OCTOBER TERM, 1991
Syllabus
COLLINS
v. CITY OF HARKER HEIGHTS, TEXAS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT
No. 90-1279. Argued November 5, 1991-Decided February
26,1992
Larry Collins, an employee in respondent city's sanitation
department, died of asphyxia after entering a manhole to unstop a
sewer line. Petitioner, his widow, brought this action under 42 U.
S. C. § 1983, alleging,
inter alia, that Collins had a right
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "to be
free from unreasonable risks of harm ... and ... to be protected
from the [city's] custom and policy of deliberate indifference
toward [its employees'] safety"; that the city had violated that
right by following a custom and policy of not training its
employees about the dangers of working in sewers and not providing
safety equipment and warnings; and that the city had systematically
and intentionally failed to provide the equipment and training
required by a Texas statute. The District Court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that it did not allege a constitutional
violation. Without reaching the question whether the city had
violated Collins' constitutional rights, the Court of Appeals
affirmed on the theory that there had been no "abuse of
governmental power," which the court found to be a necessary
element of a § 1983 action.
Held: Because a city's customary failure to train or warn
its employees about known hazards in the workplace does not violate
the Due Process Clause, § 1983 does not provide a remedy for a
municipal employee who is fatally injured in the course of his
employment as a result of the city's failure. Pp. 119-130.
(a) This Court's cases do not support the Court of Appeals'
reading of § 1983 as requiring an abuse of governmental power
separate and apart from the proof of a constitutional violation.
Contrary to that court's analysis, neither the fact that Collins
was a government employee nor the characterization of the city's
deliberate indifference to his safety as something other than an
"abuse of governmental power" is a sufficient reason for refusing
to entertain petitioner's federal claim under § 1983. Proper
analysis requires that two issues be separated when a § 1983 claim
is asserted against a municipality: (1) whether plaintiff's harm
was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether
the city is responsible for that violation. Pp. 119-120.
(b) It is assumed for the purpose of decision that the
complaint's use of the term "deliberate indifference" to
characterize the city's failure to
116
Syllabus
train its sanitation department employees is sufficient to hold
the city responsible if the complaint has also alleged a
constitutional violation. See
Canton v.
Harris,
489 U. S. 378.
Pp. 120-124.
(c) The complaint has not alleged a constitutional violation.
Neither the Due Process Clause's text-which,
inter alia,
guarantees due process in connection with any deprivation of
liberty by a State-nor its history supports petitioner's
unprecedented claim that the Clause imposes an independent
substantive duty upon municipalities to provide certain minimal
levels of safety and security in the workplace. Although the
"process" that the Clause guarantees includes a continuing
obligation to satisfy certain minimal custodial standards for those
who have already been deprived of their liberty, petitioner cannot
maintain that the city deprived Collins of his liberty when it
made, and he voluntarily accepted, an employment offer. Also
unpersuasive is petitioner's claim that the city's alleged failure
to train its employees, or to warn them about known risks of harm,
was an omission that can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or
conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense. Petitioner's claim
is analogous to a fairly typical tort claim under state law, which
is not supplanted by the Due Process Clause, see,
e. g.,
Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 332-333,
particularly in the area of public employment, see,
e. g.,
Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 350. In
light of the presumption that the administration of government
programs is based on a rational decisionmaking process that takes
account of competing forces, decisions concerning the allocation of
resources to individual programs, such as sewer maintenance, and to
particular aspects of those programs, such as employee training,
involve a host of policy choices that must be made by locally
elected representatives, rather than by federal judges interpreting
the country's basic charter of Government. For the same reasons,
petitioner's suggestion that the Texas Hazard Communication Act
supports her substantive due process claim is rejected. pp.
125-130.
916 F.2d
284, affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Sanford Jay Rosen argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were
Don Busby and
Andrea
G.
Asaro.
117
Lucas A. Powe, Jr., argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were
Roy L. Barrett and
Stuart Smith. *
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, provides a remedy for
a municipal employee who is fatally injured in the course of his
employment because the city customarily failed to train or warn its
employees about known hazards in the workplace. Even though the
city's conduct may be actionable under state law, we hold that §
1983 does not apply because such conduct does not violate the Due
Process Clause.
On October 21, 1988, Larry Michael Collins, an employee in the
sanitation department of the city of Harker Heights, Texas, died of
asphyxia after entering a manhole to unstop a sewer line.
Petitioner, his widow, brought this action alleging that Collins
"had a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable risks of
harm to his body, mind and emotions and a constitutional right to
be protected from the City of Harker Heights' custom and policy of
deliberate indifference toward the safety of its employees." App.
7. Her complaint alleged that the city violated that right by
following a custom and policy of not training its employees about
the dangers of working in sewer lines and manholes, not providing
safety equipment at jobsites, and not providing safety warnings.
The complaint also alleged that a prior incident
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by
Edward
Tuddenham, J. Patrick Wiseman, Steven R. Shapiro,
John A. Powell, and
Helen Hershkoff; for the Association
of Trial Lawyers of America by
Jeffrey L. Needle; and for
the National Education Association by
Robert H. Chanin and
Jeremiah A. Collins.
Richard Ruda, Carter G.
Phillips, and
Mark D.
Hopson filed a brief for the National League of Cities et al.
as
amici curiae urging affirmance.
118
had given the city notice of the risks of entering the sewer
lines 1 and that the city had systematically and intentionally
failed to provide the equipment and training required by a Texas
statute.
Ibid. The District Court dismissed the complaint on
the ground that a constitutional violation had not been alleged.
No. W-89-CA-168 (WD Tex., Oct. 30, 1988), App. 20. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed on a different theory.
916 F.2d
284 (1990). It did not reach the question whether the city had
violated Collins' constitutional rights because it denied recovery
on the ground that there had been no "abuse of governmental power,"
which the Fifth Circuit had found to be a necessary element of a §
1983 action.2
Id., at 287-288, and n. 3.
1 In particular, the complaint alleged that "[p]rior to October,
1988, the City of Harker Heights was on notice of the dangers to
which the employees were exposed because Larry Michael Collins'
supervisor had been rendered unconscious in a manhole several
months prior to October, 1988, in fact, several months before Larry
Michael Collins began work at the City of Harker Heights."
App.7.
2 The Court of Appeals explained:
"The question presented in this case is whether a plaintiff
seeking recovery under § 1983 for injury to a governmental employee
must demonstrate,
inter alia, that the conduct in issue was
an abuse of
governmental power. More particularly, does
alleged wrongful conduct by government-in its capacity as employer
rather than as a governing authoritythat deprives its employee of
an alleged constitutional right give rise to a § 1983 action? We
base our holding on the abuse of government power standard,
separate from the constitutional deprivation element or standard.
The district court appears to have merged those two standards,
which are among those necessary for bringing § 1983 into play here.
In reviewing this Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we will keep them
separate.
"In this Circuit, there is a separate standard that must also be
satisfiedan abuse of government power. While this element is in
many ways similar to, and often blends with, other necessary
elements for a § 1983 action, such as deprivation of a
constitutional right, and springs from the same sources as the
deprivation element, it is separate nonetheless." 916 F. 2d, at
286-287.
119
The contrary decision in
Ruge v.
Bellevue,
892 F.2d
738 (CA8 1989), together with our concern about the Court of
Appeals' interpretation of the statute, prompted our grant of
certiorari, 499 U. S. 958 (1991).
I
Our cases do not support the Court of Appeals' reading of § 1983
as requiring proof of an abuse of governmental power separate and
apart from the proof of a constitutional violation. Although the
statute provides the citizen with an effective remedy against those
abuses of state power that violate federal law, it does not provide
a remedy for abuses that do not violate federal law, see,
e. g.,
Martinez v.
California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980);
DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dept. of Social
Services, 489 U.
S. 189 (1989). More importantly, the statute does not draw any
distinction between abusive and nonabusive federal violations.
The Court of Appeals' analysis rests largely on the fact that
the city had, through allegedly tortious conduct, harmed one of its
employees rather than an ordinary citizen over whom it exercised
governmental power. The employment relationship, however, is not of
controlling significance. On the one hand, if the city had pursued
a policy of equally deliberate indifference to the safety of
pedestrians that resulted in a fatal injury to one who
inadvertently stepped into an open manhole, the Court of Appeals'
holding would not speak to this situation at all, although it would
seem that a claim by such a pedestrian should be analyzed in a
similar manner as the claim by this petitioner. On the other hand,
a logical application of the holding might also bar potentially
meritorious claims by employees if, for example, the city had given
an employee a particularly dangerous assignment in retaliation for
a political speech, cf.
St. Louis v.
Praprotnik,
485 U. S. 112
(1988), or because of his or her gender, cf.
Monell v.
New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). The
First Amendment, the Equal Protection and
120
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other
provisions of the Federal Constitution afford protection to
employees who serve the government as well as to those who are
served by them, and § 1983 provides a cause of action for all
citizens injured by an abridgment of those protections. N either
the fact that petitioner's decedent was a government employee nor
the characterization of the city's deliberate indifference to his
safety as something other than an "abuse of governmental power" is
a sufficient reason for refusing to entertain petitioner's federal
claim under § 1983.
Nevertheless, proper analysis requires us to separate two
different issues when a § 1983 claim is asserted against a
municipality: (1) whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a
constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is
responsible for that violation. See
Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 471 U.
S. 808, 817 (1985) (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.);
id., at
828-829 (opinion of Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment). Because most of our opinions discussing municipal
policy have involved the latter issue, it is appropriate to discuss
it before considering the question whether petitioner's complaint
has alleged a constitutional violation.
II
Section 1983 provides a remedy against "any person" who, under
color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the
Constitution.3 In
Monell, the Court held that Congress
intended municipalities and other local government entities to be
included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies. 436 U. S., at
690. At the same time, the Court
3 The section states, in relevant part:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress .... " 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
121
made it clear that municipalities may not be held liable "unless
action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused
a constitutional tort."
Id., at 691.4 The Court emphasized
that
"a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it
employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be
held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.
"[T]herefore, ... a local government may not be sued under §
1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.
Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury
that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983."
Id., at 691, 694 (emphasis in original).
In a series of later cases, the Court has considered whether an
alleged injury caused by municipal employees acting under color of
state law provided a proper basis for imposing liability on a city.
In each of those cases the Court assumed that a constitutional
violation had been adequately alleged or proved and focused its
attention on the separate issue of municipal liability. Thus, for
example, in
Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, supra, it was
assumed that a police officer had violated the decedent's
constitutional rights, but we held that the wrongful conduct of a
single officer without any policymaking authority did not establish
municipal policy. And in
St. Louis v.
Praprotnik,
485 U. S. 112
(1988), without reach-
4Petitioners in
Monell, a class of female employees of
the New York City Department of Social Services and Board of
Education, alleged that the board and department violated their due
process rights by implementing an official policy that compelled
pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absences before such
leaves were required for medical reasons. 436 U. S., at
660-661.
122
ing the question whether the adverse employment action taken
against the plaintiff violated his First Amendment rights, the
Court concluded that decisions by subordinate employees did not
necessarily reflect official policy. On the other hand, in
Pembaur v.
Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469 (1986), the
Court held that a county was responsible for unconstitutional
actions taken pursuant to decisions made by the county prosecutor
and the county sheriff because they were the "officials responsible
for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in
question,"
id., at 483-484.
Our purpose in citing these cases is to emphasize the separate
character of the inquiry into the question of municipal
responsibility and the question whether a constitutional violation
occurred. It was necessary to analyze whether execution of a
municipal policy inflicted the injury in these cases because,
unlike ordinary tort litigation, the doctrine of
respondeat
superior was inapplicable. The city is not vicariously liable under
§ 1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only
liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the
wrongdoer. Because petitioner in this case relies so heavily on our
reasoning in
Canton v.
Harris, 489 U. S. 378
(1989)-and in doing so, seems to assume that the case dealt with
the constitutional issue-it is appropriate to comment specifically
on that case.
In
Canton we held that a municipality can, in some
circumstances, be held liable under § 1983 "for constitutional
violations resulting from its failure to train municipal
employees."
Id., at 380. Among the claims advanced by the
plaintiff in that case was a violation of the "right, under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to receive necessary
medical attention while in police custody."
Id., at 381.5
Because we assumed,
arguendo, that the plain-
5 "At the close of the evidence, the District Court submitted
the case to the jury, which rejected all of Mrs. Harris' claims
except one: her § 1983 claim against the city resulting from its
failure to provide her with medi-
123
tiff's constitutional right to receive medical care had been
denied,
id., at 388-389, n. 8, our opinion addressed only
the question whether the constitutional deprivation was
attributable to a municipal policy or custom.
We began our analysis by plainly indicating that we were
not deciding the constitutional issue.
"In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Services, 436 U.
S. 658 (1978), we decided that a municipality can be found
liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself
causes the constitutional violation at issue. Respondeat
superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983.
Id., at 694-695. 'It is only when the "execution of the
government's policy or custom ... inflicts the injury" that the
municipality may be held liable under § 1983.' Springfield
v. Kibbe, 480
U. S. 257, 267 (1987) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) (quoting
Monell, supra, at 694).
"Thus, our first inquiry in any case alleging municipal
liability under § 1983 is the question whether there is a direct
causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged
constitutional deprivation." Id., at 385.
We did not suggest that all harm-causing municipal policies are
actionable under § 1983 or that all such policies are
unconstitutional. Moreover, we rejected the city's argument that
only unconstitutional policies can create municipalliability under
the statute.
Id., at 387. Instead, we concluded that if a
city employee violates another's constitutional rights, the city
may be liable if it had a policy or custom of failing to train its
employees and that failure to train caused the constitutional
violation. In particular, we held that the inadequate training of
police officers could be characterized as the cause of the
constitutional tort if-and only if-the
cal treatment while in custody." Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S., at
382 (emphasis added).
124
failure to train amounted to "deliberate indifference" to the
rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.
Id., at 388.6
Although the term "deliberate indifference" has been used in
other contexts to define the threshold for finding a violation of
the Eighth Amendment, see
Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976),
as we have explained, that term was used in the
Canton case
for the quite different purpose of identifying the threshold for
holding a city responsible for the constitutional torts committed
by its inadequately trained agents.7 In this case, petitioner has
used that term to characterize the city's failure to train the
employees in its sanitation department. We assume for the purpose
of decision that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to
provide a substitute for the doctrine of
respondeat superior
as a basis for imposing liability on the city for the tortious
conduct of its agents, but that assumption does not confront the
question whether the complaint has alleged a constitutional
violation. To that question we now turn.
6We added:
"Only where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a
relevant respect evidences a 'deliberate indifference' to the
rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly
thought of as a city 'policy or custom' that is actionable under §
1983.
"Consequently, while claims such as respondent's-alleging that
the city's failure to provide training to municipal employees
resulted in the constitutional deprivation she suffered-are
cognizable under § 1983, they can only yield liability against a
municipality where that city's failure to train reflects deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants."
Id., at 389, 392.
7 Indeed, we expressly stated: "The 'deliberate indifference'
standard we adopt for § 1983 'failure to train' claims does not
turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show
to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation."
Id., at 388, n. 8.
125
III
Petitioner's constitutional claim rests entirely on the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 The most familiar
office of that Clause is to provide a guarantee of fair procedure
in connection with any deprivation of life, liberty, or property by
a State. Petitioner, however, does not advance a procedural due
process claim in this case. Instead, she relies on the substantive
component of the Clause that protects individual liberty against
"certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them."
Daniels v.
Williams, 474
U. S. 327, 331 (1986).
As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to
expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts
for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce
and open-ended.
Regents of Univ. of Mich. v.
Ewing,
474 U. S. 214,
225-226 (1985). The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us
to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new
ground in this field. It is important, therefore, to focus on the
allegations in the complaint to determine how petitioner describes
the constitutional right at stake and what the city allegedly did
to deprive her husband of that right.
A fair reading of petitioner's complaint does not charge the
city with a willful violation of Collins' rights. Petitioner does
not claim that the city or any of its agents deliberately harmed
her husband. In fact, she does not even allege that his supervisor
instructed him to go into the sewer when the supervisor knew or
should have known that there was a significant risk that he would
be injured. Instead, she makes the more general allegation that the
city deprived him of
8 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process oflaw."
126
life and liberty by failing to provide a reasonably safe work
environment.9 Fairly analyzed, her claim advances two theories:
that the Federal Constitution imposes a duty on the city to provide
its employees with minimal levels of safety and security in the
workplace, or that the city's "deliberate indifference" to Collins'
safety was arbitrary government action that must "shock the
conscience" of federal judges. Cf.
Rochin v.
California, 342 U. S. 165, 172
(1952).
Neither the text nor the history of the Due Process Clause
supports petitioner's claim that the governmental employer's duty
to provide its employees with a safe working environment is a
substantive component of the Due Process Clause. "[T]he Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prevent
government 'from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an
instrument of oppression.'"
DeShaney v.
Winnebago County
Dept. of Social Services, 489 U. S., at 196 (quoting
Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U. S. 344, 348
(1986)). As we recognized in
DeShaney:
"The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to
act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and
security. It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of
life, liberty, or property without 'due process of law,' but its
language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative
obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come
to harm through other means. Nor does history support such
9 Petitioner alleges that her husband had "a constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable risks of harm to his body, mind
and emotions and a constitutional right to be protected from the
City of Harker Heights' custom and policy of deliberate
indifference toward the safety of its employees." App. 7. The
city's policy and custom of not training its employees and not
warning them of the danger allegedly caused Collins' death and thus
deprived him of those rights.
Id., at 8.
127
an expansive reading of the constitutional text." 489 U. S., at
195.10
Petitioner's submission that the city violated a federal
constitutional obligation to provide its employees with certain
minimal levels of safety and security is unprecedented. It is quite
different from the constitutional claim advanced by plaintiffs in
several of our prior cases who argued that the State owes a duty to
take care of those who have already been deprived of their liberty.
We have held, for example, that apart from the protection against
cruel and unusual punishment provided by the Eighth Amendment, cf.
Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), the
Due Process Clause of its own force requires that conditions of
confinement satisfy certain minimal standards for pretrial
detainees, see
Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 535, n.
16, 545 (1979), for persons in mental institutions,
Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 315316
(1982), for convicted felons,
Turner v.
Safley,
482 U. S. 78,
94-99 (1987), and for persons under arrest, see
Revere v.
Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U. S. 239, 244-245
(1983). The "process" that the Constitution guarantees in
10 "Historically, this guarantee of due process has been applied
to
deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a
person of life, liberty, or property.
E. g., Davidson v.
New Orleans, 96
U. S. 97 (1878) (assessment of real estate);
Rochin v.
California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952)
(stomach pumping);
Bell v.
Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971)
(suspension of driver's license);
Ingraham v.
Wright,
430 U. S. 651
(1977) (paddling student);
Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984)
(intentional destruction of inmate's property). No decision of this
Court before
Parratt [v.
Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981),]
supported the view that negligent conduct by a state official, even
though causing injury, constitutes a deprivation under the Due
Process Clause. This history reflects the traditional and
common-sense notion that the Due Process Clause, like its forebear
in the Magna Carta, see Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law
Before the Civil War, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 368 (1911), was
'intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of
the powers of government,'
Hurtado v.
California,
110 U. S. 516,
527 (1884)."
Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331
(1986).
128
connection with any deprivation of liberty thus includes a
continuing obligation to satisfy certain minimal custodial
standards. See
DeShaney, 489 U. S., at 200. Petitioner
cannot maintain, however, that the city deprived Collins of his
liberty when it made, and he voluntarily accepted, an offer of
employment.
We also are not persuaded that the city's alleged failure to
train its employees, or to warn them about known risks of harm, was
an omission that can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or
conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense. Petitioner's claim
is analogous to a fairly typical state-law tort claim: The city
breached its duty of care to her husband by failing to provide a
safe work environment. Because the Due Process Clause "does not
purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of
conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living
together in society,"
Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U. S.,
at 332, we have previously rejected claims that the Due Process
Clause should be interpreted to impose federal duties that are
analogous to those traditionally imposed by state tort law, see,
e. g., id., at 332-333;
Baker v.
McCollan, 443
U. S. 137, 146 (1979);
Paul v.
Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 701
(1976). The reasoning in those cases applies with special force to
claims asserted against public employers because state law, rather
than the Federal Constitution, generally governs the substance of
the employment relationship. See,
e. g., Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.
S. 341, 350
(1976); Board of Regents of State Colleges
v.
Roth, 408
U. S. 564, 577-578 (1972).
Our refusal to characterize the city's alleged omission in this
case as arbitrary in a constitutional sense rests on the
presumption that the administration of government programs is based
on a rational decisionmaking process that takes account of
competing social, political, and economic forces. Cf.
Walker
v.
Rowe, 791 F.2d
507, 510 (CA7 1986). Decisions concerning the allocation of
resources to individual programs, such as sewer maintenance, and to
particular as-
129
pects of those programs, such as the training and compensation
of employees, involve a host of policy choices that must be made by
locally elected representatives, rather than by federal judges
interpreting the basic charter of Government for the entire
country. The Due Process Clause "is not a guarantee against
incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions."
Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U. S., at 350. Nor does it guarantee municipal
employees a workplace that is free of unreasonable risks of
harm.
Finally, we reject petitioner's suggestion that the Texas Hazard
Communication Act 11 supports her substantive due process claim. We
assume that the Act imposed a duty on the city to warn its
sanitation employees about the dangers of noxious gases in the
sewers and to provide safety training and protective equipment to
minimize those dangers.12 We also assume, as petitioner argues,
that the Act created an entitlement that qualifies as a "liberty
interest" protected by the Due Process Clause. But even with these
assumptions, petitioner's claim must fail for she has not alleged
that the deprivation of this liberty interest was arbitrary in the
constitutional sense. Cf.
Harrah Independent School Dist.
v.
11 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 5182b (Vernon 1987). 12
Section lO(a) of the Act states, for example:
"Every employer shall provide, at least annually, an education
and training program for employees using or handling hazardous
chemicals .... Additional instruction shall be provided when the
potential for exposure to hazardous chemicals is altered or when
new and significant information is received by the employer
concerning the hazards of a chemical. New or newly assigned
employees shall be provided training before working with or in a
work area containing hazardous chemicals."
And § 15(a)states:
"Employees who may be exposed to hazardous chemicals shall be
informed of the exposure and shall have access to the workplace
chemical list and [material safety data sheets] for the hazardous
chemicals .... In addition, employees shall receive training on the
hazards of the chemicals and on measures they can take to protect
themselves from those hazards and shall be provided with
appropriate personal protective equipment. These rights are
guaranteed on the effective date of this Act."
130
Martin, 440
U. S. 194, 198-199 (1979). The reasons why the city's alleged
failure to train and warn did not constitute a constitutionally
arbitrary deprivation of Collins' life, see
supra, at
128-129, apply
afortiori to the less significant liberty
interest created by the Texas statute.
In sum, we conclude that the Due Process Clause does not impose
an independent federal obligation upon municipalities to provide
certain minimal levels of safety and security in the workplace and
the city's alleged failure to train or to warn its sanitation
department employees was not arbitrary in a constitutional sense.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
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