OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
CITY OF COLUMBUS ET AL.
v. OURS GARAGE AND WRECKER
SERVICE, INC., ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT
No. 01-419. Argued April 23, 2002-Decided June 20, 2002
Federal law preempts prescriptions by "a State [or] political
subdivision of a State ... related to a price, route, or service of
any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of
property," 49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(1). Exceptions to this general
rule provide that the preemption directive "shall not restrict the
safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor
vehicles," § 14501(c)(2)(A); "does not apply to the transportation
of household goods," § 14501(c)(2)(B); and "does not apply to the
authority of a State or a political subdivision of a State" to
regulate "the price of for-hire motor vehicle transportation by a
tow truck ... performed without the prior consent ... of the [towed
vehicle's] owner or operator," § 14501(c)(2)(C). Petitioner
Columbus, Ohio (City), extensively regulates the operation of tow
trucks seeking to pick up vehicles within city limits.
Plaintiff-respondents, a tow-truck operator and a trade association
of such operators, brought this suit to enjoin enforcement of the
City's tow-truck regulations on the ground that they were preempted
by § 14501(c)(1). The Federal District Court granted the plaintiffs
summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed based on its earlier
decision in
Petrey v.
Toledo, in which it held that
city tow-truck regulations similar to those of Columbus were
preempted. Observing that § 14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule
explicitly applies to "a State [or] political subdivision of a
State," while the exception for safety regulations, §
14501(c)(2)(A), refers only to the "authority of a State," the
Petrey court determined that the contrast in statutory
language indicated that Congress meant to limit the safety
exception to States alone. This reading, the court further
reasoned, was consistent with Congress' deregulatory purpose of
encouraging market forces by eliminating a myriad of complicated
and potentially conflicting state regulations. Yet another level of
regulation at the local level, the court inferred, would be
disfavored.
Held: Section 14501(c) does not bar a State from
delegating to municipalities and other local units the State's
authority to establish safety regulations governing motor carriers
of property, including tow trucks. Pp. 432-442.
425
(a) Had § 14501(c) contained no reference at all to "political
subdivision[s] of a State," § 14501(c)(2)(A)'s exception for
exercises of the "safety regulatory authority of a State"
undoubtedly would have embraced both state and local regulation
under
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v.
Mortier,
501 U. S. 597. It
was there held that the exclusion of political subdivisions cannot
be inferred from a federal law's express authorization to the
"States" to take action, for such subdivisions are components of
the very entity the statute empowers, and are created as convenient
agencies to exercise such of the State's powers as it chooses to
entrust to them,
id., at 607-608. This case is a closer call
than
Mortier because, in contrast to § 14501(c)(2)(A)'s
singularly bare reference to "[s]tate" authority, almost every
other provision of § 14501 links States and their political
subdivisions. Nevertheless, that does not mean that Congress
intended to limit the exception to States alone, as respondents
contend. Respondents rely on
Russello v.
United
States, 464 U. S.
16, 23, in which the Court observed that, where particular
language is included in one section of a federal statute but
omitted from another, Congress is generally presumed to have acted
intentionally and purposely. Reading § 14501(c)'s exceptions in
combination and context, however, leads the Court to conclude that
§ 14501 does not provide the requisite "clear and manifest
indication that Congress sought to supplant local authority."
Mortier, 501 U. S., at 611. Section 14501(c)(2)(C) refers to
the "authority of a State or a political subdivision of a State to
enact or enforce" regulations in particular areas, wording which
parallels that of § 14501(c)(1). Accord, § 14501(c)(3). This
parallel structure does not imply, however, that § 14501(c)(2)(A)'s
concise statement must be read to use the term "State"
restrictively. In contrast to §§ 14501(c)(2)(C) and (c)(3), neither
the safety exception, § 14501(c)(2)(A), nor the exception for the
transportation of household goods, § 14501(c)(2)(B), refers to the
"authority ... to enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other
provision." The
Russello presumption-that the presence of a
phrase in one provision and its absence in another reveals
Congress' design-grows weaker with each difference in the
formulation of the provisions under inspection. Furthermore, the
Court notes, § 14501(c)(1) preempts the power of both States and
localities to "enact or enforce" rules related to the "price,
route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the
transportation of property"; reading the term "State" in §
14501(c)(2)(A) to exclude localities would prevent those units not
only from enacting such rules but also from enforcing them, even
when such rules were enacted by the state legislature. Finally,
resort to the
Russello presumption here would yield a
decision at odds with our federal system's traditional
comprehension of the regulatory authority of a State. Local
governmental units are cre-
426
Syllabus
ated to exercise such of the State's powers as the State may
entrust to them in its absolute discretion.
Mortier, 501 U.
S., at 607-608. In contrast to programs in which Congress restricts
that discretion through its spending power, § 14501(c)(2)(A)
evinces a clear purpose to ensure that the preemption of States'
economic authority over motor carriers of property "not restrict"
the preexisting and traditional state police power over safety, "a
field which the States have traditionally occupied."
Medtronic,
Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485.
Preemption analysis "start[sJ with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."
Ibid. Because a State's "safety regulatory
authority" includes the choice to delegate power to localities,
forcing a State to refrain from doing so would effectively
"restrict" that very authority. Absent a basis more reliable than
statutory language insufficient to demonstrate a "clear and
manifest purpose" to the contrary, federal courts should resist
attribution to Congress of a design to disturb a State's decision
on the division of authority between the State's central and local
units over safety on municipal streets and roads. Pp. 432-440.
(b) Contrary to the Sixth Circuit's reading, declarations of
deregulatory purpose in the statute and legislative history do not
justify interpreting through a deregulatory prism aspects of the
state regulatory process that Congress determined should
not
be preempted. Giving § 14501(c)(2)(A)'s safety exception the
narrowest possible construction is resistible here, for that
provision does not necessarily conflict with Congress' deregulatory
purposes. The area Congress sought to deregulate was state
economic regulation; the exemption in question is for state
safety regulation. Local regulation of tow-truck prices,
routes, or services that is not genuinely responsive to safety
concerns garners no exemption from preemption. The construction of
§ 14501 that respondents advocate, moreover, does not guarantee
uniform regulation. On their reading as on petitioners', for
example, a State could, without affront to the statute, pass
discrete, nonuniform safety regulations applicable to each of its
several constituent municipalities. Furthermore, § 31141-which
authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to void any state safety
law or regulation upon finding that it has no safety benefit or
would cause an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce-affords a
means to prevent § 14501(c)(2)(A)'s safety exception from
overwhelming Congress' deregulatory purpose. Pp. 440-442.
(c) The Court expresses no opinion on whether Columbus'
particular regulations, in whole or in part, qualify as exercises
of "safety regula-
427
tory authority" or otherwise fall within § 14501(c)(2)(A)'s
compass. This question, which was not reached by the Sixth Circuit,
remains open on remand. P. 442.
257 F.3d
506, reversed and remanded.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and BREYER,
JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
O'CONNOR, J., joined,
post, p.442.
Jeffrey S. Sutton argued the cause for petitioners. With him on
the briefs were Traci L. Lovitt, Ronald E. Laymon, and Susan E.
Ashbrook.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy
Solicitor General Kneedler, Mark B. Stern, Dana Martin, Kirk K. Van
Tine, Paul M. Geier, and Dale C. Andrews.
Richard A. Cordray argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the briefs was
David A. Ferris. *
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State
of Kansas et al. by Carla
J. Stovall, Attorney General of
Kansas, and Stephen R. McAllister, State Solicitor, joined by the
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill
Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of
Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Steve Carter of
Indiana, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Jeremiah W (Jay) Nixon
of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of
Nevada, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W
A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island,
Mark Barnett of South Dakota, John Cornyn of Texas, Mark L.
Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Christine O.
Gregoire of Washington; for the City of Dallas by Christopher D.
Bowers; for Miami-Dade County by Leonard Leigh Elias; for the City
and County of San Francisco et al. by Rose-Ellen Heinz, Moses W
Johnson
TV; Michael F. Dean, Charles M. Hinton, Jr., Brad
Neighbor, Scott H. Howard, Henry W Underhill, Jr., Michael G.
Colantuono, William B. Conners, Michael A. Cardozo, Leonard
J. Koerner, George Rios, Valerie
J. Armento, Debra E.
Corbett, and Robert E. Murphy; for the City of Toledo et al. by
Barry
428
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. Federal
preemption prescriptions relating to motor carriers, contained in
49 U. S. C. § 14501(c) (1994 ed., Supp. V), specifically save to
States "safety regulatory authority ... with respect to motor
vehicles," § 14501(c)(2)(A). This case presents the question
whether the state power preserved in § 14501(c)(2)(A) may be
delegated to municipalities, permitting them to exercise safety
regulatory authority over local tow-truck operations.
The federal legislation preempts provisions by "a State
transportation of property." § 14501(c)(1). As an exception to
this general rule, Congress provided that the preemption directive
"shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with
respect to motor vehicles." § 14501(c)(2)(A). Section 14501(c)(1)'s
statement of the general rule explicitly includes "State[s]" and
their "political subdivision[s]." The exception for safety
regulation, however, specifies only "State[s]" and does not mention
"political subdivision[s]." § 14501(c)(2)(A).
We hold that § 14501(c) does not bar a State from delegating to
municipalities and other local units the State's authority to
establish safety regulations governing motor carriers of property,
including tow trucks. A locality, as § 14501(c) recognizes, is a
"political
subdivision" of the State. Ordinarily, a
political subdivision may exercise whatever portion
M. Byron, John E. Gotherman, and James G. Burkhardt; and for
Coalition for Local Sovereignty by Kenneth B. Clark.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. by
Evan M.
Tager, Beth L. Law, and
Robert Digges, Jr.; for the
California Dump Truck Owners Association by
Edward J.
Hegarty; for the Cargo Airline Association by
Paul T.
Friedman, Ruth N. Borenstein, Drew S.
Days III, and
Beth S.
Brinkmann; for the Towing and Recovery
Association of America by
Erik S.
Jaffe and
Michael P. McGovern; and for VRC LLC et al. by
James
C.
Mosser.
429
of state power the State, under its own constitution and laws,
chooses to delegate to the subdivision. Absent a clear statement to
the contrary, Congress' reference to the "regulatory authority of a
State" should be read to preserve, not preempt, the traditional
prerogative of the States to delegate their authority to their
constituent parts.
I
The Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Federal Aviation
Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1606, and the
ICC Termination Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 899, generally preempts
state and local regulation "related to a price, route, or service
of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of
property"; enumerated matters, however, are not covered by the
preemption provision. The Act prescribes:
"(1) GENERAL RULE.-Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3),
a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority
of 2 or more States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or
other provision having the force and effect of law related to a
price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to
the transportation of property.
"(2) MATTERS NOT COVERED.-Paragraph (1)-
"(A) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a
State with respect to motor vehicles ... or the authority of a
State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of
financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and
self-insurance authorization;
"(B) does not apply to the transportation of household goods;
and
"(C) does not apply to the authority of a State or a
political subdivision of a State to enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision relating to the price of for-hire
motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck,
430
if such transportation is performed without the prior consent or
authorization of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle.
"(3) STATE STANDARD TRANSPORTATION PRACTICES.-
"(A) CONTINUATION.-[Section 14501(c)(1)] shall not affect any
authority of a State, political subdivision of a State, or
political authority of 2 or more States to enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision, with respect to the intrastate
transportation of property by motor carriers, related to-linter
alia] uniform cargo liability rules ... if such law,
regulation, or provision meets [various enumerated] requirements."
49 U. S. C. § 14501(c).
Tow trucks, all parties to this case agree, are "motor
carrier[s] of property" falling within § 14501(c)'s compass. This
reading is corroborated by § 14501(c)(2)(C), which relates to
nonconsensual tows,
e. g., of illegally parked or
abandoned vehicles. That provision plainly indicates that tow
trucks qualify as "motor carrieres] of property"; it exempts from
federal preemption state and local regulation of "the price of
for-hire motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck" when the
towing "is performed without the prior consent ... of the [towed
vehicle's] owner or operator."
Petitioner, the City of Columbus, Ohio (City), extensively
regulates the operation of any tow truck that seeks to pick up
vehicles within city limits. Columbus' regulations require
tow-truck operators to obtain city licenses, submit to city
inspections, meet city standards for insurance and recordkeeping,
and conform their vehicles to the City's detailed equipment
requirements. See Columbus, Ohio, City Code §§ 549.02-549.06
(1991); App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a-52a.
Plaintiff-respondent Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc.,
joined by a trade association of tow-truck operators, the Towing
and Recovery Association of Ohio (TRAO), brought suit in Federal
District Court against the City of Columbus
431
and two city officials to enjoin enforcement of the City's
towtruck regulations. The complaint alleged that Columbus'
regulations were preempted by § 14501(c)(1). On crossmotions for
summary judgment, the District Court ruled for the plaintiffs; the
court declared the City's tow-truck regulations preempted and
enjoined their enforcement. Columbus and its officials appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
During the pendency of Columbus' appeal, the Sixth Circuit
decided
Petrey v.
Toledo, 246 F.3d
548 (2001).
Petrey held that city of Toledo tow-truck
regulations, resembling those of Columbus, were preempted by §
14501(c).1 The court observed first that § 14501(c)(1)'s preemption
rule explicitly applies to "a State [or] political subdivision of a
State," while the exception for safety regulations, §
14501(c)(2)(A), refers only to the "authority of a State." The
contrast in statutory language indicated to the court that Congress
meant to limit the safety exception to States alone.
Id., at
563. This reading, the court further reasoned, was consistent with
Congress' deregulatory purpose. "Congress intended to encourage
market forces ... through the elimination of a myriad of
complicated and potentially conflicting state regulations," the
court observed; "yet another level of regulation at the local
level," the court inferred, "would be disfavored."
Ibid.
Eleven weeks after rendering its judgment in
Petrey, the
Sixth Circuit decided this case. Holding
Petrey dispositive,
the appeals court affirmed the District Court's injunction against
enforcement of Columbus' tow-truck regulations.
257 F.3d
506, 507-508 (2001).
The Courts of Appeals have divided on the question whether §
14501(c)(2)(A)'s safety regulation exception to pre-
1 The court excepted regulations governing the city's own
purchase of towing services, which it held fell within the
"municipal proprietor" exception applicable to federal preemption
rules. See
Petrey, 246 F. 3d, at 558-559.
432
emption encompasses municipal regulations. Compare
Petrey,
246 F.3d
548;
Stucky v.
San Antonio, 260
F.3d 424 (CA5 2001);
Tocher v.
Santa Ana,
219 F.3d
1040, 1051
(CA9 2000); and
R. Mayer of Atlanta,
Inc. v.
Atlanta, 158 F.3d
538 (CAll 1998) (all holding that local safety and insurance
regulations are preempted), with
Ace Auto Body &
Towing, Ltd. v.
New York, 171 F.3d
765 (CA2 1999) (holding that local safety and insurance
regulations are not preempted). We granted certiorari to resolve
the conflict, see 534 U. S. 1073 (2002), and now reverse the Sixth
Circuit's judgment.
II
We begin our consideration of the question presented with an
observation that is beyond genuine debate. Had 49 U. S. C. §
14501(c) contained no reference at all to "political subdivision[s]
of a State," the preemption provision's exception for exercises of
the "safety regulatory authority of a State," § 14501(c)(2)(A),
undoubtedly would have embraced both state and local regulation.
Accord,
post, at 445 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). The Court's
decision in
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v.
Mortier,
501 U. S. 597
(1991), would have been definitive. There the Court considered a
provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act authorizing a "State [to] regulate the sale or use of any
federally registered pesticide or device in the State," 7 U. S. C.
§ 136v(a); the provision was "silent with reference to local
governments." 501 U. S., at 607. "Mere silence," we held, "cannot
suffice to establish a clear and manifest purpose to pre-empt local
authority."
Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
As Justice White stated for the Court in
Mortier, "[w]hen
considering pre-emption, 'we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.'''
Id., at 605 (quoting
Rice v.
433
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230
(1947)). Furthermore, Justice White explained:
"The principle is well settled that local governmental units are
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the
governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them in its
absolute discretion. The exclusion of political subdivisions cannot
be inferred from the express authorization to the States because
political subdivisions are components of the very entity the
statute empowers." 501 U. S., at 607-608 (internal quotation marks,
citations, and alterations omitted).
This case is a closer call than
Mortier. Here, the
general preemption provision, § 14501(c)(1)-from which § 14501(c)
(2)(A) excepts "the safety regulatory authority of a
State"explicitly preempts regulation both by "a State" and by a
"political subdivision of a State." The exception for state safety
regulation is the first in a series of four statutory exceptions to
the preemption rule. The third exception in the series, covering
regulation of prices for nonconsensual tow-truck services, matches
the general preemption provision; it explicitly applies to the
"authority of a State or a political subdivision of a State." §
14501(c)(2)(C). States and their political subdivisions are
likewise linked in almost every other provision of § 14501. See §§
14501(a), 14501(b)(1), 14501(c)(3)(A), 14501(c)(3)(B),
14501(c)(3)(C).
Respondents Ours Garage and TRAO, in line with several Courts of
Appeals, home in on the statute's repeated references to both
States and their political subdivisions; in contrast, they urge,
the singularly bare reference to "[s]tate" authority in §
14501(c)(2)(A)'s exception for safety regulation must mean that
Congress intended to limit the exception to States alone. See Brief
for Respondents 15-16,26-29. Respondents rely particularly on
Russello v.
United States, 464 U. S. 16 (1983). In
that case, we observed: "Where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute
434
but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion."
Id., at 23 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (cited in
Petrey, 246 F. 3d, at
561;
Stucky, 260 F. 3d, at 441; and
Tocher, 219 F.
3d, at 1051). The dissent asserts the same argument vigorously. In
its words: "The only conceivable reason" for the separate
enumeration of States and their political subdivisions in §
14501(c)(1) is to
"establish ... two
separate
categories of state power-state power exercised through
political subdivisions and state power exercised by the State
directlythat are later treated differently in the exceptions to the
rule."
Post, at 445.
We acknowledge that § 14501(c)'s "disparate inclusion [and]
exclusion" of the words "political subdivisions" support an
argument of some force, one that could not have been made in
Mortier. Nevertheless, reading § 14501(c)'s set of
exceptions in combination, and with a view to the basic tenets of
our federal system pivotal in
Mortier, we conclude that the
statute does not provide the requisite "clear and manifest
indication that Congress sought to supplant local authority." 501
U. S., at 611.
Respondents Ours Garage and TRAO, as just noted, contrast the
first statutory exception to § 14501(c)'s preemption rule, i.
e., the exception preserving "the safety regulatory
authority of a State," § 14501(c)(2)(A), with the third exception,
preserving the "authority of a State or a political subdivision to
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision relating to
the price" charged for nonconsensual towing, § 14501(c)(2)(C). See
Brief for Respondents 15-16. The nonconsensual towing exception
tracks the language and structure of the general preemption rule,
omitting only the reference to a "political authority of 2 or more
States." Similarly styled, the fourth exception, for
carrier-requested regulations in areas such as "uniform cargo
liability" and antitrust immunity, § 14501(c)(3), completely
parallels the word-
435
ing of § 14501(c)(1): It provides that preemption "shall not
affect any authority of a State, political subdivision of a State,
or political authority of 2 or more States to enact or enforce a
law, regulation, or other provision" in those areas.
The safety exception of § 14501(c)(2)(A), however, does not
borrow language from § 14501(c)(1). It simply states that
preemption "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a
State." Notably, the second statutory exception, on which
respondents train no attention, is stated with similar economy.
That exception mentions neither States nor political subdivisions;
it simply says that the general preemption rule, § 14501(c)(1),
"does not apply to the transportation of household goods," §
14501(c)(2)(B). Yet it is abundantly clear that, notwithstanding
this difference in verbal formulation, § 14501(c)(2)(B), like its
neighbor § 14501(c)(2)(C), permits both state and local regulation.
Accord,
post, at 446 (SCALIA, J., dissenting).
The inclusion of the phrase "the authority of a State or a
political subdivision of a State to enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision" no doubt synchronizes the
nonconsensual towing provision with § 14501(c)(1)'s main rule. The
parallel structure of §§ 14501(c)(1) and 14501(c)(2)(C) does not
imply, however, that § 14501(c)(2)(A)'s concise statement must be
read to use the term "State" restrictively. Respondents' inference
from the absence of "political subdivision of a State" in §
14501(c)(2)(A) would be more persuasive if the omission were the
sole difference in the expression of the general rule and the
safety exception. In contrast to §§ 14501(c)(2)(C) and (c)(3),
however, neither the safety exception nor the household-goods
exception refers to the "authority ... to enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision." 2 The
Russello presump-
2 The dissent insists that § 14501(c)(2)(B) is irrelevant
because its phrasing "ha[s] nothing to do with the issue of
separating state and local authority."
Post, at 446
(emphasis deleted). We ultimately draw the same conclusion, of
course, regarding the phrasing of the safety exception in
436
tion-that the presence of a phrase in one provision and its
absence in another reveals Congress' design-grows weaker with each
difference in the formulation of the provisions under
inspection.
Respondents' restrictive reading of the term "State," we note,
introduces an interpretive conundrum of another kind. Section
14501(c)(1) preempts the power of both States and localities to
"enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision."
(Emphasis added.) Those conjoined words travel together. If, as
Ours Garage and TRAO argue, the safety exception of §
14501(c)(2)(A) reaches only States, then localities are preempted
not only from enacting, but equally from
enforcing, safety
regulations governing motor carriers of property-even if those
regulations are enacted by the state legislature. It is unlikely
that Congress would preserve States' power to enact safety rules
and, at the same time, bar the ordinary method by which States
enforce such rulesthrough their local instrumentalities.3
§ 14501(c)(2)(A). The dissent, although it urges that "we should
take seriously the references to States and subdivisions of States
where they appear,"
post, at 447, rests upon the fact that
subdivisions of States do
not appear in the safety
exception-as they also do not in the household-goods exception of §
14501(c)(2)(B). That § 14501(c)(2) comprises three exceptions, each
differently stated, seems to us indeed relevant to the interpretive
weight that may be attached to the variation among them.
3 Faced with this argument, the dissent is converted, however
temporarily, to the view that "federal interference with the
'historic powers of the States' must be evinced by a 'plain
statement.'''
Post, at 450, n. 4 (quoting
Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501
U. S. 452, 461 (1991)). The dissent finds no plain statement in
§ 14501(c)(1)'s prohibition on local enforcement because it can be
read to mean only that "a political subdivision may not enact new
laws or enforce
its previously enacted laws" relating to
motor carriage of property.
Post, at 450, n. 4. This is by
no means the most natural reading of the preemption provision. The
suggestion of the dissent is that, as applied to localities, §
14501(c)(1) preempts only local enforcement of
locally
enacted laws. See
ibid. This interpretation raises the
startling possibility that, although § 14501(c)(1) prohibits both
States and localities
437
Finally, we reiterate, reading the term "State" as used in §
14501 to exclude political subdivisions would yield a decision at
odds with our federal system's traditional comprehension of "the
safety regulatory authority of a State," § 14501(c)(2)(A). To
repeat the essential observation made in
Mortier: "The
principle is well settled that local governmental units are created
as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental
powers of the State as may be entrusted to them in its absolute
discretion." 501 U. S., at 607-608 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). Whether and how to use that discretion is a
question central to state self-government. See,
e.
g., Holt Civic Club v.
Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. 60, 71 (1978)
(States enjoy "extraordinarily wide latitude ... in creating
various types of political subdivisions and conferring authority
upon them").
In Ohio, as in other States, the delegation of governing
authority from State to local unit has long occupied the attention
of the State's lawmakers. See D. Wilcox, Municipal Government in
Michigan and Ohio: A Study in the Relations of City and
Commonwealth 52-54, 63 (1896) (citing Ohio Const., Art. XIII
(1851)). The Ohio Constitution currently grants municipalities
within the State general authority "to exercise all powers of local
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in
conflict with the general laws." Art. XVIII, § 3. Ohio's
Legislature has enacted several statutes empowering cities to
regulate motor vehicles and highways. See,
e. g.,
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 715.22 (Anderson 2000) (municipality may
regulate motor vehicles and highways); § 723.01 ("Municipal
corporations shall have special power to regulate the use of the
streets."). Particularly relevant here, Ohio has exempted tow
trucks from the State's regulation of motor carriers,
from "enact[ing]" new laws, it permits localities (but not
States) to enforce previously enacted
state laws relating to
motor carriage of property.
438
§ 4921.02(A)(8), thus leaving tow-truck regulation largely to
the cities,
Cincinnati v.
Reed, 27 Ohio App. 3d 115,
500 N. E. 2d 333 (1985).
It is the expressed intent of § 14501(c)(2)(A) that the
preemption rule of § 14501(c)(1) "not restrict" the
existing
"safety regulatory authority of a State." Compare § 14501(c)(2)(A)
with §§ 14501(c)(2)(B) and
(C) (preemption "does not apply"
to state or local power to regulate in particular areas), and §
14501(c)(3) (preemption rule "shall not affect" multistate, state,
or local authority to regulate particular areas at the behest of
carriers). Preemption analysis "start[s] with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress."
Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485 (1996)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Section
14501(c)(2)(A) seeks to save from preemption state power "in a
field which the States have traditionally occupied."
Ibid.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A saving provision
of that order is hardly comparable to exercises of congressional
spending authority that, as a condition for receipt of
funds, explicitly restrict the prerogative of States to entrust
governance of a matter to localities. Such programs typically make
uniform statewide regulation a condition of funding, or,
conversely, provide funds to localities on the condition that they
be spent at that level in accordance with federal prescriptions and
without state interference. See,
e. g., 23 U. S. C. §
153 (grants to support traffic safety conditioned on a motorcycle
helmet law that applies "throughout the State"); § 158 (highway
grants withheld unless "State has in effect a law" setting the
drinking age at 21); 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(1) (Medicaid grants
available only if a State ensures that its plan for medical
assistance is "in effect in all political subdivisions of the
State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them");
Lawrence County v.
Lead-Deadwood School Dist. No .
.1,0-1, 469 U. S.
439
256, 270 (1985) (State may not restrict local use of funds that
the United States makes available to localities to spend at their
discretion).4
This case, by contrast, deals not with States' voluntary
agreements to relinquish authority vis-a-vis their political
subdivisions in exchange for federal funds, but with preemption
stemming from Congress' power to regulate commerce, in a field
where States have traditionally allowed localities to address local
concerns. Congress' clear purpose in § 14501(c)(2)(A) is to ensure
that its preemption of States' economic authority over motor
carriers of property, § 14501(c)(1), "not restrict" the preexisting
and traditional state police power over safety. That power
typically includes the choice to delegate the State's "safety
regulatory authority" to localities. Forcing a State to refrain
from doing so would effectively "restrict" that very authority.
Absent a basis more reliable than statutory language insufficient
to demonstrate a "clear and manifest purpose" to the
4 Nor, the dissent's suggestion notwithstanding, see
post, at 448, is § 14501 similar to the Clean Air Act, which
mandates that States undertake an environmental planning process
that of necessity cannot respect local political boundaries. See 42
U. S. C. §§ 7407(c), 7410(a)(1) (1994 ed.) (States must develop
implementation plans for air quality in each of its "air quality
control region[s]," whose borders are defined by the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency based not upon local
jurisdictional lines but upon criteria she "deems necessary or
appropriate for the attainment ... of [national] ambient air
quality standards"); cf. 33 U. S. C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (under the
Clean Water Act, each State must develop pollution abatement plans
based upon a "priority ranking" of
all "waters within its
boundaries for which ... effluent limitations ... are not stringent
enough to implement [applicable] water quality standard[s]"). Even
so, States
may delegate implementation authority under the
Clean Air Act to their political subdivisions, subject to the
requirement that the State bear ultimate oversight responsibility.
See § 7410(a)(2)(E)(iii) (State must provide "necessary assurances
that, where the State has relied on a local or regional government,
agency, or instrumentality for the implementation of any [state]
plan provision, the State has responsibility for ensuring adequate
implementation of such plan provision").
440
contrary, federal courts should resist attribution to Congress
of a design to disturb a State's decision on the division of
authority between the State's central and local units over safety
on municipal streets and roads.
III
The Court of Appeals supported its reading of § 14501(c)(2)(A)
to disallow delegation from State to city in part by reference to
the statute's deregulatory purpose. See
Petrey, 246 F. 3d,
at 563; accord,
Stucky, 260 F. 3d, at
444-446;
Tocher, 219 F. 3d, at 1048, 1051;
R. Mayer, 158 F. 3d,
at 546. We now turn to that justification.
The Conference Report on the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994 observed that "[s]tate economic
regulation of motor carrier operations ... is a huge problem for
national and regional carriers attempting to conduct a standard way
of doing business." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, p. 87 (1994).
Carrying more weight, in the Act itself Congress reported its
finding that "the regulation of intrastate transportation of
property by the States" unreasonably burdened free trade,
interstate commerce, and American consumers. Pub. L. 103-305, §
601(a)(1), 108 Stat. 1605. Congress therefore concluded that
"certain aspects of the State regulatory process should be
preempted." § 601(a)(2). These declarations of deregulatory
purpose, however, do not justify interpreting through a
deregulatory prism "aspects of the State regulatory process" that
Congress determined should
not be preempted.
A congressional decision to enact both a general policy that
furthers a particular goal and a specific exception that might tend
against that goal does not invariably call for the narrowest
possible construction of the exception. Such a construction is
surely resistible here, for § 14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule and §
14501(c)(2)(A)'s safety exception to it do not necessarily
conflict. The problem to which the congressional conferees attended
was "[s]tate
economic regulation";
441
the exemption in question is for state
safety regulation.
Corroboratively, the measure's legislative history shows that the
deregulatory aim of the legislation had been endorsed by a key
interest group-the American Trucking Associationsubject to "some
conditions that would allow regulatory protection to continue for
non-economic factors, such as ... insurance [and] safety." H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 88. The conferees believed that the
legislation "address[ed] these conditions."
Ibid.; see also
Ace Auto Body, 171 F. 3d, at 776.
The construction of § 14501 that respondents Ours Garage and
TRAO advocate, moreover, does not guarantee uniform regulation. On
respondents' reading as on petitioners', a State could, without
affront to the statute, pass discrete, nonuniform safety
regulations applicable to each of its several constituent
municipalities. Ohio thus could adopt the Columbus regulations to
govern in that city, the Toledo regulations to govern there, and so
on down the line. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38. Indeed, because §
14501(c)(2)(A) refers only to "political" subdivisions, nothing in
the statute's text would impede a State from creating an
administrative agency organized into local offices, each of which
could craft local rules suitable to its assigned jurisdiction.
There is no reason to suppose that Congress meant to stop the
States from spreading their authority among municipalities unless
they employ such artificial or inefficient schemes.
Furthermore, 49 U. S. C. § 31141 (1994 ed.) affords the
Secretary of Transportation a means to prevent the safety exception
from overwhelming the lawmakers' deregulatory purpose. That
provision authorizes the Secretary to void any "State law or
regulation on commercial motor vehicle safety" that, in the
Secretary's judgment, "has no safety benefit ... [or] would cause
an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce." §§ 31141(a),
(c)(4); see also § 31132(8) (" 'State law' includes [for the
purposes of § 31141] a law enacted by a political subdivision of a
State"); § 31132(9) (parallel definition of "State regulation").
Under this authority,
442
SCALIA, J., dissenting
the Secretary can invalidate local safety regulations upon
finding that their content or multiplicity threatens to clog the
avenues of commerce.
We reiterate that § 14501(c)(2)(A) shields from preemption only
"safety regulatory authority" (and "authority of a State to
regulate ... with regard to minimum amounts of financial
responsibility relating to insurance requirements"). Local
regulation of prices, routes, or services of tow trucks that is not
genuinely responsive to safety concerns garners no exemption from §
14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule.
***
For the reasons stated, we hold that § 14501(c)(2)(A) spares
from preemption local as well as state regulation. We express no
opinion, however, on the question whether Columbus' particular
regulations, in whole or in part, qualify as exercises of "safety
regulatory authority" or otherwise fall within § 14501(c)(2)(A)'s
compass. This question, which was not reached by the Court of
Appeals,5 remains open on remand.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins,
dissenting.
The dispute in the present case arises from the fact that a
reference to "State" power or authority can be meant to include
all that power or authority, including the portion exercised
by political subdivisions (as, for example, in the ordinary
reference to "the State's police power"); but can also be
5 Nor was it reached in
Petrey v.
Toledo,
246 F.3d
548 (CA6 2001), which the Sixth Circuit stated "controls
the disposition of this case,"
257 F.3d
506, 508 (2001). See
Petrey, 246 F. 3d, at 563-564.
443
meant to include only that power or authority exercised at the
state level (as, for example, in the phrase "State and local
governmental authority"). The issue is whether, when 49 U. S. C. §
14501(c)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V) excepts from the preclusionary
command of § 14501(c)(1) "the safety regulatory authority
of a
State with respect to motor vehicles," it means to except the
safety regulatory authority of cities and counties as well. In my
view it plainly does not.
I
There are four exceptions to the preclusionary rule of §
14501(c)(1), which read as follows:
"(2) MATTERS NOT COVERED.-[The preemption rule]-
"(A) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a
State with respect to motor vehicles, the authority of a
State to impose highway route controls or limitations based on
the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of
the cargo, or the authority of a State to regulate motor
carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility
relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance
authorization;
"(B) does not apply to the transportation of household goods;
and
"(C) does not apply to the authority of a State or a
political subdivision of a State to enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision relating to the price of for-hire
motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck, if such transportation
is performed without the prior consent or authorization of the
owner or operator of the motor vehicle.
"(3) STATE STANDARD TRANSPORTATION PRACTICES.-
"(A) CONTINUATION.-[The preemption rule] shall not affect any
authority of a State, political subdivision of a State, or
political authority of;12 or more States to
444
SCALIA, J., dissenting
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision, with
respect to the intrastate transportation of property by motor
carriers, related to-linter alia] uniform cargo liability
rules, ... if such law, regulation, or provision meets the
requirements of subparagraph (B)." §§ 14501(c)(2), (3) (emphases
added).
It is impossible to read this text without being struck by the
fact that the term "political subdivision of a State" is
added to the term "State" in some of the exceptions, §§
14501(c)(2)(C), (c)(3), but
not in the exception at issue
here, § 14501(c)(2)(A). "'[W]here Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.'"
Russello v.
United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983).
The only way to impart some purpose and intent here is to assume
that the word "State" is used in its narrower sense, so that
political subdivisions are not covered by the term. The Court
admits that the rule applied in
Russello "support[s] an
argument of some force,"
ante, at 434, that the exception
for the "safety regulatory authority of a State" does not include
local safety regulation.
But while the
Russello argument is strong, it alone does
not fully describe the
clarity with which § 14501(c)(2)(A)
excludes political subdivisions. For the clarity begins not just
with the various exceptions, but with the very preemption rule to
which the exceptions are appended. That rule reads:
"Except as provided [in §§ 14501(c)(2), (3)], a State, political
subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States
may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision
having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or
service of any motor carrier ... or any motor private carrier,
broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of
property." 49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(1).
445
Since the lawmaking power of a political subdivision of a State
is a subset of the lawmaking power of the State,
Hess v.
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U. S. 30, 47 (1994);
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U. S. 597, 607-608
(1991), the preemption rule would have precisely the same scope if
it omitted the reference to "political subdivision of a State." It
is a well-established principle of statutory construction (and of
common sense) that when such a situation occurs, when "two words or
expressions are coupled together, one of which generically includes
the other, it is obvious that the more general term is used in a
meaning excluding the specific one." J. Sutherland, Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 266, p. 349 (1891). The only conceivable
reason for this specification of "political subdivision" apart from
"State" is
to establish, in the rule, the two
separate
categories of state power-state power exercised through
political subdivisions and state power exercised by the State
directly-that are later treated differently in the exceptions to
the rule.
The situation is comparable to the following hypothetical using
the term "football" (which may be used to include soccer, see
Webster's New International Dictionary 983 (2d ed. 1950)): Assume a
statute which says that "football and soccer shall not be played on
the town green" (§ 14501(c)(1)), except that "football and soccer
may be played on Saturdays" (§ 14501(c)(2)(C)), "football and
soccer may be played on summer nights" (§ 14501(c)(3)(A)), and
"football may be played on Mondays" (§ 14501(c)(2)(A)). In to day's
opinion, the Court says soccer may be played on Mondays. I think it
clear that soccer is not to be regarded as a subset of football but
as a separate category. And the same is true of "political
subdivision" here.
II
The Court reaches the opposite conclusion merely because §
14501(c) exhibits uneven drafting. First, the Court notes that §
14501(c)(2)(A) does not "trac[k] the language and
446
SCALIA, J., dissenting
structure of the general preemption rule."
Ante, at 434.
Whereas other exceptions to the rule refer to the authority of a
State or other political entity "to enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision," § 14501(c)(2)(A) merely refers to
the "safety regulatory authority of a State." Second, the Court
notes that another exception to the preemption rule, §
14501(c)(2)(B), is "stated with similar economy."
Ante, at
435. It addresses merely the
subject of regulation
(transportation of household goods) instead of both the subject and
the
source of regulation (a State, political subdivision, or
political authority of two or more States). This has, the Court
notes, the same effect as its neighbor, § 14501(c)(2)(C), of
permitting both state and local regulation.1
Ibid. These
inconsistencies in the statute's drafting style, the Court
contends, undermine the conclusion we would ordinarily draw from
the absence of the term" 'political subdivision'" in §
14501(c)(2)(A).
Ibid.
The weakness of this argument should be self-evident.
How can inconsistencies of style,
on points that have nothing
to do with the issue of separating state and local authority,
cause the text's crystal-clear distinction between state and local
authority to disappear? It would certainly reflect more orderly
draftsmanship if the statute consistently used the formulation "to
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision," rather
than replacing it in § 14501(c)(2)(A) with the equivalent phrase
"regulatory authority of a State"; and if the statute referred to
subject matter alone (a la § 14501(c)(2)(B)) either never at all,
or else
whenever the exception applied to all three
categories of States, subdivisions of States, and political
authorities of two or more States.
1 Not only is this point (as the text proceeds to discuss)
irrelevant in principle; it is misleading in its description of
fact, suggesting that the two neighboring sections produce the same
result with different language. It is true enough that §
14501(c)(2)(C), like § 14501(c)(2)(B), permits both state and local
regulation. But § 14501(c)(2)(C),
unlike § 14501(c)(2)(B),
also permits regulation by a "political authority of 2 or more
States."
447
But it is impossible to imagine how this imperfect draftsmanship
in unrelated matters casts any doubt upon the precise meaning of
the subject-matter-plus-source provisions where they appear. Unless
the Court is appealing to some hitherto unknown canon of
interpretation-perhaps (borrowed from the law of evidence)
negligens in uno, negligens in omnibus-the diverse styles of
§ 14501(c)'s exceptions have nothing to do with whether we should
take seriously the references to States and subdivisions of States
where they appear.
What is truly anomalous here is not the fact that the
terminology of § 14501(c) is diverse with regard to presently
irrelevant matters, but the fact that the Court has today come up
with a judicial interpretation of § 14501(c) that renders the term
"political subdivision of a State," which appears throughout,
utterly superfluous throughout. Although the Court claims
that the
"Russello presumption ... grows weaker with each
difference in the formulation of the provisions under inspection,"
ante, at 435-436, it cites no authority for that
proposition-nor could it, because we have routinely applied the
Russello presumption in cases where a statute employs
different "verbal formulation[sJ" in sections that include
particular language and in sections that omit such language. See,
e. g., Barnhart v.
Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438,
452-454 (2002);
Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 173-174
(2001);
Hohn v.
United States, 524 U. S. 236, 249-250
(1998); United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997).
III
Lacking support in the text of the statute, the Court invokes
federalism concerns to justify its decision. "Absent a basis more
reliable than statutory language insufficient to demonstrate a
'clear and manifest purpose' to the contrary," the Court reasons,
"federal courts should resist attribution to Congress of a design
to disturb a State's decision on the division of authority between
the State's central and local
448
SCALIA, J., dissenting
units over safety on municipal streets and roads."
Ante,
at 439-440. Well of course we think there is "clear and manifest
purpose here"; but besides that, the Court's federalism concerns
are overblown. To begin with, it should not be thought that the
States' power to control the relationship between themselves and
their political subdivisions-their "traditional prerogative ... to
delegate" (or to refuse to delegate) "their authority to their
constituent parts,"
ante, at 429-has hitherto been regarded
as sacrosanct. To the contrary. To take only a few examples,2 the
Federal Government routinely gives directly to municipalities
substantial grants of funds that cannot be reached or directed by
"the politicians upstate" (or "downstate"), see,
e.
g., Office of Management and Budget, 2001 Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance AEI-1 to AEI-29;
Lawrence County v.
LeadDeadwood School Dist. No . .1,0-1,
469 U. S. 256, 270
(1985); and many significant federal programs require laws or
regulations that must be adopted by the state government and cannot
be delegated to political subdivisions, see,
e. g.,
42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a) (Medicaid); 23 U. S. C. §§ 153, 158
(Federal-Aid Highway System); 42 U. S. C. §§ 7407(a), 7410 (1994
ed.) (Clean Air Act).3 This "interference" of the Fed-
2 The Court thinks these examples are "hardly comparable" to §
14501(c) because many involve Spending Clause legislation.
Ante, at 438. A sufficient answer is that one of them does
not, see 42 U. S. C. § 7410 (1994 ed.) (Clean Air Act), and that
other examples not involving Spending Clause legislation could be
added, see,
e. g., 33 U. S. C. §§ 1313(d), 1362(3)
(Clean Water Act). But in any event, a siphoning off of the States'
"historic powers" to delegate has equally been achieved, whether it
has come about through the coercion of deprivation of Spending
Clause funds or through other means. The point is that it is not
unusual for Congress to interfere in this matter.
3 The Court thinks the Clean Air Act is a bad example merely
because a State can rely on political subdivisions to
enforce the State's implementation plan.
Ante, at
439, n. 4; see 42 U. S. C. §§ 7407(a), 741O(a)(2)(E)(iii). So what?
Only
States may adopt implementation plans; this duty cannot
be delegated to localities. Moreover, as I explain in
449
eral Government with the States' "traditional prerogative ... to
delegate their authority to their constituent parts" has long been
a subject of considerable debate and controversy. See,
e.
g., Hills, Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to
Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97
Mich. L. Rev. 1201 (1999).
With such major impositions as these already on the books,
treating § 14501(c)(1) as some extraordinary federal obstruction of
state allocation of power is absurd. That provision preempts the
authority of political subdivisions to regulate "a price, route, or
service of any motor carrier ... or any motor private carrier,
broker, or freight forwarder
with respect to the transportation
of property." (Emphasis added.) The italicized language
massively limits the scope of preemption to include only laws,
regulations, and other provisions that single out for special
treatment "motor carriers of property." § 14501(c). States
and
political subdivisions remain free to enact and enforce general
traffic safety laws, general restrictions on the weight of cars and
trucks that may enter highways or pass over bridges, and other
regulations that do not target motor carriers "with respect to the
transportation of property." In addition, the exception contained
in § 14501(c)(2)(A) allows a State-but not a political
subdivision-to apply special safety rules (rules adopted under its
"safety regulatory authority") to motor carriers of property.4
n. 4,
infra, the statute at issue here is no different.
Under 49 U. S. C. §§ 14501(c)(1) and (c)(2)(A), a State may enact
regulations pursuant to its "safety regulatory authority" and rely
on localities to
enforce those regulations.
4 This interpretation of the statutory scheme "introduces an
interpretive conundrum of another kind," the Court asserts, because
§ 14501(c)(1) declares that a political subdivision may not
"enact or enforce" laws, regulations, or other provisions
relating to motor carriers of property.
Ante, at 436. In the
Court's view, if the term "State" does not include "subdivision of
a State," § 14501(c)(1) will prevent a State from relying on
localities
450
SCALIA, J., dissenting
This relatively modest burden on the "historic powers of the
States" to delegate authority to political subdivisions,
Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461 (1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted), is unambiguously imposed by the
statute. The Court repeatedly emphasizes the fact that §
14501(c)(2)(A) declares that § 14501(c)(1) shall" 'not restrict'
the
existing 'safety regulatory authority of a State,'"
ante, at 438-which, it says, "includes the choice to
delegate ... to localities,"
ante, at 439. This entirely
begs the question, which is
precisely whether the statute's
reference to the authority of a "State" includes authority
possessed by a municipality on delegation from the State. As I have
described, the text and structure of the statute leave no doubt
that it does not-that "State" does not include "subdivision of a
State." Even when we are dealing with the traditional powers of the
States, "[e]vidence of pre-emptive purpose is sought in the
text
and structure of the statute at issue."
CSX Transp.,
Inc. v.
Easterwood, 507 U. S. 658, 664 (1993)
(emphasis added); see also
Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U. S.
218, 230 (1947).
to "enforce" rules adopted under its "safety regulations."
Ante, at 435436. But the conclusion that § 14501(c)(1)
prevents a political subdivision from enforcing regulations
enacted by the State can only be reached by ignoring (for
this issue) the rule that the Court is so insistent upon elsewhere:
that federal interference with the "historic powers of the States"
must be evinced by a "plain statement,"
Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501
U. S. 452, 461 (1991). A natural reading of the phrase "a ...
political subdivision of a State ... may not enact or enforce a
law" -and a reading faithful to
Gregory's plain statement
rule-is that a political subdivision may not enact new laws or
enforce
its previously enacted laws. The Court believes this
reading "raises the startling possibility,"
ante, at 436, n.
3, that § 14501(c)(1) prevents States but not political
subdivisions from enforcing
previously enacted state
regulations relating to motor carriage of property. I think
not. A possibility so startling (and unlikely to occur) is well
enough precluded by the rule that a statute should not be
interpreted to produce absurd results. The municipalities' reserved
power to enforce state law does not include the power to enforce
state law that the State has no continuing power to enact or
enforce.
451
***
I believe the text and structure of § 14501(c) show plainly that
"the safety regulatory authority of a State" does not encompass the
authority of a political subdivision. For this reason, I
respectfully dissent.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment