OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
C & L ENTERPRISES, INC.
v. CITIZEN BAND POTAWATOMI
INDIAN TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA No. 00-292.
Argued March 19, 200l-Decided April 30, 2001
Respondent, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, proposed and
entered into a standard form construction contract with petitioner
C & L Enterprises, Inc. (C & L), for the installation of a
roof on a Tribe-owned commercial building in Oklahoma. The property
in question lies outside the Tribe's reservation and is not held by
the Federal Government in trust for the Tribe. The contract
contains two key provisions. First, a clause provides that "[a]ll
... disputes ... arising out of ... the Contract ... shall be
decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association .... The
award rendered by the arbitrator ... shall be final, and judgment
may be entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any
court having jurisdiction thereof." The referenced American
Arbitration Association Rules provide: "Parties to these rules
shall be deemed to have consented that judgment upon the
arbitration award may be entered in any federal or state court
having jurisdiction thereof." Second, the contract includes a
choice-of-Iaw clause that reads: "The contract shall be governed by
the law of the place where the Project is located." Oklahoma has
adopted a Uniform Arbitration Act, which instructs that "[t]he
making of an agreement ... providing for arbitration in this state
confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce the agreement under
this act and to enter judgment on an award thereunder." The Act
defines "court" as "any court of competent jurisdiction of this
state." After execution of the contract but before C & L
commenced performance, the Tribe decided to change the roofing
material specified in the contract. The Tribe solicited new bids
and retained another company to install the roof. C & L,
claiming that the Tribe had dishonored the contract, submitted an
arbitration demand. The Tribe asserted sovereign immunity and
declined to participate in the arbitration proceeding. It notified
the arbitrator, however, that it had several substantive defenses
to C & Us claim. The arbitrator received evidence and rendered
an award in favor of C & L. The contractor filed suit to
enforce the award in the District Court of Oklahoma County, a state
court of general, first instance, jurisdiction. The Tribe appeared
in court for the limited purpose of moving to dismiss the action on
the ground that, as a sovereign, it was immune from suit. The
District
412
Syllabus
Court denied the motion and entered a judgment confirming the
award. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. While the
Tribe's certiorari petition was pending here, this Court decided
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v.
Manufacturing Technologies,
Inc., 523 U. S.
751, holding that an Indian tribe is not subject to suit in a
state court-even for breach of contract involving off-reservation
commercial conduct-unless "Congress has authorized the suit or the
tribe has waived its immunity," id., at 754, 760. On remand for
reconsideration in light of
Kiowa, the Court of Civil
Appeals held that the Tribe here was immune from suit on its
contract with C & L. Although noting that the arbitration
agreement and the contract language as to judicial enforcement seem
to indicate the Tribe's willingness to expose itself to suit on the
contract, the court concluded that the Tribe had not waived its
suit immunity with the requisite clarity. The court therefore
instructed the trial court to dismiss the case.
Held: By the clear import of the arbitration clause, the
Tribe is amenable to a state-court suit to enforce an arbitral
award in favor of C & L. Like
Kiowa, this case arises
out of the breach of a commercial, offreservation contract by a
federally recognized Indian Tribe. C & L does not contend that
Congress has abrogated tribal immunity in this setting. The
question presented is whether the Tribe has waived its immunity. To
relinquish its immunity, a tribe's waiver must be "clear."
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of
Okla., 498 U. S.
505, 509. The construction contract's arbitration provision and
related prescriptions lead to the conclusion that the Tribe in this
case has waived its immunity with the requisite clarity. The
arbitration clause requires resolution of all contract-related
disputes between the parties by binding arbitration; ensuing
arbitral awards may be reduced to judgment "in accordance with
applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof." For
governance of arbitral proceedings, the clause specifies American
Arbitration Association Rules, under which "the arbitration award
may be entered in any federal or state court having jurisdiction
thereof." The contract's choice-of-law clause makes it plain enough
that a "court having jurisdiction" to enforce the award in question
is the Oklahoma state court in which C & L filed suit. By
selecting Oklahoma law ("the law of the place where the Project is
located") to govern the contract, the parties have effectively
consented to confirmation of the award "in accordance with" the
Oklahoma Uniform Arbitration Act, which prescribes that, when "an
agreement ... provid[es] for arbitration in" Oklahoma, jurisdiction
to enforce the agreement vests in "any court of competent
jurisdiction of this state." On any sensible reading of the Act,
the District Court of Oklahoma County,
413
a local court of general jurisdiction, fits that statutory
description. This Court rejects the Tribe's contention that an
arbitration clause is not a waiver of immunity from suit, but
simply a waiver of the parties' rights to a court trial of
contractual disputes. Under the clause, the Tribe recognizes, the
parties must arbitrate. The clause no doubt memorializes the
Tribe's commitment to adhere to the contract's dispute resolution
regime. That regime has a real world objective; it is not designed
for regulation of a game lacking practical consequences. And to the
real world end, the contract specifically authorizes judicial
enforcement of the resolution arrived at through arbitration. Also
rejected is the Tribe's assertion that a form contract, designed
principally for private parties who have no immunity to waive,
cannot establish a clear waiver of tribal suit immunity. In
appropriate cases, this Court applies the common-law rule of
contract interpretation that a court should construe ambiguous
language against the interest of the party that drafted it. That
rule is inapposite here for two evident reasons. First, the
contract is not ambiguous. Second, the Tribe did not find itself
holding the short end of an adhesion contract stick: The Tribe
proposed and prepared the contract; C & L foisted no form on
the Tribe. Pp. 418-423.
Reversed and remanded.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
John D. Mashburn argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was
James W Carlton, Jr.
Gregory S.
Coleman, Solicitor General of Texas,
argued the cause for the State of Texas et al. as
amici
curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were
John
Cornyn, Attorney General,
Andy Taylor, First Assistant
Attorney General,
Rick Thompson, Assistant Solicitor
General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States
as follows:
Bill Pryor of Alabama,
Mark Pryor of
Arkansas,
Carla J.
Stovall of Kansas,
Mike
Moore of Mississippi,
Don Stenberg of Nebraska, and
Mark Barnett of South Dakota.
Michael Minnis argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were
David McCullough and
David J.
Bederman.
Gregory G.
Garre argued the cause for the United
States as
amicus curiae in support of respondent. With him
on
414
the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney
General Schiffer, and Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler.
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v.
Manufacturing Technologies,
Inc., 523 U. S.
751 (1998), this Court held that an Indian tribe is not subject
to suit in a state court-even for breach of contract involving
off-reservation commercial conduct-unless "Congress has authorized
the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity."
Id., at 754.
This case concerns the impact of an arbitration agreement on a
tribe's plea of suit immunity. The document on which the case
centers is a standard form construction contract signed by the
parties to govern the installation of a foam roof on a building,
the First Oklahoma Bank, in Shawnee, Oklahoma. The building and
land are owned by an Indian Tribe, the Citizen Potawatomi Nation
(Tribe). The building is commercial, and the land is
off-reservation, nontrust property. The form contract, which was
proposed by the Tribe and accepted by the contractor, C & L
Enterprises, Inc. (C & L), contains an arbitration clause.
The question presented is whether the Tribe waived its immunity
from suit in state court when it expressly agreed to arbitrate
disputes with C & L relating to the contract, to the governance
of Oklahoma law, and to the enforcement of arbitral awards "in any
court having jurisdiction thereof." We hold that, by the clear
import of the arbitration clause, the Tribe is amenable to a
state-court suit to enforce an arbitral award in favor of
contractor C & L.
I
Respondent Citizen Potawatomi Nation is a federally recognized
Indian Tribe. In 1993, it entered into a contract with petitioner C
& L for the installation of a roof on a Shawnee, Oklahoma,
building owned by the Tribe. The building,
415
which housed the First Oklahoma Bank, is not on the Tribe's
reservation or on land held by the Federal Government in trust for
the Tribe.
The contract at issue is a standard form agreement copyrighted
by the American Institute of Architects. The Tribe proposed the
contract; details not set out in the form were inserted by the
Tribe and its architect. Two provisions of the contract are key to
this case. First, the contract contains an arbitration clause:
"All claims or disputes between the Contractor [C & L] and
the Owner [the Tribe] arising out of or relating to the Contract,
or the breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration in
accordance with the Construction [I]ndustry Arbitration Rules of
the American Arbitration Association currently in effect unless the
parties mutually agree otherwise .... The award rendered by the
arbitrator or arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be
entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court
having jurisdiction thereof." App. to Pet. for Cert. 46.
The American Arbitration Association Rules to which the clause
refers provide: "Parties to these rules shall be deemed to have
consented that judgment upon the arbitration award may be entered
in any federal or state court having jurisdiction thereof."
American Arbitration Association, Construction Industry Dispute
Resolution Procedures, R-48(c) (Sept. 1,2000).
Second, the contract includes a choice-of-Iaw clause that reads:
"The contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the
Project is located." App. to Pet. for Cert. 56. Oklahoma has
adopted a Uniform Arbitration Act, which instructs that "[t]he
making of an agreement ... providing for arbitration in this state
confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce the agreement under
this act and to enter judgment on an award thereunder." Okla.
Stat., Tit. 15,
416
§ 802.B (1993). The Act defines "court" as "any court of
competent jurisdiction of this state."
Ibid.
After execution of the contract but before C & L commenced
performance, the Tribe decided to change the roofing material from
foam (the material specified in the contract) to rubber guard. The
Tribe solicited new bids and retained another company to install
the roof. C & L, claiming that the Tribe had dishonored the
contract, submitted an arbitration demand. The Tribe asserted
sovereign immunity and declined to participate in the arbitration
proceeding. It notified the arbitrator, however, that it had
several substantive defenses to C & L's claim. On consideration
of C & L's evidence, the arbitrator rendered an award in favor
of C & L for $25,400 in damages (close to 30% of the contract
price), plus attorney's fees and costs.
Several weeks later, C & L filed suit to enforce the
arbitration award in the District Court of Oklahoma County, a state
court of general, first instance, jurisdiction. The Tribe appeared
specially for the limited purpose of moving to dismiss the action
on the ground that the Tribe was immune from suit. The District
Court denied the motion and entered a judgment confirming the
award.
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, holding that the
Tribe lacked immunity because the contract giving rise to the suit
was "between an Indian tribe and a nonIndian" and was "executed
outside of Indian Country." App. to Pet. for Cert. 14 (citation
omitted). The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied review, and the Tribe
petitioned for certiorari in this Court.
While the Tribe's petition was pending here, the Court decided
Kiowa, holding: "Tribes enjoy immunity from suits on
contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or
commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a
reservation." 523 U. S., at 760.
Kiowa reconfirmed: "[A]n
Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized
the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity."
417
Id., at 754. Thereafter, we granted the Tribe's petition
in this case, vacated the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals,
and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Kiowa. 524 U.
S. 901 (1998).
On remand, the Court of Civil Appeals changed course.
It held that, under
Kiowa, the Tribe here was immune from
suit on its contract with C & L, despite the contract's
offreservation subject matter. App. to Pet. for Cert. 4-5. The
court then addressed whether the Tribe had waived its immunity.
"The agreement of [the] Tribe to arbitration, and the contract
language regarding enforcement in courts having jurisdiction," the
court observed, "seem to indicate a willingness on [the] Tribe's
part to expose itself to suit on the contract."
Id., at 7.
But, the court quickly added, "the leap from that willingness to a
waiver of immunity is one based on implication, not an unequivocal
expression."
Ibid. Concluding that the Tribe had not waived
its suit immunity with the requisite clarity, the appeals court
instructed the trial court to dismiss the case. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court denied C & Us petition for review.
Conflicting with the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals' current
decision, several state and federal courts have held that an
arbitration clause, kin to the one now before us, expressly waives
tribal immunity from a suit arising out of the contract. See
Sokaogon Gaming Enterprise Corp. v.
TushieMontgomery
Associates, Inc., 86 F.3d
656, 661
(CA7 1996) (clause requiring arbitration of
contractual disputes and authorizing entry of judgment upon
arbitral award "in any court having jurisdiction thereof" expressly
waived Tribe's immunity);
Native Village of Eyak v. GC
Contractors, 658 P. 2d 756 (Alaska 1983) (same);
Val/Del,
Inc. v.
Superior Court, 145 Ariz. 558, 703 P. 2d 502
(Ct. App. 1985) (same). But cf.
Pan American Co. v.
Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, 884 F.2d
416 (CA9 1989) (clause requiring arbitration of
contractual disputes did not expressly waive Tribe's immu-
418
nity). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 531 U. S.
956 (2000), and now reverse.
II
Kiowa, in which we reaffirmed the doctrine of tribal
immunity, involved an off-reservation, commercial agreement (a
stock purchase) by a federally recognized Tribe. The Tribe signed a
promissory note agreeing to pay the seller $285,000 plus interest.
The note recited: "Nothing in this Note subjects or limits the
sovereign rights of the Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma." 523 U. S., at
753-754. The Tribe defaulted, the seller sued on the note in state
court, and the Tribe asserted sovereign immunity. We upheld the
plea. Tribal immunity, we ruled in
Kiowa, extends to suits
on offreservation commercial contracts.
Id., at 754-760. The
Kiowa Tribe was immune from suit for defaulting on the promissory
note, we held, because "Congress ha[d] not abrogated [the Tribe's]
immunity, nor ha[d] petitioner waived it."
Id., at 760.
Like
Kiowa, this case arises out of the breach of a
commercial, off-reservation contract by a federally recognized
Indian Tribe. The petitioning contractor, C & L, does not
contend that Congress has abrogated tribal immunity in this
setting. The question presented is whether the Tribe has waived its
immunity.
To abrogate tribal immunity, Congress must "unequivocally"
express that purpose.
Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez,
436 U. S. 49, 58
(1978) (citing
United States v.
Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 399
(1976)). Similarly, to relinquish its immunity, a tribe's waiver
must be "clear."
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Citizen Band
Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U. S. 505, 509 (1991). We are
satisfied that the Tribe in this case has waived, with the
requisite clarity, immunity from the suit C & L brought to
enforce its arbitration award.
The construction contract's provision for arbitration and
related prescriptions lead us to this conclusion. The arbitra-
419
tion clause requires resolution of all contract-related disputes
between C & L and the Tribe by binding arbitration; ensuing
arbitral awards may be reduced to judgment "in accordance with
applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof." App. to
Pet. for Cert. 46. For governance of arbitral proceedings, the
arbitration clause specifies American Arbitration Association Rules
for the construction industry, ibid., and under those Rules, "the
arbitration award may be entered in any federal or state court
having jurisdiction thereof," American Arbitration Association,
Construction Industry Dispute Resolution Procedures, R-48(c) (Sept.
1, 2000).
The contract's choice-of-Iaw clause makes it plain enough that a
"court having jurisdiction" to enforce the award in question is the
Oklahoma state court in which C & L filed suit. By selecting
Oklahoma law ("the law of the place where the Project is located")
to govern the contract, App. to Pet. for Cert. 56, the parties have
effectively consented to confirmation of the award "in accordance
with" the Oklahoma Uniform Arbitration Act, id., at 46 ("judgment
may be entered upon [the arbitration award] in accordance with
applicable law"); Okla. Stat., Tit. 15, § 802.A (1993) ("This act
shall apply to ... a provision in a written contract to submit to
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the
parties.").l
The Uniform Act in force in Oklahoma prescribes that, when "an
agreement ... provid[es] for arbitration in this state," i.
e., in Oklahoma, jurisdiction to enforce the agreement vests
in "any court of competent jurisdiction of this
1 The United States, as
amicus supporting the Tribe,
urges us to remain within the "four corners of the contract" and
refrain from reliance on "secondary sources." Brief for United
States as
Amicus Curiae 19, and n. 7. The American
Arbitration Association Rules and the Uniform Arbitration Act,
however, are not secondary interpretive aides that supplement our
reading of the contract; they are prescriptions incorporated by the
express terms of the agreement itself.
420
state." § 802.B. On any sensible reading of the Act, the
District Court of Oklahoma County, a local court of general
jurisdiction, fits that statutory description.2
In sum, the Tribe agreed, by express contract, to adhere to
certain dispute resolution procedures. In fact, the Tribe itself
tendered the contract calling for those procedures. The regime to
which the Tribe subscribed includes entry of judgment upon an
arbitration award in accordance with the Oklahoma Uniform
Arbitration Act. That Act concerns arbitration in Oklahoma and
correspondingly designates as enforcement forums "court[s] of
competent jurisdiction of [Oklahoma]."
Ibid. C & L
selected for its enforcement suit just such a forum. In a case
involving an arbitration clause essentially indistinguishable from
the one to which the Tribe and C & L agreed, the Seventh
Circuit stated:
"There is nothing ambiguous about thee] language [of the
arbitration clause]. The tribe agrees to submit disputes arising
under the contract to arbitration, to be bound by the arbitration
award, and to have its submission and the award enforced in a court
of law .
. . . "The [tribal immunity] waiver ... is implicit rather than
explicit only if a waiver of sovereign immunity, to be deemed
explicit, must use the words 'sovereign immunity.' No case has ever
held that." Sokaogon, 86 F. 3d, at 659-660.
2 The United States argues that the Oklahoma Uniform Arbitration
Act is inapplicable in this case because it does not reach all
arbitrations properly held in Oklahoma, but only those in which the
agreement explicitly "provide[s] for arbitration in [Oklahoma]."
Tr. of Oral Arg. 47-48 (referring to §802.B). No Oklahoma authority
is cited for this constricted reading of an Act that expressly
"appl[ies] to ... a provision in a written contract to submit to
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the
parties." §802.A. We decline to attribute to the Oklahoma lawmakers
and interpreters a construction that so severely shrinks the Act's
domain.
421
That cogent observation holds as well for the case we
confront.3
The Tribe strenuously urges, however, that an arbitration clause
simply "is not a waiver of immunity from suit." Brief for
Respondent 13. The phrase in the clause providing for enforcement
of arbitration awards "in any court having jurisdiction thereof,"
the Tribe maintains, "begs the question of what court has
jurisdiction."
Id., at 22. As counsel for the Tribe
clarified at oral argument, the Tribe's answer is "no court," on
earth or even on the moon. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32-33. No
court-federal, state, or even tribal-has jurisdiction over C &
L's suit, the Tribe insists, because it has not expressly waived
its sovereign immunity in any judicial forum.
Ibid.; cf.
Sokaogon, 86 F. 3d, at 660 (facing a similar argument,
Seventh Circuit gleaned that counsel meant only a statement to this
effect will do: "The tribe will not assert the defense of sovereign
immunity if sued for breach of contract.").4
3 Instructive here is the law governing waivers of immunity by
foreign sovereigns. Cf.
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v.
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U. S. 751, 759 (1998)
("In considering Congress' role in reforming tribal immunity, we
find instructive the problems of sovereign immunity for foreign
countries."). "Under the law of the United States ... an agreement
to arbitrate is a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in ... an
action to enforce an arbitral award rendered pursuant to the
agreement .... " Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States § 456(2)(b)(ii) (1987).
4 Relying on our state sovereign immunity jurisprudence, the
United States maintains that "courts must be especially reluctant
to construe ambiguous expressions as consent by a Tribe to be sued
in state court." Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae
23; see also
id., at 25 (arguing that a State's generalized
consent to suit, without an express selection of the forum in which
suit may proceed, "should be construed narrowly as the State's
consent to be sued in its
own courts of competent
jurisdiction, and not its consent to be subjected to suits in
another sovereign's courts") (citing,
e. g., Kennecott
Copper Corp. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946)
(State statute authorizing suits against State in "any court of
competent jurisdiction" did not waive State's immunity from suit in
federal court)). But in this case, as we explained
supra, at
419-420, the Tribe has plainly consented to suit in Oklahoma state
court. We therefore have
422
Instead of waiving suit immunity in any court, the Tribe argues,
the arbitration clause waives simply and only the parties' rights
to a court trial of contractual disputes; under the clause, the
Tribe recognizes, the parties must instead arbitrate. Brief for
Respondent 21 ("An arbitration clause is what it is: a clause
submitting contractual disputes to arbitration."). The clause no
doubt memorializes the Tribe's commitment to adhere to the
contract's dispute resolution regime. That regime has a real world
objective; it is not designed for regulation of a game lacking
practical consequences. And to the real world end, the contract
specifically authorizes judicial enforcement of the resolution
arrived at through arbitration. See
Eyak, 658 P. 2d, at 760
("[WJe believe it is clear that any dispute arising from a contract
cannot be resolved by arbitration, as specified in the contract, if
one of the parties intends to assert the defense of sovereign
immunity .... The arbitration clause ... would be meaningless if it
did not constitute a waiver of whatever immunity [the Tribe]
possessed.");
Val/Del, 145 Ariz., at 565, 703 P. 2d, at 509
(because the Tribe has "agree[d] that any dispute would be
arbitrated and the result entered as a judgment in a court of
competent jurisdiction, we find that there was an express waiver of
the tribe's sovereign immunity"); cf.
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Val-U Constr. Co., 50 F.3d
560, 562 (CA8 1995) (agreement to arbitrate contractual
disputes did not contain provision for court enforcement; court
nonetheless observed that "disputes could not be resolved by
arbitration if one party intended to assert sovereign immunity as a
defense").5
no occasion to decide whether parallel principles govern state
and tribal waivers of immunity.
5 The Tribe's apparent concession-that the arbitration clause
embodies the parties' agreement to resolve disputes through
arbitration-is not altogether consistent with the Tribe's refusal
to participate in the arbitration proceedings.
423
The Tribe also asserts that a form contract, designed
principally for private parties who have no immunity to waive,
cannot establish a clear waiver of tribal suit immunity. Brief for
Respondent 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-28. In appropriate cases, we
apply "the common-law rule of contract interpretation that a court
should construe ambiguous language against the interest of the
party that drafted it."
Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514
U. S. 52, 62 (1995) (construing form contract containing
arbitration clause). That rule, however, is inapposite here. The
contract, as we have explained, is not ambiguous. Nor did the Tribe
find itself holding the short end of an adhesion contract stick:
The Tribe proposed and prepared the contract; C & L foisted no
form on a quiescent Tribe. Cf.
United States v.
Bankers
Ins. Co., 245 F.3d
315, 319-320
(CA4 2001) (where federal agency prepared
agreement, including its arbitration provision, sovereign immunity
does not shield the agency from engaging in the arbitration
process).6
***
For the reasons stated, we conclude that under the agreement the
Tribe proposed and signed, the Tribe clearly consented to
arbitration and to the enforcement of arbitral awards in Oklahoma
state court; the Tribe thereby waived its sovereign immunity from C
& Us suit. The judgment of the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
6 The Tribe alternatively urges affirmance on the grounds that
the contract is void under 25 U. S. C. § 81 and that the members of
the Tribe who executed the contract lacked the authority to do so
on the Tribe's behalf. These issues were not aired in the Oklahoma
courts and are not within the scope of the questions on which we
granted review. We therefore decline to address them.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment