OCTOBER TERM, 1997
Syllabus
CITY OF CHICAGO ET AL.
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF
SURGEONS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
No. 96-910. Argued October 14, 1997-Decided December 15,1997
Following the preliminary determination of Chicago's Historical
and Architectural Landmarks Commission (Commission) that two of
respondent ICS' buildings qualified for protection under the city's
Landmarks Ordinance, the city enacted a Designation Ordinance
creating a landmark district that included the buildings. ICS then
applied to the Commission for permits to allow demolition of all
but the facades of the buildings. The Commission denied ICS' permit
applications. ICS then filed actions in state court under the
Illinois Administrative Review Law for judicial review of the
Commission's decisions, alleging, among other things, that the two
ordinances and the manner in which the Commission conducted its
proceedings violated the Federal and State Constitutions, and
seeking on-the-record review of the Commission's decisions.
Petitioners (collectively the City) removed the suits to Federal
District Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. The
District Court consolidated the cases, exercised supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims, and granted summary
judgment for the City, ruling that the ordinances and the
Commission's proceedings were consistent with the Federal and State
Constitutions and that the Commission's findings were supported by
the evidence and were not arbitrary and capricious. The Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded to state court, ruling that a federal
district court lacks jurisdiction of a case containing state law
claims for on-the-record review of local administrative action.
Held: A case containing claims that local administrative
action violates federal law, but also containing state law claims
for on-the-record review of the administrative findings, can be
removed to federal district court. Pp. 163-174.
(a) The District Court properly exercised federal question
jurisdiction over ICS' federal claims, and properly recognized that
it could thus also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over ICS'
state law claims. Defendants generally may remove "any civil action
brought in a State court of which the [federal] district courts ...
have original jurisdiction." 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a). The district
courts' original jurisdiction
157
encompasses cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States," § 1331, and an action satisfies
this requirement when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises
issues of federal law,
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.
S. 58, 63. lCS' state court complaints raised a number of such
issues in the form of various federal constitutional challenges to
the Landmarks and Designation Ordinances, and to the manner in
which the Commission conducted its proceedings. Once the case was
removed, lCS' state law claims were properly before the District
Court under the supplemental jurisdiction statute. That statute
provides, "in any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the[y] shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that ... form part of the same case or
controversy." § 1367(a). Here, lCS' state law claims are legal
"claims" in the sense that that term is generally used to denote a
judicially cognizable cause of action, and they and the federal
claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, see
Mine
Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725. Pp.
163-166.
(b) lCS' argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction
because its complaints contained state law claims requiring
deferential, on-therecord review of the Commission's decisions
stems from the erroneous premise that those claims must be "civil
actions" within the federal courts' "original jurisdiction" under §
1441(a) for removal purposes. Because this is a federal question
case, the District Court's original jurisdiction derives not from
lCS' state law claims, but from its federal claims, which satisfy §
1441(a)'s requirements. Having thus established federal
jurisdiction, the relevant inquiry respecting the accompanying
state claims is whether they fall within a district court's
supplemental jurisdiction, and that inquiry turns on whether they
satisfy § 1367(a)'s requirements. lCS' proposed approach would
effectively read the supplemental jurisdiction statute out of the
books: The whole point of supplemental jurisdiction is to allow the
district courts to exercise pendent jurisdiction over claims as to
which original jurisdiction is lacking. Pp. 166-168.
(c) This Court also disagrees with lCS' reasoning to the extent
lCS means to suggest that a claim involving deferential review of a
local administrative decision can never be "so related to claims
... within ... original jurisdiction that [it] formEs] part of the
same case or controversy" for purposes of supplemental jurisdiction
under § 1367(a). While Congress could establish an exception to
supplemental jurisdiction for such claims, the statute, as written,
bears no such construction, as it confers jurisdiction without
reference to the nature of review. Nor do
Chicago, R. I.
&
P. R. Co. v.
Stude, 346 U. S. 574, 581, and
Horton v.
158
158 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
Syllabus
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U. S. 348, 354-355,
require that an equivalent exception be read into the statute. To
the extent that these cases might be read to establish limits on
the scope of federal jurisdiction, they address only whether a
cause of action for judicial review of a state administrative
decision is within the district courts' original jurisdiction under
the diversity statute, § 1332, not whether it is a claim within the
district courts' pendent jurisdiction in federal question cases.
Even assuming,
arguendo, that the decisions are relevant to
the latter question, both indicate that federal jurisdiction
generally encompasses judicial review of state administrative
decisions. See
Stude, supra, at 578-579;
Horton,
supra, at 352. pp. 168-172.
(d) That § 1367(a) authorizes district courts to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for on-the-record
review of administrative decisions does not mean that the
jurisdiction
must be exercised in all cases. The district
courts can decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over such
claims in the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity. See
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484
U. S. 343, 357;
Gibbs, supra, at 726-727. The supplemental
jurisdiction statute enumerates situations in which district courts
can refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, § 1367(c), taking
into account such factors as the circumstances of the particular
case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the
governing state law, and the relationship between the state and
federal claims. District courts also may be obligated not to decide
state law claims (or to stay their adjudication) where one of the
abstention doctrines applies. See,
e. g., Quackenbush v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 716. Pp.
172-174.
(e) ICS' contentions that abstention principles required the
District Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,
and that the court should have done so under § 1367(c), are left
for the Seventh Circuit to address in the first instance. P.
174.
91 F.3d
981, reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and BREYER,
JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
STEVENS, J., joined,
post, p. 175.
Benna Ruth Solomon argued the cause for petitioners.
With her on the briefs were Lawrence Rosenthal and Anne Berleman
Kearney.
159
Richard J. Brennan argued the cause for
respondents.
With him on the brief were Kimball R. Anderson and Thomas C.
Cronin.
*
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The city of
Chicago, like municipalities throughout the country, has an
ordinance that provides for the designation and protection of
historical landmarks. Chicago Municipal Code, Art. XVII,
§§2-120-580 through 2-120-920 (1990). The city's Landmarks
Ordinance is administered by the Commission on Chicago Historical
and Architectural Landmarks (Chicago Landmarks Commission or
Commission). Pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Review Law,
Ill. Compo Stat., ch. 735, §§ 5/3-103,5/3-104 (Supp. 1997),
judicial review of final decisions of a municipal landmarks
commission lies in state circuit court. In this case, we are asked
to consider whether a lawsuit filed in the Circuit Court of Cook
County seeking judicial review of decisions of the Chicago
Landmarks Commission may be removed to federal district court,
where the case contains both federal constitutional and state
administrative challenges to the Commission's decisions.
I
Respondents International College of Surgeons and the United
States Section of the International College of Surgeons (jointly
ICS) own two properties on North Lake Shore Drive in the city of
Chicago. In July 1988, the Chicago Landmarks Commission made a
preliminary determination that seven buildings on Lake Shore Drive,
including two
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of Indiana by
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney
General, and
Geoffrey Slaughter and
Anthony Scott
Chinn, Deputy Attorneys General; for Defenders of Property
Rights by
Nancie G.
Marzulla; and for the National
Trust for Historic Preservation et al. by
Paul M. Smith,
Elizabeth S.
Merritt, Laura S.
Nelson, and
Edith M. Shine.
160
160 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
mansions on ICB' properties, qualified for designation as a
landmark district under the city's Landmarks Ordinance. In June
1989, the city council enacted an ordinance (the Designation
Ordinance) designating the landmark district.
In February 1989, after the Commission's preliminary
determination, ICB executed a contract for the sale and
redevelopment of its properties. The contract called for the
developer, whose interest has since been acquired by respondent
Robin Construction Company, to demolish all but the facades of the
two mansions and to construct a high-rise condominium tower. In
October 1990, ICB applied to the Landmarks Commission for the
necessary permits to allow demolition of a designated landmark. The
Commission denied the permit applications, finding that the
proposed demolition would "adversely affect and destroy significant
historical and architectural features of the [landmark] district."
App. 49. ICB then reapplied for the permits under a provision of
the Landmarks Ordinance allowing for exceptions in cases of
economic hardship. The Commission again denied the applications,
finding that ICB did not qualify for the hardship exception.
Following each of the Commission's decisions, ICB filed actions
for judicial review in the Circuit Court of Cook County pursuant to
the Illinois Administrative Review Law. Both of ICB' complaints
raised a number of federal constitutional claims, including that
the Landmarks and Designation Ordinances, both on their face and as
applied, violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and
effect a taking of property without just compensation under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the manner in which the
Commission conducted its administrative proceedings violated ICB'
rights to due process and equal protection. The complaints also
sought relief under the Illinois Constitution as well as
administrative review of the Commission's decisions denying the
permits.
161
The defendants (collectively City), who are petitioners in this
Court, removed both lawsuits to the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
The District Court consolidated the cases. After dismissing some of
the constitutional claims and exercising supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law claims, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of the City, ruling that the Landmarks and Designation
Ordinances and the Commission's proceedings were consistent with
the Federal and State Constitutions, and that the Commission's
findings were supported by the evidence in the record and were not
arbitrary and capricious.1
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and
remanded the case to state court, concluding that the District
Court was without jurisdiction.
91 F.3d
981 (1996). The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by
construing this Court's decisions in
Chicago, R. 1. &
P. R. Co. v.
Stude, 346 U. S. 574 (1954), and
Horton v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U. S. 348
(1961), which it read to suggest that "the character of the state
judicial action" is significant when assessing whether proceedings
to review state and local administrative decisions can be removed
to federal court. 91 F. 3d, at 988. The court reasoned that, while
Stude and
Horton establish that proceedings to
conduct
de novo review of state agency action are subject to
removal, the propriety of removing proceedings involving
deferential review is still an open question. Relying on decisions
from other Courts of Appeals that interpret the scope of a district
court's diversity jurisdiction, the court determined that
deferential review of state agency action was an appellate function
that was "inconsist-
1 The District Court also dismissed a third action filed by lCS,
which is not in issue here. That action sought review of lCS'
unsuccessful efforts to obtain approval for its proposed
development under the Lake Michigan and Chicago Lakefront
Protection Ordinance, Chicago Municipal Code, ch. 194B (1973),
which, in addition to the Designation Ordinance, restricts
modification of lCS' properties.
162
162 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
ent with the character of a court of original jurisdiction." 91
F. 3d, at 990 (citing
Fairfax County Redevelopment
& Housing Authority v.
W M. Schlosser Co.,
64 F.3d
155 (CA4 1995), and
Armistead v. C &
M Transport,
Inc., 49 F.3d
43 (CAl1995)). Accordingly, the court concluded, a proceeding
to review state administrative action under a deferential standard
is not a "civil action" within a district court's "original
jurisdiction" under the removal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a), and
so cannot be removed. 91 F. 3d, at 990.
The court then applied those principles to this case. The court
began by observing that, under the Illinois Administrative Review
Law, judicial review of local administrative decisions is
deferential and not
de novo, because the reviewing court
must accept the agency's findings of fact as presumptively correct
and cannot hear new evidence.
Id., at 991-992 (discussing
Ill. Compo Stat., ch. 735, § 5/3-110 (Supp. 1997)).2 Of the various
claims raised in 1CS' complaints, the court explained, the
as-applied constitutional challenges and the claims requesting
administrative review of the Commission's decisions are bound by
the administrative record, but the facial constitutional challenges
are independent of the record and so would be removable to federal
court if brought alone. The court then addressed whether, "when the
state action involves both claims that, if brought alone, would be
removable to federal court [and] issues that clearly are grounded
in the administrative record, removal of the entire state action to
the district court is possible." 91 F. 3d, at 993. The court ruled
that, because some of the claims involve deferen-
2 Section 5/3-110 provides: "Every action to review any final
administrative decision shall be heard and determined by the court
with all convenient speed. The hearing and determination shall
extend to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire
record before the court. No new or additional evidence in support
of or in opposition to any finding, order, determination or
decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court.
The findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on
questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and
correct."
163
tial review, "the case removed to the district court cannot be
termed a 'civil action ... of which the district courts ... have
original jurisdiction' within the meaning of" the removal statute.
Id., at 994 (quoting 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a)).
We granted certiorari to address whether a case containing
claims that local administrative action violates federal law, but
also containing state law claims for on-the-record review of the
administrative findings, is within the jurisdiction of federal
district courts. 520 U. S. 1164 (1997). Because neither the
jurisdictional statutes nor our prior decisions suggest that
federal jurisdiction is lacking in these circumstances, we now
reverse.
II A
We have reviewed on several occasions the circumstances in which
cases filed initially in state court may be removed to federal
court. See,
e. g., Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482
U. S. 386, 391-392 (1987);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.
S. 58, 63 (1987);
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463
U. S. 1, 7-12 (1983). As a general matter, defendants may remove to
the appropriate federal district court "any civil action brought in
a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction." 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a). The propriety
of removal thus depends on whether the case originally could have
been filed in federal court.
Caterpillar Inc., supra, at
392;
Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 8. The district courts
have original jurisdiction under the federal question statute over
cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." § 1331. "It is long settled law that a cause of
action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's
well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law."
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, at 63.
164
164 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
In this case, there can be no question that lCS' state court
complaints raised a number of issues of federal law in the form of
various federal constitutional challenges to the Landmarks and
Designation Ordinances, and to the manner in which the Commission
conducted the administrative proceedings. It is true, as lCS
asserts, that the federal constitutional claims were raised by way
of a cause of action created by state law, namely, the Illinois
Administrative Review Law. See
Howard v.
Lawton, 22
Ill. 2d 331, 333, 175 N. E. 2d 556, 557 (1961) (constitutional
claims may be raised in a complaint for administrative review). As
we have explained, however, "[e]ven though state law creates [a
party's] causes of action, its case might still 'arise under' the
laws of the United States if a well-pleaded complaint established
that its right to relief under state law requires resolution of a
substantial question of federal law."
Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U. S., at 13; see also
id., at 27-28 (case arises under
federallaw when "federal law creates the cause of action or ... the
plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal law");
Gully v.
First
Nat. Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 112 (1936)
(federal question exists when a "right or immunity created by the
Constitution or laws of the United States [is] an element, and an
essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action"). lCS' federal
constitutional claims, which turn exclusively on federal law,
unquestionably fit within this rule. Accordingly, lCS errs in
relying on the established principle that a plaintiff, as master of
the complaint, can "choose to have the cause heard in state court."
Caterpillar Inc., 482 U. S., at 398399. By raising several
claims that arise under federal law, lCS subjected itself to the
possibility that the City would remove the case to the federal
courts. See
ibid.
As for lCS' accompanying state law claims, this Court has long
adhered to principles of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction by
which the federal courts' original jurisdiction over federal
questions carries with it jurisdiction over state law
165
claims that "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,"
such that "the relationship between [the federal] claim and the
state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before
the court comprises but one constitutional 'case.'"
Mine
Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725
(1966); see
Hurn v.
Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933);
Siler v.
Louisville &
Nashville R. Co.,
213 U. S. 175
(1909). Congress has codified those principles in the supplemental
jurisdiction statute, which combines the doctrines of pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction under a common heading. 28 U. S. C. § 1367.
The statute provides, "in any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related
to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution." § 1367(a). That provision applies with
equal force to cases removed to federal court as to cases initially
filed there; a removed case is necessarily one "of which the
district courts ... have original jurisdiction." See § 1441(a);
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 350-351
(1988) (discussing pendent claims removed to federal court).
Here, once the case was removed, the District Court had original
jurisdiction over ICS' claims arising under federal law, and thus
could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the accompanying
state law claims so long as those claims constitute "other claims
that ... form part of the same case or controversy." § 1367(a). We
think it clear that they do. The claims for review of the
Commission's decisions are legal "claims," in the sense that that
term is generally used in this context to denote a judicially
cognizable cause of action. And the state and federal claims
"derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,"
Gibbs,
supra, at 725, namely, ICS' unsuccessful efforts to obtain
demolition permits from the Chicago Landmarks Commission. That is
all the statute requires to establish supplemental jurisdiction
(barring an
166
166 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
express statutory exception, see § 1367(a)). 1CS seemed to
recognize as much in the amended complaint it filed in the District
Court following removal, stating that the nonfederal claims "are
subject to this Court's pendent jurisdiction." App. 143. We
conclude, in short, that the District Court properly exercised
federal question jurisdiction over the federal claims in 1CS'
complaints, and properly recognized that it could thus also
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 1CS' state law claims.
B
1CS, urging us to adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals,
argues that the District Court was without jurisdiction over its
actions because they contain state law claims that require
on-the-record review of the Landmarks Commission's decisions. A
claim that calls for deferential judicial review of a state
administrative determination, 1CS asserts, does not constitute a
"civil action ... of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction" under 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a).
That reasoning starts with an erroneous premise. Because this is
a federal question case, the relevant inquiry is not, as 1CS
submits, whether its state claims for on-therecord review of the
Commission's decisions are "civil actions" within the "original
jurisdiction" of a district court:
The District Court's original jurisdiction derives from 1CS'
federal claims, not its state law claims. Those federal claims
suffice to make the actions "civil actions" within the "original
jurisdiction" of the district courts for purposes of removal. §
1441(a). The Court of Appeals, in fact, acknowledged that 1CS'
federal claims, "if brought alone, would be removable to federal
court." 91 F. 3d, at 993. Nothing in the jurisdictional statutes
suggests that the presence of related state law claims somehow
alters the fact that 1CS' complaints, by virtue of their federal
claims, were "civil actions" within the federal courts' "original
jurisdiction."
167
Having thus established federal jurisdiction, the relevant
inquiry respecting the accompanying state claims is whether they
fall within a district court's supplemental jurisdiction, not its
original jurisdiction. And that inquiry turns, as we have
discussed, on whether the state law claims "are so related to [the
federal] claims ... that they form part of the same case or
controversy." § 1367(a); see
Gibbs, supra, at 725, n. 12
(distinguishing between "the issue whether a claim for relief
qualifies as a case 'arising under ... the Laws of the United
States' and the issue whether federal and state claims constitute
one 'case' for pendent jurisdiction purposes"). IGS' proposed
approach-that we first determine whether its state claims
constitute "civil actions" within a district court's "original
jurisdiction"-would effectively read the supplemental jurisdiction
statute out of the books:
The whole point of supplemental jurisdiction is to allow the
district courts to exercise pendent jurisdiction over claims as to
which original jurisdiction is lacking.
The dissent attributes a different line of argument to IGS.
Post, at 186-187. That argument, roughly speaking, is
that federal jurisdiction would lie over IGS' federal claims if
they had been brought under 42 U. S. G. § 1983, because review
would then range beyond the administrative record; but IGS
deliberately confined review of its claims to the administrative
record by raising them under the Illinois Administrative Review
Law, thereby assuring itself a state forum. See Brief for
Respondents 21-26. The essential premise of IGS' argument is that
its actions arise solely under state law and so are not within the
district courts' federal question jurisdiction, and that §
1367(a)-which presupposes a "civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction"-is thus inapplicable.
Id., at 15-21.
That reasoning is incorrect because IGS in fact raised claims
not bound by the administrative record (its facial constitutional
claims), see
supra, at 162, and because, as we have
explained, see
supra, at 164, the facial and as-applied
federal
168
168 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
constitutional claims raised by 1CS "arise under" federal law
for purposes of federal question jurisdiction. See
New Orleans
Public Service, Inc. v.
Council of City of New Orleans,
491 U. S. 350,
372 (1989) ("[A] facial challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional
... zoning ordinance" is a claim "which we would assuredly not
require to be brought in state courts"). 1CS submits, however, that
although its complaints contain
some claims that arise under
federal law, its actions nonetheless do not fall within the
district courts' original jurisdiction over federal questions.
Brief for Respondents 20-21, 26. Understandably, 1CS does not rest
this proposition on the notion that its federal claims are so
insubstantial as not to establish federal jurisdiction. See,
e.
g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.
Thompson,
478 U. S. 804,
817 (1986);
Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 70-71
(1978);
Gibbs, 383 U. S., at 725. It follows, then, that
1CS' view that the district courts lack jurisdiction even over the
federal claims in its actions stems from the mistaken
idea-embraced by the court below, see 91 F. 3d, at 993-994, and n.
14-that the other, nonfederal claims somehow take the complaints in
their entirety (including the federal claims) out of the federal
courts' jurisdiction. 1CS' rationale thus ultimately devolves into
the erroneous argument we ascribe to it: that its state law claims
for onthe-record review of the Commission's decisions must be
"civil actions" within the district courts' "original jurisdiction"
in order for its complaints to be removable to federal court.
C
To the extent that 1CS means to suggest not only that a claim
involving deferential review of a local administrative decision is
not a "civil action" in the "original jurisdiction" of the district
courts, but also that such a claim can never constitute a claim "so
related to claims ... within such original jurisdiction that [it]
formes] part of the same case or controversy" for purposes of
supplemental jurisdiction, we dis-
169
agree with its reasoning. There is nothing in the text of §
1367(a) that indicates an exception to supplemental jurisdiction
for claims that require on-the-record review of a state or local
administrative determination. Instead, the statute generally
confers supplemental jurisdiction over "all other claims" in the
same case or controversy as a federal question, without reference
to the nature of review. Congress could of course establish an
exception to supplemental jurisdiction for claims requiring
deferential review of state administrative decisions, but the
statute, as written, bears no such construction.
Nor do our decisions in
Chicago, R. 1. &
P. R.
Co. v.
Stude, 346 U. S. 574 (1954), and
Horton v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U. S. 348
(1961), on which ICS principally relies, require that we read an
equivalent exception into the statute. Both
Stude and
Horton-to the extent that either might be read to establish
limits on the scope of federal jurisdiction-address only whether a
cause of action for judicial review of a state administrative
decision is within the district courts' original jurisdiction under
the diversity statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1332, not whether it is a
claim within the district courts' pendent jurisdiction in federal
question cases. Even assuming,
arguendo, that the decisions
are relevant to the latter question, both
Stude and
Horton indicate that federal jurisdiction generally
encompasses judicial review of state administrative decisions.
In
Stude, for instance, a railroad company challenging
the amount of a condemnation assessment attempted to establish
federal jurisdiction by two separate routes. First, the railroad
filed a complaint seeking review of the amount of the assessment in
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, and second,
it filed an appeal from the assessment in state court and then
undertook to remove that case to federal court. As to the action
filed directly in federal court, this Court upheld its dismissal,
finding that state eminent domain proceedings were still pending
and that the com-
170
170 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
plaint thus improperly attempted to "separate the question of
damages and try it apart from the substantive right from which the
claim for damages arose." 346 U. S., at 582. 1CS emphasizes the
Court's observation in this interlocutory context that a district
court "does not sit to review on appeal action taken
administratively or judicially in a state proceeding."
Id.,
at 581. By that remark, however, the Court did not suggest that
jurisdiction turned on whether judicial review of the
administrative determination was deferential or
de novo. The
decision, in fact, makes no reference to the standard of
review.
Moreover, reading the Court's statement broadly to suggest that
federal courts can never review local administrative decisions
would conflict with the Court's treatment of the second action in
the case: the railroad's attempt to remove its state court appeal
to federal court. With respect to that action, the Court held that
removal was improper in the particular circumstances because the
railroad was the plaintiff in state court. But the Court observed
that, as a general matter, a state court action for judicial review
of an administrative condemnation proceeding is "in its nature a
civil action and subject to removal by the defendant to the United
States District Court."
Id., at 578-579; see
County of
Allegheny v.
Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U. S. 185, 195 (1959)
("Although holding that the respondent could not remove a state
condemnation case to the Federal District Court on diversity
grounds because he was the plaintiff in the state proceeding, the
Court [in
Stude] clearly recognized that the defendant in
such a proceeding could remove in accordance with § 1441 and obtain
a federal adjudication of the issues involved"). If anything, then,
Stude indicates that the jurisdiction of federal district
courts encompasses 1CS' claims for review of the Landmarks
Commission's decisions.
Horton is to the same effect, holding that a District
Court had jurisdiction under the diversity statute to review a
state
171
workers' compensation award. 367 U. S., at 352. The bulk of the
opinion addresses the central issue in the case, whether the suit
satisfied the amount-in-controversy threshold for diversity
jurisdiction. See
id., at 352-354;
id., at 355-363
(Clark, J., dissenting). But the plaintiff also alleged, based on
Stude, that diversity jurisdiction was lacking because the
action was an appeal from a state administrative order, to which
the Court simply responded that, "[a]side from many other relevant
distinctions which need not be pointed out," the suit in fact was a
"trial
de novo" and not an appellate proceeding. 367 U. S.,
at 354-355. The Court did not purport to hold that the
de
novo standard was a precondition to federal jurisdiction.
Any negative inference that might be drawn from that aspect of
Horton, even assuming that the decision speaks to the scope
of supplemental (and not diversity) jurisdiction, would be
insufficient to trump the absence of indication in § 1367(a) that
the nature of review bears on whether a claim is within a district
court's supplemental jurisdiction. After all, district courts
routinely conduct deferential review pursuant to their original
jurisdiction over federal questions, including on-the-record review
of federal administrative action. See
Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.
S. 99, 105-107 (1977). Nothing in § 1367(a) suggests that
district courts are without supplemental jurisdiction over claims
seeking precisely the same brand of review of local administrative
determinations. Cf.
Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central
School Dist., Westchester Cty. v.
Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 206 (1982)
(interpreting Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U. S.
C. § 1415(e), which contemplates deferential review of state
administrative action).
The dissent disagrees with our conclusion that 28 U. S. C. §
1367(a) encompasses state law claims for on-the-record review of
local administrative action, but it is unclear exactly why, for the
dissent never directly challenges our application
172
172 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
of that statute to ICS' claims. In fact, the dissent only makes
passing reference to the terms of § 1367(a), which, in our view,
resolve the case. In this light, the dissent's candid misgivings
about attempting to square its position with the text of the
jurisdictional statutes, see
post, at 176, 183-184, are
understandable. And the failure to come to grips with the text of §
1367(a) explains the dissent's repeated assumption,
post, at
175, 177, 182, 185-186, that the jurisdictional analysis of
diversity cases would be no different. But to decide that state law
claims for on-the-record review of a local agency's decision fall
within the district courts' "supplemental" jurisdiction under §
1367(a), does not answer the question, nor do we, whether those
same claims, if brought alone, would substantiate the district
courts' "original" jurisdiction over diversity cases under § 1332.
Ultimately, the dissent never addresses this case as it is
presented: a case containing federal questions within the meaning
of § 1331 and supplemental state law claims within the meaning of §
1367(a).
III
Of course, to say that the terms of § 1367(a) authorize the
district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state
law claims for on-the-record review of administrative decisions
does not mean that the jurisdiction
must be exercised in all
cases. Our decisions have established that pendent jurisdiction "is
a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right,"
Gibbs,
383 U. S., at 726, and that district courts can decline to exercise
jurisdiction over pendent claims for a number of valid reasons,
id., at 726-727. See also
Cohill, 484 U. S., at 350
("As articulated by
Gibbs, the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction thus is a doctrine of flexibility, designed to allow
courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims in the manner
that most sensibly accommodates a range of concerns and values").
Accordingly, we have indicated that "district courts [should] deal
with cases involving pendent claims in the manner that best serves
the principles of econ-
173
omy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine."
Id., at 357.
The supplemental jurisdiction statute codifies these principles.
After establishing that supplemental jurisdiction encompasses
"other claims" in the same case or controversy as a claim within
the district courts' original jurisdiction, § 1367(a), the statute
confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by
enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse
its exercise:
"(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if"(1) the claim
raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
"(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
"(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction, or
"(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction." 28 U. S. C. § 1367(c).
Depending on a host of factors, then-including the circumstances
of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the
character of the governing state law, and the relationship between
the state and federal claims-district courts may decline to
exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims. The
statute thereby reflects the understanding that, when deciding
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, "a federal court
should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the
litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity."
Cohill, supra, at 350. In this case, the
District Court decided that those interests would be best served by
exercising jurisdiction over ICS' state law claims. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 45a-46a.
174
174 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
In addition to their discretion under § 1367(c), district courts
may be obligated not to decide state law claims (or to stay their
adjudication) where one of the abstention doctrines articulated by
this Court applies. Those doctrines embody the general notion that
"federal courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in
otherwise exceptional circumstances, where denying a federal forum
would clearly serve an important countervailing interest, for
example where abstention is warranted by considerations of proper
constitutional adjudication, regard for federal-state relations, or
wise judicial administration."
Quackenbush v.
Allstate
Ins. Co., 517 U.
S. 706, 716 (1996) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). We have recently outlined the various abstention
principles, see
ibid., and need not elaborate them here
except to note that there may be situations in which a district
court should abstain from reviewing local administrative
determinations even if the jurisdictional prerequisites are
otherwise satisfied.
IV
The District Court properly recognized that it could exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over ICS' state law claims, including the
claims for on-the-record administrative review of the Landmarks
Commission's decisions. ICS contends that abstention principles
required the District Court to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, and also alludes to its contention below that the
District Court should have refused to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1367(c). We express no view on
those matters, but think it the preferable course to allow the
Court of Appeals to address them in the first instance.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
175
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,
dissenting.
This now-federal case originated as an appeal in state court
from a municipal agency's denials of demolition permits. The review
that state law provides is classically appellate in character-on
the agency's record, not
de novo. Nevertheless, the Court
decides today that this standard brand of appellate review can be
shifted from the appropriate state tribunal to a federal court of
first instance at the option of either party-plaintiff originally
or defendant by removal. The Court approves this enlargement of
district court authority explicitly in federal-question cases, and
by inescapable implication in diversity cases, satisfied that
"neither the jurisdictional statutes nor our prior decisions
suggest that federal jurisdiction is lacking."
Ante, at
163.
The Court's authorization of cross-system appeals qualifies as a
watershed decision. After today, litigants asserting
federal-question or diversity jurisdiction may routinely lodge in
federal courts direct appeals from the actions of all manner of
local (county and municipal) agencies, boards, and commissions.
Exercising this cross-system appellate authority, federal courts
may now directly superintend local agencies by affirming,
reversing, or modifying their administrative rulings.
The Court relies on the statutory words found in both 28 U. S.
C. §§ 1331 and 1332: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions .... " Then, as its linchpin, the
Court emphasizes the 1990 codification and expansion, in § 1367, of
what previously had been known as "ancillary jurisdiction" and
"pendent jurisdiction." Specifically, the Court stresses the broad
authorization in § 1367(a) for district court exercise of
"supplemental jurisdiction" over claims "so related" to a "civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction" as
to "form part of the same [Article III] case or controversy." See
ante, at 164-
176
176 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
GINSBURG, J., dissenting
169, 171-174.1 The bare words of §§ 1331, 1332, and 1367(a)
permit the Court's construction. For the reasons advanced in this
opinion, however, I do not construe these prescriptions, on
allocation of judicial business to federal courts of first
instance, to embrace the category of appellate business at issue
here.
The Court's expansive reading, in my judgment, takes us far from
anything Congress conceivably could have meant. Cf.
Lynch v.
Overholser, 369 U. S. 705, 710 (1962)
("The decisions of this Court have repeatedly warned against the
dangers of an approach to statutory construction which confines
itself to the bare words of a statute, for 'literalness may
strangle meaning.''') (citations omitted). Cross-system appeals, if
they are to be introduced into our federal system, should stem from
the National Legislature's considered and explicit decision. In
accord with the views of the large majority of federal judges who
have considered the question, I would hold the cross-system appeal
unauthorized by Congress, and affirm the Seventh Circuit's
judgment.
I
Until now it has been taken almost for granted that federal
courts of first instance lack authority under §§ 1331 and 1332 to
displace state courts as forums for on-the-record review of state
and local agency actions. In
Chicago, R. 1. &
P. R.
Co. v.
Stude, 346 U. S. 574 (1954), we
recalled the historic understanding: A federal district court "does
not sit to review on appeal action taken administratively or
judicially in
1 The Court assumes, although § 1367 does not expressly so
provide, that the section covers cases originating in a state court
and removed to a federal court.
Ante, at 165. Although the
point has not been briefed, I do not question that assumption. See
Steinman, Supplemental Jurisdiction in § 1441 Removed Cases: An
Unsurveyed Frontier of Congress' Handiwork, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 305,
308-310 (1993) (observing that arguments against application of §
1367 to removed cases "are weak").
177
a state proceeding."
Id., at 581.2 Cross-system appellate
authority is entrusted to this Court, we said in
Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923), but
it is outside the domain of the lower federal courts. Interpreting
the statutory predecessors of 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331 and 1257, we held
in
Rooker that a federal district court could not modify a
decision of the Indiana Supreme Court, for only this Court could
exercise such authority. 263 U. S., at 416.
Today, the Court holds that Congress, by enacting § 1367, has
authorized federal district courts to conduct deferential,
on-the-record review of local agency decisions whenever a federal
question is pended to the agency review action. Dismissing, as
irrelevant to jurisdiction, the distinction between
de novo
and deferential review, the Court also provides easy access to
federal court whenever the dissatisfied party in a local agency
proceeding has the requisite diverse citizenship. The Court does
all this despite the overwhelming weight of lower federal court
decisions disclaiming cross-system appellate authority, and without
even a hint from Congress that so startling a reallocation of power
from state courts to federal courts was within the national
lawmakers' contemplation.3
2 The Court in
Stude also made the following statement:
''When the proceeding has reached the stage of a perfected appeal
and the jurisdiction of the state district court is invoked, it
then becomes in its nature a civil action and subject to removal by
the defendant to the United States District Court."
Chicago, R.
I. &
P. R. Co. v.
Stude, 346 U. S., at
578-579. This statement, made on the way to the Court's conclusion
that the District Court
lacked removal jurisdiction, does
not carry great weight. It suggests that while the plaintiff in
Stude could not have filed the action in federal court
initially under § 1332, the defendant could have removed the action
to federal court pursuant to § 1441(a). That suggestion is
incorrect, for "[o]nly state-court actions that originally could
have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by
the defendant."
Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams,
482 U. S. 386,
392 (1987).
3 The Court's holding can embrace the decisions of state, as
opposed to local, agencies, only if the State consents to the
district court's jurisdiction. In
Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U. S. 89 (1984),
178
178 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
I catalog first the decisions, in addition to the Seventh
Circuit's, that the Court today overrides:
Volkswagen de Puerto
Rico, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d
38, 42 (CA1 1972) (permitting a district court to conduct
on-therecord review of a decision of the Puerto Rico Labor
Relations Board under § 1331 "would place a federal court in an
improper posture vis-a-vis a non-federal agency");
Armistead
v. C &
M Transport, Inc., 49 F.3d
43, 47 (CA1 1995) ("As courts of
original jurisdiction,
federal district courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction do not
have appellate power, nor the right to exercise supplementary
equitable control over original proceedings in the state's
administrative tribunals.");
Frison v.
Franklin County
Bd. of Ed., 596 F.2d
1192, 1194 (CA4 1979) (District Court should have declined
pendent jurisdiction over a state-law claim "because it is
essentially a petition for judicial review of state administrative
action rather than a distinct claim for relief");
Fairfax County
Redevelopment &
Housing Auth. v.
W M.
Schlosser Co., 64 F.3d
155, 158 (CA4 1995) ("Because the district court is 'a court of
original jurisdiction,' not 'an appellate tribunal,' and, thus, is
without jurisdiction 'to review on appeal action taken
administratively or judicially in a state proceeding,' it was
without jurisdiction [under § 1332] to conduct such a review of the
County Executive's finding.") (citations omitted);
Labiche
v.
Louisiana Patients' Compensation Fund Oversight Bd.,
69 F.3d
21, 22 (CA5 1995) ("We have reviewed [28 U. S. C. §§ 1330-1368]
and none would authorize appellate review by a United States
District Court of any actions
the Court held it would violate the Eleventh Amendment for a
federal court to entertain, without the State's consent, "a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their
official responsibilities."
Id., at 121. The Court further
held that "this principle applies as well to statelaw claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction."
Ibid. Notably, the Court commented in
Pennhurst:
"[I]t is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state
sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law."
Id., at 106.
179
taken by a state agency.");
Shamrock Motors, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 120 F.3d
196, 200 (CA9 1997) ("When a state provides for administrative
agency review of an appellate nature, rather than administrative
review of a de novo nature, federal district courts have neither
original jurisdiction nor removal jurisdiction over the review
proceedings.");
Trapp v.
Goetz, 373
F.2d 380, 383 (CAlO 1966) (Under § 1332, "a United States
District Court could not review an appeal action taken either
administratively or judicially in a state proceeding."). Indeed,
research discloses only a single Court of Appeals decision that has
approved a federal district court's exercise of cross-system
appellate review. See
Range Oil Supply Co. v.
Chicago,
R. 1. &
P. R. Co., 248 F.2d
477, 478-479 (CA8 1957) (District Court could exercise removal
jurisdiction over an appeal from a state railroad and warehouse
commission once that appeal had been perfected in state court). As
the Ninth Circuit said in
Shamrock Motors: "[T]he prospect
of a federal court sitting as an appellate court over state
administrative proceedings is rather jarring and should not be
quickly embraced as a matter of policy."
Shamrock Motors,
Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 120
Until today, federal habeas corpus proceedings were the closest
we had come to cross-system appellate review. See 28 U. S. C. §§
2241-2254.4 Unlike the jurisdictional reallocation the Court now
endorses, habeas corpus jurisdiction does not entail
direct
review of a state or local authority's decision. See
Lambrix
v.
Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 523
(1997).
4 The Court's citation to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA),
ante, at 171, is unpersuasive for two
reasons. First, IDEA has its own jurisdictional provision, so it
does not concern §§ 1331, 1332, or 1367. See § 615 of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997,
Pub. L. 105-17, 111 Stat. 92, to be codified at 20 U. S. C. §
1415(i)(3)(A);
Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School
Dist., 509 U. S. 1, 4 (1993). Second, IDEA creates a
federal regime. While IDEA may require federal courts to
defer to state agency decisions, those decisions are made pursuant
to
federal legislation.
180
180 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
Notably, in providing for federal habeas corpus review, Congress
has taken great care to avoid interrupting or intruding upon
state-court processes. See,
e. g., 28 U. S. C. §
2254(b)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. III) (requiring exhaustion of state
remedies before filing a federal petition for writ of habeas
corpus). The Court's holding in this "Chicago" case, however,
permits the federal court to supplant the State's entire scheme for
judicial review of local administrative actions.
When a local actor or agency violates a person's federal right,
it is indeed true that the aggrieved party may bring an action
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 without first exhausting state remedies.
See
Patsy v.
Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 516
(1982). But such an action involves no disregard, as the
cross-system appeal does, of the separateness of state and federal
adjudicatory systems. In a § 1983 action, a federal (or state)
court inquires whether a person, acting under color of state law,
has subjected another "to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal]
laws." The court exercises original, not appellate, jurisdiction;
it proceeds independently, not as substantial evidence reviewer on
a nonfederal agency's record. As now-Chief Judge Posner
explained:
"[A] suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 is not a review proceeding
even when ... it challenges administrative action that has an
adjudicative component. Federal courts have no general appellate
authority over state courts or state agencies .... The case that is
in federal court did not begin in the state agency but is an
independent as well as an original federal action."
Hameetman v. Chicago, 776 F.2d
636, 640 (CA7 1985).
II
To reach its landmark result, the Court holds that a district
court may perform cross-system appellate review of administrative
agency decisions so long as the plaintiff's complaint also contains
related federal claims, for "[t]hose federal
181
claims suffice to make the actions 'civil actions' within the
'original jurisdiction' of the district courts."
Ante, at
166. Measuring today's disposition against prior decisions
concerning proceedings in federal court following a state
administrative decision, the Court,
ante, at 169-171, takes
up
Horton v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U. S. 348 (1961), and
Stude, see
supra, at 176-177, and n. 2.
Horton was a workers' compensation case proceeding in
federal court on the basis of the parties' diverse citizenship. The
contending parties were an injured worker and the insurance company
that served as compensation carrier for the worker's employer. At
the administrative stage, the Texas Industrial Accident Board made
an award of $1,050. Neither side was satisfied. The insurer
maintained that the worker was entitled to no compensation, while
the worker urged his entitlement to the statutory maximum of
$14,035. The insurer brought suit first, filing its complaint in
federal court; one week later, the worker filed a state-court suit
and sought dismissal of the insurer's federal action on alternative
grounds: (1) the matter in controversy did not meet § 1332's
monetary amount requirement (then "in excess of $10,000"); (2) the
insurer's suit was "nothing more than an appeal from a state
administrative order" and federal courts have "no appellate
jurisdiction" over such orders, 367 U. S., at 354.
After concluding that the jurisdictional amount requirement was
met, the Court turned to the question whether the federal-court
proceeding was in fact an "appeal," and therefore barred under
Stude, which, as the
Horton Court described it, "held
that a United States District Court was without jurisdiction to
consider an appeal 'taken administratively or judicially in a state
proceeding.'" 367 U. S., at 354 (quoting
Stude, 346 U. S.,
at 581). On that matter, the Texas Supreme Court's construction of
the State's compensation law left no room for debate. When suit
commences, the administrative award is vacated and the court
determines liability
de novo. See 367 U. S., at 355, n. 15.
The suit to set
182
182 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
GINSBURG, J., dissenting
aside an award is thus like any other first instance
proceeding-it is "'a suit, not an appeal.'"
Id., at 354
(quoting
Booth v.
Texas Employers' Ins. Assn., 132
Tex. 237, 246,123
Remarkably, the Court today asserts that neither
Stude
nor
Horton "suggest[ed] that jurisdiction turned on whether
judicial review of the administrative determination was deferential
or
de novo." Ante, at 170; see also
ante, at 171
("The Court [in
Horton] did not purport to hold that the
de novo standard was a precondition to federal
jurisdiction."). The Court thus casts aside the critical difference
between fresh first instance proceedings not tied to a record made
by a tribunal lower in the hierarchy, and on-the-record substantial
evidence review, which cannot fairly be described as anything but
appellate in character.
If, as the Court reasons today, the distinction between
de
novo and deferential review is inconsequential, then a district
court may, indeed must, entertain cross-system, onthe-record
appeals from local agency decisions-without regard to the presence
or absence of any federal questionwhenever the parties meet the
diversity-of-citizenship requirement of § 1332. The Court so
confirms by noting that, in accord with
Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.
S. 99, 105-107 (1977), "district courts routinely conduct
deferential review [of federal administrative action] pursuant to
their original jurisdiction over federal questions."
Ante,
at 171. Just as routinely, it now appears, district courts must
"conduct deferential review [of local administrative action]
pursuant to their original jurisdiction over [diversity
cases]."
The Court's homogenization of
de novo proceedings and
appellate review rests on a single case,
Califano v.
Sanders. In
Sanders, the Court settled a longstanding
division of opinion over whether § 10 of the federal Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-704, ranked as an
independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to federal courts,
allowing them to review the actions of federal agencies,
183
without regard to the amount in controversy. The Court held that
the AP A "does not afford an implied grant of subject-matter
jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action."
430 U. S., at 107. Nevertheless, the Court explained, district
court review of federal administrative action-when Congress had not
prescribed another review route or specifically excluded
review-would persist. Congress had just dropped the
amount-in-controversy requirement from § 1331, thus "fill[ing] the
jurisdictional void."
Id., at 106. With the
amount-in-controversy deleted, the Court indicated in
Sanders, § 1331 would assure fidelity to the presumption
that administrative action is subject to judicial review. See
id., at 105-106;
Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387
U. S. 136, 141 (1967) (courts generally hold agency action
nonreviewable "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing
evidence' of a contrary legislative intent"); see also
Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U. S. 159, 166 (1970)
("[J]udicial review of [federal] administrative action is the rule,
and nonreviewability an exception which must be demonstrated.
").
Whatever the reason for the rule implicit in
Sanders-that
federal district courts may engage in on-the-record, substantial
evidence review of federal agency actions under § 1331Chicago homes
in on the statutory language. See Brief for Petitioners 11, 30, 39.
Section 1331 reads: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." If deferential,
on-the-record review of a
federal agency's action qualifies
as a "civil action" within a district court's "original
jurisdiction," Chicago urges, then deferential, on-the-record
review of local agency action must fit the same bill, i.
e.,
such review must qualify as a "civil action" within the district
court's "original jurisdiction."
But one of these things is not necessarily like the other.
I recognize that the bare and identical words "original
jurisdiction" and "civil action" in §§ 1331 and 1332 comport
with
184
184 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
Chicago's view and that of the Court. See
supra, at 175.
We would do well, however, to recall in this context a sage and
grave warning: "The tendency to assume that a word which appears in
two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one
purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all of
them, runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity
of original sin and must constantly be guarded against." Cook,
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L. J.
333, 337 (1933).
Cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States" within the meaning of § 1331 compose a collection
smaller than the one fitting within the similarly worded Clause in
Article III of the Constitution, "Cases ... arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made."
See,
e.g., Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v.
Mottley, 211
U. S. 149, 152 (1908);
Shoshone Mining Co. v.
Rutter, 177 U.
S. 505, 513 (1900). Diversity of citizenship must be complete
to proceed under § 1332, see
Strawbridge v.
Curtiss,
3 Cranch 267, 268 (1806), but it may be "minimal" in interpleader
cases brought under § 1335, see
State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v.
Tashire, 386 U. S. 523, 530-531
(1967).
Significantly, in assuming that § 1331 ordinarily would be
available when a person complains about arbitrary federal
administrative action, the Court in
Sanders never fixed on
the words of § 1331, and never even mentioned in relation to that
provision the terms "civil action" or "original jurisdiction." The
Court simply concluded from the legislative history that Congress
meant to fill "an interstitial gap," 430 U. S., at 107, i.
e., Congress meant to hold federal agencies accountable by
making their actions subject to judicial review.
Statutes like the Illinois Administrative Review Law, Ill.
Compo Stat., ch. 735, §§ 5/3-103, 5/3-104 (Supp. 1997),
explicitly provide for state-court judicial review of state and
local agency decisions. Unlike the federal picture the Court
con-
185
fronted in
Sanders, there is no void to fill. The gap to
which
Sanders attended-the absence of any forum for
"nonstatutory" review of federal agency decisions unless § 1331
provided one-simply does not exist in a case brought under a state
measure like the Illinois Administrative Review Law. I would
therefore resist reading
Sanders out of context to mandate
cross-system appellate review of local agency decisions.
III
Just last Term, two Members of today's majority recognized the
vital interest States have in developing and elaborating state
administrative law, for that law regulates the citizen's contact
with state and local government at every turn, for example, in
gaining life-sustaining public benefits, obtaining a license, or,
as in this case, receiving a permit. Last Term's lead opinion
observed:
"In the States there is an ongoing process by which state courts
and state agencies work to elaborate an administrative law designed
to reflect the State's own rules and traditions concerning the
respective scope of judicial review and administrative discretion
.... [T]he elaboration of administrative law ... is one of the
primary responsibilities of the state judiciary. Where, as here,
the parties invoke federal principles to challenge state
administrative action, the courts of the State have a strong
interest in integrating those sources of law within their own
system for the proper judicial control of state officials."
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U. S. 261, 276 (1997)
(principal opinion of KENNEDY, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J.).
Today's decision jeopardizes the "strong interest" courts of the
State have in controlling the actions of local as well as state
agencies. State court superintendence can now be displaced or
dislodged in any case against a local agency in
186
186 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
which the parties are of diverse citizenship and in any case in
which a Fourteenth Amendment plea can be made.
The Court insists that there is no escape from this erosion of
state-court authority. Its explanation is less than compelling. The
Court describes as the alternative "ICS' proposed approach." See
ante, at 167. That approach, according to the Court, would
have us determine first "whether [ICS's] state claims constitute
'civil actions' within a district court's 'original jurisdiction.'"
Ibid. The Court then demolishes the supposed approach by
observing that it "would effectively read the supplemental
jurisdiction statute out of the books."
Ibid.; see also
ante, at 167-169.
I do not find in ICS's brief the approach the Court constructs,
then destructs. Instead, the argument I do find, see Brief for
Respondents 21-24, runs as follows. Chicago has tried to persuade
the Court that ICS's "Complaints for Administrative Review are no
different than civil rights actions."
Id., at 21. See Notice
of Removal for Petitioner in No. 91 C 1587 (ND Ill.), App. 15 ("it
appears from the face of plaintiffs' complaint that this is a civil
rights complaint"). ICS acknowledged that it might have chosen to
bypass onthe-record administrative review in state court, invoking
federal jurisdiction under § 1983 instead, without exhausting state
remedies. Brief for Respondents 22-24. Had ICS done so, review
would have been "plenary in its scope" and would not have been
"confined by the administrative record."
Id., at 24. But ICS
did not take that path. It proceeded under the Illinois
Administrative Review Law seeking resolution of both state-law and
federal constitutional issues "in the context of on-the-record
administrative review."
Id., at 22. The distinction between
the appellate review it sought and the first instance action it did
not bring "is crucial," ICS argued.
Ibid.
In sum, from start to finish, ICS sought accurately to portray
the Seventh Circuit's resistance to "federaliz[ing]," without
explicit congressional instruction to do so, "garden-
187
variety appeals from ... local administrative decisions,"
id., at 3, appeals in which the federal issues ultimately
raised "are inextricably intertwined with [the State's]
administrative review scheme,"
id., at 4. Not a case in
which pendent or supplemental jurisdiction has ever been exercised
is touched by the argument lCS in fact made, which trained
constantly on the impropriety of cross-system appellate review. Far
from urging the Court to "read the supplemental jurisdiction
statute out of the books,"
ante, at 167, lCS simply asked
the Court not to read into § 1367 more than any other tribunal has
conceived to be there. What lCS sought to convey, the Court
obscures: "[T]he City fail[ed] to cite a single case in which a
federal court specifically assumed pendent or supplemental
jurisdiction over an on-the-record state administrative appeal."
Brief for Respondents 24, n. 11.
IV
Even if the Court were correct in maintaining that Congress
thrust local administrative agency on-the-record review proceedings
into federal court at the option of either party, given diversity
or an ultimate constitutional argument, the Court's reluctance to
"articulat[e] general standards" for the guidance of the lower
courts is puzzling. Cf.
Strickland v.
Washington,
466 U. S. 668,
698 (1984) (after "articulat[ing] general standards for judging
ineffectiveness [of counsel] claims," the Court considered it
"useful to apply those standards to the facts of thee] case in
order to illustrate the meaning of the general principles"). lCS,
seeking such guidance, did not simply "allud[e] to" the District
Court's extraordinary course. Cf.
ante, at 174. This is a
summary of the points lCS made in urging the impropriety of
federalcourt retention of the case, assuming,
arguendo,
federalcourt power to keep it. The permits in question were sought
under Chicago's Landmarks Ordinance, a measure "Illinois courts
have never had an opportunity to interpret." Brief for Respondents
4. "The issues of Illinois constitu-
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188 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
tionallaw raised by [ICS] have never been decided by Illinois
appellate courts."
Ibid. Land-use cases generally, and
landmark designations particularly, implicate "local policies" and
"local concerns."
Ibid. Yet all this Court is willing to say
is that "the District Court properly exercised federal question
jurisdiction over the federal claims in lCS' complaints, and
properly recognized that it could thus also exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over lCS' state law claims."
Ante, at 166. The
Court's opinion expresses "no [further] view."
Ante, at
174.
The District Court disposed of lCS's federal equal protection
and due process claims in less than 13 pages of its 63page opinion,
App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a-46a, and then devoted over 40 pages more
to the state-law claims.
Id., at 46a-89a. That court wrote
at greatest length on whether the Landmarks Commission's
conclusions were "Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence."
Id., at 73a-89a. Finally, the District Court "affirm[ed] the
Commission's decisions."
Id., at 89a. It would have been in
order for this Court to have recalled, in face of the District
Court's federal-claims-first approach, the "fundamental rule of
judicial restraint" that federal courts "will not reach
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding
them."
Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation
v.
Wold Engineering, P. c.,
467 U. S. 138, 157
(1984). As a rule, potentially dispositive state-law challenges,
not ultimate constitutional questions, should be cleared first.
See,
e.g., Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 546-547
(1974).
When local official actions are contested on state and federal
grounds, and particularly when construction of a state measure or
local ordinance is at issue, the state questions stand at the
threshold. In this case, for example, had lCS's construction of the
Landmarks Ordinance prevailed, no federal constitutional question
would have ripened. The Court does note that § 1367(c)
"enumerat[es] the circumstances in which district courts can refuse
[to] exercise [supplemental
189
jurisdiction],"
ante, at 173, but as to that, the Court
simply reports: "[T]he District Court decided [judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity] would be best served by
exercising jurisdiction over 1CS' state law claims,"
ibid.5 The Court also mentions, abstractly, that
"district courts may be obligated not to decide state law claims
(or to stay their adjudication) where one of the abstention
doctrines articulated by this Court applies."
Ante, at
174.
Section 1367(c), which concerns supplemental jurisdiction, will
have no utility in diversity cases where, if jurisdiction exists,
it is generally not within the court's discretion to "decline." And
lower courts have found our abstention pronouncements "less than
pellucid." See R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1247, 1251
(4th ed. 1996). Which of our "various abstention principles,"
ante, at 174, should the lower federal courts consult when
asked to review as an appellate instance, and affirm, modify, or
reverse, a local license or permit denial? To dispel confusion and
advance comity, should the lower courts endeavor to fashion-and
will we eventually declare-a
"Chicago" abstention
doctrine?
Given the state forum to which 1CS resorted, and the questions
it raised there, see App. 26-35, 76-77, 1CS's primary contention is
clear: The Commission should have granted,
under state law,
demolition permits or an economic hardship exception. I do not
comprehend the Court's reasons for suggesting that the District
Court may have acted
5 But cf.
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U. S., at 122, n. 32 ("[A]llowing claims
against state officials based on state law to be brought in the
federal courts does not necessarily foster the policies of
'judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants,'
Mine
Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726
(1966), on which pendent jurisdiction is founded. For example, when
a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal court's
construction often is uncertain and ephemeral. In cases of ongoing
oversight of a state program ... the federal intrusion is likely to
be extensive. Duplication of effort, inconvenience, and uncertainty
may well result.").
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190 CHICAGO
v. INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS
properly in holding on to this case, rather than allowing the
state courts to proceed in their normal course.
V
In
Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992), we
addressed the question whether civil actions for divorce, alimony,
or child custody fall within § 1332 when the parties are of diverse
citizenship. Nothing in the text of the Constitution or in the
words of § 1332 excluded parties from bringing such "civil actions"
in federal court. Historically, however, decrees terminating
marriages had been considered wholly within the State's domain. See
Barber v.
Barber, 21 How. 582 (1859). That
understanding, we noted in
Ankenbrandt, had prevailed "for
nearly a century and a half." 504 U. S., at 694-695. "Given the
long passage of time without any expression of congressional
dissatisfaction," we reaffirmed the absence of statutory
jurisdiction for federal court adjudication of original civil
actions for divorce, alimony, and child custody.
Id., at
703. The Court explained that its conclusion was also
"supported by sound policy considerations .... [S]tate courts
are more eminently suited to work of this type than are federal
courts, which lack the close association with state and local
government organizations dedicated to handling [the] issues
[involved]." Id., at 703-704.6
6 Ankenbrandt clarified and illustrated "that the
domestic relations exception encompasses only cases involving the
issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree"; claims of
a kind traditionally adjudicated in federal courts, for example,
tort or contract claims, are not excepted from federal-court
jurisdiction simply because they arise in a domestic relations
context.
Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U. S., at 704.
In enacting the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1916,
42 U. S. C. § 13931
et seq., Congress reinforced
Ankenbrandt by providing expressly that 28 U. S. C. § 1367
shall not be construed, by reason of a claim arising under the Act,
"to confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction over any
State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony,
equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody
decree." 42 U. S. C. § 13981(e)(4).
191
History and policy tug strongly here as well. There surely has
been no "expression of congressional dissatisfaction" with the
near-unanimous view of the Circuits that federal courts may not
engage in cross-system appellate review, and "the elaboration of
[state] administrative law" is a "prim[e] responsibilit[y] of the
state judiciary."
Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of
Idaho, 521 U. S., at 276.
This Court said in
Finley v.
United States,
490 U. S.
545,
547-548 (1989):
"It remains rudimentary law that '[a]s regards all courts of the
United States inferior to this tribunal, two things are necessary
to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The
Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it,
and an act of Congress must have supplied it .... To the
extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant.'"
(quoting Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252
(1868)).
As I see it, no Act of Congress adverts to and authorizes any
cross-system appeal from state or local administrative agency to
lower federal court. I would await express legislative direction
before proceeding down that road. Accordingly, I would affirm the
Seventh Circuit's judgment.
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