The Plaintiff and Defendant had both been inhabitants of
Connecticut previous to the revolution, when the debt, for which
this action is brought, was alledged to be contracted, and
continued
Page 1 U.S.
393, 394
so for some time after the commencement of the war. Subsequent,
however, to the declaration of independence, the Plaintiff joined
the British army, and, on the return of peace, he removed with
other Loyalists to Halifax, where he continues to reside. On the
second Thursday of May in the year 1778, the Legislature of
Connecticut enacted a law declaring that all the estate, real and
personal, of any person or persons who had joined the enemies of
the United States, or had assisted them, or should thereafter do
so, should be confiscated; and that, with respect to those persons
who had been inhabitants of the State (the last section of the act
providing for the case of persons who had never been inhabitants)
the County Court upon application was empowered and directed to
give judgment, that all their estate should be forfeited to the
Commonwealth, and thereupon to appoint admistrators (as in the case
of intestates) who were to sell such confiscated estate, institute
suits, recover and pay debts, and to deliver the surplus, if any,
into the Treasury of the State &c. In September 1779, the
Plaintiff was proceeded against under this law, as one who had been
lately a resident of the town of Newhaven; and, it being duly
adjudged that he was guilty of joining the enemies of the United
States, his estate was declared to be forfeited for the use of the
State of Connecticut, and certain parts of it were seized and sold;
but no steps were taken to recover from the Defendant the debt said
to be due from him to the Plaintiff, although the Defendant at the
time of the confiscation, and for sometime afterwards, remained an
inhabitant of Connecticut, and has always had property there,
liable to legal process. Under these circumstances, Camp instituted
this suit; in bar of which Lockwood pleaded, that the confiscation,
by virtue of the act of Connecticut, had devested the Plaintiff's
property in the debt, if any was due, and vested the same in the
State: And to the efficacy of this plea the present argument was
confined, upon a demurrer and joinder in demurrer. The point was
first opened on the 16th of August, 1788, and finally argued by
Ingersol, for the Defendant, and Rawle, for the Plaintiff, on the
21st of November following. Ingersol. The forfeiture of an enemy's
estate, moveable or immoveable, and of his rights, corporeal or
incorporeal, is a matter of strict sovereignty, although, by the
curtesy of nations, debts are allowed to revive at the conclusion
of a war. Lee on Capt. iii. The Plaintiff, however, comes not
within the rule respecting an enemy, but having been proceeded
against as a delinquent subject, he must be considered as an
attainted traitor; and, by such attainder, all his estate, real and
personal, were absolutely and irrecoverably forfeited. 3 Bac. Abr.
755. And a forfeiture of real and personal estate extends to things
in action as well as in possession. 2 Bac. Abr. 577. in which
general point of view the law of Pennsylvania has also expressly
regarded the subject. 2 State Laws99. The act of Connecticut is as
clear and comprehensive as words can make it, considering the party
as actually dead, and appointing administrators of his
Page 1 U.S.
393, 395
estate. Nor can the provisions contained in the treaty of peace
affect the question; for, the treaty does not operate like the
reversal of an outlawry, but like a pardon. 22 Vin. tit. Outlawry.
Rawle contended, that, whether the question was considered, 1st,
upon the pleadings here; or, 2ndly, upon a supposition that the
suit had been instituted in Connecticut, the Plaintiff was not
barred of his recovery. 1. Arguing the case on the pleadings here,
he premised, that it was a general principle, that nations, with
respect to each other, must be considered as individuals in a state
of nature. Puff. lib. 2. c. 3. sect. 23. 1 Vat. 4. 5. Burlam. 195.
Moral entities, or persons, are given to them, in order to render
them subjects of action; but, as to what relates to a nation
itself, or the property which it has acquired, there is no power
that can direct or restrain its conduct. In a state of society
private property yields to the general good; but this is not the
case in a state of nature; and, therefore, it may be taken as an
axiom, that where the act of a particular nation vests in itself
the property of an individual, whether a subject or not, the right,
thus acquired, extends no further than the jurisdiction of that
nation, and the act on which it is founded can have no
extra-territorial force. 1 Vat. 145. This principle has, indeed,
been recognized by the practice of the United States. For, there is
no instance of the agents for forfeited estates passing from one
State into another; but, on the contrary, acts of attainder have
always been passed against the same person in the several States
where his property was found; which would not, surely, have been
necessary, if, either on general law, or under the articles of
Confederation, the act of one State, appropriating private property
to its own use, had any effect beyond the limits of its own
jurisdiction. If then the State which has passed the law of
confiscation, has forborne to reduce the Defendants debt into
possession, and the State where the debtor resides has no power to
do so, it necessarily follows, that the debt, remaining on its
original footing, is liable to the Plaintiff's demand. When,
indeed, the act of Connecticut was passed, the Defendant resided in
that State; but when this suit was instituted he had removed
hither; and the law is clear, that the debt follows the person in
every instance, except that of a distribution in the case of
intestacy. Carth. 373. 2. Considering the point, in the second
place, upon a supposition that the action had been brought in
Connecticut, the question arises, whether a right not reduced into
possession within due time, can afterwards be recovered? If the
administrators had recovered from the Defendant, it would certainly
have been sufficient to bar the Plaintiff's claim; but, when the
State allowed the debtor to remove from its jurisdiction, an
implied power was given to the creditor to pursue him elsewhere.
Should a husband neglect during his life time to recover choses in
action belonging to his wife, she is entitled to them afterwards,
and not his executors or administrators; for, the law will never
favor negligence. The reasoning in this
Page 1 U.S.
393, 396
case will apply as well with respect to nations as individuals.
Lee on Capt. 119. Besides, a right vested for a particular purpose,
ceases with that purpose: The war being at an end, the object of
confiscating the Plaintiff's debts, &c. is also extinguished;
and if the Administrators could not recover the debt in
Connecticut, nor, a fortiori, in Pennsylvania, by the rules of
natural justice, Camp may recover it; for, there can be no
plausible reason why Lockwood should be exonerated. Under the
Treaty of Peace, indeed, and the law of Connecticut (passed the 2nd
Thursday of May, 1787) repealing all acts repugnant to the Treaty,
the Administrators could not now interfere to prevent the
Plaintiff's recovery; for, the act by virtue of which they were
appointed, is certainly of that description; so that by the 4th
article Lockwood is estopped from saying that he will pay the debt
to the Administrators; and, by the 6th article, they are precluded
from compelling him to do so. This exposition has also prevailed in
England; for, the Agents on the claims of the Loyalists make no
allowance for outstanding debts; because, as it has been already
observed, they may be recovered under the Treaty. Rawle then
proceeded to consider, particularly, the objections offered by the
Defendant's Counsel, in support of his plea; which were, he stated,
1st. That the Plaintiff was not an enemy, but a rebellious subject;
2ndly. That by the act of Connecticut, and the proceedings under
it, he was attained, and considered as actually dead; and 3rdly.
That he was not entitled to any benefit under the Treaty of Peace.
1. To the first objection, he answered, that the proceedings were
expressly against Camp as an enemy; that it was by reason of his
adherence to the enemies of the United States, and of actions not
merely criminal as they relate to his duty to the State, but to a
Foreign nation at war with the State, that the forfeiture had been
effected; and that the law of Connecticut neither knew, nor
indicated, a distinction between the inimical character of a
subject and a Foreigner. But, he urged, that, as against a
delinquent citizen, merely in relation to the State of which he was
a member, not an enemy in the strict sense of the word, the act of
the State, non valet extra territorium; that, therefore, it could
never be any bar to Camp's recovery in Pennsylvania; and that, even
in Connecticut, he would now be entitled by the Treaty of Peace,
and the law passed there in support of it, to recover all the
property not actually vested and in possession of the State. If, on
the other hand he was proceeded against as an offending subject, in
relation to his adherence to a foreign power, the general
principles entitle him to recover after the war has ceased. But, in
either point of view, the allowance of the present plea would
contravene the established principles in the cases enumerated by
Vattel 1 Vol. p. 4. sect. 13. 14. p. 121. sect. 2. 3. p. 129. sect.
25. Besides, his offences as a Subject, though committed against a
nation confederated and allied with our's, do not allow us to
Page 1 U.S.
393, 397
join in the infliction of punishment. 1. Vat. 98. sect. 232. We
cannot, therefore, make ourselves parties to the public severities
of Connecticut, nor interfere in the relation and conflict, between
that State and its Subjects: And, as no public proceedings have
taken place against the Plaintiff here, there is not any authority
for denominating him an offender against Pennsylvania. The only
instance in which these general principles have sustained an
alteration by the articles of Confederation, is confined to the
persons of offenders; and expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
But the admission of this plea would be attended with consequences
so inconvenient, that the mere argument ab inconvenienti ought to
prevent it. In whatever shape it is claimed, it would interfere
with the axiom, that one nation cannot intermedle with the
government of another. Vatt. p. 138. sect. 54. If the Plaintiff was
attainted, or in debt, here, his property could not be forfeited or
attached, since, by the adverse argument, it belongs to
Connecticut: Nay, if he came hither with a view to settle, he could
not act, trade, or become a useful Citizen on the funds he found
here. Thus a collisio legum would arise; the universal rule of
which, is, that the laws and the interest of the State having
jurisdiction of the cause, shall be preferred. 2 Hub. 26. 3 axiom.
2. To the second objection he answered, that it was not founded in
the truth of the case. Names ought not to mislead us; for although
his property in Connecticut had been confiscated, and an
administrator appointed to collect it; yet nothing appears to prove
that the Plaintiff is not still alive to every legal purpose there,
as well as here; independent too of the Treaty of Peace. 3. But, in
answer to the third objection, he insisted, that the Treaty of
Peace removes not only the personal disability, if any such there
was, but also the particular Bar. Whether, indeed, it operates as a
general reversal, or a general pardon, may be questionable;
although the former is the more probable conjecture, since the
provision made in favor of recovering property sold as confiscated,
would have been needless if it was only considered in the light of
a pardon. But, admitting it to be only a pardon, and that it has no
effect against bona fide purchasers, he contended, that it was
conclusively in favour of the Plaintiff on the point of
restitution, as against the State; and, a fortiori, in a case where
his credits had not been reduced into possession. The fair
construction of the Treaty necessarily warrants this doctrine.
Ingersol, in reply. There are a variety of instances in which this
question will be agitated, if the Plaintiff should now prevail; and
the purses of individuals, as well as the coffers of the State,
will be deeply affected by the decision. It must be remarked that
neither the Defendant, nor Connecticut, ask the interposition of
this Court, but the person who was the object of the law of that
State, that the Defendant does not intercept the money in its
course to the public Treasury; but prevents its being remitted to
Nova-Scotia; and that the contest, in fact, lies between an
individual and a sister State.
Page 1 U.S.
393, 398
He observed, that he did not controvert the general doctrine
advanced by the opposite council, that the law of nations, is the
law of nature applied to nations, and that one sovereign power
cannot be bound by another; but he distinguished between the
necessary, and the voluntary law of nations, which arises ex
comitate. Vatt. pref. 12. Ibid. p. 6. and insisted that the laws of
a nation actually enforced, are every where obligatory, unless they
interfere with the independency of another Legislature. 2. Hub. 26.
for, common conveniency renders it necessary to give a certain
degree of force to the statutes of foreign nations. 2 Ld. Kaim.
Prin. Eq. 350. 360. If nations, unconnected by any tie, thus
indirectly give effect to the laws of each other, the principle
upon which it is done, must with greater strength prevail in the
case of a political union like that of the American States. It is
true, that these States are said to be sovereign and independent;
but they are evidently bound by a link which must be taken into
view, or we shall argue wrong in the abstract. Thus, it is declared
by the articles of Confederation, that a citizen of one State, is a
citizen of every State; and the Congress are not, as Mr. Adams* has
termed them, an Assemblage of Ambassadors; but a sovereign power,
and capable of suing like a corporation, without any express
statute to enable them. See ant. 41. But, the operation and effect
of a sentence, or judgment, of a foreign Court, cannot surely be
more binding than the act of a foreign Legislature; and these, ex
comitate et jure gentium, are in many cases final, 1 Black. Rep.
258. 262. Vatt. lib. 2. c. 7. sect. 84. p. 147. If a debtor be
discharged where the debt was contracted, he is equally so in every
other place; so that if Lockwood had been discharged by the State
of Connecticut, this suit would not be maintainable against him
even in the King's Bench of England. Co. B. L. 347. The Court of
Chancery held itself bound by the decision of a competent foreign
jurisdiction, declaring an acceptance to be void; 2 Stra. 733. and,
because a debt had been discharged according to the lex loci,
though in the depreciated paper money of North-Carolina, Lord
Thurlow, since the revolution, has refused a ne exeat regno. Brown.
376. A similar principle has governed the Supreme Court, in the
case of Millar v. Hall (ant. 229.) and this Court, in the cases of
Thompson vs. Young (ant. 294.) and Le Clercus. Richette. A
distinction is likewise to be observed between a foreign sentence
authorizing, and a foreign sentence dismissing, a claim; for, if
the proper tribunal dismisses a claim, the sentence is definitive.
2 Ld. Kaim. Prin. Eq. 375. and in that description the proceedings,
as far as they affect Lockwood, must be included. The case in
Carth. 373. is certainly right as a general rule; but it is liable
to several exceptions; for, 1st, The law of one country may
indirectly have effect in another, by the voluntary law of nations;
2ndly, If a right of action has been legally transferred in one
jurisdiction, the rule by which it is to operate, is the same in
every other jurisdiction, and 3rdly, Where a debtor has been
dismissed
Page 1 U.S.
393, 399
by the proper tribunal, it is a protection every where else: And
these exceptions take place in considering the question as between
nations totally independent and unconnected. It is true, that the
American States have hitherto been held by a very slight
confederacy; but what remedy is to be pursued? Shall we, if the
knot is loose, make it still looser? If the union is weak, shall we
encrease the debility? Or, when a more perfect consolidation is
essential to the national existence, shall we employ repulsion
instead of attraction, and thus widen the inconvenient and ruinous
distance between the different members of our political body?
Neither reason or experience would justify such a construction; and
the United States, though individually sovereign and independent,
must admit, not only the voluntary law of nations, but a peculiar
law resulting from their relative situation.
No cases can be more distinguishable than the present, and that
in which the rule for reviving rights and credits at the expiration
of a war occurs. There is no doubt, that, on the declaration of
peace, a British subject could sue here; and, we find, that
although our government conceived that they might act as they
though proper with respect to the citizens of the State, yet the
instalment laws were never extended to obstruct and protract the
recovery of debts due to foreigners. If, therefore, Camp is to be
considered in the honorable light of an open enemy, the argument
for the Defendant is unfounded: but, when it is recollected, that
he did not avow his sentiments on the declaration of Independence;
and that, nevertheless, he remained in the enjoyment of his
property under the laws of Connecticut for some time afterwards, it
is impossible to regard him in any other light than that of a
subject, and subjects are the objects of the municipal law, not of
the law of nations. In the case of Respublica v. Chapman on an
indictment for treason (See ant. 53.) The Defendant was acquitted,
because, in the opinion of the Court, he was not a subject: If he
had been a subject, he must have been attainted; and being so
attainted, he could never have claimed any advantage from the law
of nations on the return of Peace. Thus, with respect to Camp, he
was a Traitor; the proceedings under the Act of Connecticut
produced a forfeiture and attainder; and the right of action was as
exclusively vested in the State (and by the power of that State
alone can it be divested) as if he had been taken and executed. The
Act, indeed, does not speak at all of an enemy, but of such persons
as were resident in Connecticut, and had joined the British troops;
for proceedings of this kind are never carried on gainst an open
enemy. The profits of his property may be sequestered during the
war, in order to prevent their being remitted, but no forfeiture
can take place.
If then Camp was a subject of Connecticut, he derives no right
from the Treaty of Peace; for, Great Britian could not mean to
interfere between that State and her own citizens. The description
in the fourth Article cannot be extended to him; and though
Page 1 U.S.
393, 400
the sixth Article certainly designates persons acting as he has
done, yet it gives no farther advantage than to protect his person
from molestation, and to preclude any future confiscations of his
property. The confiscation of the present debt, &c. was in the
year 1779, and no further proceedings are requisite to retain the
right which the State thereby acquired. The Marquis of
Carmarthaen's complaint of laws passed against the Treaty did not
include laws of this description; for although he must have known
that similar ones existed in Pennsylvania, he admits, that here
there are no acts passed against the Treaty. Purchasers under the
State are considered by the Treaty as holding a good title; but it
provides for persons entering into a negociation for the
reconveyance of their forfeited estates from such purchasers. In
the case of Respublica v. Gordon, (ant. 233.) the confiscation was
compleat before the treaty; and, therefore, thought it would have
been incompatible with it to have sustained any legal proceedings
afterwards in the Supreme Court against the Defendant, an act of
the Legislature became necessary to divest the right, which the
State had acquired by the previous confiscation. The conduct of the
British agents can furnish no authority to us; but the reason for
their refusing to make an allowance for debts was the difficulty of
ascertaining them, and not the presumption of their being
recoverable after the peace. Nor does the act of Connecticut,
repealing all laws against the treaty, affect the law in question,
which is directed to an object of mere municipal regulation. The
State had a right to do as they pleased with all the confiscated
property; and on any, or no consideration, to release all his
debtors. Whether, indeed, they had recovered the whole, or a part,
or whether they have compounded, or dismissed the debt, it could
not enure to the benefit of Camp. He cannot now be punished for
past depredations; but the property vested in the State of
Connecticut, cannot be re-vested without her authority. If the
treaty is to be considered as a reversal of outlawry, then a
restitution would ensue; but if it is taken in the light of a
pardon, that does not divest any thing previously vested in a
subject, nor even in the King who grants it, unless by express
words. 3 Bac. Abr. 810. 2 Vin. 401. pl. 4. p. 404. The right of
action in the present case was clearly transferred to Connecticut,
and neither expressly, or by implication, has she waved it. After
considering the case and arguments, the President delivered the
opinion of the Court in these words:
Shippen, President. The question in this case is of importance,
both on account of the principles to be established by the
decision, and the many cases which may possibly be affected by it.
It has been learnedly and ingeniously argued on both sides; but,
though large ground has been taken, I think the whole may be
reduced to a very moderate compass.
Page 1 U.S.
393, 401
This is not a suit brought by the State of Connecticut, or any
person claiming property under their local laws, wherein a question
can arise, whether effects forfeited by the laws of that State can
be recovered here, by the administrators of the person whose estate
is confiscated. It is simply, whether the debt has been forfeited
there, and actually vested in that State; and whether any thing has
occurred which divests it; and whether, under the peculiar
circumstances of our relative situation with regard to each other,
the Courts of this State can take notice of such confiscation and
vesting, so as to preclude the Plaintiff from recovering here, a
debt due to him there, before that confiscation. In order to pave
the way for a decision of these questions, and to distinguish
between the situation of this country, and those treated of by the
learned writers on the laws of nature and nations, and the rights
of distinct independent sovereignties quoted by the counsel, it
will be necessary to point out that peculiar, relative situation
which these States stand in with regard to each other. When a
resistance was made to the execution of the laws of Great Britain,
and an actual war took place between us and them, we were not
thirteen independent States, but Colonies and Provinces, belonging
to, and a part of, a great Empire, comprehending both countries.
The resistance was made in consequence of common grievances
suffered by all the Provinces, from the head of that empire; and it
was a struggle to untie the knot that bound us together. and to
emancipate us from the dominion of our then mother country. In the
prosecution of this plan, all were equally principals, and carried
on the war as a common cause, and by common consent, without being
tied together by any regularly organized system of Government. The
first body that exercised any thing like a sovereign authority, was
the Congress of the then United Colonies, who superintended the
whole, and, by the like common consent, were invested with such
general powers as were necessary for the prosecution of the war. We
afterwards divided ourselves into several distinct governments, by
the name of States; still leaving the general power in Congress,
which, being in a great measure undefined, was exercised, with
regard to internal matters, by recommendations to the several
Governments, instead of laws; which however had generally the force
of laws. The articles of Confederation were not acceded to by all
the States for some years. By these articles, each State was to
retain its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every right
not expressly delegated to Congress; but the free inhabitants of
each State were to be intitled to all the privileges and immunities
of free citizens in the several States. Before the articles of
Confederation were agreed to, Congress had recommended to the
several States to confiscate, as soon as might be, and to make sale
of all the real and personal estates therein of the inhabitants,
and other persons, who had forfeited the same, and the right to the
protection of their respective States.
Page 1 U.S.
393, 402
In consequence of this recommendation, the State of Connecticut,
in the month of May, 1778, passed an act to confiscate the estates
of persons inimical to the independence and liberties of the United
States, within that State. By this law, all estates, real and
personal, within the State, which belonged to any person, or
persons, who had gone over and joined with the enemies of the
United States, or had aided or assisted them, or should thereafter
do so, were declared to be confiscated. The mode of proceeding
against those who had been inhabitants, was directed to be by
application to the County Court, who are empowered to give judgment
and sentence, that all the estate of such persons should be
forfeited for the use of the State. The Court is then directed to
grant administration of the estates, as in case of intestates
estates. The administrators were to sell such estates, institute
suits, recover and pay debts, and deliver over the surplus, if any,
into the Treasury of the State. The last clause in the act directs
the mode of proceedings as to the estates of persons who never had
an abode within the State. In pursuance of this act, Abiathar Camp,
(who is stated to have been lately a resident of the town of
Newhaven,) in the month of September 1779, was charged on the
information of the select men, before the County Court, with having
joined the enemies of the United States, and put himself under the
protection of the King of Great Britain: He was thereupon adjudged
guilty, and sentence passed, that all his estate real and personal
should be forfeited to the use of the State. Certain parts of
Camp's estate were in consequence of this forfeiture seized and
sold; but no proceeding was had to recover against James Lockwood,
the present Defendant, the debt said to be due from him to the
Plaintiff, although the Defendant was at that time, and for some
time afterwards, an inhabitant of Connecticut, and amenable for the
same. And here the question arises, whether the Plaintiff himself
can now recover it? It is contended, on the part of the Plaintiff,
that the proceeding against him was as an enemy, and not as a
traitor, and that, therefore, the war being over, his right
revives. The sentence against him was certainly not expressly for
treason, and there is no judgment against him that, in terms,
subjects his person to punishment as a traitor. The act of Assembly
directs the proceeding to be had only against the estates of such
persons as had joined the enemy, but it distinguishes between such
as had been inhabitants of that State, and those who never had an
abode within it, but had estates there. The present Plaintiff was
convicted as an offender of the former description, being late a
resident in the town of Newhaven, and is plainly pointed out as a
subject. Indeed, the fact is conceeded, that he really was a
citizen of the State, who joined the enemy long after the
declaration of independence and the organization of our State
Governments. He cannot, therefore, be considered in the light of
such a public enemy whose rights are said by the writers on the law
of nations, to revive after the termination of
Page 1 U.S.
393, 403
the war: The municipal law of the country operated upon him as a
subject, and he could not be an object of the law of nations.
The objection to the Courts of this State, as a sovereign
independent State, interposing to prevent the recovery of a debt,
on account of the confiscation of it in another independent State,
is in a great measure obviated by the statement which I have before
made of the peculiar relation that these States stand in to one
another. Though free and independent States, they appear not to be
such distinct sovereignties as have no relation to each other but
by general treaties and alliances, but are bound together by common
interests, and are jointly represented and directed as to national
purposes, by one body as the head of the whole. The offence, which
incurred the forfeiture, was not an offence against the State of
Connecticut alone, but against all the States in the union: And the
act, which directed the forfeiture, was made in consequence of the
recommendation of Congress, composed of the Representatives of all
the States, and was a case within the general powers vested in them
as conductors of a war, in which we were all equally principals.
Our Courts must, therefore, necessarily take notice of the
confiscations made in a sister State on these grounds.
It remains, then, only to consider, whether this debt was vested
in the State of Connecticut, and, if it was, whether it is revested
in the Plaintiff by the treaty of peace?
All his estate, both real and personal, in that State was
confiscated. All things come within the description of confiscable
personal estate, which a man has in his own right, whether they be
in action or possession: This debt was due from a person then
residing within the State of Connecticut, and was, consequently,
confiscated as other debts due there, and the right of action, as
well as the debt, was vested in the State.
The 4th article of the treaty of peace, which directs that
creditors, on either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to
the recovery of all bona fide debts theretofore contracted, is most
certainly confined to real British subjects, on the one side, and
the citizens of America, on the other; and it has been always so
construed.
As to the restitution of estates, rights, and properties,
already confiscated, it is not required by the treaty to be done,
even as to real British subjects. It is agreed, indeed, by the 5th
article, that Congress shall recommend it to the several
Legislatures to provide for such a restitution; and, as to those of
another description, they have liberty given them by the treaty, to
reside twelve months in the United States to solicit a restitution
and composition with the purchasers of their estates, and Congress
is to recommend to the States, that they be restored on refunding
the money paid for them.
Page 1 U.S.
393, 404
But no acts for those purposes have been passed by the
Legislatures in consequence of any such recommendations. Indeed,
the ample provision made for these people in England, seems to have
been considered by the Government there as an act of justice, for
not having been able to obtain a restitution for them by the
treaty.
For these reasons, we are of opinion, that Abiathar Camp is not
such a person as has a right to sue for and recover this debt,
already vested by confiscation in the State of Connecticut.
Footnotes
[
Footnote *] See Mr. Adams's
'Defence of the American Constitutions.'
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