OCTOBER TERM, 1996
Syllabus
CHANDLER ET AL.
v. MILLER, GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA, ET
AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-126. Argued January 14, 1997-Decided April 15, 1997
A Georgia statute requires candidates for designated state
offices to certify that they have taken a urinalysis drug test
within 30 days prior to qualifying for nomination or election and
that the test result was negative. Petitioners, Libertarian Party
nominees for state offices subject to the statute's requirements,
filed this action in the District Court about one month before the
deadline for submission of the certificates. Naming as defendants
the Governor and two officials involved in the statute's
administration, petitioners asserted,
inter alia, that the
drug tests violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The
District Court denied petitioners' motion for a preliminary
injunction and later entered final judgment for respondents.
Relying on this Court's precedents sustaining drug-testing programs
for student athletes,
Vernonia School Dist. 4- 7
J v.
Acton, 515 U.
S. 646, 650, 665-666, Customs Service employees,
Treasury
Employees v.
Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 659, and
railway employees,
Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives'
Assn., 489 U. S.
602, 608-613, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court accepted
as settled law that the tests were searches, but reasoned that, as
was true of the drug-testing programs at issue in
Skinner
and
Von Raab, the statute served "special needs," interests
other than the ordinary needs of law enforcement. Balancing the
individual's privacy expectations against the State's interest in
the drug-testing program, the court held the statute, as applied to
petitioners, not inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Held: Georgia's requirement that candidates for state
office pass a drug test does not fit within the closely guarded
category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.
Pp. 313-323.
(a) It is uncontested that Georgia's drug-testing requirement,
imposed by law and enforced by state officials, effects a search
within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
pivotal question here is whether the searches are reasonable. To be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be
based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. See
Vernonia, 515 U. S., at 652-653. But particularized
exceptions to the main rule are sometimes
306
Syllabus
warranted based on "special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement." See
Skinner, 489 U. S., at 619. When such
"special needs" are alleged, courts must undertake a
context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private
and public interests advanced by the parties. See
Von Raab,
489 U. S., at 665-666. In evaluating Georgia's ballot-access,
drug-testing statute-a measure plainly not tied to individualized
suspicion-the Eleventh Circuit sought to balance the competing
interests in line with this Court's precedents most immediately in
point:
Skinner, Von Raab, and
Vernonia. Pp.
313-317.
(b) These precedents remain the guides for assessing the
validity of the Georgia statute despite respondents' invitation to
apply a framework extraordinarily deferential to state measures
setting conditions of candidacy for state office. No precedent
suggests that a State's sovereign power to establish qualifications
for state offices diminishes the constraints on state action
imposed by the Fourth Amendment. pp. 317-318.
(c) Georgia's testing method is relatively noninvasive;
therefore, if the "special need" showing had been made, the State
could not be faulted for excessive intrusion. However, Georgia has
failed to show a special need that is substantial-important enough
to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest,
sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal
requirement of individualized suspicion. Respondents contend that
unlawful drug use is incompatible with holding high state office
because such drug use draws into question an official's judgment
and integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of public functions,
including antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines public
confidence and trust in elected officials. Notably lacking in
respondents' presentation is any indication of a concrete danger
demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule. The
statute was not enacted, as respondents concede, in response to any
fear or suspicion of drug use by state officials. A demonstrated
problem of drug abuse, while not in all cases necessary to the
validity of a testing regime, see
Von Raab, 489 U. S., at
673-675, would shore up an assertion of special need for a
suspicionless general search program, see
Skinner, 489 U.
S., at 606-608;
Vernonia, 515 U. S., at 662-663. In contrast
to the effective testing regimes upheld in
Skinner, Von
Raab, and
Vernonia, Georgia's certification requirement
is not well designed to identify candidates who violate antidrug
laws and is not a credible means to deter illicit drug users from
seeking state office. The test date is selected by the candidate,
and thus all but the prohibitively addicted could abstain for a
pretest period sufficient to avoid detection. Respondents' reliance
on this Court's decision in
Von Raab, which sustained a
drug-
307
testing program for Customs Service officers prior to promotion
or transfer to certain high-risk positions, despite the absence of
any documented drug abuse problem among Service employees, 489 U.
S., at 660, is misplaced. Hardly a decision opening broad vistas
for suspicionless searches,
Von Raab must be read in its
unique context. Drug interdiction had become the agency's primary
enforcement mission. The covered posts directly involved drug
interdiction or otherwise required Customs officers to carry
firearms, the employees would have access to vast sources of
valuable contraband, and officers had been targets of and some had
succumbed to bribery by drug smugglers. Moreover, it was not
feasible to subject the Customs Service employees to the kind of
day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office
environments. In telling contrast, the day-to-day conduct of
candidates for public office attracts attention notably beyond the
norm in ordinary work environments. What is left, after close
review of Georgia's scheme, is that the State seeks to display its
commitment to the struggle against drug abuse. But Georgia asserts
no evidence of a drug problem among the State's elected officials,
those officials typically do not perform high-risk,
safety-sensitive tasks, and the required certification immediately
aids no interdiction effort. The need revealed is symbolic, not
"special." The Fourth Amendment shields society from state action
that diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's sake. Pp.
318-322.
(d) The Court expresses no opinion on medical examinations
designed to provide certification of a candidate's general health
or on financial disclosure requirements, and it does not speak to
drug testing in the private sector, a domain unguarded by Fourth
Amendment constraints. P.323.
73 F.3d
1543, reversed.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and BREYER,
JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p. 323.
Walker L. Chandler, petitioner, argued the cause and
filed a brief
pro se. With him on the briefs for petitioners
was
Robert E. Turner.
Patricia Guilday, Assistant Attorney General of Georgia,
argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General,
Michael E.
308
Hobbs, Deputy Attorney General, and
Dennis D.
Dunn, Senior Assistant Attorney General. *
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. The Fourth
Amendment requires government to respect "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and
seizures." This restraint on government conduct generally bars
officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent
individualized suspicion. Searches conducted without grounds for
suspicion of particular individuals have been upheld, however, in
"certain limited circumstances." See
Treasury Employees v.
Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 668 (1989). These circumstances
include brief stops for questioning or observation at a fixed
Border Patrol checkpoint,
United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 545-550,
566-567 (1976), or at a sobriety checkpoint,
Michigan Dept. of
State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U. S. 444, 447, 455
(1990), and administrative inspections in "closely regulated"
businesses,
New York v.
Burger, 482 U. S. 691, 703-704
(1987).
Georgia requires candidates for designated state offices to
certify that they have taken a drug test and that the test result
was negative. Ga. Code Ann. §21-2-140 (1993) (hereinafter §
21-2-140). We confront in this case the question whether that
requirement ranks among the limited circumstances in which
suspicionless searches are warranted. Relying on this Court's
precedents sustaining drug-testing
*Stephen H. Sachs, Steven R. Shapiro, Gerald R. Weber, Arthur
B.
Spitzer, and
Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for
the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as
amici curiae
urging reversal.
Richard K. Willard, Daniel J. Popeo, and
Paul D. Kamenar filed a brief for the Washington Legal
Foundation et al. as
amici curiae urging affirmance.
Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General
Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Waxman, James A. Feldman, Leonard
Schaitman, and Edward Himmelfarb filed a brief for the United
States as amicus curiae.
309
programs for student athletes, customs employees, and railway
employees, see
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v.
Acton,
515 U. S. 646,
650, 665-666 (1995) (random drug testing of students who
participate in interscholastic sports);
Von Raab, 489 U. S.,
at 659 (drug tests for United States Customs Service employees who
seek transfer or promotion to certain positions);
Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 608-613
(1989) (drug and alcohol tests for railway employees involved in
train accidents and for those who violate particular safety rules),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit judged
Georgia's law constitutional. We reverse that judgment. Georgia's
requirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test, we
hold, does not fit within the closely guarded category of
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.
I
The prescription at issue, approved by the Georgia Legislature
in 1990, orders that "[e]ach candidate seeking to qualify for
nomination or election to a state office shall as a condition of
such qualification be required to certify that such candidate has
tested negative for illegal drugs." § 21-2140(b). Georgia was the
first, and apparently remains the only, State to condition
candidacy for state office on a drug test.
Under the Georgia statute, to qualify for a place on the ballot,
a candidate must present a certificate from a stateapproved
laboratory, in a form approved by the Secretary of State, reporting
that the candidate submitted to a urinalysis drug test within 30
days prior to qualifying for nomination or election and that the
results were negative. § 21-2140(c). The statute lists as
"[i]llegal drug[s]": marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and
phencyclidines. § 21-2140(a)(3). The designated state offices are:
"the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney
General, State School Superintendent, Commissioner of
Insurance,
310
Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, Justices of
the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the
superior courts, district attorneys, members of the General
Assembly, and members of the Public Service Commission." §
21-2-140(a)(4).
Candidate drug tests are to be administered in a manner
consistent with the United States Department of Health and Human
Services Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg. 11979-11989 (1988), or other
professionally valid procedures approved by Georgia's Commissioner
of Human Resources. See § 21-2140(a)(2). A candidate may provide
the test specimen at a laboratory approved by the State, or at the
office of the candidate's personal physician, see App. 4-5 (Joint
Statement of Undisputed Facts). Once a urine sample is obtained, an
approved laboratory determines whether any of the five specified
illegal drugs are present,
id., at 5; § 21-2-140(c), and
prepares a certificate reporting the test results to the
candidate.
Petitioners were Libertarian Party nominees in 1994 for state
offices subject to the requirements of § 21-2-140. The Party
nominated Walker L. Chandler for the office of Lieutenant Governor,
Sharon T. Harris for the office of Commissioner of Agriculture, and
James D. Walker for the office of member of the General Assembly.
In May 1994, about one month before the deadline for submission of
the certificates required by §21-2-140, petitioners Chandler,
Harris, and Walker filed this action in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia. They asserted,
inter
alia, that the drug tests required by § 21-2-140 violated their
rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. Naming as defendants Governor Zell D.
Miller and two other state officials involved in the administration
of § 21-2-140, petitioners requested declaratory and injunctive
relief barring enforcement of the statute.
311
In June 1994, the District Court denied petitioners' motion for
a preliminary injunction. Stressing the importance of the state
offices sought and the relative unintrusiveness of the testing
procedure, the court found it unlikely that petitioners would
prevail on the merits of their claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5B.
Petitioners apparently submitted to the drug tests, obtained the
certificates required by § 21-2-140, and appeared on the ballot.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. After the 1994 election, the parties
jointly moved for the entry of final judgment on stipulated facts.
In January 1995, the District Court entered final judgment for
respondents.
A divided Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed.
73
F.3d 1543 (1996). It is settled law, the court accepted, that
the drug tests required by the statute rank as searches. But, as
was true of the drug-testing programs at issue in
Skinner
and
Von Raab, the court reasoned, § 21-2-140 serves "special
needs," interests other than the ordinary needs of law enforcement.
The court therefore endeavored to "'balance the individual's
privacy expectations against the Government's interests to
determine whether it [was] impractical to require a warrant or some
level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.'" 73
F. 3d, at 1545 (quoting
Von Raab, 489 U. S., at
665-666).
Examining the state interests involved, the court acknowledged
the absence of any record of drug abuse by elected officials in
Georgia. Nonetheless, the court observed, "[t]he people of Georgia
place in the trust of their elected officials ... their liberty,
their safety, their economic well-being, [and] ultimate
responsibility for law enforcement." 73 F. 3d, at 1546.
Consequently, "those vested with the highest executive authority to
make public policy in general and frequently to supervise Georgia's
drug interdiction efforts in particular must be persons
appreciative of the perils of drug use."
Ibid. The court
further noted that "[t]he nature of high public office in itself
demands the highest levels of honesty, clear-sightedness, and
clear-thinking."
Ibid. Re-
312
citing responsibilities of the offices petitioners sought, the
Court of Appeals perceived those "positions [as] particularly
susceptible to the 'risks of bribery and blackmail against which
the Government is entitled to guard.' "
Ibid. (quoting
Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 674).
Turning to petitioners' privacy interests, the Eleventh Circuit
emphasized that the tests could be conducted in the office of the
candidate's private physician, making the "intrusion here ... even
less than that approved in
Von Raab." 73 F. 3d, at 1547. The
court also noted the statute's reference to federally approved
drug-testing guidelines.
Ibid. The drug test itself would
reveal only the presence or absence of indicia of the use of
particular drugs, and not any other information about the health of
the candidate. Furthermore, the candidate would control release of
the test results: Should the candidate test positive, he or she
could forfeit the opportunity to run for office, and in that event,
nothing would be divulged to law enforcement officials.
Ibid. Another consideration, the court said, is the reality
that "candidates for high office must expect the voters to demand
some disclosures about their physical, emotional, and mental
fitness for the position."
Ibid. Concluding that the State's
interests outweighed the privacy intrusion caused by the required
certification, the court held the statute, as applied to
petitioners, not inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Ibid.1
Judge Barkett dissented. In her view, a balance of the State's
and candidates' interests was not appropriate, for the State had
failed to establish a special governmental need for the regime.
"There is nothing so special or immediate about the generalized
governmental interests involved here," she observed, "as to warrant
suspension of the Fourth
1 The court also rejected equal protection and free speech pleas
made by petitioners. 73 F. 3d, at 1547-1549. We hold §21-2-140
incompatible with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and do not
reach petitioners' further pleas.
313
Amendment's requirement of individualized suspicion for searches
and seizures."
Id., at 1551.
We granted the petition for certiorari, 518 U. S. 1057 (1996),
and now reverse.2
II
We begin our discussion of this case with an uncontested point:
Georgia's drug-testing requirement, imposed by law and enforced by
state officials, effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. See
Skinner, 489 U. S., at 617;
Tr. of Oral Arg. 36; Brief for United States as
Amicus
Curiae 10 (collection and testing of urine to meet Georgia's
certification statute "constitutes a search subject to the demands
of the Fourth Amendment" (internal quotation marks omitted)). As
explained in
Skinner, government-ordered "collection and
testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society
has long recognized as reasonable." 489 U. S., at 617. Because
"these intrusions [are] searches under the Fourth Amendment,"
ibid., we focus on the question: Are the searches
reasonable?
To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily
must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. See
Vernonia, 515 U. S., at 652-653. But particularized
exceptions to the main rule are sometimes warranted based on
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement."
Skinner, 489 U. S., at 619 (internal
2 The United States, as
amicus curiae in support of
respondents, suggests that this case may have become moot because
there is no continuing controversy regarding the now-completed 1994
election, and petitioners, who did not sue on behalf of a class,
failed to assert in the courts below that they intended to run for
a covered state office in a future election. See Brief for United
States as
Amicus Curiae 9-10, n. 4. We reject the suggestion
of mootness. Petitioner Chandler represented, as an officer of this
Court, that he plans to run again, and counsel for the State does
not contest that representation. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-6, 27; see
also 28 U. S. C. § 1653 (defective allegations of jurisdiction
curable by amendment at trial or in appellate stages).
314
quotation marks omitted). When such "special needs"concerns
other than crime detection-are alleged in justification of a Fourth
Amendment intrusion, courts must undertake a context-specific
inquiry, examining closely the competing private and public
interests advanced by the parties. See
Von Raab, 489 U. S.,
at 665-666; see also
id., at 668. As
Skinner stated:
"In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated
by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental
interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by
a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be
reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion." 489 U. S., at
624.
In evaluating Georgia's ballot-access, drug-testing statute-a
measure plainly not tied to individualized suspicionthe Eleventh
Circuit sought to "'balance the individual's privacy expectations
against the [State's] interests,'" 73 F. 3d, at 1545 (quoting
Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 665), in line with our precedents
most immediately in point:
Skinner, Von Raab, and
Vernonia. We review those decisions before inspecting
Georgia's law.
A
Skinner concerned Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
regulations that required blood and urine tests of rail employees
involved in train accidents; the regulations also authorized
railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who
violated certain safety rules. 489 U. S., at 608-612. The FRA
adopted the drug-testing program in response to evidence of drug
and alcohol abuse by some railroad employees, the obvious safety
hazards posed by such abuse, and the documented link between drug-
and alcoholimpaired employees and the incidence of train accidents.
Id., at 607-608. Recognizing that the urinalysis tests, most
conspicuously, raised evident privacy concerns, the Court noted two
offsetting considerations: First, the regulations reduced the
intrusiveness of the collection process,
id., at 626;
315
and, more important, railway employees, "by reason of their
participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to
ensure safety," had diminished expectations of privacy,
id.,
at 627.
"[SJurpassing safety interests," the Court concluded, warranted
the FRA testing program.
Id., at 634. The drug tests could
deter illegal drug use by railroad employees, workers positioned to
"cause great human loss before any signs of impairment become
noticeable to supervisors."
Id., at 628. The program also
helped railroads to obtain invaluable information about the causes
of major train accidents. See
id., at 630. Testing without a
showing of individualized suspicion was essential, the Court
explained, if these vital interests were to be served. See
id., at 628. Employees could not forecast the timing of an
accident or a safety violation, events that would trigger testing.
The employee's inability to avoid detection simply by staying drug
free at a prescribed test time significantly enhanced the deterrent
effect of the program. See
ibid. Furthermore, imposing an
individualized suspicion requirement for a drug test in the chaotic
aftermath of a train accident would seriously impede an employer's
ability to discern the cause of the accident; indeed, waiting until
suspect individuals could be identified "likely would result in the
loss or deterioration of the evidence furnished by the tests."
Id., at 631.
In
Von Raab, the Court sustained a United States Customs
Service program that made drug tests a condition of promotion or
transfer to positions directly involving drug interdiction or
requiring the employee to carry a firearm. 489 U. S., at 660-661,
667-677.3 While the Service's regime was
3 The Service's program also required tests for individuals
promoted or transferred to positions in which they would handle
"classified" material. 489 U. S., at 661. The Court agreed that the
Government "ha[d] a compelling interest in protecting truly
sensitive information."
Id., at 677. However, we did not
rule on this aspect of the program, see
id., at 677-678,
316
not prompted by a demonstrated drug abuse problem,
id.,
at 660, it was developed for an agency with an "almost unique
mission,"
id., at 674, as the "first line of defense"
against the smuggling of illicit drugs into the United States,
id., at 668. Work directly involving drug interdiction and
posts that require the employee to carry a firearm pose grave
safety threats to employees who hold those positions, and also
expose them to large amounts of illegal narcotics and to persons
engaged in crime; illicit drug users in such high-risk positions
might be unsympathetic to the Service's mission, tempted by bribes,
or even threatened with blackmail. See
id., at 668-671. The
Court held that the Government had a "compelling" interest in
assuring that employees placed in these positions would not include
drug users. See
id., at 670-671. Individualized suspicion
would not work in this setting, the Court determined, because it
was "not feasible to subject [these] employees and their work
product to the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in more
traditional office environments."
Id., at 674.
Finally, in
Vernonia, the Court sustained a random
drugtesting program for high school students engaged in
interscholastic athletic competitions. The program's context was
critical, for a local government bears large "responsibilities,
under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children
entrusted to its care." 515 U. S., at 665. An "immediate crisis,"
id., at 663, caused by "a sharp increase in drug use" in the
school district,
id., at 648, sparked installation of the
program. District Court findings established that student athletes
were not only "among the drug users," they were "leaders of the
drug culture."
Id., at 649. Our decision noted that
"'students within the school environment have a lesser expectation
of privacy than members of the population generally.'"
Id.,
at 657 (quoting
New Jersey v.
because the record did not clarify "whether the category defined
by the [regulation] encompas[sed] only those Customs employees
likely to gain access to sensitive information,"
id., at
678.
317
T. L. 0., 469 U. S. 325, 348 (1985)
(Powell, J., concurring)). We emphasized the importance of
deterring drug use by schoolchildren and the risk of injury a
drug-using student athlete cast on himself and those engaged with
him on the playing field. See
Vernonia, 515 U. S., at
662.
B
Respondents urge that the precedents just examined are not the
sole guides for assessing the constitutional validity of the
Georgia statute. The "special needs" analysis, they contend, must
be viewed through a different lens because § 21-2-140 implicates
Georgia's sovereign power, reserved to it under the Tenth
Amendment, to establish qualifications for those who seek state
office. Respondents rely on
Gregory v.
Ashcroft,
501 U. S. 452
(1991), which upheld against federal statutory and Equal Protection
Clause challenges Missouri's mandatory retirement age of 70 for
state judges. The Court found this age classification reasonable
and not barred by the federal legislation. See
id., at 473.
States,
Gregory reaffirmed, enjoy wide latitude to establish
conditions of candidacy for state office, but in setting such
conditions, they may not disregard basic constitutional
protections. See
id., at
463; McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.
S. 618 (1978) (invalidating state provision prohibiting members
of clergy from serving as delegates to state constitutional
convention);
Communist Party of Ind. v.
Whitcomb,
414 U. S. 441
(1974) (voiding loyalty oath as a condition of ballot access);
Bond v.
Floyd, 385 U. S. 116 (1966) (Georgia
Legislature could not exclude elected representative on ground that
his antiwar statements cast doubt on his ability to take an oath).
We are aware of no precedent suggesting that a State's power to
establish qualifications for state offices-any more than its
sovereign power to prosecute crime-diminishes the constraints on
state action imposed by the Fourth Amendment. We therefore reject
respondents' invitation to apply in this case a framework
extraordinarily deferential to state meas-
318
ures setting conditions of candidacy for state office. Our
guides remain
Skinner, Von Raab, and
Vernonia.
Turning to those guides, we note, first, that the testing method
the Georgia statute describes is relatively noninvasive; therefore,
if the "special needs" showing had been made, the State could not
be faulted for excessive intrusion. Georgia's statute invokes the
drug-testing guidelines applicable to the federal programs upheld
in
Skinner and
Von Raab. See Brief for United States
as
Amicus Curiae 20-21; Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 661-662, n.
1. The State permits a candidate to provide the urine specimen in
the office of his or her private physician; and the results of the
test are given first to the candidate, who controls further
dissemination of the report. Because the State has effectively
limited the invasiveness of the testing procedure, we concentrate
on the core issue: Is the certification requirement warranted by a
special need?
Our precedents establish that the proffered special need for
drug testing must be substantial-important enough to override the
individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to
suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of
individualized suspicion. See
supra, at 313317 and this
page. Georgia has failed to show, in justification of §21-2-140, a
special need of that kind.
Respondents' defense of the statute rests primarily on the
incompatibility of unlawful drug use with holding high state
office. The statute is justified, respondents contend, because the
use of illegal drugs draws into question an official's judgment and
integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of public functions, including
antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines public confidence
and trust in elected officials. Brief for Respondents 11-18. The
statute, according to respondents, serves to deter unlawful drug
users from becoming candidates and thus stops them from attaining
high state office.
Id., at 17-18. Notably lacking in
respondents' pres-
319
entation is any indication of a concrete danger demanding
departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule.
Nothing in the record hints that the hazards respondents broadly
describe are real and not simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity.
The statute was not enacted, as counsel for respondents readily
acknowledged at oral argument, in response to any fear or suspicion
of drug use by state officials:
"QUESTION: Is there any indication anywhere in this record that
Georgia has a particular problem here with State officeholders
being drug abusers?
"[COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS]: No, there is no such evidence, [and]
to be frank, there is no such problem as we sit here today." Tr. of
Oral Arg. 32.
See also
id., at 31 (counsel for respondents affirms
absence of evidence that state officeholders in Georgia have drug
problems). A demonstrated problem of drug abuse, while not in all
cases necessary to the validity of a testing regime, see
Von
Raab, 489 U. S., at 673-675, would shore up an assertion of
special need for a suspicionless general search program. Proof of
unlawful drug use may help to clarify-and to substantiate-the
precise hazards posed by such use. Thus, the evidence of drug and
alcohol use by railway employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks
in
Skinner, see 489 U. S., at 606-608, and the immediate
crisis prompted by a sharp rise in students' use of unlawful drugs
in
Vernonia, see 515 U. S., at 662-663, bolstered the
Government's and school officials' arguments that drug-testing
programs were warranted and appropriate.
In contrast to the effective testing regimes upheld in
Skinner, Von Raab, and
Vernonia, Georgia's
certification requirement is not well designed to identify
candidates who violate antidrug laws. Nor is the scheme a credible
means to deter illicit drug users from seeking election to state
office. The test date-to be scheduled by the candidate anytime
within
320
30 days prior to qualifying for a place on the ballot-is no
secret. As counsel for respondents acknowledged at oral argument,
users of illegal drugs, save for those prohibitively addicted,
could abstain for a pretest period sufficient to avoid detection.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 44-46.4 Even if we indulged respondents'
argument that one purpose of § 21-2140 might be to detect those
unable so to abstain, see
id., at 46, respondents have not
shown or argued that such persons are likely to be candidates for
public office in Georgia. Moreover, respondents have offered no
reason why ordinary law enforcement methods would not suffice to
apprehend such addicted individuals, should they appear in the
limelight of a public stage. Section 21-2-140, in short, is not
needed and cannot work to ferret out lawbreakers, and respondents
barely attempt to support the statute on that ground.
Respondents and the United States as
amicus curiae rely
most heavily on our decision in
Von Raab, which sustained a
drug-testing program for Customs Service officers prior to
promotion or transfer to certain high-risk positions, despite the
absence of any documented drug abuse problem among Service
employees. 489 U. S., at 660; see Brief for Respondents 12-14;
Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 18; see also 73 F.
3d, at 1546. The posts in question in
Von Raab directly
involved drug interdiction or otherwise required the Service member
to carry a firearm. See 489 U. S., at 670 ("Government has a
compelling interest in ensuring that front-line interdiction
personnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and
judgment.");
id., at 670-671 ("[T]he public should not bear
the risk that employees who may suffer from impaired perception and
judgment will be promoted to positions where they may need to
employ deadly force.").
4 In
Treasury Employees v.
Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656 (1989), the
applicant for promotion or transfer could not know precisely when
action would be taken on the application. In contrast, the
potential candidate knows from the start the timing of all relevant
events.
321
Hardly a decision opening broad vistas for suspicionless
searches,
Von Raab must be read in its unique context. As
the Customs Service reported in announcing the testing program:
"Customs employees, more than any other Federal workers, are
routinely exposed to the vast network of organized crime that is
inextricably tied to illegal drug use."
National Treasury
Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 816 F.2d
170, 173 (CA5 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd
in part, vacated in part,
489 U. S. 656 (1989). We
stressed that "[d]rug interdiction ha[d] become the agency's
primary enforcement mission,"
id., at 660, and that the
employees in question would have "access to vast sources of
valuable contraband,"
id., at 669. Furthermore, Customs
officers "ha[d] been the targets of bribery by drug smugglers on
numerous occasions," and several had succumbed to the temptation.
Ibid.
Respondents overlook a telling difference between
Von
Raab and Georgia's candidate drug-testing program. In
Von
Raab it was "not feasible to subject employees [required to
carry firearms or concerned with interdiction of controlled
substances] and their work product to the kind of day-to-day
scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office environments."
Id., at 674. Candidates for public office, in contrast, are
subject to relentless scrutiny-by their peers, the public, and the
press. Their day-to-day conduct attracts attention notably beyond
the norm in ordinary work environments.
What is left, after close review of Georgia's scheme, is the
image the State seeks to project. By requiring candidates for
public office to submit to drug testing, Georgia displays its
commitment to the struggle against drug abuse. The suspicionless
tests, according to respondents, signify that candidates, if
elected, will be fit to serve their constituents free from the
influence of illegal drugs. But Georgia asserts no evidence of a
drug problem among the State's elected officials, those officials
typically do not perform high-risk,
322
safety-sensitive tasks, and the required certification
immediately aids no interdiction effort. The need revealed, in
short, is symbolic, not "special," as that term draws meaning from
our case law.
In
Von Raab, the Customs Service had defended its officer
drug-testing program in part as a way to demonstrate the agency's
commitment to enforcement of the law. See Brief for United States
in
Treasury Employees v.
Von Raab, O. T. 1988, No.
86-1879, pp. 35-36. The
Von Raab Court, however, did not
rely on that justification. Indeed, if a need of the "set a good
example" genre were sufficient to overwhelm a Fourth Amendment
objection, then the care this Court took to explain why the needs
in
Skinner, Von Raab, and
Vernonia ranked as
"special" wasted many words in entirely unnecessary, perhaps even
misleading, elaborations.
In a pathmarking dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis recognized
the importance of teaching by example: "Our Government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example."
Olmstead v.
United
States, 277 U. S.
438, 485 (1928). Justice Brandeis explained in
Olmstead
why the Government set a bad example when it introduced in a
criminal proceeding evidence obtained through an unlawful
Government wiretap:
"[I]t is ... immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law
enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to
protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk
in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, wellmeaning but without
understanding." Id., at 479.
However well meant, the candidate drug test Georgia has devised
diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's sake. The Fourth
Amendment shields society against that state action.
323
III
We note, finally, matters this OpInIOn does not treat.
Georgia's singular drug test for candidates is not part of a
medical examination designed to provide certification of a
candidate's general health, and we express no opinion on such
examinations. Nor do we touch on financial disclosure requirements,
which implicate different concerns and procedures. See,
e.
g., Barry v.
City of New York, 712 F.2d
1554 (CA2 1983) (upholding city's financial disclosure law for
elected and appointed officials, candidates for city office, and
certain city employees);
Plante v.
Gonzalez,
575 F.2d
1119 (CA5 1978) (upholding Florida's financial disclosure
requirements for certain public officers, candidates, and
employees). And we do not speak to drug testing in the private
sector, a domain unguarded by Fourth Amendment constraints. See
United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 113
(1984).
We reiterate, too, that where the risk to public safety is
substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to
the risk may rank as "reasonable"-for example, searches now routine
at airports and at entrances to courts and other official
buildings. See
Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 674-676, and n. 3.
But where, as in this case, public safety is not genuinely in
jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search,
no matter how conveniently arranged.
***
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit is
Reversed.
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
I fear that the novelty of this Georgia law has led the Court to
distort Fourth Amendment doctrine in order to strike it down. The
Court notes, impliedly turning up its nose, that "Georgia was the
first, and apparently remains the only, State to condition
candidacy for state office on a drug
324
test."
Ante, at 309. But if we are to heed the oft-quoted
words of Justice Brandeis in his dissent in
New State Ice
Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311
(1932)-"[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country"-novelty itself is not a
vice. These novel experiments, of course, must comply with the
United States Constitution; but their mere novelty should not be a
strike against them.
Few would doubt that the use of illegal drugs and abuse of legal
drugs is one of the major problems of our society. Cases before
this Court involving drug use extend to numerous
occupations-railway employees,
Skinner v.
Railway Labor
Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602 (1989),
Border Patrol officers,
Treasury Employees v.
Von
Raab, 489 U. S.
656 (1989), high school students,
Vernonia School Dist.
47J v.
Acton, 515 U. S. 646 (1995), and
machine operators,
Paperworkers v.
Misco, Inc.,
484 U. S. 29
(1987). It would take a bolder person than I to say that such
widespread drug usage could never extend to candidates for public
office such as Governor of Georgia. The Court says that "[n]othing
in the record hints that the hazards respondents broadly describe
are real and not simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity."
Ante, at 319. But surely the State need not wait for a drug
addict, or one inclined to use drugs illegally, to run for or
actually become Governor before it installs a prophylactic
mechanism. We held as much in
Von Raab:
"First, petitioners argue that the program is unjustified
because it is not based on a belief that testing will reveal any
drug use by covered employees. In pressing this argument,
petitioners point out that the Service's testing scheme was not
implemented in response to any perceived drug problem among Customs
employees ....
"Petitioners' first contention evinces an unduly narrow view of
the context in which the Service's testing
325
program was implemented. Petitioners do not dispute, nor can
there be doubt, that drug abuse is one of the most serious problems
confronting our society today. There is little reason to believe
that American workplaces are immune from this pervasive social
problem .... " 489 U. S., at 673-674.
The test under the Fourth Amendment, as these cases have held,
is whether the search required by the Georgia statute is
"reasonable." Today's opinion speaks of a "closely guarded" class
of permissible suspicionless searches which must be justified by a
"special need." But this term, as used in
Skinner and
Von
Raab and on which the Court now relies, was used in a quite
different sense than it is used by the Court today. In
Skinner and
Von Raab it was used to describe a basis
for a search apart from the regular needs of law enforcement,
Skinner, supra, at 620;
Von Raab, supra, at 669. The
"special needs" inquiry as delineated there has not required
especially great "importan[ce],"
ante, at 318, unless one
considers "the supervision of probationers," or the "operation of a
government office,"
Skinner, supra, at 620, to be especially
"important." Under our precedents, if there was a proper
governmental purpose other than law enforcement, there was a
"special need," and the Fourth Amendment then required the familiar
balancing between that interest and the individual's privacy
interest.
Under normal Fourth Amendment analysis, the individual's
expectation of privacy is an important factor in the equation. But
here, the Court perversely relies on the fact that a candidate for
office
gives up so much privacy-"[c]andidates for public
office ... are subject to relentless scrutinyby their peers, the
public, and the press,"
ante, at 321-as a reason for
sustaining a Fourth Amendment claim. The Court says, in
effect, that the kind of drug test for candidates required by the
Georgia law is unnecessary, because the scrutiny to which they are
already subjected by reason of their candidacy will enable people
to detect any drug use on
326
their part. But this is a strange holding, indeed. One might
just as easily say that the railroad employees in
Skinner,
or the Customs officials in
Von Raab, would be subjected to
the same sort of scrutiny from their fellow employees and their
supervisors. But the clear teaching of those cases is that the
government is not required to settle for that sort of a vague and
uncanalized scrutiny; if in fact preventing persons who use illegal
drugs from concealing that fact from the public is a legitimate
government interest, these cases indicate that the government may
require a drug test.
The privacy concerns ordinarily implicated by urinalysis drug
testing are "negligible,"
Vernonia, supra, at 658, when the
procedures used in collecting and analyzing the urine samples are
set up "to reduce the intrusiveness" of the process,
Skinner,
supra, at 626. Under the Georgia law, the candidate may produce
the test specimen at his own doctor's office, which must be one of
the least intrusive types of urinalysis drug tests conceivable. But
although the Court concedes this, it nonetheless manages to count
this factor against the State, because with this kind of test the
person tested will have advance notice of its being given, and will
therefore be able to abstain from drug use during the necessary
period of time. But one may be sure that if the test were
random-and therefore apt to ensnare more users-the Court would then
fault it for its intrusiveness. Cf.
Von Raab, 489 U. S., at
676, and n. 4.
In
Von Raab, we described as "compelling" the Government
interest "in ensuring that many of these covered employees do not
use drugs
even off duty, for such use creates risks of
bribery and blackmail against which the Government is entitled to
guard."
Id., at 674 (emphasis added). The risks of bribery
and blackmail for high-level officials of state government using
illegal drugs would seem to be at least as significant as those for
off-duty Customs officials. Even more important, however, is our
treatment of the third class of tested employees in
Von
Raab, those who "handle[d] 'clas-
327
sified' materials." The Court relegates this discussion to a
footnote,
ante, at 315, n. 3, and all but dismisses it.
Although the lack of factual development of the record in
Von Raab prevented us from determining
who "handle[d]
'classified' material," we did consider the
weight of the
proffered governmental interest:
"We readily agree that the Government has a compelling interest
in protecting truly sensitive information from those who, 'under
compulsion of circumstances or for other reasons, ... might
compromise [such] information.' Department of Navy v.
Egan, 484 U.
S. 518, 528 (1988) . . . . We also agree that employees who
seek promotions to positions where they would handle sensitive
information can be required to submit to a urine test under the
Service's screening program, especially if the positions covered
under this category require background investigations, medical
examinations, or other intrusions that may be expected to diminish
their expectations of privacy in respect of a urinalysis test." 489
U. S., at 677.
Although petitioners might raise questions as to some of the
other positions covered by the Georgia statute, there is no
question that, at least for positions like Governor and Lieutenant
Governor, identical concerns are implicated. In short, when
measured through the correct lens of our precedents in this area,
the Georgia urinalysis test is a "reasonable" search; it is only by
distorting these precedents that the Court is able to reach the
result it does.
Lest readers expect the holding of this case to be extended to
any other case, the Court notes that the drug test here is not a
part of a medical examination designed to provide certification of
a candidate's general health.
Ante, at 323. It is all but
inconceivable that a case involving that sort of requirement could
be decided differently than the present case; the same sort of
urinalysis would be involved. The only possible basis for
distinction is to say that the State has
328
a far greater interest in the candidate's "general health" than
it does with respect to his propensity to use illegal drugs. But
this is the sort of policy judgment that surely must be left to
legislatures, rather than being announced from on high by the
Federal Judiciary.
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment or in any other part of the
Constitution prevents a State from enacting a statute whose
principal vice is that it may seem misguided or even silly to the
Members of this Court. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
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