MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
Appellant, E. C. Chappelle, Jr., wished to serve, upon
appointment, as a commissioner on the Greater Baton Rouge Airport
Commission. He, however, was deemed not qualified, since, at the
time of his appointment, he owned no "property assessed in East
Baton Rouge Parish," as required by Louisiana Act 151 of 1969. The
sole requirement is that he own property, whether real or personal,
that is assessed in that parish. We sit to judge the
constitutionality, not the wisdom, of this restriction. I am unable
to agree that the Constitution, or prior cases from this Court,
require today's declaration of unconstitutionality.
This Court has regularly sustained the imposition of city or
county residency requirements on municipal employees.
McCarthy
v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.
S. 645 (1976);
Detroit Police Officers Assn. v.
Detroit, 405 U.S. 950 (1972);
see also Bute v. Quinn,
535 F.2d 1285 (CA7),
cert.
Page 431 U. S. 160
denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976). It is dubious, at best,
whether the requirement that a public officeholder own any
assessable property within a parish is any more burdensome, or any
less rational, than a requirement that he and his family live in
that parish.
This Court has also sustained durational residency requirements
of five and seven years for candidates for the office of state
governor and senator,
Kanapaux v. Ellisor, 419 U.S. 891
(1974);
Sununu v. Stark, 420 U.S. 958 (1975). If a State
can impose a five-year residency requirement on its candidates for
its highest political office, it should be able to impose a minimal
locational property requirement on persons seeking office in this
airport district.
The Louisiana Court of Appeal concluded:
"In enacting Act 151 of 1969, the legislature sought to insure
that the members of the commission would have a substantial
interest in performing their duties effectively and
conscientiously. The legislature could have concluded reasonably
that property owners of East Baton Rouge Parish would have that
interest."
App. 22-23. Surely it was as reasonable to conclude so in this
case as it is in situations involving residency, or durational
residency, requirements. Since I believe today's opinion is
inconsistent with these cases, and since, in light of these later
cases, I would not extend
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.
S. 346,
396 U. S.
361-364 (1970), I respectfully dissent.
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