original sentencing.
Ibid.
Congress enacted the First Step Act of 2018
against that backdrop. The First Step Act authorizes district
courts to reduce the prison sentences of defendants convicted of
certain offenses involving crack cocaine. The Act allows a district
court to impose a reduced sentence “as if ” the revised
penalties for crack cocaine enacted in the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 were in effect at the time the offense was committed. The
question in this case is whether a district court adjudicating a
motion under the First Step Act may consider other intervening
changes of law (such as changes to the Sentencing Guidelines) or
changes of fact (such as behavior in prison) in adjudicating a
First Step Act motion.
The Court holds that they may. It is only when
Congress or the Constitution limits the scope of information that a
district court may consider in deciding whether, and to what
extent, to modify a sentence, that a district court’s discretion to
consider information is restrained. Nothing in the First Step Act
contains such a limitation. Because district courts are always
obligated to consider nonfrivolous arguments presented by the
parties, the First Step Act requires district courts to consider
intervening changes when parties raise them. By its terms, however,
the First Step Act does not compel courts to exercise their
discretion to reduce any sentence based on those arguments.
The District Court in this case declined to
consider petitioner Carlos Concepcion’s arguments that intervening
changes of law and fact supported his motion, erroneously believing
that it did not have the discretion to do so, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. The Court now reverses.
I
A
In 2007, Concepcion pleaded guilty to one
count of distributing five or more grams of crack cocaine in
violation of 21 U. S. C. §841(a)(1) (2006 ed.).
Concepcion admitted that he sold 13.8 grams of crack cocaine, and
he was sentenced in 2009 to 19 years (228 months) in prison. Two
features of his sentencing are relevant here. First, Concepcion was
sentenced under a scheme that created a 100-to-1 disparity between
crack-cocaine and powder-cocaine offenders. At the time Concepcion
was sentenced, an offense involving five or more grams of crack
cocaine resulted in a statutory sentencing range of 5 to 40 years’
imprisonment; it required 100 times as much powder cocaine to
trigger the same penalties. Second, when Concepcion was initially
sentenced, he qualified as a “career offender.” The career offender
provision, together with other enhancements, increased Concepcion’s
Guidelines range from 57 to 71 months to 262 to 327 months.
Both of these features of Concepcion’s
sentencing have since been altered. Just one year after Concepcion
was sentenced, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to
correct the harsh disparities between crack and powder cocaine
sentencing. Section 2 of that Act increased the amount of crack
cocaine needed to trigger the 5-to-40-year sentencing range from 5
grams to 28 grams. §2(a)(2), 124Stat. 2372. The Sentencing
Commission then retroactively amended the Sentencing Guidelines to
lower the Guidelines range for crack-cocaine offenses, but that
amendment did not benefit all prisoners serving sentences handed
down during the 100-to-1 regime. See United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines Manual App. C, Amdt. 750 (Supp. Nov. 2011)
(USSG). Concepcion was not eligible for retroactive relief under
that 2011 Sentencing Commission’s amendment because he was
sentenced under the career offender enhancement, but he became
eligible to have his sentence reduced in 2018, when Congress passed
the First Step Act. The First Step Act authorized district courts
to “impose a reduced sentence” for qualifying movants “as if
sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in
effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” Pub. L.
115–391, §404(b), 132Stat. 5222.
B
Concepcion filed a
pro se motion
under the First Step Act in 2019. He argued that he was serving a
sentence for a “covered offense” because §2 of the Fair Sentencing
Act “modified” the statutory penalties for his conviction under 21
U. S. C. §841(a)(1). Concepcion contended that
retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act lowered his
Guidelines range from 262 to 327 months to 188 to 235 months. The
Government conceded Concepcion’s eligibility for relief and his
calculation of the Guidelines but opposed the motion, emphasizing
that Concepcion’s original sentence of 228 months fell within the
new Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months. While recognizing
Concepcion’s participation in various programs in prison, the
Government detailed “troubling behaviors such as ‘[f]ighting
(12/19/2017); Interfering with Staff (11/15/2012); and Possession
of a Weapon’ ” in Concepcion’s prison records that, in the
Government’s view, counseled against a sentence reduction.
Electronic Case Filing in No. 1:07–cr–10197 (Mass.) (ECF), Doc. 78,
pp. 4–5, n. 4.
In his reply brief, represented by counsel,
Concepcion made two primary arguments in support of a reduced
sentence. First, he argued that he would no longer be considered a
career offender under the amended Guidelines, because one of his
prior convictions had been vacated and his remaining convictions
would no longer be considered crimes of violence that trigger the
enhancement.[
1] Without the
career offender enhancement, Concepcion argued that his revised
Guidelines range should be 57 to 71 months. Second, Concepcion
pointed to postsentencing evidence of rehabilitation. Concepcion
highlighted his successfully completed drug and vocational
programming, as well as his stable reentry plan. He also submitted
a letter from a Bureau of Prisons chaplain who attested to
Concepcion’s spiritual growth while incarcerated.
The District Court denied Concepcion’s motion.
It adopted the Government’s argument that if the Court “considered
only the changes in law that the Fair Sentencing Act enacted,
[Concepcion’s] sentence would be the same.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
71a. The court declined to consider that Concepcion would no longer
qualify as a career offender on the ground that the First Step Act
“does not authorize such relief.”
Id., at 72a. In doing so,
the District Court adopted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit,
which understood the First Step Act to require a district court to
“ ‘plac[e] itself in the time frame of the original
sentencing, altering the relevant legal landscape only by the
changes mandated by the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act.’ ”
Id., at 74a (quoting
United States v.
Hegwood,
934 F.3d 414, 418 (CA5 2019)). The District Court did not address
Concepcion’s evidence of rehabilitation or the Government’s
countervailing evidence of Concepcion’s disciplinary record.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a divided
opinion. The court interpreted the First Step Act as requiring a
“two-step inquiry.” 991 F.3d 279, 289 (CA1 2021). At the first step
of that inquiry, a district court decides whether a movant should
be resentenced at all, considering only the changes wrought by the
Fair Sentencing Act.
Ibid. If the district court answers in
the affirmative at the first step, it may then, in its discretion,
consider new factual or legal developments in determining how to
resentence the movant.
Id., at 289–290. Judge Barron
dissented, rejecting the panel’s bifurcated approach. In his view,
the First Step Act requires only one step of analysis, at which
district courts have “substantial discretion” to consider evidence
of rehabilitation and Guidelines changes.
Id., at 293,
309–310.
The Court of Appeals opinion added to the
disagreement among the Circuits as to whether a district court
deciding a First Step Act motion must, may, or may not consider
intervening changes of law or fact.[
2] This Court granted certiorari to resolve this
disagreement. 594 U. S. ___ (2021).
II
“From the beginning of the Republic, federal
judges were entrusted with wide sentencing discretion.” K. Stith
& J. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the
Federal Courts 9 (1998) (Stith & Cabranes). Federal courts
historically have exercised this broad discretion to consider all
relevant information at an initial sentencing hearing, consistent
with their responsibility to sentence the whole person before them.
That discretion also carries forward to later proceedings that may
modify an original sentence. Such discretion is bounded only when
Congress or the Constitution expressly limits the type of
information a district court may consider in modifying a
sentence.
A
There is a “long” and “durable” tradition that
sentencing judges “enjo[y] discretion in the sort of information
they may consider” at an initial sentencing proceeding.
Dean
v.
United States, 581 U.S. 62, 66 (2017).[
3] This history dates back to before the
founding: “[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a
nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy
under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in
the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining
the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed
by law.”
Williams, 337 U. S., at 246. Early state and
English courts broadly recognized this discretion. See,
e.g., Rex v.
Bunts, 2 T. R. 683, 100 Eng. Rep.
368 (K. B. 1788) (“[W]hen any defendant shall be brought up for
sentence on any indictment” the court shall hear evidence from the
prosecution and the defense in determining an appropriate
sentence);
State v.
Summers, 98 N. C. 702, 705,
4 S.E. 120, 121 (1887) (“It was competent for [the trial judge] to
hear such evidence as he might deem necessary and proper to aid his
judgment and discretion in determining the punishment to be
imposed”);
State v.
Reeder, 79 S. C. 139, 141,
60 S.E. 434, 435 (1908) (rejecting claim that trial court erred in
considering aggravating evidence at sentencing, and explaining that
“[t]he circuit judge merely permitted himself to be informed as to
the character of the accused and the circumstances of the crime, so
that he might be able to exercise his discretion intelligently and
pronounce a just sentence”).
That unbroken tradition characterizes federal
sentencing history as well. “Federal judges exercising sentencing
discretion have always considered a wide variety of aggravating and
mitigating factors relating to the circumstances of both the
offense and the offender.” Stith & Cabranes 14. Indeed, “[i]t
has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for
the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an
individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings
that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the
punishment to ensue.”
Koon, 518 U. S., at 113; see,
e.g., United States v.
Randall, 27 F. Cas.
696, 708 (No. 16,118) (DC Ore. 1869) (considering the defendant’s
“former good reputation” in imposing sentence);
United
States v.
Nye, 27 F. Cas. 210, 211 (No. 15,906) (CC
Mass. 1855) (considering “palliating circumstance[s],” including
that the defendants were “sober, and fit for duty,” in imposing
sentence);
Lyon’s Case, 15 F. Cas. 1183, 1185 (No. 8,646)
(CC Vt. 1798) (considering the “reduced condition of [the
defendant’s] estate” in imposing sentence). Accordingly, a federal
judge in deciding to impose a sentence “may appropriately conduct
an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind
of information he may consider, or the source from which it may
come.”
United States v.
Tucker,
404 U.S.
443, 446 (1972).
B
The discretion federal judges hold at initial
sentencings also characterizes sentencing modification hearings.
Relying on
Williams and
Koon, the Court in
Pepper found it “clear that when a defendant’s sentence has
been set aside on appeal and his case remanded for resentencing, a
district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s
rehabilitation since his prior sentencing.” 562 U. S., at 490.
Pepper reached that conclusion in light of the “federal
sentencing framework” that allows sentencing judges to consider the
“ ‘fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s
life and characteristics.’ ”
Id., at 488, 490.
Accordingly, federal courts resentencing
individuals whose sentences were vacated on appeal regularly
consider evidence of rehabilitation developed after the initial
sentencing. See,
e.g., United States v.
Rodriguez, 2020 WL 2521551, *5 (SDNY, May 18, 2020)
(considering the movant’s “exemplary conduct during a lengthy
period of incarceration”);
United States v.
Raifsnider, 2020 WL 1503527, *3 (D Kan., Mar. 30, 2020)
(considering that the movant “has completed his GED, taken hundreds
of hours of programming offered by the Bureau of Prisons, and is
taking college classes”). Similarly, district courts in
resentencing proceedings frequently consider evidence of violence
and rule breaking in prison. See,
e.g., United States
v.
Riley, 785 Fed. Appx. 282, 285 (CA6 2019) (considering a
“ ‘series of disciplinary violations while in the Bureau of
Prisons’ ”);
United States v.
Diaz, 486 Fed.
Appx. 979, 980 (CA3 2012) (considering “infractions while in
prison,
e.g., possession of marijuana”).
Where district courts must calculate new
Guidelines ranges as part of resentencing proceedings, courts have
also considered unrelated Guidelines changes in their discretion.
See,
e.g., United States v.
Frates, 896 F.3d
93, 101–102 (CA1 2018) (distinguishing between recalculating a
Guidelines range based on nonretroactive intervening changes of law
and considering those changes as a matter of “discretion to select
an appropriate sentence”);
United States v.
Taylor,
648 F.3d 417, 425 (CA6 2011) (“[T]he district court can consider
subsequent amendments to the Guidelines for purposes of fashioning
an appropriate sentence [at resentencing]”);
United States
v.
Gilmore, 599 F.3d 160, 166–167 (CA2 2010) (considering
subsequently updated Guidelines as “evidence of society’s judgment
of the seriousness of [the movant’s] offense”). In many cases, a
district court is prohibited from recalculating a Guidelines range
in light of nonretroactive Guidelines amendments, but the court may
find those amendments to be germane when deciding whether to modify
a sentence at all, and if so, to what extent.
C
The only limitations on a court’s discretion
to consider any relevant materials at an initial sentencing or in
modifying that sentence are those set forth by Congress in a
statute or by the Constitution. See
Pepper, 562 U. S.,
at 489, n. 8 (“Of course, sentencing courts’ discretion
. . . is subject to constitutional constraints”);
Mistretta v.
United States,
488
U.S. 361, 364 (1989) (“[T]he scope of judicial discretion with
respect to a sentence is subject to congressional control”).
Congress is not shy about placing such limits
where it deems them appropriate. At an initial sentencing, Congress
has provided generally that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense” when deciding what sentence to
impose. 18 U. S. C. §3661. Congress has, however,
expressly prohibited a district court in crafting an initial
sentence from considering a defendant’s need for rehabilitation in
support of a prison sentence. See §3582(a);
Tapia v.
United States,
564 U.S.
319, 328 (2011).
In other aspects of sentencing, Congress also
has expressly limited district courts to considering only certain
factors. For example, in determining whether to include a term of
supervised release, and the length of any such term, Congress has
expressly precluded district courts from considering the need for
retribution. See §3583(c);
id., at 326.
Congress has further imposed express statutory
limitations on one type of sentencing modification proceeding.
Section 3582(c)(2) provides that
“in the case of a defendant who has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range
that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission
. . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment,
after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the
extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.”
For those proceedings, Congress expressly
cabined district courts’ discretion by requiring courts to abide by
the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. See also
§3582(c)(1)(A) (permitting district courts to grant compassionate
release in certain circumstances if “such a reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission”).[
4]
III
A
Congress in the First Step Act simply did not
contravene this well-established sentencing practice. Nothing in
the text and structure of the First Step Act expressly, or even
implicitly, overcomes the established tradition of district courts’
sentencing discretion.
The first section of the First Step Act,
§404(a), sets out who is eligible for relief:
“In this section, the term ‘covered
offense’ means a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the
statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . that was committed
before August 3, 2010.” 132Stat. 5222.
The second section, §404(b), describes what
relief is available for the parties who meet §404(a)’s
criteria:
“A court that imposed a sentence for a
covered offense may, on motion of the defendant, the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or the
court, impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . were in effect at the time
the covered offense was committed.” 132Stat. 5222.
The third section, §404(c), places two explicit
limitations on available relief:
“No court shall entertain a motion made
under this section to reduce a sentence if the sentence was
previously imposed or previously reduced in accordance with the
amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 . . . or if a previous motion made under this
section to reduce the sentence was, after the date of enactment of
this Act, denied after a complete review of the motion on the
merits. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a
court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.” 132Stat.
5222.
The text of the First Step Act does not so much
as hint that district courts are prohibited from considering
evidence of rehabilitation, disciplinary infractions, or unrelated
Guidelines changes. The only two limitations on district courts’
discretion appear in §404(c): A district court may not consider a
First Step Act motion if the movant’s sentence was already reduced
under the Fair Sentencing Act or if the court considered and
rejected a motion under the First Step Act. Neither of those
limitations applies here. By its terms, §404(c) does not prohibit
district courts from considering any arguments in favor of, or
against, sentence modification. In fact, §404(c) only underscores
that a district court is not required to modify a sentence for any
reason. “Drawing meaning from silence is particularly
inappropriate” in the sentencing context, “for Congress has shown
that it knows how to direct sentencing practices in express terms.”
Kimbrough v.
United States,
552 U.S.
85,
103 (2007).[
5]
Nor did Congress hide any limitations on
district courts’ discretion outside of §404(c). Section 404(b) does
not erect any additional such limitations. The term “as if ”
simply enacts the First Step Act’s central goal: to make
retroactive the changes in the Fair Sentencing Act. That language
is necessary to overcome 1 U. S. C. §109, which creates a
presumption that Congress does not repeal federal criminal
penalties unless it says so “expressly.” To defeat the presumption
established by this statute, Congress needed to make clear that the
Fair Sentencing Act applied retroactively. Notably, the “as
if ” clause requires a district court to apply the Fair
Sentencing Act as if it applied at the time of the commission of
the offense, not at the time of the original sentencing. Had
Congress intended to constrain district courts to consider only the
record as it existed at the time of the original sentencing,
Congress would have written the “as if ” clause to refer to
that sentencing, not the commission of the offense. Thus, the
language Congress enacted in the First Step Act specifically
requires district courts to apply the legal changes in the Fair
Sentencing Act when calculating the Guidelines if they chose to
modify a sentence.[
6] The “as
if ” clause does not, however, limit the information a
district court may use to inform its decision whether and how much
to reduce a sentence.
B
Consistent with this text and structure,
district courts deciding First Step Act motions regularly have
considered evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation and unrelated
Guidelines amendments when raised by the parties. By definition,
First Step Act movants have amassed prison records of over a
decade. See §404(a), 132Stat. 5222 (requiring the movant to have
been sentenced for an offense “committed before August 3, 2010”).
Those records are naturally of interest to judges authorized by the
First Step Act to reduce prison sentences or even to release
movants immediately. See,
e.g., United States v.
Crawford, 483 F. Supp. 3d 378, 381 (ND W. Va.
2020) (considering that the movant earned his GED in prison,
obtained a carpentry certification through a local community
college, and was sanctioned for only “two minor write-ups” in the
nine years preceding his motion);
United States v.
Henderson, 399 F. Supp. 3d 648, 656 (WD La. 2019)
(considering that the movant “ha[d] not seen his children in eight
years,” that he had “possible employment opportunities
. . . upon his release,” and that he “ha[d] received only
two incident reports” while incarcerated);
United States v.
Mitchell, 2019 WL 2647571, *8 (D DC, June 27, 2019)
(considering that the movant “incurred no disciplinary infractions
over his last fourteen years in prison” and that the movant would
no longer be considered a career offender based on an intervening
change of law).
Likewise, when deciding whether to grant First
Step Act motions and in deciding how much to reduce sentences,
courts have looked to postsentencing evidence of violence or prison
infractions as probative. See,
e.g., United States v.
Rose, 841 Fed. Appx. 328, 329 (CA2 2021) (affirming partial
denial of motion where the district court relied on the movant’s
“lengthy history of prison disciplinary infractions, which included
many recent violent infractions”);
United States v.
Barlow, 544 F. Supp. 3d 491, 505 (NJ 2021)
(considering, in denying motion, that the movant was disciplined in
prison seven times, including “three times for possessing a
dangerous weapon,” “once for possessing marijuana,” and “once for
fighting”);
United States v.
Slutzkin, 2019 WL
5696122, *8 (Conn., Nov. 4, 2019) (considering in denying motion
the movant’s “behavior once incarcerated [as] perhaps the greatest
concern to the Court,” in light of “25 disciplinary citations while
in state incarceration and six more in federal prison”).[
7]
Moreover, when raised by the parties, district
courts have considered nonretroactive Guidelines amendments to help
inform whether to reduce sentences at all, and if so, by how much.
See,
e.g., United States v.
Coachman, 2020 WL
6939890, *3 (ND Fla., June 22, 2020) (considering that the movant
“would not qualify for career offender status” at the time of his
sentence modification hearing);
United States v.
Frederick, 2020 WL 555302, *4 (WD Pa., Feb. 4, 2020)
(considering “the fact that [the movant] would not qualify as a
career offender under the current version of the career offender
provisions . . . as a factor favoring the exercise of the
discretionary relief that may be awarded”);
United States v.
Newton, 2019 WL 1007100, *5 (WD Va., Mar. 1, 2019)
(considering that the movant, “if he were sentenced today,” would
no longer qualify for career offender status). Nothing express or
implicit in the First Step Act suggests that these courts
misinterpreted the Act in considering such relevant and probative
information.[
8]
C
The Court therefore holds that the First Step
Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law
or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence
pursuant to the First Step Act.
It follows, under the Court’s sentencing
jurisprudence, that when deciding a First Step Act motion, district
courts bear the standard obligation to explain their decisions and
demonstrate that they considered the parties’ arguments. It is well
established that a district court must generally consider the
parties’ nonfrivolous arguments before it. See
Golan v.
Saada, 596 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 11). Of
course, a district court is not required to be persuaded by every
argument parties make, and it may, in its discretion, dismiss
arguments that it does not find compelling without a detailed
explanation. Nor is a district court required to articulate
anything more than a brief statement of reasons. See
Rita v.
United States,
551 U.S.
338, 356 (2007). Nothing in the First Step Act contravenes
those background principles.
When it comes to that reasoned explanation, the
First Step Act “ ‘leaves much . . . to the judge’s
own professional judgment.’ ”
Chavez-Meza v.
United
States, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 3)
(quoting
Rita, 551 U. S., at 356). The First Step Act
does not “require courts to expressly rebut each argument” made by
the parties.
United States v.
Maxwell, 991 F.3d 685,
694 (CA6 2021). In excising its discretion, the court is free to
agree or disagree with any of the policy arguments raised before
it. Cf.
Kimbrough, 552 U. S., at 111. All that the
First Step Act requires is that a district court make clear that it
“reasoned through [the parties’] arguments.” 991 F. 3d, at
693.
The broad discretion that the First Step Act
affords to district courts also counsels in favor of deferential
appellate review. As a general matter, “it is not the role of an
appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the
sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular
sentence.”
Solem v.
Helm,
463
U.S. 277, 290, n. 16 (1983). Section 404(c) of the First
Step Act confers particular discretion, clarifying that the Act
does not “require a court to reduce any sentence.” Other than legal
errors in recalculating the Guidelines to account for the Fair
Sentencing Act’s changes, see
Gall v.
United States,
552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007), appellate review should not be overly
searching.
Put simply, the First Step Act does not require
a district court to accept a movant’s argument that evidence of
rehabilitation or other changes in law counsel in favor of a
sentence reduction, or the Government’s view that evidence of
violent behavior in prison counsels against providing relief. Nor
does the First Step Act require a district court to make a
point-by-point rebuttal of the parties’ arguments. All that is
required is for a district court to demonstrate that it has
considered the arguments before it.
* * *
The First Step Act does not require a district
court to be persuaded by the nonfrivolous arguments raised by the
parties before it, but it does require the court to consider them.
The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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