OCTOBER TERM, 1995
Syllabus
CARLISLE
v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT
No. 94-9247. Argued January 16, 1996-Decided April 29, 1996
At his trial on a federal marijuana charge, petitioner filed his
motion for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29(c) after the jury returned a guilty verdict and was
discharged. The District Court granted the motion even though it
was filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by Rule 29(c),
which provides,
inter alia, that "[i]f the jury returns a
verdict of guilty ... , a motion for judgment of acquittal may be
made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or
within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day
period." In reversing and remanding for reinstatement of the
verdict and for sentencing, the Sixth Circuit held that under Rule
29 a district court has no jurisdiction to grant an untimely motion
for judgment of acquittal, or to enter such a judgment
sua
sponte after submission of the case to the jury.
Held: The District Court had no authority to grant
petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day outside
the Rule 29(c) time limit. Pp.419-433.
(a) The Rules do not permit the granting of an untimely
postverdict motion for judgment of acquittal. Rule 29(c)'s text,
when read with Rule 45(b)'s statement that "the court may not
extend the time for taking any action under Rul[e] 29 ... except to
the extent and under the conditions stated in [the Rule]," is plain
and unambiguous: If, as in this case, a guilty verdict is returned,
a motion for judgment of acquittal must be filed either within
seven days of the jury's discharge or within an extended period
fixed by the court during that 7-day period. Furthermore, in light
of Rule 29(c)'s clarity, petitioner cannot rely either on Rule 2,
which requires that ambiguous Rules "be construed to secure
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay," or on Rule 57,
which allows district courts discretion to regulate practice when
there is no controlling law. Pp. 419-425.
(b) This Court rejects petitioner's invocation of courts'
"inherent supervisory power" as alternative authority for the
District Court's action. Whatever the scope of federal courts'
inherent power to formulate procedural rules not specifically
required by the Constitution or the Congress, it does not include
the power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
417
See,
e. g., Bank of Nova Scotia v.
United States,
487 U. S. 250,
254-255. Whether the District Court's action is described as the
granting of an untimely motion, or the
sua sponte entry of a
judgment of acquittal, it contradicted Rule 29(c)'s plain language
and effectively annulled the 7-day filing limit. The cautionary
principle that the Court will not lightly assume that the Rules
mean to depart from established principles does not apply in this
case, because prior to the enactment of Rule 29, there was no long,
unquestioned power of federal district courts to acquit for
insufficient evidence
sua sponte, after return of a guilty
verdict. Pp. 425-428.
(c) The Court also rejects petitioner's remaining arguments: (1)
that the District Court had power to order acquittal in this case
under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651, through the writ of
coram nobis; (2) that the failure to allow the District
Court to order acquittal would violate the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause; and (3) that prohibiting a district court from
granting an acquittal motion filed only one day late will lead to
needless appeals and habeas corpus proceedings. pp. 428-430.
(d) The Court rebuts arguments put forward by the dissent,
including the proposition that permissive rules do not withdraw
pre-existing inherent powers, and the dissent's reliance on this
Court's precedents to support the existence of the "inherent power"
petitioner invokes. pp. 430-433.
48 F.3d
190, affirmed.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SOUTER, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and
BREYER, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p. 434. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion, in
which SOUTER and BREYER, JJ., joined,
post, p. 434. STEVENS,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY, J., joined,
post, p. 436.
James A. Christopherson argued the cause and filed briefs
for petitioner. With him on the briefs was
Joel R.
Myler.
Paul A. Engelmayer argued the cause for the United States. With
him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant
Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and
David S. Kris.
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a district court has
authority to grant a postverdict motion for judgment of
418
acquittal filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c).
I
Petitioner Charles Carlisle, along with several codefendants,
was tried by jury in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan for conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§ 841, 846,
84 Stat. 1260, 1265. He did not move during the trial for a
judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
29(a). On July 13, 1993, the jury returned a guilty verdict and was
discharged. On July 23, 1993, Carlisle filed a "Motion for a
Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29(c)," arguing that there was insufficient evidence to
sustain his conviction. App. 6-9. Rule 29(c) provides that "a
motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7
days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as
the court may fix during the 7-day period." Excluding the
intermediate Saturday and Sunday (as Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 45(a) requires), the 7-day period in this case ended on
July 22,1993. The United States' response to Carlisle's motion
argued that it should be denied as untimely and, alternatively,
that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The
District Court denied Carlisle's motion on August 19, 1993. Its
written opinion did not address the timeliness issue, but concluded
that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Carlisle knew about, and
knowingly and voluntarily joined, the charged conspiracy.
When Carlisle appeared for sentencing on October 14, 1993, the
District Court announced that it was reversing its ruling. When it
made its decision in August, the court said, it had prepared two
opinions, one granting and one denying the motion, and it had now
decided to substitute the former for the latter. The court
subsequently entered an order that
419
(i) withdrew the opinion and order denying the motion to acquit
and (ii) granted "Carlisle's motion for a judgment of acquittal
pursuant to Rule 29(c), filed July 23, 1993." App. 45. An opinion
accompanying the order concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that Carlisle knowingly and voluntarily joined
the conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana. In a footnote,
the opinion acknowledged that the motion for judgment of acquittal
was filed one day late, but concluded:
" ... I can conceive of no prejudice to the United States which
will result from consideration of a motion that is one day lat[e]
in this case. Because I believe that refusal to hear this motion
would result in grave injustice, and because [Rule 29(c)] permits
the Court to extend the deadline, I will consider this motion as if
it were filed in a timely manner." Id., at 37.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed the judgment of acquittal and remanded to the District
Court for reinstatement of the jury's verdict and for sentencing.
It held that under Rule 29 a district court has no jurisdiction to
grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, and that a
district court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment of acquittal
sua sponte after the case has been submitted to the jury.
48 F.3d
190, 192 (1995). We granted certiorari. 515 U. S. 1191
(1995).
II
Petitioner argues that district courts "should be given the
power to go outside the strict time limits of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 29(c)" when (1) there is a claim that the
defendant was legally innocent, (2) the motion is filed prior to
sentencing, and (3) the motion was not timely filed because of
attorney error. Brief for Petitioner 8. Petitioner seeks to root
this argument in, among other places, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
420
Rule 29 is reproduced in its entirety below.1 Subdivision (c)
provides, in relevant part, that "[i]f the jury returns a verdict
of guilty ... , a motion for judgment of acquittal may
1 "Rule 29. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
"(a) MOTION BEFORE SUBMISSION TO JURY. Motions for directed
verdict are abolished and motions for judgment of acquittal shall
be used in their place. The court on motion of a defendant or of
its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of
one or more offenses charged in the indictment or information after
the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.
If a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of
the evidence offered by the government is not granted, the
defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right.
"(b) RESERVATION OF DECISION ON MOTION. The court may reserve
decision on a motion for judgment of acquittal, proceed with the
trial (where the motion is made before the close of all the
evidence), submit the case to the jury and decide the motion either
before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of
guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict. If the
court reserves decision, it must decide the motion on the basis of
the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved.
"(c) MOTION AFTER DISCHARGE OF JURY. If the jury returns a
verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a
verdict, a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed
within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further
time as the court may fix during the 7 -day period. If a verdict of
guilty is returned the court may on such motion set aside the
verdict and enter judgment of acquittal. If no verdict is returned
the court may enter judgment of acquittal. It shall not be
necessary to the making of such a motion that a similar motion has
been made prior to the submission of the case to the jury.
"(d) SAME: CONDITIONAL RULING ON GRANT OF MOTION. If a motion
for judgment of acquittal after verdict of guilty under this Rule
is granted, the court shall also determine whether any motion for a
new trial should be granted if the judgment of acquittal is
thereafter vacated or reversed, specifying the grounds for such
determination. If the motion for a new trial is granted
conditionally, the order thereon does not affect the finality of
the judgment. If the motion for a new trial has been granted
conditionally and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial
shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. If
such motion has been denied conditionally, the appellee on appeal
may assert error in that denial, and if the judgment is reversed on
appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the
order of the appellate court."
421
be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or
within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day
period." Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(b) provides that
whereas certain untimely acts may be accorded validity upon a
showing of excusable neglect, "the court may not extend the time
for taking any action under Rul[e] 29 ... except to the extent and
under the conditions stated in [the Rule]." These Rules are plain
and unambiguous. If, as in this case, a guilty verdict is returned,
a motion for judgment of acquittal must be filed, either within
seven days of the jury's discharge, or within an extended period
fixed by the court during that 7 -day period. There is simply no
room in the text of Rules 29 and 45(b) for the granting of an
untimely postverdict motion for judgment of acquittal, regardless
of whether the motion is accompanied by a claim of legal innocence,
is filed before sentencing, or was filed late because of attorney
error.
Unable to offer any reading of Rule 29(c) that would permit an
untimely motion for judgment of acquittal to be granted, Carlisle
contends that Rule 29(a) gives a district court authority to enter
a judgment of acquittal
sua sponte at any time before
sentencing. Rule 29(a), entitled "Motion Before Submission to
Jury," provides in relevant part:
"The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall
order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses
charged in the indictment or information after the evidence on
either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction of such offense or offenses."
It would be quite a surprise to find a district court's
sua
sponte power to grant judgment of acquittal
after
submission of the case to the jury hidden away in a provision
entitled "Motion
Before Submission to Jury." We are not
inclined to adopt an interpretation that creates such a surprise
unless the intent that the text exceed its caption is clear.
422
Here, to the contrary, the structure of Rule 29 indicates that
subdivision (a) is limited as its caption says.
Petitioner's proposed reading would create an odd system in
which defense counsel could move for judgment of acquittal for only
seven days after the jury's discharge, but the court's power to
enter such a judgment would linger. In
United States v.
Smith, 331 U.
S. 469 (1947), we declined to read former Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 33, which placed a 5-day limit on the making of
a motion for new trial, as "permit[ting] the judge to order retrial
without request and at any time," 331 U. S., at 473. "[I]t would be
a strange rule," we said, "which deprived a judge of power to do
what was asked when request was made by the person most concerned,
and yet allowed him to act without petition," and such an
arrangement "would almost certainly subject trial judges to private
appeals or application by counselor friends of one convicted,"
id., at 474, 475. The same is true here.2 In addition,
petitioner's reading makes a farce of subdivision (b) of Rule 29,
which provides that a court may reserve decision on the motion for
judgment of acquittal and decide it after submission to the jury.
There would be no need for this procedure if, even without
reserving, the court had continuing power to grant judgment of
acquittal on its own. In
2 The dissent forcefully argues that
Smith does not
compel the result we reach in this case.
Post, at 452-453.
That is an effective rejoinder to an argument we have not made. In
response to the argument we
have made-that some of the
considerations supporting the holding in
Smith apply
here-the dissent (i) ignores the portion of
Smith discussing
the strangeness of a rule that would give a judge greater power to
act
sua sponte than on motion; and (ii) transforms
Smith's desire to spare trial judges "private appeals or
application by counselor friends of the person convicted" into a
concern for the "appearance of impropriety" that
"ex parte
approaches" would create,
post, at 453, which concern in the
present context (though presumably for some reason not in the
Smith context) the dissent regards as "a highly
inappropriate comment on the integrity of the federal judiciary,"
ibid., and the dissent says it was dictum in
Smith
anyway.
423
sum, even without the captions (and
a fortiori with them)
it is clear that subdivisions (a) and (b) of Rule 29 pertain to
motions made before submission, and subdivisions (c) and (d) to
motions made after discharge.
The Government offers an alternative theory of a court's power
to act
sua sponte under Rule 29: Because Rule 29(a) refers
to both a "motion of a defendant" and a court's "own motion,"
whereas Rule 29(c) refers only to "a motion"
simpliciter,
the latter must refer to motions both of defendants and of courts,
permitting both such "motions" to be made within seven days after
the jury's discharge. We do not find this reading plausible. Rule
29(c) not only provides that "a motion for judgment of acquittal"
may be made or renewed within seven days after the jury is
discharged. It goes on to provide, in its second and third
sentences:
"If a verdict of guilty is returned the court may
on such motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment of
acquittal.
If no verdict is returned the court may enter
judgment of acquittal." The phrase "on such motion" is notably
absent from the third sentence-conveying the idea that, where a
jury has not returned a verdict, a court can act without motion,
but where a jury has returned a guilty verdict, it cannot. But if
"on such motion" includes action taken by a court on its own
initiative, the limiting phrase "on such motion" in the second
sentence has no effect, and a court may act on its own
whether
or not a verdict has been returned. That is to say, the
inclusion of the phrase "on such motion" in one sentence but not in
the other would be inexplicable.3
3 Perhaps even more inexplicable is what precisely would be
achieved by the Government's reading, which (unlike petitioner's
theories) would permit the court to act
sua sponte only
during the 7-day period specified by the Rule (or any extension
thereof ordered by the court during the 7-day period, as Rule 29(c)
allows). The sole beneficiary of the Government's textual
contortions is the district judge who wants to set aside a verdict,
but lacks the wit to invite a motion for that during the 7-day
period, or (if defendant's counsel is unavailable) to extend the
7-day period,
424
Petitioner contends that even if Rule 29 does not permit a court
to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 2 vests the court with supervisory power to
enter judgment of acquittal. Rule 2 provides:
"These rules are intended to provide for the just determination
of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay."
This Rule is of no aid to petitioner. It sets forth a principle
of interpretation to be used in construing ambiguous rules, not a
principle of law superseding clear rules that do not achieve the
stated objectives. It does not, that is to say, provide that rules
shall be construed to mean something other than what they plainly
say-which is what petitioner's proposed construction of Rule 29(c)
would require.
We must acknowledge that there is precedent in this Court for
using Rule 2 as a basis for deviating from time limits imposed by
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In
Fallen v.
United States, 378 U. S. 139 (1964), we
cited Rule 2 in the course of excusing the failure of an
incarcerated paraplegic
pro se petitioner to comply with the
time limit for filing a notice of appeal under former Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 37(a). Concluding that the petitioner "had
done all that could reasonably be expected" to file a timely
appeal, including mailing a notice of appeal to the clerk's office
two days before the notice was due, we "decline[d] to read the
Rules so rigidly as to bar a determination of his appeal on the
merits." 378 U. S., at 144.
Fallen has been made obsolete by
an amendment to Rule 37(a).4 And
sua sponte, in order to invite such a motion later. It is
our hope and belief that no such district judge exists.
4 Rule 37(a) was amended in 1966 to provide that a district
court may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal "[u]pon a
showing of excusable
425
of course
Fallen was a narrow ruling when it was
announced, as is evident from
Berman v.
United
States, 378 U. S.
530 (1964) (per curiam), a decision announced on
the same day as
Fallen, summarily affirming the dismissal of
an appeal that had been filed one day late.
Finally, petitioner cannot rely on Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 57 as the source of the District Court's authority in
this case. The version of Rule 57 in effect when criminal
proceedings against petitioner commenced (and which he relied upon
at oral argument) states, in relevant part, that, "[i]n all cases
not provided for by rule, the district judges ... may regulate
their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules."
The relevant portion of the current version of Rule 57 is captioned
"Procedure When There Is No Controlling Law," and states: "A judge
may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law,
these rules, and local rules of the district." Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 57(b). We need not decide which version of this Rule controls
the present case, because neither authorizes the District Court's
action here. A rule permitting a party to submit and prevail on an
untimely motion for judgment of acquittal is "inconsistent" (or not
"consistent") with Rule 29's 7 -day filing limit; and the question
of when a motion for judgment of acquittal may be granted does not
present a case "not provided for" by Rule 29; and Rule 29 is the
"controlling law" governing this question.
III
As alternative authority for the District Court's action,
petitioner invokes courts' "inherent supervisory power." Brief for
Petitioner 9. We have recognized that federal
neglect." See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 37(a) (1966). When Rule
37(a) was abrogated and replaced by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(b), the substance of this amendment was transferred to
Rule 4(b). See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(b) (1968).
426
courts "may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not
specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress."
United States v.
Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 505
(1983). Whatever the scope of this "inherent power," however, it
does not include the power to develop rules that circumvent or
conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. As we
recognized in
Bank of Nova Scotia v.
United States,
487 U. S. 250,
254-255 (1988), holding that federal courts may not invoke
supervisory power to circumvent Rule 52(a): "[F]ederal courts have
no more discretion to disregard the Rule's mandate than they do to
disregard constitutional or statutory provisions." Whether the
action of the District Court here is described as the granting of
an untimely motion, or the
sua sponte entry of a judgment of
acquittal, it contradicted the plain language of Rule 29(c), and
effectively annulled the 7 -day filing limit.
In
Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U. S. 32, 47 (1991),
we said that we would not "'lightly assume that Congress has
intended to depart from established principles' such as the scope
of a court's inherent power,"
id., at 47 (quoting
Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 313
(1982)). Similarly, in
Link v.
Wabash R. Co.,
370 U. S. 626,
629-632 (1962), we said that since a district court's authority to
dismiss
sua sponte for lack of prosecution was a "sanction
of wide usage," we would not assume, in the absence of a clear
expression, that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which
allowed a party to
move for dismissal for lack of
prosecution, abrogated this "long ... unquestioned" power. That
cautionary principle does not apply in the present case, not only
because of the clarity of the text, but also because we are unaware
of any "long unquestioned" power of federal district courts to
acquit for insufficient evidence
sua sponte, after return of
a guilty verdict. Indeed, we are aware of only two cases prior to
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that could
be read as asserting in dictum the existence of
427
such a power.
United States v.
McCracken, 26 F.
Cas. 1069, 1069 (No. 15,664) (ED Va. 1878);
United States v.
Hayden, 26 F. Cas. 236, 238 (No. 15,333) (NDNY 1877).5
5 The dissent's extended discussion of pre-Rule federal cases
produces a lot of smoke, and no fire.
Ansley v.
United
States, 135 F.2d 207, 208
(CA5 1943), described by the
dissent as "establishing a district court's inherent power to
review
sua sponte a jury verdict for sufficiency of the
evidence,"
post, at 446, establishes no such thing. There,
after noting the appellants' failure to renew their motions for
directed verdict at the close of evidence, the Fifth Circuit
said:
"[T]he question of the sufficiency of the evidence was not
properly saved for review by this court. It is true that the
question may and should be raised by the court of its own motion,
if necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice, but this is not
such a case. We have examined the record, and have found it to
contain ample evidence to support the judgment." 135 F. 2d, at
208.
It is obvious that the statement "the question may and should be
raised by the court of its own motion" refers to the power of an
appellate court to review sufficiency of the evidence where
the issue has not been preserved for appeal. The cases cited by the
dissent deal with the power of a district court to enter a judgment
of acquittal
before the return of a verdict (i.
e.,
to direct a verdict of acquittal), see
Cady v.
United
States, 293 F.8d
9 (CADC 1923);
Nosowitz v.
United States,
282 F.5d
5, 578
(CA2 1922); United States v.
Fullerton, 25
F. Cas. 1225 (No. 15,176) (SDNY 1870); the power of a district
court to set aside a verdict and order a new trial, see
Wiborg v.
United States, 163 U. S. 632, 658-659
(1896);
United States v.
Harding, 26 F. Cas. 131, 136
(No. 15,301) (ED Pa. 1846); cf.
Charles v.
State, 4
Port. 107, 109-110 (Ala. 1836); the power of a district court to
enter judgment of acquittal where the defendant
has made a
preverdict or postverdict motion to acquit, see
Ex parte United
States, 101 F.2d 870, 878
(CA7 1939), aff'd by an
equally divided Court,
United States v.
Stone, 308 U.
S. 519 (1939);
United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 23
F. Supp. 937, 938-939 (WD Wis. 1938); cf.
State v.
Meen, 171 Wis. 36, 38-39 (1920); and even the power of an
appellate court to reverse a district court's denial of a
motion for directed verdict, see
Nosowitz, supra, at 578;
Cherry v.
United States, 78 F.2d 334
(CA7
1935);
Reiner v.
United States, 92 F.2d 823, 824-825
(CA9 1937);
France v.
United States, 164 U. S. 676, 680
(1897);
Romano v.
United States, 9 F.2d 522, 524
(CA2 1925). Not a single pre-Rule case cited by the dissent
purports to exercise the power at issue here: a
district
court's power to enter
judgment of acquittal for
insufficient evidence,
without motion, and
after the
return of a guilty
428
The case law of this Court that petitioner relies upon does not
establish any "inherent power" to act in contravention of
applicable Rules. In
Gaca v.
United States, 411 U. S. 618
(1973) (per curiam), which reinstated an appeal that had
been dismissed for want of timely prosecution, there was no
suggestion that reinstatement was contrary to any statute or rule
of procedure. And in
United States v.
Nobles,
422 U. S. 225
(1975), which approved exercise of a District Court's inherent
authority to order the disclosure of certain witness statements, we
felt it necessary to make sure that such exercise did not conflict
with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Petitioner's best case
is
Thompson v.
INS, 375 U. S. 384 (1964),
which, contrary to former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(a),
gave effect to a notice of appeal filed more than 60 days from the
entry of judgment.
Thompson, however, is not pertinent here,
since it expressly relied upon the "'unique circumstances'" that
the cause of the failure to meet the Rule's deadline was an
erroneous ruling or assurance by the District Court itself. 375 U.
S., at 387 (quoting
Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Cherry
Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215, 217 (1962)
(per curiam)).
IV
Petitioner's three remaining arguments need not detain us long.
First, he argues that the District Court had power to enter a
judgment of acquittal in this case under the All Writs Act, 28 U.
S. C. § 1651, through the writ of
coram nobis. Apart from
the fact that the District Court was not asked to
verdict. The dissent apparently thinks it an adequate
explanation for this lack of support that, prior to our decision in
United States v.
Smith, 331 U. S. 469, 474 (1947)
(suggesting that
sua sponte grant of a new trial may raise
double jeopardy concerns), district courts could order new trials
where there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury verdict.
Post, at 442-443. But if these district courts truly had
latent inherent power to enter a judgment of acquittal, surely at
least
some of them would have been willing to give a legally
innocent defendant that to which he was entitled-viz., a judgment
of acquittal-rather than just a new trial.
429
issue, and did not purport to be issuing, a writ of
coram
nobis, that writ would not have lain here, since it was
traditionally available only to bring before the court factual
errors "material to the validity and regularity of the legal
proceeding itself," such as the defendant's being under age or
having died before the verdict. See
United States v.
Mayer, 235 U.
S. 55, 67-68 (1914). Moreover, "[t]he All Writs Act is a
residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise
covered by statute. Where a statute specifically addresses the
particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All
Writs Act, that is controlling."
Pennsylvania Bureau of
Correction v.
United States Marshals Service, 474 U. S. 34, 43 (1985).
As we noted a few years after enactment of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, "it is difficult to conceive of a situation in
a federal criminal case today where [a writ of
coram nobis]
would be necessary or appropriate."
United States v.
Smith, 331 U. S., at 475, n. 4. In the present case, Rule 29
provides the applicable law.
Second, petitioner asserts that the failure to allow the
District Court to enter a judgment of acquittal would violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. His argument on this
point consists of nothing more than bald assertions that Rule 29(c)
as applied to the facts of this case transgresses principles of
fundamental fairness, "shocks the conscience," and interferes with
rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Brief for
Petitioner 28-29 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U. S. 390 (1993);
Rochin v.
California, 342 U. S. 165, 172
(1952); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325-326
(1937)). Petitioner has failed to proffer any historical, textual,
or controlling precedential support for his argument that the
inability of a district court to grant an untimely postverdict
motion for judgment of acquittal violates the Fifth Amendment, and
we decline to fashion a new due process right out of thin air.
430
Third, petitioner argues that prohibiting a district court from
granting a motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day late will
lead to needless appeals and habeas corpus proceedings, where it
will be more difficult for defendants to obtain relief than in
motions directed to the trial court. Assuming,
arguendo,
that these contentions are accurate, we cannot permit them to alter
our analysis, for we are not at liberty to ignore the mandate of
Rule 29 in order to obtain "optimal" policy results. Cf.
United
States v.
Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 229-230 (1960). We
are similarly unmoved by petitioner's contention that the
"rationale" behind Rule 29(c)'s time limit does not apply where the
motion for judgment of acquittal is filed a mere eight days after
the trial. The only evident "rationale" behind Rule 29(c)'s 7-day
time limit is that a motion for judgment of acquittal filed eight
days after trial is a motion filed one day later than justice and
equity demand. As we said in a case involving the filing deadline
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U. S. C.
§ 1744 (1988 ed.): "If i-day late filings are acceptable, 10-day
late filings might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of
exceptions that would engulf the rule erected by the filing
deadline; yet regardless of where the cutoff line is set, some
individuals will always fall just on the other side of it."
United States v.
Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 101
(1985).
v
Finally, we may respond to some of the many arguments put
forward by the dissent. The dissent makes the sweeping assertion
that "a district court clearly has the inherent authority to ensure
that a legally innocent defendant is not wrongfully convicted,"
post, at 442. Perhaps so. As the dissent itself recognizes,
however, that power has come to an end once an appeal has been
taken.
Post, at 452-453. We are in accord, then, that there
is
some point at which the district court is rendered
powerless to enter a judgment of acquittal, and the disagreement
between us and the dissent
431
comes down to nothing more cosmic than the question of
timing-which we find answered by the text of Rule 29.
In an effort to explain why, if a Rule 29(c) motion is in any
event unnecessary, it makes any sense to impose a 7 -day
deadline upon the making of it, the dissent maintains that
the untimeliness of a motion gives a district court discretion to
ignore it.
Post, at 445. This presents the disedifying
prospect of a court vested with "the inherent authority to ensure
that a legally innocent defendant is not wrongfully convicted,"
post, at 442, exercising its discretion to let an innocent
defendant be wrongfully convicted. Quite obviously, this
explanation of the deadline is incompatible with the premise that
underlies the dissent's entire argument. As for the dissent's
concern,
post, at 448, that our decision runs afoul of Rule
2's mandate that the rules "be construed to secure simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay": We see neither simplicity, nor
fairness, nor elimination of delay in a regime that makes it
discretionary whether an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal
will be entertained.
The dissent asserts that "permissive rules do not withdraw
pre-existing inherent powers."
Post, at 452. That assertion
is really not relevant to the present case since, as we have
discussed, the power to enter postverdict judgments of acquittal
sua sponte was not a "pre-existing inherent power." See
supra, at 426-428, and n. 5. But besides the lack of factual
predicate for its application here, the principle the dissent
proposes would produce some extraordinary consequences. For
example, as the cases cited by the dissent illustrate, see
post, at 439-440, courts previously have ordered new trials
sua sponte. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, however,
provides that "[t]he court on motion of a defendant
may
grant a new trial .... " Following the dissent's logic, Rule 33,
being permissive, does not preclude a court from granting a new
trial without motion, thereby leaving open to the court a course of
action that may well
432
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. But see Advisory Committee's
Notes on 1966 Amendment of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 33, 18 U. S. C.
App., p. 801 ("The amendments to the first two sentences make it
clear that a judge has no power to order a new trial on his own
motion, that he can act only in response to a motion timely made by
a defendant. Problems of double jeopardy arise when the court acts
on its own motion"). Similarly, a pre-existing practice, if there
was one, would allow a subpoena to be served by a party or a minor
despite Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(d) ("A subpoena may
be served by the marshal, by a deputy marshal or by any other
person who is not a party and who is not less than 18 years of
age"); would allow a judge from another district to take over a
jury trial from a disabled judge despite Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 25(a) ("If ... the judge before whom a jury trial has
commenced is unable to proceed with the trial, any other judge
regularly sitting in or assigned to the court ... may proceed with
and finish the trial"); and would allow a court to correct a
technical error in a sentence more than seven days after the
imposition of the sentence, despite Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 35(c) ("The court, acting within 7 days after the
imposition of sentence, may correct a sentence that was imposed as
a result of arithmetical, technical, or other clear error").
The decisions of Justice Harlan relied upon by the dissent to
support the proposition that permissive rules do not eliminate
inherent powers are not germane. We have discussed
Link
above, see
supra, at 426. In
United States v.
Ohio
Power Co., 353 U.
S. 98, 104 (1957), Justice Harlan noted that this Court has
proceeded on the assumption that we have inherent authority to
"affect judgments by action which would otherwise be out of time
under [our own] Rules." That statement would be relevant if the
present case involved a district court's departure from one of its
own rules-which of course it does not. In
Fernandez v.
United
433
States, 81 S. Ct. 642 (1961), 5 L. Ed. 2d 683 (Harlan,
J., in chambers), Justice Harlan recognized that the provision of
former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a) that a "person
arrested for an offense not punishable by death shall be
admitted to bail" (emphasis added) did not withdraw district
courts' authority to
revoke bail in a noncapital case.
Fernandez, supra, at 644, and n. 7, 5 L. Ed. 2d, at 685, and
n. 7. What admitting to bail implies with respect to revocation of
bail is not comparable to what granting judgment on motion implies
with respect to granting judgment without motion. What the dissent
needs, in the
Fernandez context, is a case holding that a
statute which permits bail for "persons arrested for noncapital
offenses" does not preclude bail for persons arrested for capital
offenses. Of course, such a case will not be found.
Finally, the dissent contends that
United States v.
Sisson, 399 U.
S. 267 (1970), supports existence of the "inherent power"
petitioner invokes. See
post, at 448-449. We think not.
Sisson did
not "implicitly conclude" that it was
proper to enter a postverdict judgment of acquittal without motion,
because the
propriety of the judgment of acquittal was
irrelevant to the decision. The only issue was whether the judgment
appealed from
was a judgment of acquittal (proper
or
improper), because that would mean that the Government's appeal
under the former 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (which did not apply to
judgments of acquittal) must be dismissed. See
United States
v.
Wilson, 420
U. S. 332, 351 (1975) (appeal in
Sisson "was barred
solely by the statute").
***
We conclude that the District Court had no authority to grant
petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day outside
the time limit prescribed by Rule 29(c). We therefore affirm the
judgment of the Sixth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
434
JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring.
In Part I of his dissenting opinion, JUSTICE STEVENS makes a
persuasive argument that, absent a rule to the contrary, district
judges have an "inherent authority" to enter a judgment of
acquittal, although, for the reasons offered by the majority,
ante, at 426, I am not persuaded that this inherent
authority extends to the power to act
sua sponte to grant a
judgment of acquittal after the jury has returned a verdict. In any
event, I accept the received view that inherent power generally is
subject to legislative abrogation, see
Bank of Nova Scotia
v.
United States, 487 U. S. 250, 254-255
(1988);
ante, at 426, and although Congress's power is not
necessarily plenary, its limits are not implicated here. While
there may be some point at which legislative interference with a
court's inherent authority would run afoul of Article III, see
Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U. S. 32, 58 (1991)
(SCALIA, J., dissenting) ("Some elements of that inherent authority
are so essential to '[t]he judicial Power,' U. S. Const., Art. III,
§ 1, that they are indefeasible"), it is not seriously contended
that Rule 29(c) is an unconstitutional interference with the
court's inherent authority. I therefore join the Court's
opinion.
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE BREYER
join, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court and highlight features of the
case key to my judgment.
It is anomalous to classify time prescriptions, even rigid ones,
* under the heading "subject matter jurisdiction." That most basic
requirement relates to the subject matter of the case or
controversy or the status of the parties to it. See 13 C. Wright,
A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3522,
p. 78 (2d ed. 1984); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11 (1982)
(defining "subject matter juris-
*See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 45(b) (listing time rules that are
not subject to enlargement for "cause shown").
435
diction" as the "authority [of the court] to adjudicate the type
of controversy involved in the action"); cf.
United States
v.
Kember, 648 F.2d
1354,1357-1358 (CADC 1980)
(per curiam) (commenting on
"manifold settings in which we employ the term [jurisdiction]" and
distinguishing fundamental "jurisdiction" questions from issues of
a less basic character);
Center for Nuclear Responsibility,
Inc. v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
781 F.2d
935, 945, n. 4 (CADC 1986) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(questioning "profligate use" of the word "jurisdiction," in
diverse contexts, "to mean many things-from the absence of a
constitutional grant of judicial power to a statutory limit on time
to appeal").
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) concerns a matter less
basic. It is simply a time prescription. Rule 29(c)'s prescription
is a tight one, to be sure. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
45(b) makes that clear by precluding extensions, even for
"excusable neglect," after expiration of the seven days specified
in Rule 29(c). But like limitation periods generally, see,
e.
g., Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990)
("[t]ime requirements in lawsuits ... are customarily subject to
'equitable tolling' "), the 29(c)/45(b) constraint is not utterly
exceptionless.
This Court has recognized one sharply honed exception to rules
of the 29(c)/45(b) genre. That exception covers cases in which the
trial judge has misled a party who could haveand probably would
have-taken timely action had the trial judge conveyed correct,
rather than incorrect, information. See
Thompson v.
INS, 375 U. S.
384, 386-387 (1964)
(per curiam) (had trial judge not
misinformed party that his new trial motion was made "in ample
time," party "could have, and presumably would have, filed the
appeal within 60 days of the entry of the original judgment, rather
than waiting, as he did, until after the trial court had disposed
of the [new trial motion]");
Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215, 216-217
(1962)
(per curiam) (instructing that petitioner's appeal be
heard on the merits
436
where petitioner had received from trial court an improperly
grounded 14-day extension of the time to file his appeal); see also
4A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1168, at
501 (describing
Thompson and
Harris Truck Lines as
"based on a theory similar to estoppel"). As the Court observes,
however, this exception "is not pertinent here." See
ante,
at 428.
Carlisle's counsel was not misled by any trial court statement
or action; rather, he neglected to follow plain instructions. Rule
29(c) clearly instructs that a motion for a judgment of acquittal
be filed "within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such
further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period." Just as
clearly, Rule 45(b) excludes motions for enlargement once seven
days have run. I agree that a rule like 29(c) is framed to resist
ad hoc relaxation. A time line must be drawn at some point, and it
is not unreasonable to draw the line as the rulemakers did, rather
than extend it out to the day set for sentencing.
It bears emphasis, finally, that the Government recognizes legal
avenues still open to Carlisle to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to warrant his conviction: on appeal (subject to "plain
error" standard); and through a postconviction motion, under 28 U.
S. C. § 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. Brief
for United States 38-39. In the rare situations JUSTICE STEVENS
envisions-delay of a meritorious motion due to an Act of God, see
post, at 454, or cases comparable to those in which we would
read and grant an out-of-time rehearing petition, see
post,
at 450-451these modes of relief should provide an adequate
corrective.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins,
dissenting.
As long as a federal court retains jurisdiction over a criminal
case, it has the authority to ensure that no conviction is entered
unless the prosecutor has proved the defendant's guilt. The
exercise of the court's inherent power to set
437
aside a jury verdict unsupported by evidence is not contingent
on the filing of a timely motion by the defendant. The question in
this case, therefore, is not whether Rule 29 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure
authorizes the court to grant an
untimely motion for judgment of acquittal; I agree with the Court
that it does not. Rather, the question is whether that Rule
withdraws the court's pre-existing authority to refrain from
entering judgment of conviction against a defendant whom it knows
to be legally innocent.
Viewed in this light, the majority places more reliance on the
negative implication in Rule 29 than its permissive language can
bear. Assuming it exists at all, this negative implication is far
too weak to justify the conclusion that Rule 29 manifests that
Congress desired to withdraw a federal court's inherent authority
to acquit an innocent defendant.
I
Trial judges are kept busy responding to motions, objections,
and requests by the litigants. It is quite wrong, however, to
assume that a judge is nothing more than a referee whose authority
is limited to granting or denying motions advanced by the parties.
As Learned Hand tersely noted, a "judge, at least in a federal
court, is more than a moderator; he is affirmatively charged with
securing a fair trial, and he must intervene sua sponte to that
end, when necessary."
Brown v.
Walter, 62 F.2d 798,
799 (CA2 1933). That duty encompasses not only the avoidance of
error before it occurs, but the correction of error that may have
occurred earlier in a proceeding.
The basic principle has been stated many times. There is a
"power 'inherent in every court of justice so long as it retains
control of the subject matter and of the parties, to correct that
which has been wrongfully done by virtue of its process.'
Arkadelphia Co. v.
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co.,
249 U. S. 134,
146. See
Northwestern Fuel Co. v.
Brock, 139 U. S. 216, 219."
United States v.
Morgan, 307 U. S. 183,
438
197 (1939). Although that statement was made in a civil case, we
have made it clear that a federal court has even broader discretion
to notice error independently in the trial of a criminal case than
in civil cases.
Crawford v.
United States, 212 U. S. 183, 194
(1909).
Examples of the exercise of the federal courts' inherent powers
are abundant in both our civil and our criminal jurisprudence.1
Indeed, when he was serving on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, then-Judge Kennedy, after considering a series of cases
that recognized various inherent judicial powers,2 correctly
pointed out:
1 A few examples illustrate the breadth of that power. We have
held that a district court "has inherent power to dismiss a suit
pursuant to the doctrine of
forum non conveniens," Gulf Oil
Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 502
(1947); to dismiss an appeal in a criminal case if the defendant is
a fugitive,
Molinaro v.
New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365, 366
(1970); to enforce compliance with lawful orders through civil
contempt,
Shillitani v.
United States, 384 U. S. 364, 370
(1966); to order special conferences that will aid in the
disposition of a complex antitrust case,
United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 340 U. S. 76, 81 (1950);
and to stay proceedings "to control the progress of the cause so as
to maintain the orderly processes of justice,"
Enelow v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 379,381-382
(1935). We have also recognized the court's inherent power to
enforce its judgments, see
Peacock v.
Thomas,
516 U. S. 349
(1996), as well as its inherent power to award attorney's fees in
exceptional cases,
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 256
(1975).
2 "E. g., Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U. S. 752, 764-67 ...
(1980) (assessing costs against parties or attorneys);
Cooke
v.
United States, 267 U. S. 517, 534 ... (1925) (contempt
power);
United States v.
Armstrong, 621 F.2d
951, 954-55 (9th Cir. 1980) (allowing inspection of property
belonging to third parties);
Franquez v.
United
States, 604 F.2d
1239 (9th Cir. 1979) (ordering jury trial on an issue when not
contemplated by statute);
In re Sealed Affidavit(s) to Search
Warrants (Agosto), 600 F.2d
1256 (9th Cir. 1979) (sealing papers filed with the court);
United States V.
Simmons, 536 F.2d
827, 832-34 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U. S. 854 ...
(1976) (dismissal for want of prosecution);
United States V.
Malcolm, 475 F. 2d 420 (9th Cir. 1973) (ordering a defendant
to undergo a psychiatric exam)."
Arizona V.
Manypenny, 672 F.2d
761, 765
(CA9 1982).
439
"Exercise of judicial power by entry of orders not expressly
sanctioned by rule or statute in order to correct the legal process
or avert its misfunction has been approved in varied
circumstances." Arizona v. Manypenny, 672 F.2d
761, 765, cert. denied, 459 U. S. 850 (1982).
When a federal court declines to enter a judgment of conviction
against a defendant whom it should have directed the jury to
acquit, it clearly corrects the legal process and averts its
misfunctioning. Given the various
sua sponte powers that
district courts unquestionably may exercise in order to ensure that
legally innocent defendants are not convicted, it is clear that
they also possess the inherent authority
sua sponte to enter
postverdict acquittals when the Government has failed to prove that
a defendant is guilty.
District courts have long exercised their inherent power to
direct an acquittal
sua sponte when the prosecution fails to
prove its case at the close of evidence. See
Wiborg v.
United States, 163 U. S. 632, 659
(1896);
Cady v.
United States, 293
F.8d 9 (CADC 1923);
Nosowitz v.
United States,
282 F.5d
5, 578 (CA2 1922).3 They have also long exercised
3 Indeed,
Cady referred to "the well-established and
oft-repeated principle that, unless there is substantial evidence
of facts which exclude every other hypothesis but that of guilt,
it is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury to return
a verdict for the accused .... " 293 F., at 830 (emphasis
added). Moreover, in both of the cases cited by the majority as
supporting the existence of the power exercised here,
United
States v.
McCracken, 26 F. Cas. 1069 (No. 15,664) (ED
Va. 1878), and
United States v.
Hayden, 26 F. Cas.
236, 238 (No. 15,333) (NDNY 1877), see
ante, at 426-427, the
district judges directed the jury to return a verdict of not
guilty. In the
Hayden case, the court went on to describe
what I assume was the settled practice among all federal judges at
the time: "I have made it a rule to direct a verdict of not guilty
where, in my opinion the evidence will not authorize the jury to
find a verdict of guilty, or, if so found, I would set aside the
verdict as contrary to evidence. I think this is a case of that
class, and I therefore direct the jury to find a verdict of not
guilty." 26 F. Cas., at 238.
440
their inherent power to set aside a jury verdict for
insufficiency of the evidence
sua sponte. See
United
States v.
Harding, 26 F. Cas. 131, 136 (No. 15,301) (ED
Pa. 1846);
United States v.
Fullerton, 25 F. Cas.
1225 (No. 15,176) (SDNY 1870); see also F. Wharton, Criminal Law of
the United States 669 (1846) ("Where, however, evidence is not
sufficient in law to authorize a verdict, a new trial will be
granted, even though no objection be made at the trial");
id., at
643(s) (explaining that the judge reserves
"it to himself, if there be an improper conviction, to arrest the
judgment or set aside the verdict");
Charles v.
State, 4 Port. 107, 109-110 (Ala. 1836).4
The District Courts' longstanding exercise of these inherent
powers is entirely consistent with the conclusion that a district
court acts within its power when it enters a judgment of acquittal
upon setting aside an unsupported jury verdict. To be sure, the
early cases reveal that District Courts typically ordered new
trials, rather than acquittals, upon concluding that the jury's
verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence. However,
subsequent cases demonstrate that as courts became concerned that
the new
4 Out of deference to the King, the rule was apparently
different in England. See 1 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal
Law of England 312313 (1883); but cf. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
*389-*390. Even still, English judges evaded the procedural bar by
declining to enter sentence and requesting the Crown to pardon
wrongfully convicted defendants. These requests were routinely
granted. See
Ex parte United States, 101 F. 2d 870, 875, n.
15
(CA7 1939). Judge Kane explained that he did "not
remember to have read of a single instance in which the judicial
recommendation has been disregarded by the ministers of the crown,
and [he did] not suppose that it could be without a breach of the
constitution of the realm."
United States v.
Harding,
26 F. Cas. 131, 137 (No. 15,301) (ED Pa. 1846). As a result of this
consistent practice, he concluded that "[i]n England, therefore,
the denial to the courts of a revisory power over verdicts in any
cases is apparent, rather than real. The judge, if dissatisfied
with a conviction on the merits, respites the sentence or reprieves
the prisoner, and the king's prerogative interposes to do justice
as a thing of course."
Ibid.
441
trial remedy trenched on the prohibition against double
jeopardy, they began to enter judgments of acquittals. See
Ex parte United States, 101 F.2d 870, 878 (CA7 1939), aff'd
by an equally divided Court in
United States v.
Stone, 308 U. S. 519 (1939).
The earliest cases involve appellate courts entering judgments
of acquittal in order to remedy a district court's failure to
direct the jury to acquit. See
Nosowitz v.
United
States, 282 F.5d
5 (CA2 1922);
Cherry v.
United States, 78 F.2d
334 (CA7 1935);
Reiner v.
United States, 92 F.2d 823
(CA9 1937); see also
France v.
United States,
164 U. S. 676
(1897) (remanding to the District Court with directions to enter
such judgment);
Romano v.
United States, 9 F.2d 522
(CA2 1925) (same). Later cases reveal that District Courts soon
followed suit, either by ruling on reserved, preverdict acquittal
motions or by granting postverdict motions to acquit. See
Ex
parte United States, 101 F.2d 870 (CA7 1939);
United
States v.
Standard Oil Co., 23 F. Supp. 937 (WD Wis.
1938), aff'd in
United States v.
Socony- Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U. S.
150, 165, n. 1 (1940);
State v.
Meen, 171 Wis. 36
(1920) (same); see also Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 29
(endorsing these practices). Moreover, prior to the adoption of
Rule 29 in 1944, the Fifth Circuit explained that, even after a
jury returns a verdict, a court "may and should"
sua sponte
review the sufficiency of the evidence.
Ansley v.
United
States, 135 F.2d 207, 208 (1943).
In light of this history, it makes no sense to conclude that a
federal district court lacks the inherent power to enter
sua
sponte a postverdict judgment of acquittal. A trial court's
postverdict entry of a judgment of acquittal is in substance no
different from an appellate court's order directing entry of that
same judgment. Moreover, the double jeopardy concerns that may bar
a district court from ordering a new trial to remedy its failure to
have directed an acquittal cannot sensibly be understood to
prohibit the district court from providing a defendant some measure
of relief from a legally
442
insufficient guilty verdict. See
United States v.
Smith, 331 U. S. 469, 474 (1947). Finally, given that a
motion was not thought to be needed in order for the District Court
to exercise its inherent power either to direct an acquittal, or to
set aside an unsupported verdict and order a new trial, there is no
reason to conclude that a district court is utterly powerless to
remedy a wrongful conviction in the exceedingly rare circumstance
in which an unforeseen accident results in the defendant's failure
to file a motion for acquittal.
In all events, a district court clearly has the inherent
authority to ensure that a legally innocent defendant is not
wrongfully convicted. It would be most strange to conclude that
this authority, which enables a district court to keep a case from
the jury altogether when the Government fails to prove its case,
does not permit that same court to revise a guilty verdict that the
jury returns despite the Government's insufficient proof. That
conclusion is particularly difficult to fathom when one considers
that the latter action may be appealed by the Government, while the
former may not.
United States v.
Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 345
(1975). Not surprisingly, therefore, numerous courts have
recognized that, prior to the passage of Rule 29, district courts
possessed the inherent power to acquit defendants
sua
sponte. See
United States v.
Hughes, 759 F. Supp.
530, 532536 (WD Ark.), aff'd
sub nom. United States v.
Haren, 952 F.2d
190 (CA8 1991);
United States v.
DiBernardo,
880 F.2d
1216, 1225, n. 4 (CAll 1989);
United States v.
Coleman, 811 F. 2d 804 (CA3 1987);
United States v.
Giampa, 758 F.2d
928, 936, n. 1 (CA3 1985);
Arizona v.
Manypenny,
672 F. 2d, at 765;
Ansley v.
United States, 135 F.
2d, at 208; see also
United States v.
Weinstein,
452 F.2d
704, 713, 714 (CA2
1971); United States v.
Broadus, 664 F. Supp. 592, 595-598 (DC 1987).
The majority states that no pre-Rule case establishes the
precise power at issue here.
Ante, at 427-428, n. 5.
That
443
is true but unremarkable. The majority does not dispute that,
prior to the passage of Rule 29, trial courts possessed the
inherent power to remedy unsupported guilty verdicts by ordering
new trials
sua sponte. After Rule 29 was adopted, this Court
pointed out the double jeopardy concerns raised by the
sua
sponte exercise of the new trial remedy. See
United
States v.
Smith, 331 U. S., at 474. Since that time,
numerous cases have concluded that courts may remedy unsupported
jury verdicts by entering judgments of acquittal. The majority
offers no principled reason for concluding that this more recent
remedy is beyond the power of district courts, even though the
prior remedy was not.
In sum, the error-correcting power that is "'inherent in every
court of justice so long as it retains control of the subject
matter and of the parties,'"
Morgan, 307 U. S., at 197,
encompasses the kind of error at issue in this case. Therefore,
absent some express indication that Congress intended to withdraw
the power that implicitly attends its initial grant of
jurisdiction, a district court acts well within its discretion when
it sets aside a jury verdict and acquits a defendant because the
prosecution failed to prove its case.
II
Because the Acts of Congress investing federal judges with
jurisdiction to try criminal cases are the source of a district
court's power to set aside unsupported jury verdicts, I have no
occasion to disagree with the Court's view that petitioner errs in
relying on Rule 29 as the source of the District Court's authority
in this case. I do, however, strongly disagree with the Court's own
reliance on that Rule for the quite different conclusion that it
clearly prohibits the power exercised by the District Court
here.
In Part III of its opinion, the majority asserts that the
District Court's action "contradicted the plain language of Rule
29(c), and effectively annulled the 7-day filing limit,"
444
ante, at 426, and that "the clarity of the text" suffices
to prohibit the District Court's action,
ibid. The majority
assumes that these conclusory assertions follow implicitly from its
determination in Part II of its opinion that Rule 29 does not
authorize the District Court to set aside a jury verdict
sua
sponte.
In my view, the Rule serves three salutary purposes that are in
no tension with a district court's inherent power to enter a
judgment of acquittal
sua sponte. None of these purposes
would be frustrated if the Rule were understood to coexist with,
though not to authorize, a district court's power to avoid imposing
sentence on an innocent defendant in the truly exceptional case in
which evidence of guilt is wholly lacking.
First, subdivision (a) confirms the view that a judge has a duty
to direct an acquittal if the prosecution has failed to prove its
case at the close of evidence. The Rule's affirmation of that duty
is in no way inconsistent with a court's exercise of its
postverdict power to enter
sua sponte a judgment of
acquittal. As then-Judge Kennedy explained for the Ninth Circuit in
Arizona v.
Manypenny, 672 F. 2d, at 764: "We do not
read the mention in Rule 29(a) of a court granting such a judgment
'on its own motion' before submission to a jury as an elimination
of a court's inherent power to grant such a judgment after
submission to the jury."
Second, subdivision (b) accommodates the defendant's right to
move for a directed acquittal with the Government's right to seek
appellate review. Indeed, the subdivision was amended in 1994 for
the very purpose of striking a more proper balance between those
two interests. See Advisory Committee's Notes to Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 29(b), 18 U. S. C. App., pp. 784-785. As a result, a district
court's
sua sponte decision to acquit after the jury returns
a guilty verdict can hardly be said to undermine the purpose of
subdivision (b). The defendant's interests are obviously fully
protected by an acquittal, while the Government's right to appeal
is pro-
445
tected because the jury has already returned its verdict of
guilt. See
United States v.
Wilson, 420 U. S., at
345.5
Third, subdivision (c) requires defense counsel to file the
postverdict motion for judgment of acquittal promptly, while the
trial judge presumably retains a firm recollection of the evidence
and therefore is able to rule expeditiously and efficiently. The
untimeliness of a later motion provides the judge with a sufficient
reason for denying it without even reading it or reviewing the
transcript. Thus, a judge's entirely discretionary decision to
enter
sua sponte an acquittal after the 7-day period in no
way annuls the 7-day deadline. Defendants are still bound by that
time limitation, and the Rule thus serves the useful function of
limiting a defendant's right to require a judge to reconsider the
sufficiency of the evidence. As then-Judge Kennedy explained: "Rule
29(c) creates a deadline by which defendants must present motions
for judgment of acquittal to the court; it does not address the
court's inherent power to grant such a judgment."
Arizona v.
Manypenny, 672 F. 2d, at 764.
5 The majority is also wrong to contend that it would make a
"farce" of subdivision (b) to construe it to permit judges to act
sua sponte. Ante, at 422. There are sound reasons for
setting forth regulations concerning a court's power to reserve a
defense motion that it must entertain even if the court also
possesses the entirely discretionary power to acquit at any time on
its own initiative as long as it possesses jurisdiction over the
case. For example, the new Rule 29(b) makes clear that the district
court, even if it reserves a motion for acquittal filed after the
prosecution's case in chief, may not consider any evidence
submitted thereafter in disposing of the motion. That limitation on
the district court's authority protects a defendant's right to make
a motion for acquittal and to put on rebuttal evidence without
risking that new evidence of guilt will emerge. Such a protection
serves a useful function even though in the absence of a motion to
acquit a court would have the discretionary power to enter judgment
in the defendant's favor. Thus, it is simply not true that there
"would be no need" for the procedures set forth in Rule 29(b) if,
"even without reserving, the court had continuing power to grant
judgment of acquittal on its own."
Ibid.
446
The majority nevertheless maintains that the Rule must be read
to require judges, in some instances, to enter judgments of
conviction against defendants they know to be innocent. The
majority does not argue that Rule 29
expressly prohibits a
district court from acting on its own to set aside an unsupported
jury verdict. Rather, it relies solely on the negative inference
that it draws from the absence of three words in one sentence of
Rule 29(c).
Ante, at 423.6 Specifically, the majority seizes
upon the "notabl[e] absen[ce]" of the phrase "on such motion" in
the third sentence of the Rule,
ibid., and concludes that
this omission "convey[s] the idea that, where a jury has not
returned a verdict, a court can act without motion, but where a
jury has returned a guilty verdict, it cannot,"
ibid.
In light of the pre-Rule precedent establishing a district
court's inherent power to review
sua sponte a jury verdict
for sufficiency of the evidence, see
Ansley v.
United
States, 135 F. 2d, at 208, the majority reads far too much into
the omission. The caption to Rule 29(c) makes clear that the
subdivision only contemplates judicial action taken in response to
a motion. The first sentence explains that a motion may be made
after a jury's discharge whether or not a guilty verdict has been
returned. The next sentence sets forth the action that the district
court may take when such a motion is filed after the jury returns a
guilty verdict. In a similar vein, the third sentence sets forth
the action that the district court may take when no verdict has
been re-
6 Rule 29(c) reads as follows:
"(c) MOTION AFTER DISCHARGE OF JURY. If the jury returns a
verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a
verdict, a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed
within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further
time as the court may fix during the 7 -day period. If a verdict of
guilty is returned the court may on such motion set aside the
verdict and enter judgment of acquittal. If no verdict is returned
the court may enter judgment of acquittal. It shall not be
necessary to the making of such a motion that a similar motion has
been made prior to the submission of the case to the jury."
447
turned. The omission of the words "on such motion" from the
third sentence surely just reflects a draftsman's sensible decision
to avoid a patent redundancy rather than a cryptic intent to change
the law by prohibiting a judge from exercising his or her inherent
power to enter a judgment of acquittal.7
Common sense refutes what the text fails to compel.
Under the majority's reading, Rule 29(c) establishes a most
inefficient regime for setting aside unsupported jury verdicts by
requiring defendants to file appeals and collateral challenges to
judgments of conviction that district judges knew to be
unsupported. Given that Federal Rule of Criminal
7 The inclusion of the phrase "on such motion" in the second
sentence of Rule 29(c) is no mystery. Unlike the present Rule, the
original version of Rule 29 permitted the defendant to move either
for a new trial or for an acquittal after the jury had been
discharged. The next sentences of the original Rule stated that the
district court was authorized to grant either a new trial or an
acquittal whether or not the jury returned a verdict. The inclusion
of the phrase "on such motion" was necessary in order to make clear
that the judge could not order a new trial unless the defendant
first requested one.
Contrary to the majority's construction of the relevant
language, there is no reason to suppose that the phrase "on such
motion" in the old Rule applied only to the circumstance in which
the jury returned a verdict. Under such a construction, the
original Rule would have been intended to "conve[y] the idea,"
ante, at 423, that the District Court possessed the
authority to impose a new trial against the defendant's wishes
whenever the jury had been discharged without having returned a
verdict. It is clear that the drafters never intended to convey
such a potentially unconstitutional idea. Indeed, it was the
drafters' concern that the original Rule might be subject to the
potentially unconstitutional "interpretation that a motion for
judgment of acquittal gives the court power to order a new trial
even though the defendant does not a wish a new trial and has not
asked for one" that led them to eliminate all references to new
trial orders in what is now Rule 29(c). Advisory Committee's Notes
on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29, 18 U. S. C. App., pp. 784-785. There
is no hint in the Advisory Committee's Notes, or the Rule's
drafting history, that this limiting revision was simultaneously
intended to link the district court's power to acquit for
insufficiency of the evidence with the jury's return of a
verdict.
448
Procedure 2 directs that the rules "shall be construed to secure
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay," there is no reason
to read the ambiguity in Rule 29(c) to prohibit a district court
from correcting a plain error that would otherwise be challenged in
a subsequent court proceeding.8
Indeed, our decision in
United States v.
Sisson,
399 U. S. 267
(1970), reveals that when we previously considered Rule 29 we did
not understand it to prohibit a district court from
sua
sponte entering a postverdict judgment of acquittal. There,
defendant's counsel moved postverdict to arrest judgment under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 34. 399 U. S., at 276. The
District Court purported to grant the Rule 34 motion on evidentiary
and constitutional grounds that the defendant's motion did not
raise.
Id., at 277, n. 6. The Government sought review from
this Court pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3731, which at that time
permitted governmental appeals from orders arresting judgment but
not from orders entering judgments of acquittal. 399 U. S., at
279-280.
In holding that we lacked jurisdiction to hear the Government's
appeal, we explained that although the District Court termed its
order an "arres[t] [of] judgment," it was in fact an acquittal.
Id., at 288. The portion of Justice Harlan's opinion that
five Members of the Court joined equated the District Court's
sua sponte acquittal with an acquittal by a jury. As support
for the comparison, the opinion explained that, under Rule 29,
"judges, like juries, can acquit defendants."
Id., at 290.
Moreover, it noted that Rules 29(b) and
8 The majority dismisses these concerns by suggesting that
because we agree that a district court lacks the power to enter a
judgment of acquittal after an appeal is taken, we disagree only as
to "timing."
Ante, at 431. In truth, our point of
disagreement is more fundamental. It concerns the power of a court
to correct a miscarriage of justice while it retains jurisdiction
over a case. Because an appeal can only be taken once a judgment
has been entered, the real issue that divides us is whether the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure compel a district court to
enter a judgment of conviction against a defendant whom it knows to
be innocent.
449
(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure "expressly allow
a federal judge to acquit a criminal defendant after the jury
'returns a verdict of guilty.'"
Ibid.; see also
United
States v.
Weinstein, 452 F. 2d, at 713, 714 (explaining
that
Sisson determined that the District Court in that case
acted within its jurisdiction in entering the postverdict judgment
of acquittal).
Although the merits of the judgment of acquittal were not before
the Court in
Sisson, the trial court's jurisdiction to enter
the judgment plainly was. Just as a trial court's postjudgment
acquittal could not have mooted a pending appeal, neither could a
jurisdictionally barred action have prevented an appeal from being
taken. Nevertheless, the
Sisson Court did not identify any
jurisdictional bar to the judge's entry of a postverdict acquittal
motion, even though no Rule 29 motion had been filed. I am
therefore mystified as to why the Court now concludes that the Rule
can only be read to deprive the district court of jurisdiction to
acquit postverdict in the absence of a defendant's motion.
Our prior construction of procedural rules that employ
permissive language similar to that used in Rule 29 reinforces the
implicit conclusion that we reached in
Sisson. As we
recently explained, our prior cases reveal that although Congress
may limit the exercise of the inherent power of lower federal
courts, "'we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended'" to
do so.
Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U. S. 32, 47 (1991)
(quoting
Weinberger v.
RomeroBarcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 313
(1982)). That interpretive principle suggests that something far
more than an ambiguous silence is required to withdraw a district
court's inherent power.
Link v.
Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626 (1962),
sets forth the proper analysis. In
Link, we rejected the
argument that the authority granted to a defendant by Rule 41 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure to move for an involuntary dismissal
of a complaint, by negative implication, precluded such a dis-
450
missal on the court's own motion. In his opinion for the Court,
Justice Harlan explained:
"We do not read Rule 41(b) as implying any such restriction.
Neither the permissive language of the Rule-which merely authorizes
a motion by the defendant-nor its policy requires us to conclude
that it was the purpose of the Rule to abrogate the power of
courts, acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars of
cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or
dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief. The authority of a
court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has
generally been considered an 'inherent power,' governed not by rule
or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases." Id., at 630-631 (footnote
omitted).9
Our practice with respect to petitions for rehearing is also
instructive. Such petitions, like motions for a judgment of
acquittal, are routinely filed and almost never granted. If not
filed within the time specified in our Rules, it is appropriate to
deny such a petition without even reading it. On rare occasions,
however, we have held that the interest in the evenhanded
administration of justice outweighs the interest in finality and
granted such petitions even though un-
9 In an effort to distinguish
Link, the Court asserts
that the practice of setting aside insufficient jury verdicts in
criminal cases is far less established than was the practice of
dismissing cases for want of prosecution. It further contends that
the "clarity of the text,"
ante, at 426, in this case
renders the logic of
Link inapplicable.
Link cannot
fairly be read to suggest that inherent powers of recent origin may
be more easily withdrawn than those of older vintage. In any event,
the court's inherent power to set aside criminal convictions
unsupported by evidence has been long accepted. Finally, given that
Justice Harlan authored both
Link and
Sisson, I find
most unpersuasive the majority's conclusion that the "clarity of
the text" in Rule 29 should occasion a different result from that
reached in
Link.
451
timely and even though there is not a word in our Rules that
authorized such action.
Thus, in
United States v.
Ohio Power Co., 351 U.
S. 980 (1956), the Court on its own initiative vacated an earlier
order denying a petition for rehearing and, in the following Term,
granted the previously denied petition.
United States v.
Ohio Power Co., 353 U. S. 98 (1957). While
Justice Harlan dissented from that disposition, he did not disagree
with the proposition that "the Court's inherent power over its
judgments" included the authority to take action that "would
otherwise be out of time under the Rules."
Id., at 104.
Just three years after the
Ohio Power decision, Justice
Harlan had occasion to endorse the exercise of a District Court's
use of its inherent powers in apparent conflict with the language
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Explaining his denial
of an application for bail, he correctly observed that those Rules
should not be construed to withdraw the District Court's inherent
power to revoke bail during the course of a criminal trial. See
Fernandez v.
United States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 644, n. 7,
5 L. Ed. 2d 683, 685, n. 7 (1961) (in chambers). In doing so, he
exposed the basic flaw in an argument comparable to the one
accepted by the Court today.
Justice Harlan explained that even though Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 46(a)(1) stated that a "'person arrested for an
offense not punishable by death
shall be admitted to bail,'"
that Rule did not purport to withdraw the district courts'
"authority, as an incident of their inherent powers to manage the
conduct of proceedings before them, to revoke bail during the
course of a criminal trial, when such action is appropriate to the
orderly progress of the trial and the fair administration of
justice."
Fernandez v.
United States, 81 S. Ct., at
644, 645, n. 7, 5 L. Ed. 2d, at 685, n. 7, 686 (in chambers). He
properly read the seemingly mandatory language of Rule 46(a)(1)
against a pre-Rule legal back-
452
ground that afforded district courts a greater measure of
discretion.
Ibid.; see also
United States v.
Anguilo, 755 F.2d
969, 972 (CA1 1985) (Breyer, J.). Given that Justice Harlan
also authored
Link, which holds that a procedural rule
permitting a dismissal on motion does not preclude a dismissal
without motion, I doubt that the majority's attempt to distinguish
Fernandez would have been persuasive to its author.
Our decision in
United States v.
Smith, 331 U. S. 469 (1947), is
consistent with our prior cases holding that permissive rules do
not withdraw pre-existing inherent powers.10 Although the majority
contends that
Smith supports the inference that the
draftsmen of Rule 29 intended to limit the court's authority to
take action in response to a timely motion by counsel, that case
actually supports the proposition that the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure did not modify the pre-existing power
of the district court to set aside an erroneous judgment while it
retains jurisdiction of a case.
The error committed by Judge Smith was his attempt to assert
jurisdiction in a criminal case after the
judgment of
conviction had been affirmed on appeal and even after the defendant
had started to serve his sentence. There was not even an arguable
basis for suggesting that the judge then had jurisdiction to order
a new trial.
Id., at 474; see
United States v.
Mayer, 235 U.
S. 55, 70 (1914).11 The only theory that might have justified
his action was his lawyer's argument that the Rules had expanded
the District Court's jurisdiction beyond the end of the term of
court in which the trial
lOThat is not to say that permissive rules
establish
inherent powers.
For that reason, the majority's recitation of various permissive
rules for which no analogous inherent power exists is quite beside
the point.
Ante, at 431-432.
11 As the Court pointed out in
United States v.
Smith, 331 U.
S. 469 (1947), new trial orders are particularly problematic
because they raise serious double jeopardy concerns. Of course, no
such concerns are present here.
453
had been conducted. This Court's reasons for holding that the
Rules did not enlarge that jurisdiction equally support the
proposition that they did not diminish that jurisdiction
either.
In fact, if one takes note of the extraordinary character of
Judge Smith's attempt to set aside a conviction after it had been
affirmed on appeal and after the defendant had been incarcerated
for several months, it is easy to understand why Justice Jackson's
opinion for the Court expressed concern that such action might give
rise to an appearance of impropriety, and therefore provided us
with the dictum concerning possible
ex parte approaches to
the judge on which today's majority relies. The suggestion that
that dictum has any relevance to the period between the return of
the jury's verdict and the imposition of sentence is not only
misplaced, but also represents a highly inappropriate comment on
the integrity of the federal judiciary. Judge Smith's singularly
bizarre action a half century ago provides no basis for either the
inference or the rule that today's majority thinks the
Smith
opinion supports. See
Arizona v.
Manypenny, 672 F.
2d, at 765, n. 10 (explaining that
"Smith cannot be applied
indiscriminately outside of the particular factual context at issue
there").
The decision in
Smith was a correct application of the
principle that should control the disposition of this case. There
is a "power 'inherent in every court of justice so long as it
retains control of the subject matter and of the parties, to
correct that which has been wrongfully done by virtue of its
process.'"
United States v.
Morgan, 307 U. S., at
197. Of course, that power does not survive after the court's
jurisdiction of the subject matter has expired. It is surely
sufficient, however, to enable the judge to refuse to impose
sentence on a defendant when the record does not contain evidence
of guilt.
As a result, Rule 29(c) is best read to state the proper
procedures for handling and filing defense motions for acquit-
454
tals, but to leave unaddressed the court's authority to act on
its own initiative.12 Such a construction comports with the sound
historical and commonsense reasons for concluding that Congress
would not likely have intended to require a district court to enter
a judgment of conviction against a defendant whom it knows to be
innocent.13
III
A brief final word about the practical significance of today's
holding. There is no real danger that district judges will be
burdened by a flood of untimely motions. On the other hand, the
possibility that an Act of God may preclude the timely filing of a
meritorious motion cannot be denied. Because evidence of guilt is
"absolutely vital to defendants,"
Wi borg, 163 U. S., at
658, that possibility, no matter how remote, is sufficient to
justify a district court's inherent authority to avert the
conviction of a legally innocent defendant despite the absence of a
timely motion. Because there is no
12 For this reason, the Government's reliance on Rule 45 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is misplaced. Although Rule 45
generally permits a district court to hear an untimely motion if
the defendant can demonstrate that excusable neglect caused the
late filing, it specifically prohibits a district court from
extending the time for "tak[ing] any action" under Rule 29. As I
have explained, Rule 29(c) only addresses the rules that govern a
defendant's postverdict acquittal motion; it does not address the
district court's
sua sponte postverdict acquittal power.
Thus, while Rule 45 serves to make clear that district courts may
not entertain defense motions for acquittal filed more than seven
days after the jury's discharge, it speaks not at all to the
court's inherent power to decline to enter a judgment of conviction
sua sponte when the jury's verdict is not supported by
legally sufficient evidence.
13 The majority contends that if we accept that district courts
have the discretion to refuse to consider untimely motions for
acquittal, then we must also accept that district courts have the
discretion to convict defendants whom they know to be innocent.
Ante, at 431. The imaginative suggestion that some district
judges might choose to convict those they believe to be innocent
surely does not justify the conclusion that other judges should be
required to do so.
455
language in Rule 29 that purports to constrain the authority
exercised in this case, I would reject the majority's
interpretation of the Rule and adhere to the commonsense
understanding revealed by the Court's holding in
Sisson.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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